

# MIGRATION THEORY

TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES

FOURTH EDITION



EDITED BY CAROLINE B. BRETTELL  
AND JAMES F. HOLLIFIELD

ROUTLEDGE

The Routledge logo, which consists of the word "ROUTLEDGE" in a bold, sans-serif font, positioned to the left of a stylized white silhouette of a person's head and neck in profile, facing right.

“This latest edition of one of the essential texts in migration studies offers updated and expanded discussions of the state of the literature in the field’s constituent disciplines. The introductory and concluding chapters are testament to the rapid evolution of migration studies and take seriously the challenge posed by critical migration studies to the field’s mainstream. This is a must-read and will be an indispensable reference book for both new and established scholars of migration.”

**Antje Ellermann**, *Professor, The University of British Columbia*

“This volume is a heroic and unique attempt to bridge disciplinary and conceptual boundaries in migration studies. Although different approaches and theories enrich the field, we need more agreement on the nature of the phenomenon we are trying to understand. ‘Talking across disciplines’ makes a persuasive case for structured comparisons, in time, space and scale and as such is a crucial intervention that helps us to accumulate knowledge in a more systematic, efficient and encompassing way.”

**Leo Lucassen**, *Director of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, Professor in Global Labour and Migration History, Leiden University*

“Understanding migration requires insight into movement across geographies, economic drivers and impacts, change over time, social and cultural integration, as well as law and states’ power to enforce or open borders. Brettell and Hollifield bring together field experts and cogent syntheses to celebrate interdisciplinarity, highlighting how key questions, methods and theoretical tool-kits can be complementary or stand apart. They seek to end such distances, and do a truly admirable job. Anyone interested in migration, whether a new or seasoned scholar, will learn from this impressive book.”

**Irene Bloemraad**, *Faculty Director, University of California Berkeley*



**Taylor & Francis**

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

# Migration Theory

The revised fourth edition of *Migration Theory* continues to offer a one-stop synthesis of contemporary thought on migration.

Editors Catherine B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield remain committed to include coverage that is comparative and global in scope while enhancing similarities and differences between one academic field and the next. All chapters have been revised to highlight cutting-edge issues in the field of migration studies today. The fourth edition welcomes two new authors, Professors Marie Price and François Héran, to offer a fresh approach with their chapters on geography and demography, respectively.

Designed for undergraduate and graduate courses in migration studies, a primary goal of the text is to assist instructors in guiding students who may have little background on migration, to understand important issues and the scientific debates. This ensures *Migration Theory* is a highly valuable guide not only to the perspectives of one's own discipline but also to those of cognate fields.

**Caroline B. Brettell** is University Distinguished Professor and Chair of Anthropology at Southern Methodist University. From 2012 to 2018, she served as the Founding Director of the Dedman College Interdisciplinary Institute. She is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

**James F. Hollifield** is Ora Nixon Arnold Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University. He is also a member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC, and Fellow at the French Institute for Advanced Studies in Paris (2021–22).



**Taylor & Francis**

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

# **Migration Theory**

## Talking across Disciplines

Fourth Edition

**Edited by**  
**Caroline B. Brettell and**  
**James F. Hollifield**

Cover image: © AndreyPopov / Getty Images

Fourth edition published 2023

by Routledge

605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

and by Routledge

4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Trademark notice:* Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

First edition published by Routledge 2000

Third edition published by Routledge 2015

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

A catalog record for this title has been requested

ISBN: 978-0-367-63857-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-63855-9 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-12101-5 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003121015

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

# Contents

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <i>List of Illustrations</i>   | ix  |
| <i>List of Contributors</i>  | xi  |
| <i>Preface</i>   | xvi |
| <b>Introduction: Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines</b>  | 1   |
| CAROLINE B. BRETTELL AND JAMES F. HOLLIFIELD   |     |
| <b>1 Historical Migration Studies: Time, Temporality, and Theory</b>   | 44  |
| DONNA R. GABACCIA  |     |
| <b>2 Demography and Migration: The Wildcard in Population Dynamics</b>   | 78  |
| FRANÇOIS HÉRAN   |     |
| <b>3 Economic Aspects of Migration</b>   | 130 |
| PHILIP MARTIN  |     |
| <b>4 The Sociology of International Migration</b>  | 160 |
| DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD   |     |
| <b>5 Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: The Cultural, Social, Phenomenological, and Embodied Dimensions of Human Mobility</b> | 194 |
| CAROLINE B. BRETTELL   |     |
| <b>6 Geographical Theories of Migration: Exploring Scalar, Spatial, and Placeful Dimensions of Human Mobility</b>                | 232 |
| MARIE PRICE  |     |
| <b>7 The Politics of International Migration</b>   | 269 |
| JAMES F. HOLLIFIELD AND TOM K. WONG  |     |



|          |   |     |
|----------|---|-----|
| <b>8</b> | <b>Law and Migration: Constants, Challenges, and Changes</b>                        | 306 |
|          | DAVID ABRAHAM   |     |
| <b>9</b> | <b>The State of Migration Theory: Challenges, Interdisciplinarity, and Critique</b> | 341 |
|          | ADRIAN FAVELL   |     |
|          | <i>Index</i>  | 359 |

# Illustrations

## Figures

- 2.1 The two components of population growth in Germany and Spain, from 1950 to 2020. Note: Germany includes both parts of the country, East (ex-GDR) and West (FRG) 108
- 2.2 The two components of population growth in France and the United States, from 1950 to 2020. Note: France is limited to the “metropolis” (without the overseas territories) 110
- 2.3 Natural increase and net migration per thousand inhabitants in selected countries. Notes: Observed or estimated flows from July 2015 to June 2020 in annual average. The algebraic sum of the two rates (represented by a diamond) gives the total growth rate. Groups 1 to 5: classification of countries according to whether the two balances are positive, negative or null 112
- 2.4 Proportion of the national population residing abroad around 2019 for the seven “demographic giants” (more than 150 million inhabitants) and a selection of other countries 112
- 2.5 Distribution of migrants in the world according to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the birth and residence countries around 2015. Notes: The HDI combines life expectancy, school enrolment, and per capita income. It is divided here into ten groups of equal numbers of countries. The least-developed countries (groups 1 and 2) have very few migrants in the most-developed countries (9–10), in contrast to countries with intermediate or high levels of development. The group 6→10 includes Mexicans in the United States; 4→10 Filipinos and Indians in the United States, Canada, and UK; and 3→10 Pakistanis in the same countries, as well as Syrians in Germany, Austria, and Sweden. France is in group 9. Group 8 includes Russia and the Gulf countries 117
- 3.1 The economic impacts of migration 136

|     |   |     |
|-----|---|-----|
| 3.2 | Education of foreign- and US-born workers in 2019 (25 and older)  | 138 |
| 6.1 | Zelinsky’s Model of Mobility Transition. Note: A schematic visualization of Wilbur Zelinsky’s Mobility Transition across space with less mobility at the beginning of modernization and greater mobility over time. He argued that certain seminal zones of socioeconomic development have strong historical and spatial continuity. He also noted that more work had to be done on how colonization impacted the mobility transition | 237 |
| 6.2 | Islands where asylum-seekers are detained. Note: Modified and redrawn from Figure 6.1 in Mountz (2011), in which the Enforcement Archipelago is described as part of a securitization strategy that can indefinitely delay asylum claims. This figure is drafted for this chapter by Richard Hinton, George Washington University   | 254 |
| 7.1 | Changes in type and function of the nation-state  | 272 |
| 7.2 | The dilemmas of migration governance  | 273 |

**Tables**

|     |  |     |
|-----|--|-----|
| 0.1 | Migration Theories across Disciplines  | 11  |
| 0.2 | Modeling Migrant Behavior and Its Effects  | 26  |
| 1.1 | Volumes and Rates of Scholarly Production across Disciplines, 1960–2020  | 54  |
| 1.2 | Cross-Disciplinary Exchange. N per 1,000 JSTOR Items <sup>1</sup> That Include References to Scholar in Another Discipline, 1960–2020, by Discipline   | 55  |
| 2.1 | The Three Questions on Intentions to Migrate Asked by the World Gallup Survey in 152 Countries, among Adults Aged 15 and Over, as Revealed by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission | 105 |

# Contributors

**David Abraham** is Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Miami. Coming to the United States as a stateless post-WWII refugee, Abraham grew up in the ethnically diverse industrial city of Buffalo. He was educated as an historian at the University of Chicago and as a jurist at the University of Pennsylvania. Abraham taught German and European history in the History Department at Princeton University for a number of years before joining a Law Faculty. Abraham has published widely on issues of politics and economics in Weimar Germany and is the author of *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic* (1981, 1988, 2021). More recently, he has written on immigration and citizenship law with a particular focus on citizenship in a neoliberal era, and problems of social solidarity, diversity, and integration in Germany, Israel, and the United States. He has published, among others, in *Law and Social Inquiry*, *Politics & Society*, *The American Journal of Legal History*, *Citizenship Studies*, the *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, the *International Migration Review*, *The American Historical Review*, the *Journal of Modern History*, *Critical Historical Studies*, and a number of law reviews. In his recent articles, he has focused on the dilemma of the political Left.

**Caroline Brettell** grew up in Montreal (Canada), the daughter of a Swiss-born father and a mother who was the daughter of an Irish father and a British mother. She pursued her education in the United States (Smith College, Yale College, Brown University) and in 1993 became a naturalized US citizen. She joined the faculty of Southern Methodist University (SMU) in 1988 and is currently University Distinguished Professor of Anthropology. From 2012 to 2018, she served as the Founding Director of the Dedman College Interdisciplinary Institute. She has spent her career studying immigrant populations in Europe, Canada, and the United States (most recently in the DFW area). Her particular interests are in the gendered aspects of migration, issues of identity and citizenship, and the relationship between immigrants and cities. In addition to numerous journal articles and book chapters she is the author, co-author, or editor/co-editor of 17 books. She was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2017.

**Adrian Favell** is Chair in Sociology and Social Theory at the University of Leeds, and a research associate of CEE, Sciences Po, Paris. He was formerly Professor of Sociology at UCLA and Professor of European and International Studies at Aarhus University. He is the author of various works on migration, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and cities, including *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (1998), *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe* (2008), a collection of essays, *Immigration, Integration and Mobility: New Agendas in Migration Studies* (2015), and a work on migration theory, *Integration after Diversity: A Critique* (2022). Most recently, he has led the UK ESRC project, *Northern Exposure: Race, Nation and Disaffection in “Ordinary” Towns and Cities after Brexit*. Website: [www.adrianfavell.com](http://www.adrianfavell.com)

**David Scott FitzGerald** is Theodore E. Gildred Chair in US-Mexican Relations, Professor of Sociology, and Co-director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California San Diego. His research analyzes policies regulating migration and refugees in countries of origin, transit, and destination, as well as the experiences of people on the move. FitzGerald’s books include *Refuge beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers* (2019), winner of the American Sociological Association (ASA) International Migration Section Best Book Award; *Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas* (2014), which was awarded the ASA *Distinguished Scholarly Book Award*, among other awards; and *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration* (2009). His seven co-edited books include *Immigrant California: Understanding the Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Policy* (2021). He is currently co-authoring a book titled *Refugees: A Sociological Systems Approach* (under contract).

**Donna R Gabaccia** is Professor Emerita of History, University of Toronto. She previously held the Rudolph J. Vecoli Chair as Director of the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota. Her interdisciplinary work began when she shifted from undergraduate studies of sociology and social theory into graduate work in history and anthropology. She has since written and edited 14 books on international migration. Her 1998 book *We Are What We Eat* became a foundational text in food studies, while her 1999 book *Italy’s Many Diasporas* helped to launch Italian diaspora studies. *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspectives* won the Theodore Saloutos Prize of the Immigration and Ethnic History Society and *Gender and International Migration*, co-authored with Katharine Donato, won an honorable mention from the International Migration Section of the American Sociological Association. She is currently General Editor of the forthcoming *Cambridge University History of Global Migrations*.

**François Héran** earned a PhD from EHESS (Paris) and a “Doctorat d’État” in anthropology from Paris-Descartes University. After four years of fieldwork

in Spain and Bolivia, in 1980 he joined the French National Institute for Demographic Research (INED) and the National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) to conduct surveys on sociability, education, family structures, language transmission, and migration. He was head of the Population Surveys Branch at INSEE from 1993 to 1998 and led INED from 1999 to 2009. He presided over the European Association for Population Studies (2008–2012). In 2017 he was elected Professor at the Collège de France (Paris) in the “Migrations and Societies” chair. In the same year, his project for a “Migration Institute” was selected by the program “Investing for the Future.” It supports 530 fellows across a broad spectrum of disciplines ([icmigrations.cnrs.fr](http://icmigrations.cnrs.fr)). Among his recent publications in English are: “French fertility is the highest in Europe. Because of its immigrants?,” *Population & Societies*, 568, July/August (with Sabrina Volant and Gilles Pison), pp. 1–4 (2019); “Europe and the spectre of sub-Saharan migration,” *Population & Societies*, 558, pp. 1–4 (2018); and “The vocabulary of demography, from its origins to the present day: a digital exploration,” *Population*, 70(3), pp. 497–536 (2015).

**James F. Hollifield** grew up in rural Southern Appalachia on top of the Blue Ridge in western North Carolina before attending Wake Forest College where he graduated with honors. He lived and studied in Switzerland and France in the 1970s, primarily at the University of Grenoble, returning to the United States to pursue a PhD in political science at Duke University. In the early 1980s, he lived in Paris and worked at the Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques and Sciences Po. Currently he is Ora Nixon Arnold Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Tower Center at SMU. He is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC and Fellow at the Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit at the University of Bonn. Hollifield is a scholar of international and comparative politics and has written widely on issues of political and economic development, with a focus on migration. Before joining the faculty at SMU, Hollifield taught at Brandeis and Auburn, was a Fellow at Harvard’s Center for European Studies and Associate Director of Research at the French CNRS. In addition to many scientific articles and reports, his recent works include *Controlling Immigration* in its fourth edition, *Understanding Global Migration*, and *International Political Economy: History, Theory and Policy* (forthcoming). Hollifield has served as an advisor for many governments and international organizations on matters of migration and human and economic development. In 2016 he received a Distinguished Scholar Award from the International Studies Association, and in 2021–2022 he was named Fellow of the French Institute for Advanced Studies in Paris. His wife, Machiko Tadokoro, is a naturalized US citizen originally from Tokyo, Japan. They have three daughters, Hannah, Lydia, and Marie Flora, and two grandsons, Kai and Zeke.

**Philip L. Martin** is Professor Emeritus of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California at Davis, whose research focuses on international

labor migration, farm labor, and economic development. Martin is editor of the quarterly *Rural Migration News*. His recent books include *Merchants of Labor: Recruiters and International Labor Migration* (2017). Martin has earned a reputation as an effective analyst who can develop practical solutions to complex and controversial migration and labor issues. He served on the Commission on Agricultural Workers to assess the effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and evaluated the prospects for Turkish migration to the European Union between 1987 and 1990, studied the effects of immigration on Malaysia's economy and labor markets in 1994–1995, and was a member of the Binational Study of Migration between 1995 and 1997.

**Marie Price** is Professor of Geography and International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, DC. A Latin American and migration specialist, her research has explored human migration's impact on development and social change. She is President of the American Geographical Society and a non-resident fellow of the Migration Policy Institute. She also serves on the Board of the Dream Project-VA that supports immigrant youth through scholarships and mentoring. In 2017 she participated in an UN expert group on sustainable cities, human mobility, and international migration, and in 2018 she gave the keynote address at the UN Commission on Population and Development. She is co-author of two leading textbooks on world geography: *Diversity Amid Globalization: World Regions, Environment and Development*, 7th edition (2018), and *Globalization and Diversity: Geography of a Changing World*, 6th edition (2020). Her publications also include a co-authored report, *Migrants' Inclusion in Cities: Innovative Urban Policies and Practices* (2012), a co-edited book, *Migrants to the Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities* (2008), and over 60 peer-reviewed articles and book chapters.

**Tom Wong** is Associate Professor of Political Science and Founding Director of the US Immigration Policy Center (USIPC) at the University of California, San Diego. He served as an advisor to the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (WHIAAPI) under the Obama administration where he co-led the immigration portfolio and was appointed by Governor Gerry Brown to serve on the State of California 2020 Census Complete Count Committee (CCC). He is also Co-director of the Human Rights and Migration program. His research focuses on the politics of immigration, citizenship, and migrant "illegality." As these issues have far-reaching implications, his work also explores the links between immigration, race and ethnicity, and the politics of identity. His first book, *Rights, Deportation, and Detention in the Age of Immigration Control*, analyzes the immigration control policies of 25 Western immigrant-receiving democracies (2015). In analyzing over 30,000 roll call votes on immigration-related legislation in Congress since 2005, his second book, *The Politics of Immigration: Partisanship, Demographic Change, and American National Identity* (2017), represents the most comprehensive analysis to date on the contemporary politics of immigration in the United States. Wong's research has been used by policymakers both in the United States and

in Mexico, as well as by organizations that serve immigrant communities. His research has also been used in several federal lawsuits to defend DACA, end family separation at the southern border, and prohibit indefinite child detention, among others. Wong and his work have been covered by *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post*, NPR, and major media outlets across the country in hundreds of articles.



# Preface

As scholars and teachers, we are constantly engaged in writing and speaking. But in our haste to produce that next article or lecture, we do not always take the time to listen, especially to those working in sister disciplines. It is in the spirit of dialogue and in the hopes of gaining greater insight into the complex phenomenon of international migration that we started this project, now 20 years ago. It is also the reason why we have decided to publish a fourth edition, because the issue of migration is even more important globally and it has provoked heated debates among politicians and policymakers in the Global North and South, and among scholars. These debates have intensified with a surge in nativism and xenophobia in erstwhile liberal democracies, the global pandemic has put more pressure on states to limit migration and mobility, and for the first time since 1945 Europe is engulfed in a major land war in Ukraine that has generated 4 million refugees as of this writing. Equally, and as reflected in many of the chapters in this edition, forced migration and displacement have drawn more attention and concern, much of it driven by climate change. Readers must judge whether or not we have succeeded in creating a dialogue and shedding light on why individuals move across national boundaries, how they are incorporated into host societies, and why some migrants may return to, or at least continue to be engaged with, their countries of origin.

Migration is a subject that cries out for an interdisciplinary approach. Each discipline brings something to the table, theoretically and empirically. Anthropologists have taught us to look at transnational communities and the embodied experience of migration, while sociologists and economists draw our attention to the importance of social and human capital and the difficulties of immigrant settlement and incorporation. Geographers are interested in the spatial and scalar dimensions of migration and settlement. Political scientists help us to understand the play of organized interests in the making of public policy; together with legal scholars, they show us the impact migration can have on the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship. Historians portray the migrant experience over time and in all of its complexity, giving us a much greater empathetic understanding of the hopes and ambitions of those who move from one place to another. Demographers have perhaps the best empirical grasp on the movement of people across boundaries, and

they have the theoretical and methodological tools to show us how such movements affect population dynamics in both sending and receiving societies.

In bringing together this particular group of scholars, two of whom are new contributors to the book (François Héran and Marie Price), our ambition is to take a step in the direction of creating a more unified field of study by making migration scholars, no matter what their disciplinary training, more aware of what is happening in other fields. We hope that anyone who picks up this book will read every chapter, recognizing that many teachers will assign chapters selectively based on their disciplinary needs. Yet only by reading and talking across disciplines can the deep complexities of population movements be understood.

The first edition of this volume emerged over 20 years ago from a panel at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association. For the fourth edition, the authors gathered at a virtual workshop in December of 2020, hosted by two centers in Dedman College at SMU, the Tower Center and the Interdisciplinary Institute, to discuss drafts of their chapters, giving us time to learn from each other and to rework the chapters to produce an integrated volume. We asked contributors to draw some comparisons between and among disciplinary approaches, highlighting similarities and differences in core questions; and we asked contributors, where possible, to bring in literature that deals with movement within the “Global South,” including Asia. Some authors also added brief sections on methodological approaches within their fields. And finally, we asked each author to add four to six discussion questions at the end of their respective chapters in hopes that this would make the text more appealing for teachers and students.

We wish to thank those who had a direct hand in the production of the fourth edition. The editor at Routledge, Natalja Mortensen, enthusiastically and patiently supported the idea of issuing another edition, while Charlie Baker and Jayanthi Chander assisted in shepherding the project from review to production. Bora Laci, Program Director in the Tower Center, helped to organize the virtual workshop and Sara Mosher (graduate student in anthropology at SMU) helped with editing and formatting the final text. The contributors themselves have been both conscientious and patient. Finally, SMU has provided us with the resources and the environment in which to do productive scholarly work and for that we are deeply grateful.

Caroline B. Brettell, Department of Anthropology, SMU  
James F. Hollifield, Department of Political Science, SMU



**Taylor & Francis**

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

# Introduction

## Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines

*Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield*

Interest in international migration in the social sciences has tended to ebb and flow with various waves of emigration and immigration, but migration studies is now a well-established field of study across the social science disciplines, including history and law. International migration and mobility have been steadily increasing in the post-WWII era. According to UN data, in 2020 approximately 281 million people resided outside of their country of birth for one year or more, representing only 3.6 percent of the global population—a number that is low because the most populous countries, including China, India, and the United States, have proportionately low rates of emigration. Until the global pandemic of 2020, tens of millions of people crossed borders on a daily basis, which added up to roughly three billion border crossings per year. Human mobility is part of a broader trend of globalization, including trade and foreign direct investment, and the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrates once again the vital role immigration plays across the OECD world, with foreign and immigrant workers filling gaps in labor markets and deemed “essential” in many sectors from food processing to healthcare.

The United States is well into the fourth great wave of immigration in its history, and it is the largest destination for international migrants in the world. In 2019, the foreign-born population of the United States stood at a historic high of 45 million, representing almost 14 percent of the total population. As the foreign-born share of the US population continues to increase, the number of second-generation Americans, the children of immigrants, will also rise. In 2015, first- and second-generation Americans accounted for almost 26 percent of the US population, and this figure is projected to rise to 36 percent of the population by 2065 (Pew 2015).<sup>1</sup> As a region, however, Europe hosts the largest migrant population of 87 million, followed by North America with 59 million, and Northern Africa and Western Asia with almost 50 million. Although more international migrants still reside in the Global North—with nearly two-thirds in high-income countries—south-south migration has been increasing and in 2020, 36 percent of global migrant stock, 82 million people, resided in the Global South.<sup>2</sup>

In 2019 the share of the foreign born in the total population of the US (13.7 percent) was slightly below the OECD average (13.8 percent), compared with Germany (16.1), Sweden (19.5), Canada (21), Australia (29.5), and Switzerland

(29.7), to take but a few examples that top the charts (OECD 2020). In Canada, the establishment in 1967 of a point system for entry based on skills and the reunion of families not only increased the volume of immigrants but also diversified their places of origin. The same is true for Australia where 40 percent of population growth in the post-WWII period has been the result of immigration. With the abandonment in the 1960s of the White Australia Policy barring non-European settlers, Australia became a multicultural nation (see chapters on Canada by Reitz 2022 and on Australia by Gamlen and Sherrill in Hollifield et al. 2022), just as the United States became a more multicultural society in the wake of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which radically altered the composition of immigration, opening the door to Asians, Africans, and immigrants from the four corners of the globe, while at the same time imposing a quota on immigration from the Western Hemisphere and setting the stage for the creation of a black market for Mexican labor (Tichenor 2021). Even Japan and South Korea, countries with long histories of restricting immigration, began admitting foreign workers in the 1980s and 1990s, and numbers continue to increase (Chung 2022).

Lest we forget, not all migration is voluntary. In any given year, tens of millions of people move to escape political violence, war, hunger, deprivation, and the vagaries of climate change, becoming refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced persons. At the end of 2020, the number of “persons of concern” to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 82.4 million (1 percent of the world’s population), including 26.4 million refugees, 4.1 million asylum seekers, 48 million internally displaced people, and a relatively new category, 5.4 million Venezuelans forced to flee their country, a number that continues to rise (Hazán 2021; Hollifield 2021c). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022 has led within a matter of weeks to the largest migrations in Europe since the Second World War, displacing over 10 million Ukrainians, including 4 million who fled to neighboring countries and 6.7 million who are internally displaced. By some estimates, a prolonged conflict could result in one-fourth of the pre-war population of Ukraine (43.3 million) seeking refuge abroad, making the Russia-Ukraine war one of the largest humanitarian disasters since the partition of India in 1947. Eighty-six percent of forced migrants, almost 70 million people, are hosted in developing countries. Forced migration, especially in the southern hemisphere, where the ability of many states to host asylum seekers and refugees is limited, feeds the narrative of a global migration crisis that is destabilizing countries and entire regions (Weiner 1995; cf. Hollifield and Foley 2021). Understanding the dynamics of forced migration, displacement, and development is a major challenge for migration scholars.

Whether and where there might be a migration crisis remains an open question. But clearly, we are living in a new age of migration (de Haas, Miller, and Castles 2020). Scholars in all of the social sciences have turned their attention to the study of this extraordinarily complex phenomenon.<sup>3</sup> Yet, despite the volume of research in a host of academic fields, only rarely are there conversations across the disciplines about shared theoretical perspectives and common analytical concepts, or about core assumptions that might differentiate one disciplinary approach from

another.<sup>4</sup> Douglas Massey and his colleagues (1994:700–1) formulated the problem in succinct terms almost 30 years ago:

Social scientists do not approach the study of immigration from a shared paradigm, but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines, regions, and ideologies. As a result, research on the subject tends to be narrow, often inefficient, and characterized by duplication, miscommunication, reinvention, and bickering about fundamentals and terminology. Only when researchers accept common theories, concepts, tools, and standards will knowledge begin to accumulate.

One broad division separates those social scientists who take a top-down “macro” approach, focusing on immigration policy or market forces, using aggregate data, from those whose approach is bottom-up, emphasizing the experiences of the individual migrant, the immigrant family, or a particular neighborhood or village. A second, broad division, raised by Donna Gabaccia (this volume), is between social scientists who represent the relationship between past migrations and more recent migrations as a “rupture” and historians who emphasize continuities—in other words, a “then and now” framework (Foner 2000) and a “then to now” framework. It may be too much to hope for a unified theory of migration—one that encompasses all possible motives for moving or all possible results of that movement—but unless we foster dialogue across the disciplines, social scientists will remain confined to their narrow fields of inquiry and the dangers of constantly reinventing wheels will increase. It may be premature to speak of migration studies as a unified field of study, but clearly the study of migration cuts across disciplines, and many programs, centers, and schools for the study of migration have been established around the globe in recent decades. The emergence of a “new” research field or area of study in the social sciences is always fraught with controversy, fits and starts, and theoretical, methodological, and epistemological debates. Migration studies is no different, but some things are relatively unique about this “new” field of study, while other aspects are more mainstream (Pisarevskaya 2020).

This book represents an effort to talk about migration theory across disciplines and to explore the emergence of migration studies as a field or discipline in its own right. To this end, we have brought together in a single volume essays by an historian, two sociologists, a demographer (also trained as an anthropologist), two political scientists, an economist, an anthropologist, a geographer, and a legal scholar (also trained as a historian). Each scholar was asked to assess and analyze the central concepts, questions, and theoretical perspectives pertaining to the study of migration in her or his respective discipline and in the intersection between disciplines. Most of the authors adopt a broad “survey of the literature” approach, focusing on the debates that characterize their respective fields and comparing these, when appropriate, to what scholars in other disciplines address. Some advance an argument about the state of the field of migration studies in their discipline and how it is informed by other social sciences. Readers will certainly note some shared conceptual formulations (for example, transnationalism) across

several disciplines, as well as some similarities in areas of more recent research (for example, refugees or borders and bordering).

Rather than reaching for a unifying theory, as Massey et al. (1993, 1998), Elizabeth Fussell (2012), and Peter Scholten (2020) have tried to do,<sup>5</sup> in this introduction we examine the chapters in this volume as a whole, noting convergence and divergence in how questions are framed, how research is conducted, at what levels and with what units of analysis, how hypothesis-testing proceeds, what are the methodologies and principal sources of data, and ultimately how theoretical models are constructed. Most of the contributors take an eclectic approach to “theory,” leaving ample room for positivist (hypothetico-deductive) and interpretivist (inductive and idiographic) approaches to the study of migration—the former being more characteristic of economics and political science and the latter more common in history and anthropology, with sociology, demography, and geography somewhere in between (see Weber 1949). In the concluding chapter, the sociologist Adrian Favell gives an assessment of the book as a whole, looking at the “state of migration theory” from a critical and cultural studies perspective, arguing for “interdisciplinarity, globality, and post-disciplinarity in migration studies.”

Our goal in this volume is to stimulate conversations about migration, drawing on theoretical and empirical insights from history, law, and the social sciences. To some extent, we challenge readers to draw comparisons and formulate cross-disciplinary insights for themselves as they read the chapters collectively. If this book moves the conversation in the direction of “the study of migration as a social science in its own right ... strongly multidisciplinary in its theory and methodology” (Castles 1993: 30), it will have achieved its objective. In the 20 years since the first edition of this book appeared, migration studies have indeed become “mainstream” in the social sciences, but the enterprise is still largely US- and Euro-centric, wedded to a Weberian paradigm, and embedded in a “Westphalian frame,” which is state-centric and with a logic of “governmentality,” to borrow from Favell’s synthesis and critique, echoing Michel Foucault (cf. Levy et al. 2020). To say that there is a power dynamic in the study of migration and that states and politics matter should come as no surprise (Hollifield and Wong in this volume). However, as we shall see, each discipline approaches bordering and ordering and power dynamics in a different way.

## **Migration as a “New” Field of Study in Social Science**

Migration has been a topic of inquiry in the social sciences for decades, and in the fields of sociology, geography, and demography, the focus on migration studies dates from the late nineteenth century and even earlier in the case of population studies. The fact that sociology, particularly as practiced in the United States, was the first discipline to make the study of migration a central feature of inquiry is not a coincidence. The beginning of migration studies dates from the works of Ravenstein (1885; also see Price and Héran in this volume), and early twentieth-century sociology (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918). In this period, the dominant paradigms in migration theory were the assimilation model, associated with Robert Park (1930) and the “Chicago School” (Park and Burgess 1921; see also

Gordon 1964 and FitzGerald this volume). The assimilation model, which predicted a single outcome, eventually gave way to new models predicting a range of outcomes, as reflected in Portes and Rumbaut's (1990) now-classic study of immigrant "incorporation" in the United States. They predicted outcomes for different groups according to contexts of reception that vary with reference to (1) policy that accepts or actively supports immigrants; (2) labor market reception that is neutral, positive, or discriminatory; and (3) ethnic communities that are either nonexistent, working class, or entrepreneurial/professional. Sociologists emphasized the role of social capital, networks, and social relationships of immigrants (Portes and Zhou 1993) in facilitating incorporation while economists placed greater emphasis on human capital criteria such as schooling, professional qualifications, and language proficiency (Chiswick 1978 and Martin in this volume) in facilitating incorporation—all quite conventional, Weberian social science. Meanwhile, geographers were focused on assimilation as spatial process with distinct outcomes based on race, ethnicity, time frame, and settlement type.

From the 1970s, migration studies tended to cluster around ethnic and race relations, assimilation and acculturation, with Portes and his students at the heart of this approach. The Portes "school" is heavily inductive, positivist, behavioral, and "data driven," making it quite conventional from the standpoint of philosophy of social science. Social demographers like Douglas Massey also were instrumental in defining the field of migration studies, focusing on population dynamics, the pattern and direction of migration flows (from Mexico to and from the United States), and the characteristics of migrants (age, gender, occupation, education, and so on). Social demographers seek to understand how and why people migrate, what happens to migrants, especially in the receiving society where they are likely to have a major impact on the population, and how difficult it is for migrants to be "absorbed" into the host society. Demography plays a major role in migration studies because demographers collate and generate much of the data from censuses, surveys, and the like (see for example Jeff Passel and Pew's estimates of the size of the undocumented population in the United States, using census data or Douglas Massey and colleagues' famous Mexican Migration Project, both discussed at length by Héran in this volume). Héran cautions against using simple gravity and push-pull models to understand migration flows, pointing out that these models lead to oversimplification and they give rise to distorting metaphors like waves, invasions, and replacement that lend themselves to symbolic and populist politics (see Héran 2018 and the discussion by Hollifield and Wong in Chapter 7 in this volume). Like anthropologists and sociologists, demographers also focus on individual behavior to understand migrant behavior, for example decisions about marriage, childbearing, etc., and by extension they develop theories of household behavior—a primary unit of analysis—and they delve into economic theory, looking at the structure and functioning of labor markets (hence the rise of economic sociology) to understand how these affect the propensity for people to move. Demographers wrestle with the same concepts as sociologists (and later anthropologists), such as ethnicity and race. They theorize about intermarriage rates, social capital, and civil society and thereby help us to understand the effects of immigration on receiving and sending societies. Sociologists illustrate



how and why some immigrant groups adapt and integrate better than others, echoing the now-classic findings of scholars like Alejandro Portes, Roger Waldinger, Richard Alba, and others, and giving us what David FitzGerald (in this volume) has called an “ethnic Olympic Games.”

Economists, still with a laser-like focus on the United States and sticking with conventional (positivist and hypothetico-deductive) social science, have been equally influential in the development of the field of migration studies, relying on rationalist and utilitarian theories of human behavior. They frame their research questions in terms of scarcity, cost-benefit, and rational choice. Like sociologists, they are interested in why some people move while others do not, paying close attention to selectivity to determine what migration means for the sending and receiving societies (Stark 1991; Chiswick 2008). The macroeconomic perspective explores what immigrants add to the economy of the receiving society (in terms of wealth, income, skills, etc.), what emigrants take away from the economy of the sending society (in terms of capital, human and otherwise), what they send back in remittances, and what is the net gain/loss. From a microeconomic perspective, economists view migrants as utility maximizers who assess opportunity in cost-benefit terms and act accordingly (Martin in this volume). These two perspectives (macro and micro) have generated a range of questions and debates within economics about winners and losers in labor markets where migrants are present, about the impact of immigration on public finances, about entrepreneurship and innovation, and about the social mobility of immigrants—questions that economists share with sociologists (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; cf. Bevelander and Hollifield 2021). Certainly, these two disciplines, sociology and economics, have created a common language, if not a single theoretical framework or a unified field of migration studies.

Economists are often called upon (by those who formulate policy) to assess the fiscal and human capital costs and benefits of immigration in precisely these evaluative terms. Cost-benefit analysis therefore shapes many of the theoretical debates in economics (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985), not to mention broader debates about the effects of immigration policy on the macro-economy (again, Martin in this volume). To take two prominent examples, Barry Chiswick (1978), in contrast to George Borjas (1985, 1987), argues that higher levels of inequality in the country of origin do not necessarily lead to negative selectivity of immigrants, but rather to less favorable positive selectivity. In effect, according to Chiswick (2008), even though immigrants may come from very poor countries, they still are favorably selected compared to those who stay behind, and are likely to add to the human capital stock of the receiving country and to assimilate quickly. In this framework, immigrants’ earnings are likely to increase at a higher rate than the earnings of natives. Hence, economists and sociologists are focused on many of the same questions concerning the incorporation, integration, or assimilation of immigrants, even though their theories and methods are quite different. Economists and demographers also have explored the educational, welfare, and social security costs of immigration. Americans in particular are concerned about the costs and benefits of immigration and want to harness the social sciences, especially economics and demography, to shape and inform

policy debates (Hanson 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; National Academies of Sciences 2015, 2017). European scholars (Kahanec et al. 2009) also are concerned about the macroeconomic and labor market impacts of immigration, while most European governments (and scholars) are preoccupied with perceived crises of integration and with the effects of immigration on the welfare state and the social contract (Favell 1998; Bommers and Geddes 2000; Bevelander and Hollifield 2021; Brochmann 2022).

In keeping with conventional approaches to the study of migration, one could argue that the growth of work on the second generation, particularly within the discipline of sociology, is a result of the rejection of the assumptions of earlier assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1996; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; Zhou 2012). Some scholars (see again George Borjas 1985) have argued that given postindustrial economies and the diversity of places of origin of today's immigrant populations, the path to upward mobility (and hence incorporation) will be much less favorable for the second generation than it was for the second generation of the past. This has resulted in segmented assimilation theory and Gans's formulation of "second-generation decline" (see FitzGerald, this volume). Clearly, this is a topic of intense debate and another area of research and theory building, dominated by a focus on US immigration, with sparse attention to other immigrant-receiving societies (see, however, recent work by Thomson and Crul 2007; Alba and Holdaway 2013; Ziolk-Skrzypczak 2013; Bevelander and Hollifield 2021).

Finally, one should add to the mix and to the emphasis on a range of outcomes, the model of transnationalism that was first formulated by anthropologists, but which has had an impact on migration research in several other disciplines, including sociology, geography, and political science. Formulated in part as a critical response to assimilation theory, the roots of transnationalism within anthropology can be found in earlier work on return migration that emphasized links with the homeland and the notion that emigration did not necessarily mean definitive departure in the minds of migrants themselves. But equally transnationalism implies that return is not definitive return. Historians have also taken up these concepts of transnationalism and return, documenting return movement in an era prior to global communication and cheap and easy mass transportation (Wyman 1993; Hoerder 2002). Social scientists have yet to take advantage of this historical dimension to refine their understanding of contemporary flows. What precisely is different? Is transnationalism simply a characteristic of the first generation of contemporary migrants, or does it endure and hence mean something different in the twenty-first century from the return migration flows of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Are scholars of immigration talking about something totally new when they use the term "transnational space"?

From this cryptic review, we can see **one unique feature** of the field of migration studies. The experience of immigration in the settler/colonial societies, especially the United States but also Canada, Australia, and even South Africa and New Zealand (the Dominions), has dominated research on migration in the social sciences, making the field exceptionally Western, Anglo-Saxon, and ethnocentric (Levy et al. 2020; cf. Hollifield and Foley 2021). A quick look

at the bibliographies in this book drives home the point. The research agendas of American sociologists and economists are focused heavily on migrant agency and experience, and these agendas were exported first to Canada and Australia, then to the United Kingdom, making the field look even more ethnocentric, as it has been dominated by English-language scholarship. Eventually the dominant paradigms of ethnic and race relations, acculturation, assimilation, ethnic entrepreneurship, embedded in a broad “world systems” framework (Wallerstein 1974) would be exported to Western Europe, having a big impact on the development of migration studies in the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia, and somewhat later in France and southern Europe. As Europe made the transition from a continent of emigration (in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) to a land of immigration in the post-WWII era (Thränhardt 1996; Lucassen 2021; Hollifield 2021b), it is not surprising that European scholars of migration would turn to American and British theories to frame their research questions and formulate hypotheses. However, the historical context of migration in Europe is quite different from that of the settler societies (Moch 1992; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997; Gabaccia in this volume). Many of the new immigration countries in Europe struggled with the legacies of imperialism, and post-colonialism, making the US assimilation or acculturation paradigms inappropriate. This tension is especially evident in countries with a long imperial history, like Britain and France, but also the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Italy (Hollifield and Foley 2021; Hollifield et al. 2022). In Northern Europe, the preoccupation with the social contract and the viability of the welfare state have tended to dominate migration studies (Bevelander and Hollifield 2021; Brochmann 2022).

**A second unique feature** of migration studies—as opposed to other fields of study in the social sciences—is the extent to which it is ethnocentric, driven by specific historical and cultural contexts. The experience of the settler societies (the United States and the Dominions but also Latin America; see Hollifield and Foley 2021) is unique, and the weight of imperialism is evident in both the sending and receiving societies of Western Europe and almost every other region of the globe touched by European (or American) conquest and colonization. Little attention has been paid to the impact of European migrations on indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, and Australia, for example (see, however, Ellermann et al. 2021). These lacunae make history and anthropology especially important in the study of migration, to move us away from a narrow focus on migrant agency in the dominant (Western) paradigm of economic sociology and demography, and to take account of larger, historical, structural (institutional), and transnational forces at work in the movement of populations (see chapters by Gabaccia and Brettell in this volume). For this reason, a more critical approach to migration is needed, to bring non-Western contexts and perspectives to bear in understanding migration, and to gain a greater appreciation of the power dynamics between peoples, regions, and states (Favell in this volume; Massey 1999; Liu-Farrar and Yeoh 2018; Hollifield and Foley 2021). However, it will take more than cross-country collaborations (Levy et al. 2020) to overcome the Western

bias in migration studies. In this regard, the “cultural turn” in migration studies to quote Favell (in this volume) could help attenuate the Western bias.

**A third unique feature** of migration studies is the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of understanding migration and mobility from a single disciplinary perspective. Despite the dominance of sociology and economics in the field (Levy et al. 2020), there is a lot of interchange among the disciplines. Historians draw on many of the theories formulated by sociologists (Lucassen and Lucassen 1997; Gabaccia in this volume). Demographers are attentive to both sociological and economic theories and, increasingly, to those emerging from political science. Law has close affinity with all the social sciences and with history (Abraham in this volume), while political science borrows heavily from economics and history as well as from sociology and law. One could argue, as Hollifield and Wong (this volume) do, that political science is a theoretical vagabond when it comes to the study of migration, while anthropology (Brettell in this volume) shares much with history, sociology, and geography. Although economists borrow from and work with other disciplines—demography, sociology, and history, for example—they maintain a focus on their own (often highly quantitative) methodology and (formal) models, especially rational choice (Martin in this volume). Proponents of rational choice argue that the formal (game theoretic) approach is an indication of how much more scientific (hypothetico-deductive) and advanced this framework is, when compared with other approaches. Detractors would say that those wedded to the rationalist paradigm and to game theory cannot admit that any other approach might be as powerful as a straightforward, interest-based, micro-economic model. An economist might respond with the metaphor of Occam’s Razor—simple and parsimonious models are more powerful than the complex, idiographic models offered by other social science disciplines, and that economics is a more advanced “science,” because there is agreement on a unified (rationalist) theory and a common methodology. On the other hand, it is easy to slit one’s throat with Occam’s Razor!

### **Framing the Question**

In the social sciences, students are taught that they must start any inquiry with a puzzle or a question, whatever the topic of study may be. Of course, the way in which that question is posed or framed is dependent upon the discipline; and the construction of hypotheses is almost always driven by disciplinary considerations, often too by limitations of the data (see especially the chapter on demography by Héran in this volume). Intense disagreements and debates about the meaning and interpretation of the history and the same body of data exist even within single disciplines. Sometimes, there can be more agreement across the disciplines on the nature of the problem, or on the methodology, than within a single discipline—contrast for example a historical narrative to a more positivist, social scientific approach to history, or a formal, rational choice to a historical-institutional approach to the study of politics. However, agreement on a single explanation for or a model of migration is less likely. It is even rarer to find hypotheses

that are truly multidisciplinary, drawing upon concepts and insights from several disciplines simultaneously. Each discipline tends to have its preferred or acceptable list of questions, hypotheses, variables, and data sources.

In Table 0.1, we have constructed a matrix that summarizes principal research questions and methodologies, as well as dominant theories and hypotheses for each of the disciplines represented in this volume. The matrix is necessarily schematic and cannot include every question or theory; but it provides a framework for establishing a dialogue across disciplines.

For historians, who nowadays straddle the divide between the humanities (cultural studies) and the social sciences, principal research questions emerge from an emphasis on time, timing, and temporality (Gabaccia in this volume). Periodicity is a form of theorizing that focuses attention on both short- and long-term temporal scales and cycles. While historians may not engage directly in the development of theoretical models that predict behavior (as economists or political scientists might do), they do engage in theory to frame their questions and to test or explore their arguments in ways that are familiar to social scientists. For example, they might ask what are the determinants and consequences of population movements? Who moves, when, why and where, and how have patterns of movement changed over time? Why do most people stay put? As noted above, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, only a fraction (3.6 percent) of the world's population live outside of their country of birth. How do those who move experience departure, migration, and settlement? Do we need a broader definition of migration (apart from the standard UN definitions) to take into account forced migrations resulting from colonialism and settlement, war, irredentism, internal migration, and other (transnational) forms of mobility (see, for example, Koslowski 2011; Betts 2013). These questions can be applied to one or more groups (or even individuals) at a particular place and time, but they can also be applied over the long durations of time in the arena of migration history (Lucassen and Lucassen 1997; Goldin et al. 2011; Lucassen 2021). In the latter case, the result, Gabaccia observes, has been the re-theorization of human mobility by world historians. By framing questions in relation to time (then to now), historians like Gabaccia and Lucassen are able to confront the limitations of temporality in community studies that cannot explain enduring ethnic identities, for example. Moreover, they are equally able to extend the temporal scales for patterns that we might assume to be of more recent vintage.

Anthropologists tend to be context-specific in their ethnographic endeavors, and much of their theorizing is idiographic. But their ultimate goal is to engage in cross-cultural comparisons that make possible generalizations across space and time, and hence nomothetic theory building. Although Bjeren (1997) has argued that anthropologists never formulate theories divorced from context, this is not necessarily the case. While context is generally very important to anthropologists, some theorizing moves away from it. Anthropologists who study migration are interested in more than the who, when, and why; they want to capture through their ethnography the embodied and lived experience of being an immigrant and the meaning, to the migrants themselves, of the social and cultural changes that

Table 0.1 Migration Theories across Disciplines

| <i>Discipline</i> | <i>Research Question(s)</i>  | <i>Levels/Units of Analysis</i>   | <i>Dominant Theories</i>  | <i>Sample Hypothesis</i>   |
|-------------------|--|---|---|--|
| Anthropology      | How does migration effect cultural change and affect cultural identity?  | Micro/individuals, households, groups   | Relational or structuralist and transnational/meaning-centered          | Social networks help maintain cultural difference  |
| Demography        | Can migration compensate for low birth rates and thereby constitute a factor of rejuvenation in an aging society?  | National and foreign-born populations, individuals, households, and ethnic groups | Theory of a stable or stationary population                             | The fertility of immigrant women converges with that of natives beginning in the second generation     |
| Economics         | What explains the propensity to migrate and its effects?   | Micro/individuals   | Rationalist: cost-benefit and utility maximizing behavior               | Incorporation varies with the level of human capital of immigrants                                     |
| Geography         | What explains the spatial patterns of migrant networks and settlement?   | Multi-scalar and scale jumping/ individuals, households, and groups               | Relational, structural, and transnational                               | Incorporation depends on ethnic networks, legal status, residential patterns, and context of reception |
| History           | How has a phenomenon (e.g., causes, structures, processes, consequences of migration) or a relationship (e.g., gender and migration) changed or persisted over time? | Varies temporally (from short-to medium- and long-term) as well as spatially      | Periodization   | Usually not applicable   |
| Law               | How does the law influence migration?  | Macro and micro/the political and legal system                                    | Institutionalist and rationalist (borrows from all the social sciences) | Rights create incentive structures for migration and incorporation                                     |
| Political science | Why do states have difficulty controlling migration?   | More macro/political and international systems                                    | Institutionalist and rationalist  | States are often captured by pro-immigrant interests   |
| Sociology         | What explains incorporation and exclusion?   | Macro/ethnic groups and social class  | Structuralist or institutionalist                                       | Incorporation varies with social and human capital   |

Source: Created by the authors.

result from leaving one context and entering another. Brettell (in this volume) notes that this has led anthropologists to explore, for example, the impact of emigration and immigration on the social relations between men and women, among kin, and among people from the same cultural or ethnic background. Questions in the anthropological study of migration are framed by the assumption that outcomes for people who move are shaped by their social, cultural, and gendered locations and that migrants themselves are agents in their behavior, always interpreting, constructing, and reconstructing social realities within the constraints of structure.

Geographers are primarily interested in spatial and scalar relationships. In migration research their attention is therefore directed, as Price (this volume) points out, to mapping migration flows, tracking patterns of spatial assimilation, and shifting or jumping scales from the local to the global. These foci have resulted in the introduction of new concepts such as “heterolocalism” and ethnoburbs into the literature of migration studies. Geographers, like anthropologists, explore not only intersectionality and context, but also the transnational and diasporic dimensions of migration, as well as the role of social networks in connecting populations and individuals across space. Geographers also put processes of placemaking and bordering at the center of their analyses, as these inform dimensions of migrant experiences and identity. More recently, and not unexpectedly, geography has turned its lens on the environmental drivers of human mobility, and with economists they share an interest in the relationship between migration and development.

Returning to sociology—one of the first disciplines in migration studies along with demography and geography—as FitzGerald (in this volume) emphasizes, the central questions are why does migration occur and who migrates—that is, issues of selectivity. How is migration sustained over time (through networks and social capital)? What happens once these populations settle in the host society and begin to take part in a multigenerational competition for resources and status, often defined in ethnic terms? Sociologists share a common theoretical framework with anthropologists and there is a good deal of cross-fertilization between these disciplines. Both are grounded in the classic works of social theory (Marx, Durkheim, and Weber), and each tends to emphasize social relations as being central to understanding the processes of migration and immigrant incorporation.

However, sociologists have worked primarily in the receiving society with some notable exceptions (see the works of Douglas Massey et al. 2004; FitzGerald 2008 on Mexico; de Haas 2010), while anthropologists and geographers have often worked in the countries of origin, destination, or both. The difference is a result of the historical origins of these disciplines—sociology is grounded in the study of Western institutions and society, whereas anthropology began with the study of “the other” and geography entailed field work that was always global in scope. From Ravenstein’s laws of migration to Zelinsky’s mobility transition, geographers have long seen the movement of people as critical to understanding how places are transformed by migration at various scales. Anthropology “came later” to the study of migration and immigration,



but, in sociology and geography, migration, specifically immigration, has been a topic of long-standing interest. Sociological questions are generally also outcome questions. Sociological theory has moved from postulating a single immigration outcome (classic assimilation) to manifold outcomes that depend on such factors as human and social capital, labor markets, and a range of institutional structures (Bevelander and Hollifield 2021). FitzGerald outlines the major alternatives—segmented assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation. Assessment of these outcomes is often linked to an understanding of the political factors that undergird them, thereby bridging to questions of citizenship and political participation that are of great interest to political scientists as well (see, for example, Jones-Correa 1998; various works of Joppke 1998, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Hollifield 2021a). Even though sociologists are interested in the causes of emigration (again see FitzGerald 2008 and de Haas 2010), the discipline places great emphasis on the process of immigrant incorporation (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Kastoryano 1997; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Favell 1998; Bloemraad 2006). Despite the importance of (macro) world systems theory to both sociology and anthropology, much theorizing in these fields takes place at the meso- and micro-levels—with a focus on agency—rather than at the macro-level with a focus on structure. This tension between the micro and macro runs throughout the works of Portes and Massey (see discussion of Massey’s work in Héran’s chapter on demography in this volume).

By contrast, political science and especially international relations (Hollifield 2012), with its focus on the state, policy (process), and institutions, operates comfortably at the macro- or systemic level (Table 0.1), leaving international relations scholars open to the criticism of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002; Favell in this volume). Some political scientists (Zolberg 1981, 2006; Hollifield 2004, 2005; Hollifield and Wong in this volume), sociologists (Joppke 1998; Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004), and jurists (Schuck 1998 and Abraham in this volume) argue that migration scholars ignore the nation-state at their peril. Brettell (in this volume), on the other hand, traces a shift in anthropology in levels of analysis from the individual to the household, a shift that accompanied the realization that migrants rarely make decisions in a vacuum about whether to leave and where to go, and that immigrant earnings and remittances are often pooled into a household economy. Similarly, it is in the distinction between individual decision-making, on the one hand, and household or family decision-making, on the other, that Massey et al. (1993) locate the difference between neoclassical microeconomic migration theory and the new economics of migration. New economics theorists argue that households send workers abroad “not only to improve income in absolute terms, but also to increase income relative to other households, and, hence, to reduce their relative deprivation compared with some reference group” (Massey et al. 1993:438; cf. earlier work by Mincer 1978; Stark 1991). This is an economic theory that, with a different unit of analysis, must take sociological and anthropological questions into consideration (Levy et al. 2020).



The central question for demographers is the nature of population change. Births, deaths, and migration are the major components of population change (Héran 2012). Drawing largely on aggregate data, they document the pattern and direction of migration flows and the characteristics of migrants (age, sex, occupation, education, and so on). Within demography, a distinction is often drawn between formal demography, which is highly formal and mathematical, and social demography, which borrows freely from other social science disciplines and is more idiographic and applied. Formal demographers have paid more attention to fertility and mortality as mechanisms of population change than they have to the messier process of migration—a wildcard in population dynamics. As Héran explains, historically, migration was treated as a marginal factor in formal demography, but over time demographers were forced to find ways to incorporate migration into their formal models of population change. Sweden was the first country to try to include migration in vital statistics, counting entries as births and departures as deaths. But since migration is not a discrete biological event, like a birth or a death, it is difficult to measure and requires detailed knowledge of individual and household behavior (Héran 2017). Still, demographers rely heavily on vital statistics and censuses for their data, and these data are collected and collated by international organizations like the United Nations (UNDESA—the Population Division), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. Such highly aggregated data are useful for governments and social scientists, but they have many limitations, as described by Héran in his chapter. To complete the picture of population change and to account for the impact of migration, demographers and sociologists have developed surveys to gather more micro- and individual-level data, using qualitative as well as quantitative techniques. Measuring population movements and their role in demographic change is a highly political exercise, as arguments about the levels of irregular migration, replacement migration, and the rise of “ethnic” minorities attest. Héran debunks many popular “theories” that have become a mainstay of political debates in the United States and Europe: that “demography is destiny,” that high-fertility populations will inevitably move (because of push factors) to low-fertility societies (because of pull factors), thus “replacing” national populations with foreigners, and (white and Christian) majorities with (non-white and non-Christian) minorities (Héran 2007, 2018). Héran reviews the theory that governments—following recommendations of the UN Population Division—conspired to increase levels of immigration in order to “replace” native populations, pointing out that the original UN report was a purely hypothetical exercise, never intended as a basis for making immigration policy. In spite of these polemics and the misuse and abuse of data, demographers, Héran argues, strive for accuracy in measurement and analysis, so that other social sciences can use the data to develop and test hypotheses about population change (Héran 2017).

However, social demographers like Héran (this volume) and Douglas Massey have made migration a focus of study in sociology. Demographers are as interested as historians, anthropologists, and sociologists in the questions of who moves and when, and to answer these questions, they engage in the construction

of predictive models. Demographers can forecast the future of populations or at least they try harder than other social scientists, especially in formal demography, which deals with hard numbers on births, deaths, age, and gender. But as Héran reminds us in his chapter, migration, which is so hard to measure, has a powerful effect on societies and their populations (Héran 2017). Here the focus is on social demography, which, much like sociology (see FitzGerald in this volume), tries to understand how and why people migrate, what happens to migrants, especially in the receiving society where they are likely to have a major impact, and how difficult is it for migrants to be absorbed into the host society. Héran reviews theories of household behavior—a primary unit of analysis for demographers—and he delves into household decision-making that affects the life cycle, especially decisions about marriage and childbearing. He compares the behavior of migrants and the native population as it affects the health of the two populations, pointing out that understanding the effects of migration on public health requires interdisciplinary studies involving demography, economics, epidemiology, and other social sciences. Héran wrestles with many of the same concepts as sociologists and anthropologists, such as ethnicity and race, and, like political scientists, he and other demographers strive to understand migration policies and how they affect population dynamics. He theorizes about intermarriage rates, social capital (although he questions the way in which sociologists like Massey use this theory developed first by Pierre Bourdieu), and civil society and thereby helps us to understand the effects of migration on host societies and countries of origin.

Economists also build predictive models, relying heavily on rationalist theories of human behavior, and they tend to frame their questions in terms of scarcity and choice (Martin in this volume). Economists are interested in why some people move while others do not, and like sociologists they pay close attention to selectivity, to determine what it means for the sending (de Haas 2010; Kapur and McHale 2012) and receiving (Orrenius and Zavadny 2012) societies. From a microeconomic perspective, economists view migrants as utility maximizers who assess opportunity in cost-benefit terms and act accordingly. These two perspectives (macro and micro) have generated a range of questions and debates within economics about winners and losers in labor markets where migrants are present, about the impact of immigration on public finances, about entrepreneurship and innovation, and about the social mobility of immigrants—questions that economists share with sociologists and political scientists. Martin observes that depending on the question and how it is framed economists can engage in a case study approach or in more longitudinal and econometric studies.

Anthropologists and historians argue that economic and demographic factors cannot and do not fully predict population movement when they are divorced from social and cultural context. Anthropologists in particular reject a universal rationality in favor of a more constructivist approach. Furthermore, anthropologists and historians are reluctant, if not averse, to framing questions in cost-benefit terms or in relation to evaluations of positive and negative inputs, outputs, or outcomes. Like many sociologists, anthropologists reject teleological reasoning that is inherent in modernization theory—that development is a one-way, linear

process, as societies progress from traditional to modern, with markets coming to dominate human behavior and social relations through an increasingly complex and hierarchic division of labor. But economists (and other social scientists who engage in policy analysis) are often called upon to assess the fiscal and human capital costs and benefits of immigration in precisely these evaluative terms, and because of their perceived methodological and theoretical prowess, economics shapes many theoretical debates (Chiswick 1978, 1986; Borjas 1985; Rothman and Epsenshade 1992; Duleep and Regets 1997a, 1997b; Huber and Espenshade 1997), not to mention broader debates about immigration policy (Borjas 1991, 1999; Card 2001; Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Economists and demographers have explored the educational, welfare, and social security costs of immigration (Simon 1984; Passel 1994; Borjas 1998; Bevelander and Hollifield 2021), thereby responding to national debates that erupt periodically in the political arena. A country that emphasizes skills as the primary criterion upon which to issue visas will experience a different pattern in the growth and composition of its immigrant population from that of a country that constructs a policy based on family reunification or refugee status (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012; Martin in this volume). It is with attention to these policy questions that political scientists and legal scholars have entered the arena of migration research as relative newcomers.

As Hollifield and Wong emphasize in their chapter in this volume, the questions for scholars of the politics of international migration follow three themes: (1) the role of the nation-state in controlling migration flows and hence its borders; (2) the impact of migration on the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship (Hollifield 2005, 2021a), and the relationship between migration, on the one hand, and foreign policy and national security, on the other; and (3) the question of incorporation, which raises a host of behavioral, normative, and legal issues. Political science has paid attention to what sociologists and economists have written about social and economic incorporation and added to it the dimension of political incorporation, specifically questions of citizenship and rights, familiar themes for legal scholars as well (see Abraham in this volume; Schuck 1998 and Motomura 2014). It is worth noting, however, that scholars in other disciplines—for example history and anthropology—have been equally attentive to questions of citizenship in both its legal and participatory dimensions. For example, in her book *Law Harsh as Tigers*, historian Lucy Salyer (1995) shows how the Chinese “sojourners” who immigrated to the United States in the late nineteenth century exercised their rights to challenge discriminatory laws. A second historical example is Gardner’s (2005) analysis of the impact of US citizenship laws on immigrant women in particular.

Like sociologists, political scientists have worked largely in the receiving societies, although one finds an increasing number of scholars whose research has addressed emigration policy (rules of exit), rather than immigration policy (rules of entry), according to similar themes of control, but with a greater focus on development issues (Leeds 1984; Russell 1986; Weiner 1987, 1995; Sadiq 2009; Klotz 2013; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Norman 2020; Chung 2021; Hollifield and Foley 2021). Whether they are looking at the sending or receiving societies,

political scientists tend to be split theoretically. Some lean heavily toward a more interest-based, microeconomic (rational choice) approach to the study of migration (Freeman 1995, 1998; Peters 2015), whereas others favor institutional, historical, and/or constructivist explanations for migration, immigrant incorporation, participation, and citizenship in the liberal democracies (Hollifield 1992, 2021a, 2022; Zolberg 1981, 2006; Koslowski 2011; Klotz 2013). All agree, however, that it is important to understand how the state and public policy affect migration (rules of entry and exit), mobility, immigrant incorporation, identity, and citizenship, or, as Zolberg (2006) puts it, how nations are designed and shaped by migration policy.

Like political scientists, legal scholars focus largely on institutions, process, and rights as key variables for explaining immigration outcomes, often with a heavy overlay of political philosophy (for example, Abraham in this volume; Legomsky, 1987; Schuck 1998; Bosniak 2006). Most legal scholars are skeptical of the possibility for developing a “science of law” or, as Abraham (this volume) puts it, “law is not a research discipline ... [but it] is ... a tool of regulation; as such it constructs legality and illegality, the permissible and the impermissible.” In the Anglo-American common law tradition, legal scholars devote their efforts to the analysis and assessment of case law (Aleinikoff, et al. 2003; Motomura 2014). But in his work, Abraham seeks to explain how the law has evolved over time and in different national contexts to shape international migration, and how immigration in particular affects American political development. Abraham shows how the construction of the American state following the Civil War resulted in the rise of a new jurisprudence revolving around issues of sovereignty, plenary power, immigration control (exclusion), citizenship, and membership, eventuating in the racist and discriminatory Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the National Origins Quota Law (1924). The arbitrary powers of the state to exclude undesirable aliens, even retroactively, continued apace during the Cold War and the “war on terror,” attenuated by the rise of what Hollifield (2012, 2022; Hollifield and Wilson 2011) has called rights-based politics, with the adoption and ratification (by most states) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Jacobson 1996) and the civil rights movement itself in the United States. As Abraham shows in his review of US case law (e.g., *Plyler v. Doe*), a new jurisprudence was emerging in the 1970s and 1980s that would challenge the plenary power doctrine (see also Schuck 1998 and Law 2010) and expand the legal basis of citizenship. Abraham’s analysis is reminiscent of similar work in political science (Freeman 1995; Jones-Correa 1998; Zolberg 2006; Hollifield et al. 2022) and sociology (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1998), which seeks to explain the difficulties of immigration control in liberal democracies. Abraham argues that law plays a crucial role in structuring international migration and shaping immigrant incorporation. On the one hand, legal admissions largely determine the types of naturalized citizens; on the other, the enforcement of immigration law is often constrained by cost or by the liberal constitutions and human rights conventions. In the work of Abraham, we can see how the jurist’s approach to the study of migration differs from that of many social scientists and historians. Legal scholars are less concerned with theory

building and hypothesis testing, and more inclined to use the eclectic techniques of analysis in social science to argue for specific types of policy reform.

Like many political scientists (see, for example, Hollifield 2005, 2012, 2012; Rudolph 2006; also the sociologist, Joppke 1998) Abraham stresses the importance of the institution of sovereignty in a largely Westphalian world where the plenary power of states to regulate and control entry to their territories is a fundamental principle of both municipal and international law, and this, in his words, “notwithstanding the growth ... of universalism and humanitarianism in international law.” Also, like Hollifield (2021a, 2022) and Joppke (1998, 1999), he struggles to understand the impact that law (*qua* rights) has on the ability of states to master immigration flows and on the capacity of states and societies to absorb, assimilate, and integrate foreign populations, illustrating his theoretical musings by comparing citizenship and naturalization laws in the United States and Germany. Following the logic of the Marshallian trilogy of rights civil, political, and social (Marshall 1964; Brubaker 1992; FitzGerald in this volume), Abraham seeks to understand how the evolution of immigration law and policy in Europe and the United States is tied to rights-based politics, that is struggles over civil rights and the “criminalization” of immigration in the United States, and struggles over social/welfare rights and the “social wage” in Europe (cf. Bevelander and Hollifield 2021). Finally, he extends his argument into the realm of political philosophy to understand how the rise of dual and multiple citizenships has undermined (or not) classical liberal conceptions of citizenship and the social contract from the more cosmopolitan theory of Carens (2000, 2013) to the multicultural model of Kymlicka (1995).

### **Levels and Units of Analysis**

Objects of inquiry and theory building are closely related to the levels and units of analysis. In migration research, these vary both within and between disciplines. An initial contrast is between those who approach the problem at a macro-level, examining the structural conditions (largely political, legal, and economic) that shape migration flows; and those who engage in micro-level research, examining how these larger forces shape the decisions and actions of individuals and families, or how they effect changes in communities. World systems theory is one manifestation of the macro approach. World historians, such as those described by Donna Gabaccia, as well as a range of social scientists, particularly sociologists and anthropologists, have been influenced by this Braudelian approach that emphasizes *la longue durée* (Sassen 1996; Portes 1997; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). However, as Hollifield (2004, 2012) and others (Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004) point out, political scientists have tended to be critical of world systems theory and the types of globalization arguments that flow from it. The logic of world systems theory is heavily sociological and structural, and it discounts the role of politics and the state in social and economic change. Mainstream scholars of international relations continue to place the state, as a unitary and rational actor, at the center of their analyses of any type of transnational phenomenon, whether

it is trade, foreign direct investment, or international migration (Hollifield 2000, 2004, 2012).

Despite the importance of world systems theory, FitzGerald and Brettell suggest that more theorizing in sociology and anthropology takes place at the micro-level, or at what Thomas Faist (1997), following Douglas Massey et al. (1998), labeled a “meso-level” that focuses on social ties.<sup>6</sup> Political science, especially in the sub-field of international relations, with its focus on the state and national interest, is focused on the macro- or systemic level. This is also true of the law, especially when law intersects with politics and economics. However, legal scholars equally focus on individual cases and on patterns of case law and hence operate at a micro-level of analysis as well. Economics also operates at both levels, depending on the research questions. Economists have not only theorized about how wage or employment opportunity differentials between sending and receiving societies affect general flows of populations but also about how such differentials influence individual or household cost/benefit and utilitarian decision-making about migration. Demography is perhaps a special case because the primary unit of analysis for the demographer is the population. Hill (1997:244) has argued that the “easy definition of a population has blinded [demographers] to more complex thoughts about what holds people together and what divides them.” In other words, the meso-level at which sociologists and anthropologists frequently operate to theorize about the maintenance or construction of kinship, ethnic, or community ties among immigrants is not necessarily of primary concern to demographers. However, as Héran stresses in his chapter in this volume, households are often the critical decision-making units, as migrants make cost-benefit calculations about whether or not to move, when to get married, when to have children, and if and when to return to their home countries. “Risk-minimization” is a “significant force” that drives the life cycle and decisions by individuals and households on whether or not to move.

Some geographers also work at a meso-level, while others work at the macro-level to trace and map broad patterns of movement across space. Still others work at the micro-level of communities, households, and individuals. Geographers are attentive to varied units of analysis precisely because the concept of scale is at the core of their research. As Price (this volume; see also Chacko and Price 2020) observes, scale influences how geographers view and theorize about both vertical and horizontal socio-spatial interactions. Scale, in geography refers primarily to space/place but also temporal scale, which addresses the size of time units, and thematic scale, which addresses “the groupings of entities or attributes such as people or weather variables” (Montello 2001: 13501) are also important. Montello (2001: 13502) also describes analysis scale, “the size of the units in which phenomena are measured and the size of the units into which measurements are aggregated for data analysis and mapping.” To these, Price (this volume) also adds “individual scale”—a concept that allows, for example, exploration of involuntary mobility—and city/suburbs and other sub-state scales. Clearly, all these elements or dimensions of scale have framed the ways in which geographers, and other social scientists, have theorized migration.



Like some geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, and some economists and political scientists have also emphasized the individual as the primary unit of analysis, leaving them open to the criticism of “methodological individualism” (Sassen 1996; Favell in this volume). The sociologist Alejandro Portes (1997:817), for example, has argued strongly in favor of something other than the individual as the unit of analysis. “Reducing everything to the individual plane,” according to Portes, “unduly constrains the enterprise by preventing the utilization of more complex units of analysis—families, households, and communities, as the basis for explanation and prediction.”

Economists asking a different set of research questions that are shared with sociologists often focus on other units of analysis—the labor market in the receiving society (Martin in this volume) or the economy of a sending society. These generate different bodies of theory about dual and segmented labor markets, formal and informal economies, about aggregate income and income distribution, about the impact of capitalist development, about the political implications of emigrant remittances, about global cities, about gateway cities of immigration and cities as contexts for immigrant incorporation, or about the role of migrants and city-making (Sassen 1991; Brettell 2003b; Foner 2005; Hanley et al. 2008; Price and Benton-Short 2008; Singer et al. 2008; Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2018). In all cases, the needs and interests of entities other than the individual are of interest here.

Political scientists and legal scholars have generally entered into the debate at this point, taking as their primary unit of analysis the state. Bringing the state in as the unit of analysis focuses attention on power relationships, policy, and regulation of population movements, whether domestic (as in the system of internal passports in the old Soviet Union or China today) or international (see Torpey 2000). As Zolberg (1981) noted, micro-analytic theories often do not distinguish between domestic and international flows; nor do meso-level theories. The politics of the state (or states in the international system) are often behind refugee and illegal flows (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1986; Hollifield 2004, 2012; Passel and Cohn 2011; Passel et al. 2013; Hollifield and Wong, and Abraham in this volume). Rules of entry and exit formulated by the state regulate migration flows. State sovereignty, control and rule of law are at issue in debates about citizenship, and since citizenship and sovereignty are cornerstones of the international legal system, migration always has the potential to affect international relations, including issues of war and peace. In this case, the level of analysis may move (from the individual or the state) to the international system itself (Hollifield 2000, 2012), and normative issues of morality and justice come into play (Carens 2013; Hollifield 2021a).

Contrasts between the perspectives of political science and those of anthropology are stark on the issue of the relationship between immigration and citizenship. Anthropologists are more concerned with the meaning of citizenship for the individual migrant—whether and how citizenship and nationality are incorporated into a new identity (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012) than are their colleagues in political science (or law), who may be focused on the international systemic

or national security implications of population movements, as well as the mechanisms of naturalization, rights, and formal political participation (DeSipio 1996, 2012; Rudolph 2006; Hollifield 2021a). Sociologists, with their interest in institutions, have, it appears, aligned themselves more with political scientists and lawyers than with anthropologists on this particular question (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004; FitzGerald 2008). The theoretical focus in the citizenship literature, particularly in the European context, is on the transformation of host societies and only secondarily on the immigrants. It is here that some intriguing interdisciplinary interchange could occur by combining different units of analysis (the state and the individual) and different questions, relating to sovereignty and identity (Kastoryano 1997; Hollifield 2021a). The utilitarian aspects of citizenship constitute one dimension of such interdisciplinary exploration. In their work on citizenship, for example, Peter Schuck (Schuck and Smith 1985, 2018; Schuck 1998) and Rogers Smith (1997) explore the way in which naturalization law and policy (a state-level variable) affect the rate of political incorporation of newcomers.

## Data and Methodology

The units of analysis in migration research are closely linked to matters of data and methodology. When the unit of analysis is the population, research is conducted at an aggregate level, using primarily census data, but sometimes also data from large surveys. Demographic data are abundant, discrete, and accessible, and theorizing is driven largely by the data (Hill 1997). Demographers are perhaps most preoccupied with the accuracy of the data and with matters of method.<sup>7</sup> Because they use secondary data, they must be concerned with how migration and immigration were defined by those who collected the data. Héran (in this volume) uses publicly available aggregate data compiled by international organizations, particularly the OECD and the World Bank, to explore the relationship between population dynamics and “net migration.” Sociologists and economists of migration, particularly if they are also trained as demographers, often use the same secondary data and engage in similar kinds of statistical methods of analysis. Yet, when they do this it is with an awareness of the limitations of census data. “They undercount undocumented migrants, they provide no information on legal status, and they are ill-suited to the study of immigration as a process rather than an event,” write Massey and colleagues (1994:700). They realize that data sets vary in their suitability for addressing various questions and the task of social scientists is to identify the most appropriate data for a given problem or question and to be ever vigilant in questioning the concepts and categories of analysis (see, for example, Skerry 2000; Simon 2005; Simon et al. 2015; and especially Héran in this volume for a lucid discussion of data sources and methodology in population studies).

Sociologists, demographers, and some economists also generate their own individual- or household-level data, using surveys with sample sizes that can range into the thousands (Massey and Durand 2004; Héran in this volume). This



is equally true of much geographical and anthropological research on migration, in which primary individual- and household-level data are collected through extended and sometimes arduous periods of ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation. Geographer Emily Skop (2006) extols the value of focus groups to understand immigrant inclusion and exclusion, especially in multiracial settings. While it may not be the basis for extensive theory construction, the life history method has been employed to some effect by anthropologists and demographers to access the rich texture of the lived experience of being a migrant and the cultural context of decision-making.<sup>8</sup> Benmayor and Skotnes (1994b:15) are most articulate in outlining the way personal testimony

speaks ... to how im/migrant subjects constantly build, reinvent, synthesize, or even collage identities from multiple sources and resources, often lacing them with deep ambivalence. Knowing something of the utter uniqueness of particular individual migrant experiences certainly enhances our generalizations about the group experience, but it also elicits humility about the adequacy of these generalizations and a realization that few actual individual lives fully conform to the master narratives.

In political science and the law, common methods often involve interviews with key politicians and lawmakers. They also involve a careful reading of texts, as well as statistical analysis of aggregate or individual-level data, depending on the types of questions that are asked. Policy analysis and political economy are often focused on aggregate data (Hollifield 1992; Tichenor 2002; Wong 2015, 2017; Bevelander and Hollifield 2021), whereas studies of political and voting behavior, as well as public opinion, involve the use of individual-level survey data (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa 1998; Wong 2017). Legal scholars are less likely than economists or political scientists to use formal models or statistical analysis, relying instead on interpretation of case law, institutional analysis, and political history (Schuck 1998; Motomura 2014; Abraham in this volume). But, with the theoretical and methodological borrowing that goes on between law and economics or political science, legal scholars have come increasingly to draw on more formal methods of data analysis.

Clearly, historical methods, which rely on archival sources, are quite distinct and well developed within that discipline. Historians, especially demographic historians, and historical anthropologists have also turned increasingly to quantitative methods of data analysis, which have in turn expanded and enriched the range of sources drawn upon to study migration and immigration. These include manuscript census data, ownership and housing records (Gabaccia 1984), population registers (Kertzer and Hogan 1989), official statistics containing aggregate data on emigration and immigration (Hochstadt 1981), passport registers (Baganha 1990), ships' manifests (Swierenga 1981), and even local parish records (Moch and Tilly 1985; Brettell 1986). However, historians also use the kinds of documents to study migration that they have used for other historical projects—letters, autobiographies, newspapers and magazines, urban citizenship registers, sacred

and secular court documents, tax and land records, settlement house and hospital admission records, organization booklets, and oral histories (Diner 1983; Gjerde 1985; Miller 1985; Baily and Ramella 1988; Yans-McLaughlin 1990; Mageean 1991).

The diverse methods of history and the social sciences, and the various bodies of data that are used, yield different knowledge about migration. They access different voices and leave others out. They provide for different types of generalizations and hence different levels of theorizing. Bjerer (1997:222) outlines the implications of different methods for migration research. She writes:

Large-scale social surveys are certainly necessary in migration research since it is only through such studies that the relative (quantitative) importance of different phenomena, the distribution of characteristics, and their relationship between variables can be ascertained. However, the limitations imposed by the method of investigation must be respected for the results to be valid. The same holds true for detailed studies of social contexts, where the fascination of the complexity of life may make it difficult for the researcher to step back and free herself from the idiosyncrasies of an individual setting or situation.

If survey data miss some of the intersubjective meanings characteristic of social situations revealed in participant observations (Kertzer and Fricke 1997:18), research based on an intense examination of a limited number of cases (such as occurs in history and anthropology) can in turn limit generalization.

Although method also involves comparison, in the study of migration, there are differences of approach, as well as units of comparison within each discipline (Bloemraad 2013; Martiniello 2013). Some historians avoid comparisons mostly because they pose methodological challenges in terms of time and the skills necessary to command archival sources in different countries and distinct languages. On the other hand, there are any number of historians comparing immigrants from the same place of origin in different destinations (for example Baily 1999; Gabaccia and Ottanelli 2001), or engaged, as Gabaccia (this volume) suggests, in migration on the world stage to understand comparative processes of mobility.

The concept of “my group”—the Irish, the Italians, the Germans (e.g., Fuchs 1990; Diner 2008)—that characterizes the approach of some historians is also characteristic of anthropology, although the roots of anthropology as a discipline are in the comparative method (Schnegg and Lowe 2020). The anthropologist feels equally compelled to have command of the language of the immigrant population among whom he or she is conducting ethnographic fieldwork (participant observation), be it the Portuguese in Paris, the Hmong in Minneapolis, or the Koreans in New York. When an anthropologist engages in comparison, it is often based on data gathered by another ethnographer and tends to be more impressionistic than systematic (Brettell 2020). There are, however, some examples of anthropologists who have studied the same national immigrant population in two different receiving societies and, hence, engaged in a process of controlled comparative analysis of quite specific questions that provide the foundation for the

construction of middle-range theories of processes of migration and settlement (Brettell 1981; Foner 1985, 2005). Foner (1998:48) suggests that the comparative approach to migration reveals “a number of factors that determine the outcome of the migration experience ... Cross-national comparisons allow us to begin to assess the relative weight of cultural baggage, on the one hand, and social and economic factors, on the other.” Revealing in this regard is the comparison that sociologists Nancy Foner and Richard Alba (2008) undertake of the role of religion in processes of immigrant settlement in Europe and the United States.

Some social scientists use historical analysis to frame their comparisons (Freeman 1979; Hollifield 1992; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; Foner 2000; King 2000, 2005). An excellent example is Robert Smith’s (1997) comparison of the transnational practices of Italians who came to New York in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with Mexican and other immigrants who have entered that city more recently. In particular, he notes differences in the longevity of community/ethnic organizations of the present by contrast with those of the past, the greater extent of participation in the development of sending communities, and an international political context and weaker anti-immigrant tenor that fosters continued ties with the homeland. But the comparison also allows him to argue that the “global nation is not a new idea” (Robert Smith 1997:123).

When historians of migration have themselves engaged in comparison, it is largely based on secondary sources used to complement primary research. (Campbell 1995). Thus, Gjerde (1996) has drawn on a range of works to write his masterful and ambitious analysis of the Midwestern immigrant experience in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, Gabaccia (1994) uses a wealth of both primary and secondary sources to explore similarities and differences in the experiences of migratory women who came to the United States between 1820 and 1990. Historian Nancy Green (1990 and 1997:59ff) has argued that only through comparison can we understand what is specific and what is general in migration and that “by changing the unit of analysis to compare immigrant groups to each other in their cities of settlement, we can focus on the intermediary—‘mezzo’—level of analysis more pertinent to understanding the social construction of ethnic identities” (p. 61). Historical comparisons that are “explicit, systematic, and methodologically rigorous” would, as Samuel Baily (1990:243) observes, “provide a corrective to the misleading assumption of U.S. exceptionalism.” Indeed, sociologist Barbara Heisler (2008) has called strongly for the development of cross-national comparative research. For her, the ocean that divides the study of immigration in Europe from that in the United States is perhaps as wide as the canyon that separates scholarship of the different disciplines—she calls for a bridge between Americanists and comparatists/globalists. Only through such comparison can the “national models” of migration be tested for cross-cultural validity. Portes (1997:819) has made a similar plea by suggesting that there are many questions that have flourished in the North American immigration literature that lack a comparative dimension.<sup>9</sup> The research of some European scholars of immigrant communities on ethnic enclaves and ethnic entrepreneurs in cities such as Amsterdam, Paris, and Berlin begins to address this problem (Rath 2002).

Of equal interest are a book comparing Amsterdam and New York as cities of immigration (Foner et al. 2014), the comparative work of Richard Alba and various co-authors on immigrant youth (Alba and Waters 2011; Alba and Holdaway 2013), and a volume that explores transatlantic perspectives on immigrant political incorporation (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009).

Although the case study is commonly used in all of the social sciences, much of the most important and pathbreaking work on migration has taken the form of systematic comparison, often with very sophisticated research designs using comparative method as a way of testing hypotheses and building theories. Some of the earliest work on immigration in political science and sociology involved systematic comparisons of politics and policy (Castles and Kosack 1973; Freeman 1979; Schmitter 1979; Miller 1981; Hammar 1985). These studies, which followed a most-similar-systems design, gave rise to a new literature in the comparative politics and sociology of immigration and citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1992, 2021a; Horowitz and Noiriel 1992; Ireland 1994; Soysal 1994; Sowell 1996; Bade and Weiner 1997; Weiner and Hanami 1998; Joppke 1999, 2021; Rudolph 2006; Bauböck 2012). Such systematic, cross-national research has helped to illuminate similarities and differences in immigration and citizenship policy and to explain different outcomes (Wong 2015). It is safe to say that the comparative method has been a mainstay of migration research across the social science disciplines, and it has resulted in some of the most innovative scholarship in the field. It certainly undergirds contemporary context-based and multi-sited approaches to migration (King 2018).

### **Bridge Building among the Disciplines**

Our discussion demonstrates clear divergences in which questions are asked and how they are framed, in units of analysis, and in research methods. Conducting interdisciplinary research on migration is certainly challenging (Borkert 2018) and hence we suggest that bridge building might best proceed through the development of interdisciplinary and collaborative research projects on a series of common questions to which scholars in different disciplines and with different regional interests could bring distinct insights drawn from their particular epistemological frameworks (see Hollifield and Foley 2021). How, for example, might anthropologists and legal scholars collaborate in the study of so-called cultural defenses (Magnarella 1991; Volpp 1994; Coleman 1996; Shweder 2003) that often involve new immigrants and how might the results of this work lead to refinements in theories about migration and change? How might scholars from across a range of disciplines collaborate on a project focused on the financial and health status of undocumented immigrants in several receiving societies with or without government benefits? How might scholars in geography, economics, and anthropology come together to study the impact of migration and migrant remittances on development in sending societies? How might scholars in political science, anthropology, and geography advance our understanding of borders, borderlands, and bordering policies and processes?

Bridge building (metaphorically and across borders) also entails identifying a common set of dependent and independent variables, so that it is clear what we are trying to explain and what factors we stress in building models to explain some segment of migrant behavior or the reaction of states and societies to migration. In this vein, we propose the following (suggested) list of dependent and independent variables, broken down by discipline (see Table 0.2). It is important to recognize not only that this is very simplified but also that scholars in some disciplines (history, for example) rarely consider that they are examining discrete dependent or independent variables.

Clearly, we endorse the call for more cross-national interdisciplinary research projects (Castles 1993; Massey et al. 1998; Favell in this volume), whether at a micro- or a macro-level of analysis. How, for example, are first-generation immigrants differentially incorporated (economically, politically, socially, spatially) in

*Table 0.2* Modeling Migrant Behavior and Its Effects

| <i>Discipline</i> | <i>Dependent Variables</i>   | <i>Independent Variables</i>  |
|-------------------|--|---|
| Anthropology      | Migrant behavior and migrant identities, gender relations (emigration, integration)                                      | Social and cultural context, transnational networks   |
| Demography        | Population dynamics: fertility rates, aging, mortality, and public health  | Levels of immigration and emigration, gender composition of migrant flows. Public policies that determine the composition of migrant flows and stocks: worker <i>versus</i> family migration, student, and refugee migrations |
| Economics         | Migrant flows and adjustment and macroeconomic impact  | Wage/income differentials, demand-pull/supply-push, human capital, factor proportions, structure of the economy and transfer systems  |
| Geography         | Scale of analysis, migrant agency, and structural barriers to mobility   | Spatial, environmental, political, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts   |
| History           | Migrant experience   | Social/historical context   |
| Law               | Legal, political, social, and economic treatment of migrants   | Law or policy   |
| Political science | Policy outputs (admissionist or restrictionist); policy outcomes (control); political incorporation and civic engagement | Institutions, rights, interests   |
| Sociology         | Migrant behavior (immigration and incorporation)   | Networks, enclaves, social capital  |

Source: Created by the authors.

Germany as opposed to the United States, in Britain by comparison with France, in Australia by contrast with Canada, or in Singapore by comparison with Japan or Korea? Similarly, how and to what extent are immigrants, their children, and subsequent generations differentially incorporated in a cross-national context? Or, how do different policies shape the experiences of forced migrants or asylum seekers in Ireland by contrast with Germany or the United States or in countries of the Global South as compared with those of the Global North?

A second topic crying out for interdisciplinary and cross-national examination is the impact (political, economic, social, cultural) of emigration and transnationalism on sending societies (Massey 1999). For example, many scholars have noted how crucial migrants are for national economies (Guarnizo 1997; Newland and Patrick 2004; Kapur and McHale 2012; Martin in this volume) and processes of development (Hollifield et al. 2006; Castles and Wise 2008; de Haas 2010; Wise and Covarrubias 2010; Hollifield and Foley 2021). In the destination countries, we foresee exciting collaboration on the question of citizenship between the political scientists and political sociologists who frame the question in relation to the nation-state and the rights of a democratic society (for example, King 2000), and the anthropologists who frame the questions in relation to ethnicity, the construction of identity, and a sense of belonging (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). One precise example of cross-disciplinary fertilization in this arena is a book edited by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) on the civic participation of immigrants that brings together work by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians. One of the central debates, emerging largely from within the field of economics but with resonance in law and political science, is between those who see a positive impact of immigration and hence propose an admissionist policy, and those who highlight the negative impact and advocate more restrictionist policy.<sup>10</sup> Economic models alone do not offer a complete explanation. Getting to the roots of anti-immigrant sentiments and their connection to the way nationals of the receiving society construct their own identities in relation to immigrants should be a prime research agenda for scholars of international migration. Indeed, political scientists and sociologists already have an extensive body of work on these topics (see, for example, Money 1999; Givens 2005; Norris 2005; Wong 2017). But they need more input from geographers and anthropologists. Again, it is a question that would be better served by cross-national and comparative research on the question of reception.

The broader implications of multidisciplinary and comparative approaches for theory are exciting to contemplate, particularly if bridges can be built between deductive and interpretive approaches, between statistical regularities and unique occurrences, and between the economic and structural forces that shape migrant behavior, and the individual agency that operates both harmoniously and disharmoniously in relation to those forces. In his concluding essay, Adrian Favell challenges migration scholars to think globally and to avoid the tendency to focus narrowly on nation-states and the comparative politics of immigration. He laments the dominance of the US case and of American social scientists in the study of migration. He also explains how the organization of migration research

in university departments is a constraining factor (the silo effect) on truly interdisciplinary work, a point also suggested by Borkert (2018). Favell strives mightily to square some very difficult social scientific circles, between what he calls naïve positivism and constructivism, arguing instead for what he calls “constructive realism” that “might enable a re-thinking of migration theory ... and help us re-build a more politically autonomous and scientific form of studying [migration].” He wants to move away from an approach to the study of migration that is wedded to “time and place specific narratives.” In this, he is closer to many anthropologists (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) who reject a “nation-state”-centered approach and he takes issue with Hollifield and Wong who want to give primacy to the state and policy in explaining international migration. He takes the counterintuitive view that mobility is natural and normal in human history (a point also made by Gabaccia for the *longue-durée*), and that “what is abnormal ... is the idea that human societies need to construct political borders ... that constrain ... spatial mobility.” Not surprisingly, he points to the European Union (EU) with its relatively open borders as the wave of the future, even though the global pandemic, combined with a nativist and populist backlash against immigration and asylum-seeking, has led to the re-imposition of border controls and new constraints on human mobility. Brexit—the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the EU—is a prime example.

Much work remains to be done on migration and the Global South. As noted above, primarily anthropologists and, to a lesser extent, historians have conducted the most work in the countries of origin, but the questions asked must be expanded through the participation of those in other disciplines, particularly political science (see Sadiq 2009; Betts 2013; Norman 2020) and economics (Clemens 2011). Approximately 36 percent of global migration is south–south and because of climate change, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts, the number of forced migrants, whether refugees or internally displaced people, is increasing (Hollifield 2021c). Migration is increasingly important for human and economic development, and migration is beginning to rival trade and FDI as a driver of interdependence (Hollifield et al. 2006; Hollifield and Foley 2021). The northern (and western) bias in migration studies is essentially a power dynamic, with most theory originating from scholars in the Global North, whereas the data are to be found increasingly in the Global South. This is clearly reflected in Levy et al. (2020), which depicts the “internationalization” of the field, co-authorships, and self-reference revolving around scholarly networks in the United States and Western Europe. The “structure” of the field is driven largely by the research and policy agenda of scholars in the Global North.

Perhaps the biggest (and most unique) challenge in migration studies is to “bring the state and politics back into” our theoretical and analytical frameworks, which have been heavily society-centric, because of the dominance of sociology and demography in the field (Hollifield and Wong, also Héran and Abraham in this volume). With the rise of reactive populism (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Joppke 2021), the politics of migration has taken a radical turn. Nationalism, nativism, and new forms of “scientific racism” (Thürnhardt 1993) are taking



us “back to the future,” and much of the scholarship on migration has been politicized. Politicians of the radical right dismiss decades of research on the economics of migration (immigrants are blamed for taking jobs from natives), immigrant integration (immigrants are blamed for crime, terrorism, insecurity, and an “unwillingness to assimilate”), and migration and development (refugees and asylum seekers are seen as a burden). Symbolic politics (the push by the Trump administration to build a wall along the entire southern border of the US) have overwhelmed the realities of migration (Mexico has gone through a demographic transition and net migration from Mexico to the US has been negative since 2007; Massey 2020). In the 2010s, increasing numbers of people were displaced and refugee populations continue to increase, just at a time when states are closing their borders to asylum seekers, ignoring their commitments to the Refugee Convention and undermining cooperation among states to deal with displacement and the ensuing humanitarian crises (Mountz 2020; Hollifield 2021c). Clearly, politics and the state matter in migration studies, but, as Hollifield and Wong put it, how can we bring them back into migration studies? Migration policy is one of the principal ways in which states “discipline” (Foucault 1979) individuals, groups, and populations that fall under their control, and social scientists often are caught up in policy agendas that serve dominant interests and the parties in power. It has been pointed out that migration policy is, by definition, discriminatory, and that states must choose who is allowed to enter, reside, and settle on their territories (see, for example, Carens 2013). For social scientists, this poses a host of ethical and moral dilemmas, and many political theorists have wrestled with the tradeoffs involved in making migration policy (Gibney 2004).

Because of the radical and populist turn in erstwhile liberal democracies, it is more important than ever for scholars to understand the politics of migration and the evolution of migration states (Hollifield 2004), how states seek to manage migration for strategic gains, and the role of migration in national and human development in the Global North and especially in the Global South (Hollifield and Foley 2021). At the same time, and given the highly politicized nature of the field, scholars must be ever attentive to the empirical (fact- and data-based) nature of their work (Héran in this volume), and they must hew to the Popperian maxim of advancing falsifiable propositions. In this respect, migration studies are quite conventional, even though the field is almost by definition multidisciplinary and has many unique features. Thus, it is equally important to pay attention to historical context, to the immigrant point of view and the immigrant experience, to the myriad contributions that immigrants make to local and national economies, and to the social connections that they forge within and across national boundaries.

## Notes

1. These projections by Pew have not held up well due in large part to the highly restrictive immigration and refugee policies put in place by the Trump



administration. This observation is based on an exchange with one of the authors of the Pew report.

2. Even though the UN (UNDESA 2019) continues to make a distinction between migration in the Global North and Global South, some migration scholars (Bakewell 2009; Natter 2018) question the north/south binary because it is politically constructed, a legacy of colonialism, and it obfuscates the many similarities between migration in the southern and northern hemispheres.
3. A conceptual distinction is drawn between internal and international migration, the former referring to movement that occurs within national borders (internal migration) and the latter to movement across national borders (emigration or immigration and forced migration). We use the term migration somewhat loosely here to refer to international migration, generally the emphasis of all the essays in this volume. However, from a theoretical perspective it is worth noting that economic theories of migration often apply to internal and international flows (Stark 1991; Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch 2006); and some sociologists, political scientists, demographers, and human geographers prefer the more general term “mobility” to migration (Koslowski 2011; Smith and Favell 2006).
4. Hammar and Tamas (1997:13) observe that research is “frequently undertaken without consideration or consultation of related work in other disciplines” and call for more multidisciplinary research endeavors. Similarly, in an edited volume on Mexican immigration to the United States, Suárez-Orozco (1998) calls for more “interdisciplinary dialogue.” An early effort at interdisciplinary dialogue is Kritiz, Keely, and Tomas (1981).
5. Portes (1997:10) argues that any attempt at an all-encompassing theory would be futile and that even the macro and the micro are not easily united into a single approach. Cf. also Portes and DeWind (2004).
6. Faist (1997:188) has usefully reformulated these three levels of analysis as the structural (the political-economic and cultural factors in the sending and receiving countries), the relational (the social ties of movers and stayers), and the individual (the degrees of freedom of potential movers). He also views macro- and micro-models as causal, while meso-models are processual. Hoerder (1997) offers a slightly different tri-level model: analysis of world systems, analysis of behavior among individual migrants from the bottom up, and analysis of segmentation and individual actions in terms of networks and family economies.
7. Caldwell and Hill (1988) have noted a similar “obsession” in other areas of demographic research and have consequently called for more micro approaches. Massey et al. (1994:700) view the focus on methodological and measurement issues in the literature on North American immigration as limiting to the advancement of theoretical understanding of what shapes and controls flows on migration.
8. Some examples are Brettell (1995), Hart (1997), Kibria (1993), Gmelch (1992), Olwig (1998), Stack (1996), and several of the chapters in Benmayor

- and Skotnes (1994a). Yans-McLaughlin (1990) writes about the use of subjective documents in history for similar purposes. See also Brettell (2003a).
9. Massey et al. (1998) make such an attempt in a volume that compares the migration systems in North America, Western Europe, the Gulf region, Asia and the Pacific, and the Southern Cone region of South America. See also Hollifield and Foley (2021).
  10. There are those policy analysts who see the impact of immigration varying with the characteristics of the migrants and the nature of the host economy; hence, visas should be rationed according to the “national interest” and a strict cost-benefit logic.

## References

- Adamson, Fiona B. and Gerasimos Tsourapas. 2019. “The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental and Neoliberal Forms of Migration Management.” *International Migration Review* 54 (3): 853–82.
- Alba, Richard and Mary Waters, eds. 2011. *The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in Comparative Perspective*. New York: New York University Press.
- Alba, Richard and Jennifer Holdaway. 2013. *The Children of Immigrants at School: A Comparative Look at Integration in the United States and Western Europe*. New York: New York University Press.
- Aleinikoff, Alexander, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura. 2003. *Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy*. St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West.
- Bade, Klaus and Myron Weiner. 1997. *Migration Past, Migration Future: Germany and the United States*. Providence/Oxford: Berghan Books.
- Baganha, Maria Ioannis. 1990. *Portuguese Emigration to the United States, 1820–1930*. New York: Garland.
- Baily, Samuel L. 1990. “Cross-Cultural Comparison and the Writing of Migration History: Some Thoughts on How to Study Italians in the New World.” In *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, edited by Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, 241–53. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1999. *Immigrants in the Land of Promise. Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Baily, Samuel L. and Franco Ramella, eds. 1988. *One Family, Two Worlds: An Italian Family’s Correspondence across the Atlantic, 1901–1922*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Bakewell, Oliver. 2009. “South-South Migration and Human Development: Reflections on African Experiences.” In *Human Development Research Paper 2009/07*. New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- Bauböck, Rainer. 2012. “Migration and Citizenship: Normative Debates.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 594–613. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Benmayor, Rina and Andor Skotnes. 1994a. *Migration and Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1994b. “On Migration and Identity.” In *Migration and Identity*, edited by Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotnes, 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Betts, Alexander. 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and Displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Bevelander, Pieter and James F. Hollifield. 2021. "Managing Migration in Modern Welfare States." In *Handbook on Migration and Welfare*, edited by Markus M.L. Crepaz, 13–44. London: Edward Elgar.
- Bjeren, Gunilla. 1997. "Gender and Reproduction." In *International Migration, Immobility and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist, 219–46. New York: Berg Publishers.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2013. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Comparative Design in the Study of Migration." *Migration Studies* 1 (1): 27–46.
- Bommes, Michael and Andrew Geddes. 2000. *Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State*. London: Routledge.
- Borjas, George J. 1985. "Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality and the Earnings of Immigrants." *Journal of Labor Economics* 3: 463–89.
- . 1987. "Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants." *American Economic Review* 77: 531–53.
- . 1991. "Immigration and Self-Selection." In *Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market*, edited by John Abowd and Richard Freeman, 29–76. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
- . 1998. "Immigration and Welfare Magnets." *NBER Working Paper Series*, no. 6813, 1–32. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
- . 1999. *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Borkert, Maren. 2018. "Moving Out of the Comfort Zone: Promises and Pitfalls of Interdisciplinary Migration Research in Europe." In *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Evren Yalaz, 57–73. IMISCOE Research Series. New York: Springer Open Access Publishers.
- Bosniak, Linda. 2006. *The Citizen and the Alien*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brettell, Caroline B. 1981. "Is the Ethnic Community Inevitable? A Comparison of the Settlement Patterns of Portuguese Immigrants in Toronto and Paris." *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 9: 1–17.
- . 1986. *Men Who Migrate, Women Who Wait: Population and History in a Portuguese Parish*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1995. *We Have Already Cried Many Tears: The Stories of Three Portuguese Migrant Women*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- . 2003a. "Migration Stories: Agency and the Individual in the Study of Migration." In *Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity*, edited by Caroline B. Brettell, 56–74. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- . 2003b. "Bringing the City Back In: Cities as Context for Immigrant Incorporation." In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, edited by Nancy Foner, 163–95. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research.
- . 2020. "Thinking with Comparison in the Anthropology/Historical Anthropology of Migration." In *Comparing Cultures: Innovations in Comparative Ethnography*, edited by Michael Schnegg and Edward Lowe, 23–44. Cambridge University Press.
- Brettell, Caroline B. and Deborah Reed-Danahay. 2012. *Civic Engagements: The Citizenship Practices of Indian and Vietnamese Immigrants*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brochmann, Grete. 2022. "Governing Immigration in Advanced Welfare States: The Scandinavian 'Case.'" In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective*, edited

- by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia Orrenius, and François Héran, 412–439. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Çağlar, Ayşe and Nina Glick Schiller. 2018. *Migrants and City-Making: Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban Regeneration*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Caldwell, John C. and Allan G. Hill. 1988. “Recent Developments Using Micro-Approaches to Demographic Research.” In *Micro-Approaches to Demographic Research*, edited by John Caldwell, Allan Hill, and Valerie Hull, 1–9. London: Kegan Paul International.
- Campbell, M. 1995. “The Other Immigrants: Comparing the Irish in Australia and the United States.” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 14: 3–22.
- Card, David. 2001. “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration.” *Journal of Labor Economics* 19: 22–64.
- Carens, Joseph. 2000. *Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2013. *The Ethics of Immigration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castles, Stephen. 1993. “Migrations and Minorities in Europe. Perspectives for the 1990s: Eleven Hypotheses.” In *Racism and Migration in Western Europe*, edited by John Wrench and John Solomos, 17–34. Oxford: Berg Publishers.
- Castles, Stephen and G. Kosack. 1973. *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Castles, Stephen and Raúl Delgado Wise, eds. 2008. *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Chacko, Elizabeth and Marie Price. 2020. “(Un)Settled Sojourners in Cities: Exploring the Scalar and Temporal Dimensions of Migrant Precarity.” -- special issue *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46: 4597–4614.
- Chiswick, Barry. 1978. “The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men.” *Journal of Political Economy* 86: 897–921.
- . 1986. “Is the New Immigration Less Skilled than the Old?” *Journal of Labor Economics* 4: 168–92.
- . 2008. “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?” In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines* (2nd ed.), edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, 63–82. New York: Routledge.
- Chung, Erin Aeran. 2021. “The Developmental Migration State in East Asia.” In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, 127–151. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2022. “Immigration and Citizenship in Japan and Korea.” In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective* (4th ed.), edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran, 639–666. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Clemens, Michael. 2011. “Economics and Emigration: Trillion Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25 (3): 83–106.
- Coleman, Doriane Lambelet. 1996. “Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma.” *Columbia Law Review* 96: 1093–167.
- De Haas, Hein. 2010. “Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective.” *International Migration Review* 44 (1): 227–64.
- De Haas, Hein, Mark J. Miller, and Stephen Castles. 2020. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: The Guilford Press.

- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate*. Charlottesville, VI: University of Virginia Press.
- . 2012. “Immigrant Participation.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 171–89. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Diner, Hasia. 1983. *Erin’s Daughters in America: Irish Immigrant Women in the Nineteenth Century*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2008. “History and the Study of Immigration: Narratives of the Particular.” In *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines* (2nd ed.), edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, 31–50. New York: Routledge.
- Duleep, Harriet O. and Mark C. Regets. 1997a. “Measuring Immigrant Wage Growth Using Matched CPS Files.” *Demography* 34: 239–49.
- . 1997b. “The Decline in Immigrant Entry Earnings: Less Transferable Skills or Lower Ability?” *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 37 (Special Issue on Immigration): 89–208.
- Ellermann, Antje and Ben O’Heran. 2021. “Unsettling Migration Studies: Indigeneity and Immigration in Settler Colonial States”. In *Research Handbook on Law and Politics of Migration*, edited by Catherine Dauvergne, 21–34. Cheltenham: Elgar.
- Faist, Thomas. 1997. “The Crucial Meso-Level.” In *International Migration, Immobility and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist, 187–217. New York: Berg Publishers.
- Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- FitzGerald, David. 2008. *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Foner, Nancy. 1985. “Race and Color: Jamaican Migrants in London and New York City.” *International Migration Review* 19: 706–27.
- . 1998. “Towards a Comparative Perspective on Caribbean Migration.” In *Caribbean Migration: Globalised Identities*, edited by Mary Chamberlain, 47–60. New York: Routledge.
- . 2000. *From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration*. New Haven, CT and New York: Yale University Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
- . 2005. *In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration*. New York: New York University Press.
- Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba. 2008. “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?” *International Migration Review* 42 (2): 360–92.
- Foner, Nancy, Jan Rath, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Rogier van Reekum. 2014. *New York and Amsterdam; Immigration and the New Urban Landscape*. New York: New York University Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1979. *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Freeman, Gary P. 1979. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experiences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1995. “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States.” *International Migration Review* 19: 881–902.
- . 1998. *Toward a Theory of the Domestic Politics of International Migration in Western Nations*. South Bend, IN: The Nanovic Institute, University of Notre Dame.
- Fuchs, Lawrence. 1990. *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and Civic Culture*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.

- Fussell, Elizabeth. 2012. "Space, Time, and Volition; Dimensions of Migration Theory." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 25–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gabaccia, Donna. 1984. *From Sicily to Elizabeth Street: Housing and Social Change among Italian Immigrants, 1880–1930*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- . 1994. *From the Other Side: Women, Gender and Immigrant Life in the U.S. 1820–1990*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Gabaccia, Donna and Fraser M. Ottanelli. 2001. *Italian Workers in the World: Labor Migration and the Formation of Multiethnic States*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Gamlen, Alan and Henry Sherrell. 2022. "Australia and New Zealand: Classical Migration States?" In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective* (4th ed.), edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran, 175–210. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gardner, Martha. 2005. *The Qualities of a Citizen: Women, Immigration and Citizenship, 1870–1965*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gibney, Matthew J. 2004. *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Givens, Terri E. 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gjerde, Jon. 1985. *From Peasants to Farmers: The Migration from Balestrand, Norway, to the Upper Middle West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1996. *The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830–1917*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina.
- Gmelch, George. 1992. *Double Passage: The Lives of Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back Home*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Goldin, Ian, Geoffrey Cameron, and Meera Balarajan. 2011. *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gordon, Milton. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Green, Nancy. 1990. "L'histoire comparative et le champs des études migratoires." *Annales ESC* 6: 1335–50.
- . 1997. *Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work: A Century of Industry and Immigrants in Paris and New York*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo. 1997. "The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and The Mirage of Return Migration among Dominican Transmigrants." *Identities* 4: 281–322.
- Hammar, Tomas, ed. 1985. *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hammar, Tomas and Kristof Tamas. 1997. "Why Do People Go or Stay?" In *International Migration, Immobility and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist, 1–19. New York: Berg Publishers.
- Hanley, Lisa M., Blair A. Ruble, and Allison M. Garland. 2008. *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities: Renegotiating the City*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hanson, Gordon H. 2005. *Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.



- Hart, Dianne Walta. 1997. *Undocumented in L.A.: An Immigrant's Story*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Hazán, Miryam. 2021. "International Migration and Refugee Movements in Latin America." In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, 312–341. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Heisler, Barbara Schmitter. 2008. "The Sociology of Immigration: From Assimilation to Segmented Assimilation, from the American Experience to the Global Arena." In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines* (2nd ed.), edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, 83–112. New York: Routledge.
- Héran, François. 2007. *Le Temps des immigrés. Essai sur le destin de la population française*. Paris: La République des idées / Seuil.
- . 2012. "The Population Ageing Process in Global Perspective." In *Global Ageing in the 21st Century: Challenges, Opportunities and Implications*, edited by S. McDaniel and Z. Zimmer, 13–31. Farnham, Ashgate.
- . 2017. *Avec l'immigration. Mesurer, débattre, agir*. Paris: La Découverte.
- . 2018. "Europe and the Spectre of Sub-Saharan Migration." *Population and Societies* 558: 1–4.
- Hill, Allan G. 1997. "'Truth Lies in the Eye of the Beholder': The Nature of Evidence in Demography and Anthropology." In *Anthropological Demography: Toward a New Synthesis*, edited by David I. Kertzer and Tom Fricke, 223–47. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L. and John H. Mollenkopf. 2009. *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hochstadt, Steve. 1981. "Migration and Industrialization in Germany, 1815–1977." *Social Science History* 5: 445–68.
- Hoerder, Dirk. 1997. "Segmented Macrosystems and Networking Individuals: The Balancing Function of Migration Processes." In *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, edited by Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, 73–84. Bern: Peter Lang.
- . 2002. *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hollifield, James F. 1992. *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2000. "Migration and the 'New' International Order: The Missing Regime." In *Managing Migration: The Need for a New International Regime*, edited by Bimal Ghosh, 75–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2004. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* 38: 885–912.
- . 2005. "Sovereignty and Migration." In *Immigration and Asylum from 1900 to the Present, Volume Two*, edited by Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansens. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- . 2012. "Migration and International Relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2021a. "General Perspectives on Membership: Citizenship, Migration, and the End of Liberalism?" In *Handbook of Citizenship and Migration*, edited by Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso, 101–117. London: Edward Elgar.

- . 2021b. “Migration and the Liberal Paradox in Europe.” In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, 413–441. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2021c. “Driven Out.” *The Wilson Quarterly*. Fall.
- Hollifield, James F. and Neil Foley, eds. 2021. *Understanding Global Migration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F., Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran, eds. 2022. *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective* (4th ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F., Pia M. Orrenius, and Thomas Osang. 2006. *Migration, Trade and Development*. Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Hollifield, James F. and Carole J. Wilson. 2011. “Rights-Based Politics, Immigration, and the Business Cycle: 1890–2008.” In *High-Skilled Immigration in a Global Labor Market*, edited by Barry R. Chiswick, 50–80. Washington, DC: The AEI Press.
- Horowitz, Donald and Gérard Noiriel. 1992. *Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American Experience*. New York: New York University Press.
- Huber, Gregory A. and Thomas J. Espenshade. 1997. “Neo-Isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism, and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants.” *International Migration Review* 31: 1031–54.
- Ireland, Patrick. 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jacobson, David. 1996. *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Joppke, Christian, ed. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-state: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2021. *Neoliberal Nationalism: Immigration and the Rise of the Populist Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahanec, M., A. Zaiceva, and K.F. Zimmermann. 2009. “Lessons from Migration after EU Enlargement.” In *EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration*, edited by M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann, 3–46. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Kapur, Devesh and John McHale. 2012. “Economic Effects of Emigration on Sending Countries.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 131–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kastoryano, Riva. 1997. *La France, l’Allemagne et leurs immigrés: négocier l’identité*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Kertzer, David and Dennis Hogan. 1989. *Family, Political Economy, and Demographic Change: The Transformation of Life in Casalecchio, Italy, 1861–1921*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Kertzer, David I. and Tom Fricke. 1997. “Toward an Anthropological Demography.” In *Anthropological Demography: Toward a New Synthesis*, edited by David I. Kertzer and Tom Fricke, 1–35. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kibria, Nazli. 1993. *Family Tighrope: The Changing Lives of Vietnamese Americans*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- King, Desmond. 2000. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Diverse Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



- . 2005. *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, Russell. 2018. “Context Based Qualitative Research and Multi-suited Migration Studies in Europe.” In *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, edited by Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Evren Yalaz, 35–56. IMISCOE Research Series, Springer Open Access Publishers.
- Klotz, Audie. 2013. *Migration and National Identity in South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Koslowski, Rey, ed. 2011. *Global Mobility Regimes*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kritz, Mary M., Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi, eds. 1981. *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research in International Population Movements*. New York: Center for Migration Studies.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Law, Anna O. 2010. *The Immigration Battle in American Courts*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Leeds, Elizabeth. 1984. “Salazar’s ‘Modelo Económico’: The Consequences of Planned Constraint.” In *Portugal in Development: Emigration, Industrialization, the European Community*, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau, Victor M.P. da Rosa, and Alex Macleod, 13–51. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
- Legomsky, Stephen. 1987. *Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levy, Nathan, Asya Pisarevskaya, and Peter Scholten. 2020. “Between Fragmentation and Institutionalisation: The Rise of Migration Studies as a Research Field.” *Comparative Migration Studies* 8/24: 1–24.
- Liu-Farrer, Gracia and Brenda Yeoh, eds. 2018. *Routledge Handbook of Asian Migrations*. New York: Routledge.
- Lucassen, Jan and Leo Lucassen, eds. 1997. *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Lucassen, Leo. 2021. “Beyond the Migration State: Western Europe since World War II.” In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, 385–411. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mageean, Deirdre M. 1991. “From Irish Countryside to American City; The Settlement and Mobility of Ulster Migrations in Philadelphia.” In *Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: A Social History of Migration*, edited by Colin G. Pooley and Ian D. Whyte, 42–61. London: Routledge.
- Magnarella, Paul J. 1991. “Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The Cultural Defense on Trial.” *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 19: 65–84.
- Marshall, T.H. 1964. *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
- Martin, Philip, Manolo Abella, and Christianne Kuptsch. 2006. *Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Martiniello, Marco. 2013. “Comparisons in Migration Studies.” *Comparative Migration Studies* 1 (1): 7–22.
- Massey, Douglas S. 1999. “International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State.” *Population and Development Review* 25: 303–22.
- . 2020. “Immigration Policy Mismatches and Counterproductive Outcomes: Unauthorized Migration to the U.S. in Two Eras.” *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(21): 1–27.

- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kovaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review* 19: 431–66.
- . 1994. "An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case." *Population and Development Review* 20: 699–751.
- . 1998. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Massey, Douglas S. and Jorge Durand, eds. 2004. *Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican Migration Project*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Miller, Kerby. 1985. *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, Mark J. 1981. *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force*. New York: Praeger.
- Mincer, Jacob. 1978. "Family Migration Decisions." *Journal of Political Economy* 86: 749–73.
- Moch, Leslie Page. 1992. *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Moch, Leslie Page and Louise A. Tilly. 1985. "Joining the Urban World: Occupation, Family and Migration in Three French Cities." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 25: 33–56.
- Money, Jeannette. 1999. *Fences and Neighbors: The Geography of Immigration Control*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Montello, D.R. 2001. "Scale in Geography." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes, 13501–04. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Motomura, Hiroshi. 2014. *Immigration Outside the Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mountz, Alison. 2020. *The Death of Asylum: Hidden Geographies of the Enforcement Archipelago*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- The National Academies of Science (NAS). 2015. *The Integration of Immigrants into American Society*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- The National Academies of Science (NAS). 2017. *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Natter, Katharina. 2018. "Rethinking Immigration Policy Theory Beyond 'Western Liberal Democracies.'" *Comparative Migration Studies* 6 (4): 1–21.
- Newland, Kathleen and Erin Patrick. 2004. *Beyond Remittances: The Role of the Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Norman, Kelsey P. 2020. *Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration, and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD. 2020. *OECD International Migration Outlook*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Olwig, Karen Fog. 1998. "Constructing Lives: Migration Narratives and Life Stories among Nevisians." In *Caribbean Migration: Globalised Identities*, edited by Mary Chamberlain, 63–80. New York: Routledge.

- Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny. 2012. "Economic Effects of Migration: Receiving States." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 105–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, Robert Ezra. 1930. "Assimilation, Social." In *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by Edwin Seligman and Alvin Johnson, 281. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Park, Robert Ezra and Ernest W. Burgess. 1921. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. 1994. *Immigrants and Taxes: A Reappraisal of Huddle's 'The Costs of Immigration.'* Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. and D'Vera Cohn. 2011. *Unauthorized Immigrant Populations: National and State Trends*. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.
- Passel, Jeffrey S., D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. 2013 "Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed." *Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project*.
- Perlmann, Joel and Roger Waldinger. 1997. "Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Present—A Reconsideration." *International Migration Review* 31: 893–922.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67 (1): 114–54.
- Pew Research Center. 2015. *Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
- Pisarevskay, Asya. 2020. "Mapping Migration Studies: An Empirical Analysis of the Coming of Age of a Research Field." *Migration Studies* 8 (3): 455–81.
- Portes, Alejandro, ed. 1996. *The New Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1997. "Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities." *International Migration Review* 31: 799–825.
- Portes, Alejandro and Josh DeWind, eds. 2004. "Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration." *International Migration Review* 38: special issue.
- Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 1990. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 530: 74–96.
- Price, Marie and Lisa Benton-Short, eds. 2008. *Migrants to the Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick and Irene Bloemraad, eds. 2008. *Civic Hopes and Political Realities; Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Rath, Jan, ed. 2002. *Unravelling the Rag Trade: Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Seven World Cities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ravenstein, E. 1885. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 48 (2): 167–235.
- Reitz, Jeffrey. 2022. "Canada." In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective* (4th ed.), edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran, 123–167. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Rothman, E.S., and Thomas J. Espenshade. 1992. "Fiscal Impacts of Immigration to the United States." *Population Index* 58: 381–415.
- Rudolph, Christopher. 2006. *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Russell, Sharon Stanton. 1986. "Remittances from International Migration: A Review in Perspective." *World Development* 41: 677–96.
- Sadiq, Kamal. 2009. *Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salyer, Lucy E. 1995. *Law Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1991. *The Global City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1996. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schmitter, Barbara E. 1979. *Immigration and Citizenship in West Germany and Switzerland*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Schnegg, Michael and Edward Lowe, eds. 2020. *Comparing Cultures: Innovations in Comparative Ethnography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scholten, Peter. 2020. *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: A Complexity Approach to the Governance of Migration and Diversity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schuck, Peter H. 1998. *Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Schuck, Peter H. and Rogers Smith. 1985. *Citizenship without Consent*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 2018. "The Question of Birthright Citizenship." *National Affairs*. Summer: 50–67.
- Shweder, Richard. 2003. "The Moral Challenge in Cultural Migration." In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, edited by Nancy Foner, 259–94. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- Simon, Julian. 1984. "Immigrants, Taxes and Welfare in the United States." *Population and Development Review (March)* 10/1: 55–69.
- Simon, Patrick. 2005. "The Measurement of Racial Discrimination: The Policy Use of Statistics." *International Journal of Social Science* 183: 9–25.
- Simon, Patrick, Victor Piché, and Amélie A. Gagnon, eds. 2015. *Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity*. London: Springer.
- Singer, Audrey, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds. 2008. *Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Skerry, Peter. 2000. *Counting on the Census: Race, Group Identity, and the Evasion of Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Skop, Emily. 2006. "The Methodological Potential of Focus Groups in Population Geography." *Population, Space and Place* 12: 113–24.
- Smith, Michael Peter and Adrian Favell. 2006. *The Human Face of Global Mobility: International Highly Skilled Migration in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Smith, Robert. 1997. "Transnational Migration, Assimilation, and Political Community." In *The City and the World: New York's Global Future*, edited by Margaret E. Crahan and Alberto Vourvoulias-Bush, 110–32. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

- Smith, Rogers. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sowell, Thomas. 1996. *Migration and Cultures: A World View*. New York: Basic Books.
- Soysal, Yasemin N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Stack, Carol. 1996. *Call to Home: African Americans Reclaim the Rural South*. New York: Basic Books.
- Stark, Oded. 1991. *The Migration of Labor*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
- Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M. 1998. *Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Swierenga, Robert. 1981. "Dutch International Migration Statistics, 1820–1880: An Analysis of Linked Multinational Nominal Files." *International Migration Review* 15: 445–70.
- Thomas, W. and F. Znaniecki. 1918. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Boston, MA: Badger.
- Thomson, Mark and Maurice Crul. 2007. "The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (7): 1025–41.
- Thränhardt, Dietrich. 1993. "Die Ursprünge von Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der Konkurrenzdemokratie." *Leviathan* 21/3: 336–57.
- , ed. 1996. *Europe: A New Immigration Continent*. Münster: Lit verlag.
- Tichenor, Daniel J. 2002. *The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2021. "The Development of the U.S. Migration State: Nativism, Liberalism, and Durable Structures of Exclusion." In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, 205–232. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Torpey, John. 2000. *The Invention of the Passport*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- UNDESA. 2019. "International Migration 2019." New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
- Volpp, Leti. 1994. "(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the 'Cultural Defense.'" *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 17: 57–101.
- Waldinger, Roger and David FitzGerald. 2004. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (5): 1177–95.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- Weber, Max. 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: The Free Press.
- Weiner, Myron. 1987. "International Emigration and the Third World." In *Population in an Interacting World*, edited by William Alonso, 173–200. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1995. *The Global Migration Crisis*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Weiner, Myron and Tadashi Hanami. 1998. *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens? Japanese and U.S. Migrations Policies*. New York: New York University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-state Building, Migration, and the Social Sciences." *Global Networks* 2 (4): 301–34.

- Wise, Raul Delgado and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias. 2010. "Understanding the Relationship between Migration and Development: Toward a New Theoretical Approach." In *Migration, Development and Transnationalization: A Critical Stance*, edited by Nina Glick Schiller and Thomas Faist, 142–75. New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books.
- Wong, Tom K. 2015. *Rights, Deportation, and Detention in the Age of Immigration Control*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2017. *The Politics of Immigration: Partisanship, Demographic Change, and American National Identity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wyman, M. 1993. *Round Trip to America*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yans-McLaughlin, Virginia. 1990. "Metaphors of Self in History: Subjectivity, Oral Narrative, and Immigration Studies." In *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, edited by Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, 254–90. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zhou, Min. 2012. "Segmented Assimilation and the American Experience of Asian Immigrant Children." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 383–409. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ziolek-Skrzypczak, Magdalena. 2013. "Integrating Immigrant Youth: Transatlantic Perspectives." *Migration Information Source*, September.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. 1981. "International Migration in Political Perspective." In *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research in International Population Movements*, edited by Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi. New York: Center for Migration Studies.
- . 2006. *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. New York: Russell Sage; and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Zolberg, Aristide R., A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo. 1986. "International Factors in the Formation of Refugee Movements." *International Migration Review* 20: 151–69.

# 1 Historical Migration Studies

## Time, Temporality, and Theory<sup>1</sup>

*Donna R. Gabaccia*

Hasia Diner's argument (2008: 31–32) that theory matters little in migration history is accurate only if we limit the definition of theory to the creation of models that can predict future outcomes with great generality and certainty. Prediction is key to theorization in the natural sciences, but it is less characteristic of the social sciences and almost completely absent in the humanities. In migration studies, as in the social sciences generally, theory more often explains than predicts. It offers explanations for the causes, consequences, structures, experiences, and dynamics of migration (Brettell and Hollifield, this volume). Migration historians, too, typically seek to explain; in so doing they may use theory from history,<sup>2</sup> humanities, or social sciences. Even for those historians presenting their arguments as chronological and interpretive “narratives” or stories (Cronon 2013), it is explanation, not prediction, that predominates.<sup>3</sup>

No distinctive theory, method, or particular type of evidence defines the discipline of history, which is instead marked by theoretical, methodological, and evidentiary eclecticism. While history certainly studies the past, so do many other disciplines: in migration studies, both humanities and social science scholars sometimes analyze the past (e.g., Ingleheart 2011; Baker and Tsuda 2014). This means that history might best be understood as episteme—a distinctive way of seeing or knowing. Consistent awareness of time (dating), timing (sequencing, chronology, conjuncture), and temporality (scales of analysis) have forged disciplinary lenses that mark history as much as space, place, and spatiality create geography's distinctive disciplinary lenses.

This chapter focuses on the analytical use of time and temporality in migration studies. It argues that periodization—the selection of start and end dates to create temporal scales of analysis—constitutes history's main theoretical contribution to migration studies. Differing periodizations quite literally create different knowledge. Finally, this chapter will also seek to demonstrate how periodization has shaped the kinds of cross-disciplinary exchanges this volume aims to nurture.

### **Discipline and Methodology**

Historical studies suggest that disciplines are ever the constructions of centers of learning, with early documented roots in ancient China and the ancient



Mediterranean (Martin 2010). Because history numbers among the earliest of disciplines, it is often imagined in today's world as Janus-faced for it gazes simultaneously toward the theories, methods, and evidence of humanities and the social sciences. Even today's most important sites of learning—universities—disagree about history's place in their curricula and physical infrastructure: in some universities, historians share buildings and co-teach with colleagues in literature, philosophy, or arts; elsewhere, history shares turf and co-listed courses with sociology, anthropology, or economics. Many historians of migration are most comfortable positioning themselves among social scientists (as in this volume), but considerable numbers instead prefer affiliation with the humanities. In this chapter, I focus most attention on interactions of historians and social scientists within migration studies.

While the study of theory and method are required components of advanced training in the social sciences, historians are more often required to study historiography. Historiography is the history of researching or writing history; it offers historians an introduction to the methodological, theoretical, and evidentiary eclecticism that defines their discipline. This eclecticism is another product of history's long history as a discipline. The earliest historians recorded events in chronological sequences, usually by drawing on their own lived experiences (much like ethnographic "chroniclers" of a particular dynastic state, kin group, or monarch) or on the memory of elders, as captured through oral histories. Mastery of chronology was understood to inform both statecraft among narrow elites and the moral development of all humanity. In Renaissance Europe's Catholic universities, by contrast, history co-existed with other humanistic disciplines—grammar, rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy—that shared a common methodology based on the recovery and critical reading of Greek and Roman texts. With the rise of the modern nation-state after 1700, history increasingly became a discipline defined by analysis of state archives. Archival methods so powerfully reinforced history's association with statecraft and nation building through state activism that the discipline came to be understood as the study of past politics. Within that era's secularizing universities, archival methods sharply differentiated history from newer, positivist disciplines in the social sciences—anthropology, with its commitments to field work, or sociology, with its surveys or analysis of "data."

One of the most striking characteristics of universities in the second half of the twentieth century was the development of interdisciplinarity: increasingly, history adopted and adapted methods from other disciplines, and archival methods were increasingly taken up in the social sciences and humanities as well (e.g., Corti 2004; Steedman 2013). As a result, new scholars in history can experience the recent historiographies of scholarship on human movement as vertigo-inducing. Until a decade or two before I began my own advanced studies, immigration history seemed dominated by "filiopietistic" studies that highlighted immigrant "contributions" to American politics and life. In the 1970s and 1980s, my scholarly generation instead wrote social or "ethnic" histories of individual ethnic and national groups, using quantitative methods (Ruggles and Magnuson 2020), demographic and historical survey data (with significant influence from



theorization within the social sciences or oral histories). Beginning in the 1980s, historians shifted dramatically away from social toward cultural analysis. As newer scholars attempted to “bring the state back in” and to “de-construct” migrant groups through analysis of race, class, and gender, archival methods and textual critiques again became popular, as did theories emerging from literary studies and the humanities. As this chapter will show, the methodological and theoretical twists and turns of historians studying human mobility persistently engaged them in cross-disciplinary exchanges. However, even the experience of vertiginous change failed to dislodge the discipline’s central focus on time, timing, and temporality. Periodization became and has remained a challenge to interdisciplinary dialogue.

### Periodization as Theory

Migration historians work with widely variable temporal scales or “periodizations.” A short periodization may encompass a single year, an individual biography of multiple decades, or analysis of three immigrant generations (Weber 1991)—roughly a century. A century-long periodization also frames many analyses of the development and demise of migrant institutions and immigration policy regimes or political movements. Historians of global migrations more often choose multi-century periodizations, distinguishing early modern (1500–1800) from modern (1800–present) migrations. Such centuries-long periodizations also include the time spans typical of modern nations (“national time”) or modern empires (“imperial time”). World historians of human movement instead prefer longer periodizations—e.g., one millennium (Hoerder 2002) or many millennia (Manning 2013). Here, I will label such periodizations “humanity time”—although some, including Manning (2020), might prefer “species time.” The broadest periodization of all defines “Big History,” which resembles geology in measuring time in eons (Brown 2007; Spier 2010; Christian 2011).<sup>4</sup> Temporal and spatial scales need not match. For example, micro-historians of mobility sometimes write of small places with a very capacious periodization (Wright 2004; Hoerder 2021) or analyze a single year (Hansen 2020) on a global scale.

The social sciences treat periodization more casually. If pressed, most researchers claim to study “the present,” with no concern for when the slice of time defining their research began or ended. For example, of 176 lead articles published in the *International Migration Review* between 2016 and 2020, the titles of three-quarters had titles indicating a geographical location but fewer than ten percent noted periodization or referenced temporality with specific chronological limits or words such as “generational,” “longitudinal,” or “long-term.” A focus on a present time that is presumably quite short but also temporally unspecific transforms the very long past into a section most social scientific studies consider “background.” Temporality is not completely absent from other disciplines of course. Anthropologists critique their discipline’s conflation of an “ethnographic present” with the temporally much longer pre-colonial cultures of the past (Halstead et al. 2008). Sociologists sometimes theorize time itself (Hall 1980). And the social

sciences include historical geographers, historical sociologists, and economic historians. But these are minority approaches.

This chapter argues that periodization constitutes history's main theoretical contribution to migration studies. As much as the choice of spatial scale or the choice of theory, choice of periodization shapes the production of knowledge about both the past and the present. Analysis over shorter or longer time spans typically produces quite different explanations for any phenomenon a scholar seeks to understand. This chapter offers three case studies to illustrate how periodization shapes knowledge production in migration studies. The first examines etymologies of key terms in migration studies. The second traces the development of interdisciplinary scholarship on migration and immigration. The third and longest case study illustrates interdisciplinary exchanges after 1960. It shows how periodization has promoted "talking across disciplines"—notably when historians and social scientists shared a common periodization—or precluded significant cross-disciplinary exchange—e.g., when global historians adopted long periodizations, while global social scientists more often preferred short ones.

### Terminologies of Mobility: Two Periodizations

Language changes over time. English-speaking scholars today work with "terminologies of mobility" (Gabaccia 2018) that include "migration"/"migrants," "mobility," "exile/s," "foreigner/s," "refugee/s," "immigration"/"immigrants," and "emigration"/"emigrants." These terms remain loosely defined and unevenly used across disciplines. They do not translate neatly across languages.<sup>5</sup> Showing how key English language terms evolved over shorter ("national" or "imperial") and longer ("humanity") periodizations produces differing explanations for today's terminological preferences.

The most important key words in use today among English-language scholars date from the years after 1600. Although the Oxford English Dictionary notes "migration" first appearing in the 1500s, the word did not describe human movement until the 1600s. "Emigration" and "immigration" were first used in the 1640s and 1650s, respectively. In the 1700s, English speakers invented new nouns for mobile persons—"migrant" (first use, 1752),<sup>6</sup> "emigrant" (1754), and "immigrant" (1805). This periodization suggests that modern terminologies of mobility reflect the points of view of nation-states and the international system of nations (Hollifield, this volume) that developed in tandem with them and with the beginning of English Empire-building. However, if we substitute a longer periodization, we begin to see, among other things, the origins of the deeply negative associations that sometimes still adhere to these terms.

Phil Barthram's "Old English to Modern English Translator"<sup>7</sup> suggests that British Anglo-Saxons (400–1100 CE) possessed terminologies of mobility long before the emergence of modern nation-states. The Oxford English Translator (OET) translates "migration" as *forweorpnes*, and identifies several other terms, e.g., *faerenness* ("passage from one place to another"), *leoredness* or *geleorednes* ("going out") and *ymbcerr* ("moving about locally"). Old English had no nouns

for immigrants, emigrants, or migrants but rather for the foreigner (*wealh*: meaning Welsh or Gaelic)—who was a mobile outsider. It also had many terms for moving away—there were nouns for pilgrims, outlaws, and banished persons and verbs for fleeing or being forced away. The noun, *wtecscipe* described a miserable, wandering life in a foreign place, and is usually translated as “exile.”

Few of these Old English terms persisted into Modern English. Newer terminologies—including “migration”—emerge during the linguistic transition from Old to Middle English, initiated by the 1066 invasion and settlement of Britain by French-speaking Normans (Huscroft: 321–322). The newer terms mainly had origins in Classic Latin or Greek. Already in the 1200s, English speakers replaced *elpeodignes* with “pilgrim” (Latin, *peregrinum*/foreigner). In the 1300s, the Latin noun “exile” (*exsilium*) replaced *wtecscipe*. In the 1400s, a new noun—“foreigner”—melded Old French *forain* (vulgate Latin *foranus*—outsider, outlander, coming from outside) and Old English *faerenness* or *forweorpn* (migration). By the 1500s, English speakers also used “barbarian” (Latin *barbaros*) and “stranger” (Latin *extrāneus*) as synonyms for “foreigner,” and they adopted “migration” (Latin *migratio*) for animal, but not yet for human, movements. “Migration” in the 1500s still referred only to human souls ascending to heaven.<sup>7</sup>

The Latin and Greek origins of today’s terminologies introduce the usefulness of a longer periodization—“humanity time”—that brings into contemporary English terminologies the legacy of very old human reckonings with mobility. Until roughly 12,000 years ago, all humans lived as hunting foragers within continuously mobile communities (Manning 2013); mobility itself could not have a marked difference within or across groups. Yet mobility had already appeared to be a salient marker of difference among peoples in the first written documents dating from 1250 to 600 BC in China, Greece, and Rome. The development of agriculture encouraged cultivators to become more sedentary, making mobility salient. The transition from Anglo-Saxon Old English to Middle English terms thus incorporated perspectives that had originated within Rome’s wealthy, urbanized, and culturally diverse agrarian empire. Like other early empires, Rome was also heavily engaged in long-distance trade (Smith 2020; Wilson 2020)—a reminder that both imperial expansion and trade obviously rested on human movement. Still, Rome resembled Greece and China in understanding itself not only as sedentary but also as superior and “civilized.” It labeled its mobile neighbors—the illiterate nomadic pastoralists, herders, hunters, and foragers—as “barbarians,” “foreigners,” and “invaders”—all thoroughly negative terms (Golden 2002: 72–73). Terminologies for “civilized” forms of mobility were different, and benign: Greek merchants or urban Jewish exiles were not barbarians but scattered seeds (*diasporas*). Roman colonizers of conquered territories—*coloni*—were veterans transformed into sedentary farmers (Mann 1983). Rural labor migrants seeking work in Rome’s cities were *metic*, *plebes*, *liberti*, *proletari* (de Ligt and Tacoma 2016). There was no “migrant” in Rome, and *migratio* referred to inconsequential residential moves or simply meant “changeable” (as in the modern Italian term *mobile*—*la donna e mobile*—“the lady is fickle”).

As periodization, “humanity time” explains why so many Middle English terms for mobile humans—foreigners, barbarians, strangers—were decidedly negative, why “mobility” (first used in the 1690s) meant a threatening crowd (a “mob”), and why English speakers created new terms for their own moves as nation- and empire-builders. I have argued elsewhere that, throughout the British Empire, “emigrants” (first used in 1754) functioned as a positive synonym for the people we today more often call “settlers” or “colonizers.” Americans especially valorized the “emigrants” who carried civilization westward, replacing indigenous peoples, to build a new nation. They used the term interchangeably for recently arrived newcomers from Europe and for white Americans with longer colonizing genealogies. While celebrating “emigrants,” Americans attached older, negative associations with foreigners and barbarism to the newer and less commonly used term “immigrant.” Until the twentieth century the label of “immigrant” mainly stigmatized impoverished wage-earners from Asia or from Europe’s margins—newcomers whose involvement in urban and industrial conflicts was believed to originate in their racial inferiority. “Immigrant” lost these threatening associations by the mid-1960s, after 40 years of American exclusion and restriction of labor migrants. Americans thus begin to imagine the United States as a “nation of immigrants” (Gabaccia 2010) as the “great migrations” of African Americans unfolded and as the Civil Rights movement demanded full citizenship for Black Americans—legitimate demands that may have threatened white descendants of immigrants with a still-fragile sense of belonging.

Terminologies of mobility in other languages do not share this very English-centric history. Even today, people labeled as “immigrants” in English are often still “foreigners,” “strangers,” or “outsiders” in other languages. In those languages, “immigrant” and “immigration” are recent and sometimes reluctant borrowings from English or new linguistic inventions based on English language words. The term “refugee” (invented in the 1500s) is still not used interchangeably with “migrant” or “immigrant,” and it is striking that refugee studies too remains a separate field of scholarly study. Based on this etymological history of key terms, I have chosen not to treat migration and immigration studies in this chapter as transparently interchangeable terms and I instead distinguish between immigration studies and migration studies. Contrasting periodizations for the two produce differing explanations for the origins of both. (Future research might also productively explain why refugee studies and mobility studies still remain distinct from immigration studies and migration studies.)

## **Two Periodizations of Interdisciplinary Research**

Most scholars today are familiar with the relatively short periodization of interdisciplinary immigration studies that begins around 1920 with the Chicago School of Sociology. That periodization attributes the origins of immigration studies to American efforts to assess whether urban, industrial “immigrants” would repeat the successful incorporation of their rural, “emigrant” and settler predecessors. The Chicago School of Sociology first theorized immigrants as marginal men,

disorganized both individually and socially by their move from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, but then began to describe them achieving assimilation over the course of three generations (Turner 1988; Conzen 1996; Bukowczyk 2013). In this periodization, the ideas of the Chicago sociologists were taken up by Harvard historians Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. (who saw immigration transforming the United States into an urban society) and his student Oscar Handlin (who famously, if inaccurately, declared that immigrants *were* American history; Handlin 1951: 1). After its short journey from Chicago to Cambridge, however, immigration studies halted its march: it could not easily travel into lands and languages where terminologies of mobility instead focused on “foreigners” (Gabaccia 2018).

A different periodization is required to understand the origins of interdisciplinary migration studies. While some scholars trace the origins of migration studies to the German-born geographer Georg Ravenstein (Greenwood and Hunt 2003), German historians Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder embraced a longer periodization and tell a different story. In *What is Migration History?*, they attributed the development of migration studies to the “sophisticated collection of empirical data” during “(1) eighteenth-century urbanization and increasing mobility within European states, (2) the nineteenth-century transatlantic mass migrations, and (3) twentieth-century northern Chinese settlement migrations to Manchuria” (Harzig and Hoerder 2009: 54–55), tying scholarship in a rather different way to the rise of modern nation-states and empires.

Harzig and Hoerder are correct that mobility was of limited interest to earlier states that produced empirical data mainly to consolidate their power, estimate food storage needs, and tax property (Thorvaldsen 2018: 33). There were minor exceptions, of course. Roman censuses required migrants to return to their birthplaces to be enumerated. Early modern parishes recorded the birthplaces of strangers wishing to register their marriages and deaths. Many early states also demanded that clerks track and tax trade goods entering ports or cities. We know the numbers of enslaved and transported Africans only because they were traded as commodities.

Migration studies certainly owes its origins to what came to be known as the “state sciences” of Europe’s emerging nations—economics, demography, statistics, international law, political economy. Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “mercantilists” such as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Thomas Mun, and Antonio Serra began to address the relationship between human mobility and national well-being. They encouraged states to increase populations by encouraging movements into the realm while limiting outward movements. Mercantilists also grasped how the mobility of empire-building soldiers, missionaries, prisoners, settler colonizers, and merchants engaged in plunder and enslavement could enhance a nation’s wealth (Bennett 2019). The eighteenth-century state scientists—including French physiocrat, physician, and economist François Quesnay, the Swiss jurist and diplomat Emer de Vattel, the British political economist Adam Smith, and the theologian and demographer Thomas Malthus—sought equally to assist states in addressing contemporary problems (Pastore 2005) but more often viewed free migration as positive contributions to national sovereignty

and imperial expansion (Chetail 2017: 901). Only Malthus advocated for limits on movement: historians now see Malthusian restrictions on the mobility of the English poor as a key foundation for later immigration restrictions (Parker 2000; Hirota 2017).

According to Hoerder and Harzig, the vast proletarian migrations that occurred between 1840 and 1930 sparked new international and interdisciplinary migration studies. King (2012) posits Ravenstein's "laws" of migration (based on analysis of census enumerations) as the origin of migration theory. Donato and Gabaccia (2015: 26–27) describe a transatlantic network of state scientists working both for national governments and for the League of Nation's International Labour Office to explain labor mobility. Newer scholarship has also revealed humanities and history scholars joining social scientists employed at secular research universities (Wellmon 2016) to create migration studies. Felix Wiedemann (2020) describes "Migrationists" (Adams et al. 1978) as European scholars who attributed cultural and societal change to migration rather than to Darwinian evolution and natural selection (see also Howells 1976). Using quite different methods, anthropologists, archaeologists, linguists, and Biblical or classical scholars analyzed both physical artifacts and written texts, focusing on the ancient Mediterranean and western Asia. Although later scholars dismissed the racism inherent in some migrationists' work, Wiedemann describes them as theorizers of "geo-historical areas"; according to Wiedemann, migrationists viewed mobile people as founding, destroying, and transforming cultural areas, in part through reproductive amalgamation.

Equally concerned with the relation of culture and migration was the multidisciplinary network nurtured by the migrant German Jewish anthropologist Franz Boas at New York's Columbia University. Hoerder (2015) describes the Boas circle as theorizing migrants as culture-bearing agents of cultural transformation, an idea adopted not only by anthropologists such as the Mexican Manuel Gamio, the first theorist of *indigenismo* and emigration, but also by historians Caroline Ware (who wrote about Greenwich Village's immigrants) and Ralph Tannenbaum (an early student of the African slave trade). The Boas circle read and translated works on culture and power by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and Cuban ethnomusicologist Fernando Ortiz. In particular, Hoerder emphasizes the anti-racist theories developing within this network.

Other recent works by historians (Gjerde 1999; Gabaccia 2015) offer an alternative periodization of American immigration studies. Gjerde described midwestern historians of frontier settlements (i.e., of "emigrants") as "ethnic Turnerians" (or followers of Frederick Jackson Turner, whose "frontier thesis" linked settlement to American democracy). Gabaccia emphasizes their institutional ties to the new public universities of the American Midwest. The midwestern immigration historians had lived in intimate familiarity with their immigrant parents' rural communities. (By calling them "immigrants" rather than "emigrants," these historians began the work of transforming the stigmatized term; not surprisingly, most opposed US immigration restrictions.) These historians knew immigrants' languages; several pursued research on immigrants' former lives in Europe. Like



the Chicago sociologists Florian Znaniecki and William I. Thomas, University of Minnesota historians George Stephenson and Theodore Blegen recognized immigrants' ongoing connections to Europe *via* letter-writing, return migration, and gift exchange.

Turning a gender lens on the Chicago School, sociologist Mary Jo Deegan (1988) has also discovered a "women's Chicago School" that developed around Hull House and other urban social settlements in the 1890s (see also Seltzer and Haldar 2015). In Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York, researchers—many of them female—affiliated with the Russell Sage Foundation (founded by Mrs. Russell Sage, herself a wealthy widow) pioneered survey and statistical methods for the analysis of recently arrived families and communities. Much like state scientists, they offered advice to their governments, and often advocated for the expansion of governmental social services for the poor. Their work too was institutionalized at the University of Chicago, not in the Department of Sociology but at the independent School for Social Service Administration.

Only in the interwar years of the twentieth century did Harzig and Hoerder locate the first migration studies developing outside Europe and the Americas when the South Manchurian Railway Company began a sociological research department to examine the relationship between migration and settlement (Fogel 1988). To date, historians of Chinese mobility (Gottschang 1987; McKeown 2001; Lary 2012; Low 2014) have not pinpointed earlier precedents in China. Meanwhile, in Europe, fascist nationalist movements virtually ended the study of migration (Foner and Lucassen 2012). In the United States, the interwar years saw theorizers of cultural pluralism—Randolph Bourne, Horace Kallen, Leonard Covello, Louis Adamic (Meyer 2000; Selig 2008; Enyeart 2019) reproducing and popularizing ideas originating with Freyre and Ortiz in Latin America.

Again, a change in periodization transforms how we explain a phenomenon—in this case, the origins of both immigration studies and migration studies as overlapping but somewhat different interdisciplinary fields that have co-existed since at least the 1890s. International and interdisciplinary exchanges were foundational to both; the legacies of each field reach to the present. Today's world historians and "big historians" share the migrationists' interest in mobility as a driver of change and innovation. Cultural studies, anthropology, and history still seek answers to the Boasians' and migrationists' questions about migration's cultural consequences. Historians and sociologists continue to debate the theorization by the two Chicago Schools' of American immigrants as problematic newcomers to be served, surveyed, or assimilated. Geographers, historians, and sociologists critique the gravity models and gender analysis developed by Ravenstein as "laws of migration." Dirk Hoerder (2004) acknowledges Ortiz's work in developing his own call for "transcultural societal studies" of human movement. Anthropologists and historians write emic accounts of immigrant and migrant subjectivity, families, communities, and culture, and both also use the translocal or "bottom-up" (Blegen 1947) methods pioneered by early immigration historians. Clearly, more recent and more extensive efforts to talk across disciplines have had rich precedents.

## **Cross-Disciplinary Exchange: The View from History**

Both interdisciplinarity and the disciplinary production of knowledge about migration and immigration has continued to expand and to change since 1960. To explore historians' involvement in more recent immigration studies and migration studies, I first use a JSTOR digital collection to broadly survey production of knowledge and patterns of exchange. I then turn to examples of interdisciplinary exchanges within immigration studies and migration studies in order to demonstrate how historians engage with theory across disciplinary borders. These examples suggest that the shared periodization of "national time" has provided a dependable facilitator of cross-disciplinary theoretical exchange. Barriers to exchange become more obvious at larger spatial scales, as global historians have adapted longer periodizations such as "humanity time" even as global social scientists have remained committed to a temporally unspecific and short periodization of "the present."

To gain an overview of scholarship produced since 1960, I analyzed 45,000 JSTOR "items" (articles and book chapters available through the University of Toronto Library) that contained "migration," "immigration," or "emigration" in their titles. Searches using JSTOR's "subject" (field)-specific lists of journals and books facilitated comparisons across disciplines and interdisciplinary fields (see Table 1.1, which measures both the volume and rate of scholarly production by discipline). The social sciences (excluding history) collectively produced 64 percent of all relevant titles since 1960, far surpassing the collective contributions of humanities (six percent—again, without the inclusion of history) and of interdisciplinary fields (14 percent). Three individual disciplines—history, anthropology, and sociology—each contributed an impressive 17 percent of the volume of scholarly production since 1960. Measuring rates of productivity—and thus the relative centrality of mobility studies in each discipline—shows that population studies ranked first among the social sciences, followed by anthropology, sociology, and geography. History's productivity was comparable to that of geography. (Readers may be surprised to see high rates of productivity also in archaeology, American studies, Slavic studies, and urban studies as measured in Table 1.1.)

Where possible, I then used a common authorial habit—that of noting the disciplinary "home" of any outsider scholar referenced—e.g., in-text references to "the historian, X," "the anthropologist, Y," "the demographer, Z,"—as a rough measure of cross-disciplinary exchange in the 45,000 items surveyed. The fact that there is no comparable label for scholars in interdisciplinary fields limits a broader analysis. Table 1.2 shows that every 1,000 anthropology "items" about migration, immigration, or emigration included 63.82 references to an historian but only 2.49 references to an economist. Historians were referenced most often in anthropology and economics; economists were referenced most often in geography and population studies; and anthropologists were referenced most often in history and sociology. Overall, political science items were most likely to reference other disciplines, whereas economics items were least likely to do so. My approximate measure of exchange also allowed me to identify more and less



Table 1.1 Volumes and Rates of Scholarly Production across Disciplines, 1960–2020

| <i>JSTOR Subject</i>     | <i>Volume: N Items<sup>3</sup></i> | <i>N Titles<sup>4</sup></i> | <i>Rate: N Items per Title</i> |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Social Sciences</b>   |                                    |                             |                                |
| Anthropology             | 7223                               | 94                          | 78.84                          |
| Archaeology              | 1833                               | 119                         | 15.40                          |
| Development Studies      | 326                                | 26                          | 12.54                          |
| Economics                | 2350                               | 184                         | 12.77                          |
| Geography                | 729                                | 33                          | 22.09                          |
| International Relations  | 638                                | 102                         | 6.25                           |
| Law                      | 1039                               | 136                         | 7.64                           |
| Political Science        | 4006                               | 231                         | 17.34                          |
| Population Studies       | 3564                               | 27                          | 132.00                         |
| Psychology               | 69                                 | 36                          | 1.92                           |
| Sociology                | 7108                               | 150                         | 47.87                          |
| History                  | 7701                               | 355                         | 21.69                          |
| <b>Humanities</b>        |                                    |                             |                                |
| Art/Art History          | 146                                | 171                         | .85                            |
| Classical Studies        | 50                                 | 78                          | .64                            |
| Language and Literature  | 1472                               | 440                         | 3.35                           |
| Philosophy               | 222                                | 139                         | 1.60                           |
| Religion                 | 706                                | 146                         | 2.69                           |
| <b>Interdisciplinary</b> |                                    |                             |                                |
| African Studies          | 480                                | 64                          | 7.5                            |
| African American Studies | 127                                | 20                          | 6.35                           |
| American Studies         | 2196                               | 87                          | 25.24                          |
| Asian Studies            | 1027                               | 136                         | 7.55                           |
| Cultural Studies         | 89                                 | 23                          | 8.87                           |
| European Studies         | 228                                | 19                          | 12.00                          |
| Feminist/Women's Studies | 217                                | 38                          | 5.71                           |
| Gender Studies           | 56                                 | 20                          | 2.80                           |
| Irish Studies            | 185                                | 49                          | 3.78                           |
| Jewish Studies           | 293                                | 58                          | 5.01                           |
| Latin American Studies   | 610                                | 57                          | 10.70                          |
| Middle East Studies      | 344                                | 68                          | 5.05                           |
| Slavic Studies           | 245                                | 20                          | 12.25                          |
| Urban Studies            | 204                                | 17                          | 12.00                          |

Source: University of Toronto JSTOR,<sup>1</sup> Number of Items with Title Key Words Migration, Immigration, or Emigration by Subject.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>University of Toronto JSTOR digital collection, accessed on November 3–4, 2020. JSTOR subscriptions are priced to provide variable levels of access, and its journal titles are continually updated which means JSTOR findings are rarely replicable across time or subscription. For the purposes of this survey, I accessed “all content” (not “only content I can access”) and applied no filters (that can limit searches to specific publication genres, e.g., abstracts or reviews). I did not limit searches by language although my decision to search “immigration,” “migration,” and “emigration” obviously privileged English-language publications.

<sup>2</sup> In JSTOR terminology, “subjects” include both traditional disciplines and interdisciplinary fields.

<sup>3</sup> In JSTOR terminology, “items” are book chapters or journal articles, reviews, and special features.

<sup>4</sup> In JSTOR terminology, “titles” are books, journals, pamphlets, research reports, etc. Journals far outnumber edited books in the University of Toronto JSTOR collection. This means that disciplines privileging scholarly production and circulation through books—history is one of them—may be less well represented in measures of volume or rate of productivity than article-driven disciplines.

<sup>5</sup> This table locates History between Social Sciences and Humanities to reflect the discipline’s Janus-faced position in the disciplinary typologies of modern research universities, as discussed in the text.

<sup>6</sup> The University of Toronto JSTOR digital collection does not include “ethnic studies,” “racial studies,” or “racial/ethnic studies” as separate subjects. Nor are several key journals among other subjects. Compared to the United States or Europe, Ethnic/Racial Studies are not well represented across Canada’s universities.

Source: Created by author.

Table 1.2 Cross-Disciplinary Exchange. N per 1,000 JSTOR Items<sup>1</sup> That Include References to Scholar in Another Discipline, 1960–2020, by Discipline

| <i>JSTOR Discipline (Subject)</i>       | <i>Anthropology</i> | <i>Economics</i> | <i>Geography</i> | <i>History</i> | <i>Political Science</i> | <i>Population Studies</i> | <i>Sociology</i> |
|---|---------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| <i>Discipline of Scholar Referenced</i> |                     |                  |                  |                |                          |                           |                  |
| Anthropologist                          |                     | 8.51             | 26.06            | 46.23          | 33.70                    | 15.43                     | 63.51            |
| Demographer                             | 6.78                | 10.21            | 5.49             | 6.10           | 5.99                     |                           | 4.87             |
| Economist                               | 2.49                |                  | 23.32            | 34.02          | 71.14                    | 37.60                     | 16.57            |
| Geographer                              | 20.63               | 15.74            |                  | 13.50          | 10.23                    | 28.62                     | 8.22             |
| Historian                               | 63.82               | 33.61            | 23.32            |                | 24.71                    | 17.40                     | 17.41            |
| Political Scientist                     | 6.09                | 4.26             | 2.74             | 7.40           |                          | 4.49                      | 5.15             |
| Sociologist                             | 31.01               | 18.72            | 16.46            | 25.06          | 19.22                    | 14.59                     |                  |

<sup>1</sup> In JSTOR terminology, “items” are book chapters, or journal articles, reviews, and special features.

<sup>2</sup> In JSTOR terminology, “subjects” include both traditional disciplines and interdisciplinary fields.

Source: Created by author.

reciprocal cross-disciplinary exchanges. For example, historians referred approximately as often to anthropologists, economists, and sociologists as to scholars in each of those disciplines referred to historians: these exchanges were roughly reciprocal. Historians' exchanges with other social sciences were not reciprocal. For example, geographers, political scientists, and demographers were two to three times more likely to refer to historians than historians were to reference geographers, political scientists, and demographers.

Table 1.2 paints a portrait of an overall positive, if somewhat uneven cross-disciplinary exchange for the years after 1960. It confirms conclusions reached by Levy et al. (2020) that "epistemic communities in migration studies, based largely on disciplines, increasingly refer to one another." Interdisciplinarity is quite common, in other words. However, neither Levy et al. nor Tables 1.1 and 1.2 distinguished immigration studies from migration studies. Given the quite distinctive histories of interdisciplinarity in these fields before 1960, I expected to find differences persisting after 1960. For example, given the birth of immigration studies within the American nation-building project, I expected to find that historians and sociologists would contribute more to immigration studies than migration studies. And that is, in fact, what a comparison of the numbers of JSTOR titles including migration or immigration suggests. However, law and political science closely resembled history and sociology in this respect. For history, a timeline generated by Google Ngram from English-language books suggests that published references to "migration history" surpassed references to "immigration history" only in the past decade.<sup>9</sup> Since 1960, by contrast, scholars in anthropology, archaeology, development studies, economics, and geography have more enthusiastically embraced migration studies, as have humanities disciplines and interdisciplinary fields.

### ***Immigration Studies and National Time***

As a discipline, history has long played a central role in nation building; as we saw earlier, "immigration" (and "emigration") were new terminologies invented to reflect the perspective of a small number of national states emerging from within the British Empire. I thus expected to find that periodization figured differently in immigration studies (which were framed around a "national time" of several centuries) and in migration studies, where (at least since the work of the nineteenth-century migrationists) periodization has varied considerably.

I begin with an American example. Regardless of discipline or national origin, scholars studying U.S. immigration receive at least some training in American history; for them, a shared periodization of "national time" links past to present. Beginning in the 1960s, American immigration reform debates and the popularization of the "nation of immigrants" trope fostered the rapid expansion of historical immigration studies. New scholarly associations (e.g., the Immigration and Ethnic History Society) appeared, along with new journals (such as the *Journal of American Ethnic History*) and book series (*The Ellis Island/Statue of Liberty Series* at the University of Illinois Press). So did hundreds of new monographs (Chudacoff 1976). Drawing on both Chicago Schools and earlier immigration

history, new scholarship appeared on immigrant work and labor (Gutman 1976; Brody 1980) and on immigrant women, families, and communities (McLaughlin 1977; Sellar 1981). With the increase in immigration volumes after 1970, the social sciences also revived their waning interest in American immigration.

As expected, extensive cross-disciplinary exchanges continued (Yans-McLaughlin 1991). One of the most successful developed among feminist scholars. Historians explained the lives of immigrant women by drawing on sociological theories of both sex role socialization (McLaughlin 1974) and anthropological theorization of a universal cultural division of life around masculine (public) and female (private) spheres (Pleck 1978). Historians participated in or initiated all early multidisciplinary publications focusing on modern immigrant women (Morokvasic 1984; Simon and Brettell 1986; Gabaccia 1992). This exchange survived as anthropologists, historians, and sociologists shifted away from the study of women, families, and households toward the study of gender (Mahler and Pessar 2001; Luibheid 2002; Donato et al. 2006; Sinke 2006; Nawyn 2010; Mitchell 2012; Brettell 2016). Attention to gender also opened up new dialogues with humanities scholars (Castro Borrego and Romero Ruiz 2011) and scholarship across all disciplines increasingly explored the intersections of gender, nationality, and migration status in politics, workplaces, education, sexuality, and even the human body itself.

A second extensive dialogue between history and sociology emerged around assimilation in America. Historian Rudolph J. Vecoli's trenchant 1964 article, "Contadini in Chicago" provided an opening salvo that questioned the Chicago School's portraits of immigrant "marginal men." Social and oral histories (Bodnar 1982; Hareven 1983; Blewett 1990) questioned the inevitability of assimilation or viewed Europeans' successful "transplantations," pointing toward "ethnicization" as one dimension of Americanization within a pluralistic society (Gerber 1989; Conzen et al. 1992). Conzen et al. (1992) and Gabaccia (1998) portrayed immigrants not as assimilating to a single mainstream but rather as defining many American mainstreams. Other scholars re-asserted the explanatory power of assimilation theory (Morawska 1994; Barkan 1995; Kazal 1995). But scholars of immigration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America also found assimilation less helpful in explaining their continued exclusion from the American mainstream. Still, historians could easily recognize and embrace the updating of assimilation theory offered by sociologists Alba and Nee in 2003.

Earlier, I described the methodological and theoretical changes of the 1970s and 1980s as vertigo-inducing. By the time Bodnar (1985) offered a synthesis of the newer social and ethnic histories of American immigration, histories of racialized immigrations from Asia (Takaki 1989), the Caribbean (Watkins 1996), Latin America (Ruiz 1987; Sanchez 1993), and Africa (Halter and Johnson 2014) offered sharp critiques of what Paul Spickard (2007) called the "Ellis Island paradigm." Erika Lee (2003) portrayed the United States not as a welcoming "nation of immigrants" but as a gate-keeping nation characterized by racialized exclusions. Shifting attention to exclusionary policies in turn heightened interest in American xenophobia (Lee 2019) and deportation (Hester 2017). National

histories also increasingly portrayed the United States as a culturally plural but hierarchically segmented nation (Gerstle 2002).

These changes in turn fostered new types of cross-disciplinary exchange about methodology and theory. The older heart of American immigration studies in history and sociology shattered into dozens of new interdisciplinary initiatives as critical race theory, refugee studies, and, especially, postcolonial theory fostered new dialogues. So did growing demands to “bring the state back” into the social and ethnic histories of earlier decades. History saw a resurgence in both the exploration of archives (and also of their “silences”; Gilland 2017) and the reading of ever more diverse bodies of texts, ranging from photography, music, and digital metadata to a wide variety of old and new media. Increasingly, American immigration historians studied citizenship, law, alienage, deportation, and illegality (Ngai 2003; Motomura 2006, 2014; Molina 2013; Parker 2015; Zimmer and Salinas 2018), refugee policy (Bon Tempo 2009; Garcia 2017), and borders and borderlands with an expanding American empire (Sharpe 1995; Lim 2017). Scholars in law and political sciences became especially important partners in explorations of policy. The growing popularity of cultural histories of immigration also brought new theoretical influences from the humanities, (Lowe 1996; Buff 2001; Kurashige 2002; Schmidt-Camacho 2008; Bencivenni 2011) and on social constructions, such as whiteness, pan-ethnicity and racialization (Barrett and Roediger 1997; Roediger 2005; Jung 2006). While some historians draw theories from cultural studies (e.g., Appadurai’s ethnoscaples or Spivak’s theories of subalternity), Foucault’s theories of bio-politics and governmentality probably provided the most commonly used theoretical frames for newer work.

Unlike in the past, immigration studies after 1960 also spread modestly beyond the United States. Historians wrote about immigration in other settler colonies such as Australia (Hawkins 1989), Canada (Avery 1979), and, beyond the British Empire, in Argentina (Devoto 2003), thereby raising questions about the exceptionalism of the American nation of immigrants. After 1980, historians also began to consider immigration in Britain (Panayi 1994), France (Noiriel 1988), and even ancient China (Chang 2007). As a wider circle of scholars embraced immigration studies, a useful exchange developed between European and American historians and social scientists who compared western countries (Schrover and Moloney 2013) or compared “past” and “present” immigrations. In a new but apparently shared periodization of “then and now,” “then” meant immigration from or to Europe between 1870 and 1940 while the present usually remained unspecified but quite recent (Foner 2000; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Foner and Fredrickson 2005; Lucassen 2005).<sup>8</sup> This approach also attracted critics, with Nancy Foner (2006) noting historians’ preference for exploring “then to now,” and with Donato and Gabaccia (2015) arguing that comparisons of present-day gender ratios to those of 1900 (when female migration, relative to male migration, had reached its historical nadir) produced inaccurate assessments of the purportedly very recent “feminization” of migration.

Discomfort with American assimilation theory also became apparent as scholars studied immigration outside the United States. Borrowing from older

International Relations terminologies, “integration” gained in popularity as a new term for two-way social and cultural adjustments. A Google Ngram<sup>11</sup> shows exploding use of the term “immigrant integration” after 1990. Even American immigration historians soon wrote of “incorporation” (Barkan et al. 2008). (A full exploration of the newer terminologies of integration and incorporation is impossible here but see Schrover and Schinkel 2014.)

### ***Migration Studies: The Challenge of Periodization***

No shared periodization comparable to “national time” has characterized the development of migration studies since 1960, and this is especially true for scholars seeking to analyze migration at scales larger than the individual nation-state. Although historians may have been slower than colleagues in other disciplines to adopt the terminology of “migration,” they had been writing about migration for several decades before the American Social Science Research Council invited historians to join its new Migration Program in the mid-1990s (DeWind 2020).

Americanists began to study migration as they explored methodologies (sometimes called “village outward”) that began and sometimes also ended in the migrants’ “homelands” (Gabaccia 1984; Gjerde 1985; Kamphoefner 1987; Hsu 2000). In Europe, historical migration research projects and institutes founded in Germany and the Nordic countries instead began by confronting the historical simultaneity of American immigration and European emigration, for example in Germany (Bade 1983). By the 1980s, Dirk Hoerder’s Labor Migration Project at Bremen University not only connected American and European historians of emigration and immigration but pioneered a Europe-wide perspective as appropriate for historical migration studies. Historians of important nations of emigration such as Italy, Poland, and today’s “Global South” made especially significant contributions to migration studies (Green and Weil 2007). However, as growing numbers of historians shifted from immigration studies into migration studies, their concerns with time, temporality, and periodization also created new challenges for this interdisciplinary field. Periodizations of sending and receiving countries rarely matched precisely and the periodization of larger spatial units were even more diverse.

Relinquishing what theorists later called their methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) was a significant move for historians, given their historical ties to nation-states. A significant number embraced migration studies in the 1970s as they adopted the theorization of a capitalist world system developed by historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). Inspired by historian Fernand Braudel (1973) Wallerstein used a generous periodization: his capitalist world system began around 1500, while some colleagues pushed its origins backward to 1300 AD (Abu-Lughod 1989) or even to the onset, 7,000 years ago, of trade networks linking the world’s earliest cities (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1994). While sociologist Lydia Potts (1990) examined migration in the world system on a global scale, historians of migration initially focused attention on Wallerstein’s “semi-peripheries” as producers of

labor for capitalist economic “cores” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Using translocal, multi-sited, and multi-lingual research methods, they analyzed recruitment of labor in southern and eastern Europe and linked that recruitment to immigrant labor militancy in Atlantic core economies (Keil and Jentz 1983; Bukowczyk 1989; Hoerder and Rossler 1993; Hoerder and Blank 1994). These studies revealed patterns largely invisible in immigration studies—e.g., labor circulation and return migration (Gabaccia 1988; Wyman 1993), chain migrations (Cinel 1982), and remittance flows (Cinel 1991).

Social scientists studying historical world systems initially showed little awareness of this work. Perhaps they viewed historians’ focus on two centuries as inappropriate. In any case, Wallerstein blurbed Dirk Hoerder’s *Cultures in Contact* (2002) in part because the historian had adopted the millennium-long periodization and global spatiality of the world systems social scientists.

Historical work inspired by world systems theory built the foundation for a more reciprocal exchange with anthropologists in the 1990s. In *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration*, the editors included a chapter by historian Barry Goldberg (1992) that insisted that historians had already documented transnational moves, lives, and dynamics among migrants a century earlier. Comparative attention to transnationalism “then and now” engaged historians and social scientists (Barkan et al. 2008) and delineated how changing transport and communication technologies altered everyday transnational practices over time. Discussions of migrant transnationalism were consistently interdisciplinary (Barkan 2004; Bommers 2005) and continue down to the present. *A Century of Transnationalism* (2016), co-edited by sociologist Roger Waldinger and historian Nancy Green, brought analysis to a global scale. In diaspora studies, too, historians (Gabaccia 2000; Kenny 2003; Manning 2009; Kenny 2013; Green and Waldinger 2016) joined sociologist Robin Cohen (1997) in insisting that diasporas must be understood temporally: diasporas do not emerge immediately or inevitably with the earliest migrations but must be reproduced over time to connect migrants and their old homelands.

The 1990s became a particularly intense period of intellectual ferment in migration studies as the desire to understand Europe as a single region developed after 1989. The inclusion of a right to free mobility for Europeans within the expanding European Union and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989 heightened interest in intra-European migrations and also created a new material foundation for the funding of research and scholarly innovation. Already in the 1970s, emigration institutes were founded in Germany and the Nordic countries, but research projects associated with Hoerder in Bremen (1980s) and the foundation by migration historian Klaus Bade of Osnabrück’s Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) in 1991 adopted a Europe-wide approach. During the 1990s, historians of migration at Dutch universities and at the Amsterdam International Institute for Social History—notably Jan and Leo Lucassen and Marcel van der Linden (Brass and Van der Linden 1997; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997)—also nurtured European historical research—especially on labor migrations and activism—across 500



years, while also providing resources and leadership for a new European Social Science History Conference in 1996.

But in Europe interdisciplinary reciprocity may have faltered. In a recent essay assessing the state of the field, Asya Pisarevskaya, Nathan Levy and Peter Scholten (2020; see also Levy et al. 2020) acknowledged that experts consulted had pointed toward historians as pioneering the early development of European migration studies. Yet Pisarevskaya and her colleagues identified no distinctive cluster of historians, historical methods, or historical themes in their review of migration knowledge production either before or after 1990. I offer a simple explanation for this surprising finding: the editors surveyed only scholarly publications accessible through the Web of Science, a database that excludes most publications in history and anthropology (presumably for being “not scientific”?).<sup>9</sup> Yet Table 1 has suggested these two disciplines together produced about one-third of all scholarship after 1960. Other evidence confirms a possible divergence in Europe of historical and social scientific research within migration studies. Currently, for example, only four historians appear in the online directory of the IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe) network, founded in 2004.

Historical work in Europe has if anything expanded since the pioneers suggested a way forward. David Feldman at Birkbeck College in London, Leo Lucassen and Marlou Schrover in Amsterdam and Leiden, respectively, and in France, Nancy Green, François Weil at EHESS in Paris, and Phillipe Rygiel at Nanterre have continued to foster historians’ involvement in interdisciplinary curricula and research, often within the centuries-long periodizations of “modern” and “early modern” eras (Feldman et al. 2006; Green 2006; Rygiel 2007). A significant product of historian activism was the monumental *Enzyklopedie Migration in Europa vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Bade et al 2010, English language ed. 2011). In an important development, Europe’s peripheries have found their place in an earlier historiography focused on the United Kingdom and northern and western Europe. New work on Austria (Hahn 2008; Steidl 2020) in particular emphasizes the simultaneous entangling of migrations into, within, and out of the old multi-national Austro-Hungarian empire while Luethi et al. (2019) explore issues of colonialism and post-colonialism in and beyond Switzerland. Italy, too, continues to produce new work on emigration (Bevilacqua 2001–2002).

Although the European Social Science History Association continues to foster a strong and interdisciplinary network on migration studies, the danger of migration studies becoming dominated by the social sciences threatens to distort broader policy and cultural discussion, especially if research portrays migration exclusively as recent and as an unprecedented challenge. Beyond Europe and North America, therefore, two options beckon as models for new interdisciplinary research centers being founded in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These are already supporting research on what is now called “South-South” migrations (Campillo-Carrete 2013). In Latin America, centers for migration studies have deep historical roots (in the Catholic Scalabrinian order) and have fostered



historical as well as social scientific work focused on the present. In Africa, the University of Witwatersrand's African Centre for Migration and Society and several forced migration studies programs are instead tightly focused on the production of knowledge within the social sciences. The same seems to be true of the "Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit" at the University of Dhaka in Bangladesh and in the programs and centers for the study of migration and refugees at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University and the National University of Singapore.

It would be a disappointing outcome if history had become more marginal just as historians increasingly invested in migration studies and as historians began writing about migration at more varied spatial scales, ranging from the local and regional (Moch 1983; Lucassen 1987; Borges 2000) to the imperial (Azuma 2005; Harper and Constantine 2010), oceanic (Nugent 1992; Clancy-Smith 2011; Gabaccia and Hoerder 2011; Amrith 2013; Putnam 2013; Jung 2014), and continental (Moch 1992; Bade 2003; Baily and Miguez 2003; Lucassen and Lucassen 2014; Siegelbaum and Moch 2014). New historical studies increasingly explore at global scales themes such post-colonialism and identity (Bosma et al. 2012). Although precedents surely existed (Scott 1968), historians too have written increasingly vigorous arguments for global analysis of migration (Hoerder and Moch 1996; Wang 1997; McKeown 2004; Harzig and Hoerder 2009; Manning 2013, first ed. 2006). In North America and Europe, new journals (e.g., *Journal of Global History*, *Journal of Migration History*, 2013) and book series (*Studies on World Migrations*, University of Illinois Press, 2005; *Studies in Global Social History*, Brill, 2008; *Studies in Global Migration History*, Brill, 2013) opened new publication venues for dozens of monographs and edited collections by historians. Still, as historians of migration have increasingly pursued global analysis, they have also increasingly adopted broad periodizations for their work. These generated exciting new theories of migration but also exacerbated differences between historical study and present-oriented social science studies of migration.

Take, as an example, Hoerder's *Cultures in Contact* (2002), which offered a human-centered history of mobility over the past thousand years. Hoerder explicitly rejected the spatial framing of the nation-state and adopted the perspective of Ortiz and others in writing about migrants as culture-bearers engaged in transcultural movements, encounters, and exchanges. More than many historians writing from a global perspective, Hoerder tried to bring insights from cultural studies into the analysis of change over 1,000 years. Migrants, in Hoerder's view (as Marx also once indicated) always attempt to make their own histories while facing conditions and circumstances they could not themselves determine. For Hoerder, mobility has become a tool of the less powerful as they pursue their own life projects. Three clear messages emerge from *Cultures in Contact*. One is that human migrations are motivated by humans' search for equality; the corollary to this observation is that restrictions on or coercions of movement generally work to reinforce existing inequalities on a global scale. The second is that migrations have driven many of largest structural and cultural changes in the world. The third is, of course, that the migrations of today are neither unprecedented nor particularly

to be feared; what is unprecedented is the fervor with which nation-states now attempt to demobilize migrants and to confine them to the spaces (often national territories) where they supposedly “belong.” Despite its focus on culture, then, *Cultures in Contact* begins to create a periodization within which we can begin to see how the transition from empires to nation-states has made the twentieth century, in Hoerder’s words, “a century of refugees.”

In *Migration in World History* (2013, first ed. 2006) and *A History of Humanity* (2020), Patrick Manning has offered a periodization that stretched from the time of the first hominids to the present. He truly writes of “Humanity Time.” Unlike Hoerder, with his focus on culture and migration as forms of human agency, Manning asks readers to consider humans as a mobile species, writing recently, “I see migration as essential to the human trajectory: it maintains diversity and originality in every region” (2020: 6). Within Manning’s broad periodization, the earliest human migrations constituted the first globalization; they produced thousands of small but highly mobile societies. Manning’s work has been noteworthy in using modeling from both historical linguistics and genomic science to trace the globalization of humans (see also Lucassen et al. 2010) and to create a typology of movement that can be applied equally to 200 BC and 2020 AD.

By adopting temporally broad periodizations, world and global historians of migration have developed their own theory of migration. Humans have always been mobile, they have agreed, and human mobility has for hundreds of thousands of years constituted the central motor of social, cultural, and economic change. Even after agriculture constrained cultivators to more sedentary lives, short-distance urbanization and long-distance trade became forms of mobility that repeatedly produced innovation. Histories of pre-modern and early modern migrations have called increasing attention to enslavement and other types of coerced migrations (Eltis 2000, 2002, 2007; Gabaccia 2022) or “organizational” migrations directed by powerful institutions—the military, the Catholic Church, modern corporations (Lucassen and Smit 2015). In this view, there is nothing unique about modern migrations; rates of migration did not necessarily increase with industrialization (Hochstadt 1999; Ehmer 2011; Lucassen and Lucassen 2011). McKeown (2004) has even established that nineteenth-century migrations were as global as today’s. Although Hoerder rejects Manning’s evolutionary perspective, his portrait of the world as a maelstrom of persistent but also strategically undertaken moves reveals migration as a constant product of human power struggles. In this view, empires at first forced humans to become more mobile but, when nations then imposed restrictions on mobility, they created the foundation for today’s global inequalities. Collectively, then, world and global historians theorize migration not as a problem to be solved but as a condition of human life on earth and a constant source of contestation and change, much of it positive. With a capacious periodization, they have generated a bold theory that challenges all who focus exclusively on the very short and unspecific periodization of “the present.”

These theories have been picked up, at least in part, by journalists (Shah 2020) but there is still little reciprocal exchange among global historians and the social sciences. Globalization theory in the 1990s apparently pushed history and social

sciences in somewhat different directions. A Google NGram<sup>13</sup> confirms that the years around 2000 saw considerable speculation about migration as an “unprecedented” and threatening development. Yet the same figure reveals the concern of English speakers about unprecedented emigration in the early 1800s, unprecedented immigration in the decades around 1900, and unprecedented migrations in the years bracketing WWII. Anxiety about unprecedented mobility also apparently has a long history; it was a midwife to many modern disciplines and many theories of migration as described above, and it reminds us of the continued legacy of the anxious terminologies of mobility in ancient Greece, Rome, and China.

The years between the 1990s and 2015 constitute only the most recent such period of xenophobic anxieties. Theorists often treated globalization and the migrations accompanying it as unprecedented threats to national and supranational states and the international system they created. Sociologist George Ritzer’s *Blackwell Companion to Globalization* (2007) acknowledged the existence of more “historicist” theories of globalization while nevertheless focusing relentlessly on controversies of the present moment. Even the new field of mobility studies (Sheller and Urry 2006) has scarcely begun to incorporate the insights of the world historians of migration, with their sweeping studies of how human mobility has entwined with transport and communication systems, and the movements of ideas, technologies, and commodities.

I nevertheless find some evidence of improving cross-disciplinary exchange through enhanced attention being paid to temporality among social scientists. The sixth edition of the very widely used text by Hein de Haas, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (2019) provides one example. As in earlier editions, the book’s introduction establishes its focus on globalization and global migrations in the contemporary world, with a focus on controversy, fear, anxiety, debates, and policy-oriented problem solving. A review of categories and theories of migration opens the book, suggesting these are equally applicable to the book’s historical Chapter 5, the chapters on the world’s many regions (Chapters 6–9) and an array of current challenges, problems, and solutions (Chapters 10–14).

Nowhere do the authors refer to contemporary migrations as being “unprecedented,” however. Their history chapter covers the world before 1945 and notes work on early history without tackling the world historian’s overarching theories. Their background chapter on the “world before 1945” actually begins with the onset of European imperialism around 1500. That chapter offers differing periodizations for settler migrations (1820–1960), slave trades (1501–1866), American immigration (1850–2010) and the onset of twentieth-century restrictions. Similarities between “then” (the nineteenth century) and “now” (the present) are acknowledged and the authors assert that the categories and theories introduced in Chapters 2–4 are useful at least for analyzing historical labor migrations. Some of the book’s chapters on world regions after 1945 also offer nuanced periodizations, e.g., distinguishing Europe’s postwar boom from the Americas’ migration “transition.” Both end in 1973, a date that presumably defines the onset of globalization. It seems reasonable to assume that “the

present” analyzed in *The Age of Migration* also begins around 1973 since the book’s main thematic chapters offer some chronology but no nuanced periodization: all are, presumably, analyses of “the present.” While *The Age of Migration* does not respond to the world historians’ provocation that migration is normal and universal—an attribute of all known human societies, and not a problem—it documents at least how greater attention to periodization might begin to make cross-disciplinary exchanges with world and global historians both more extensive and more reciprocal.

## Conclusion

The case studies included in this chapter were not meant to be exhaustive, and there are undoubtedly many other ways to understand time and temporality both across disciplines and in the theorization of migration. It seems likely that differing temporalities shape how scholars conduct literature reviews, for example, with social scientists more likely to privilege recent publications because of a powerful, shared assumption that the knowledge they produce is cumulative, and that recent knowledge production is thus the most salient. A survey of how chronology is used in social scientific analysis and the theorization of migration, perhaps through deeper analyses of path dependency, would also surely be productive.

So would a cross-disciplinary exploration of notions of “rupture” between past and present. One need not agree completely with Nancy Foner (2006) or Nancy Green (2006: 251–52) to notice that historians of migration have more often emphasized continuities over time because they routinely connect past to present, while social scientists, thinking comparatively, emphasize a rupture separating “then” from “now,” making of the past a foreign country. Disciplinary differences in thinking about time remain obstacles to cross-disciplinary exchange.

The case studies presented in this chapter show that time and temporality always matter in the study of migration and that they also matter in any effort to foster talk across disciplines. Historians can contribute most effectively to cross-disciplinary exchange when they foreground their disciplinary expertise on temporality and encourage their colleagues in other disciplines to recognize their own, often implicit and unacknowledged, assumptions about time and temporality. Recognizing periodization as a form of theorizing might also help us to understand and explain the use and changing meaning of key terminologies in our shared scholarly field of study—whether that is migration studies or immigration studies. It can alter how scholars in migration studies understand the emergence and evolution of disciplines and interdisciplinary migration scholarship, including shifts, forms of interdisciplinarity, and overlap and co-existence of immigration studies and migration studies. In that way it can even influence scholars’ identities as intellectuals involved in related if not completely coterminous undertakings. Shared periodization can nurture scholarly efforts to talk across disciplines while radically diverging periodizations limit the likelihood that theories, as explanatory frames, travel from one discipline into another.

An important step toward enhancing such exchanges was taken by the authors of *The Age of Migration*, who now offer more nuanced periodizations—with multiple ruptures and distinctive “eras”—of continuing migrations from the 1500s to the present. What if all social scientists began to situate their studies not only in place but also in time by featuring both temporality and spatiality in their titles? Regardless of particular thematics addressed, any reader can benefit from knowing immediately whether fieldwork was conducted in 1990–1992 or in 2015–2017 or whether the survey data they analyze is from 1960, 1978, 1992, and 2000 (e.g., four decades, between 1960 and 2000) or instead from a single decade, e.g., 2005, 2010, and 2015 (2005–2015). Each of these date ranges specify a time that once was “the present” and that is now increasingly “the past.” For those authors who find specific date ranges in titles to be ungainly, it is possible to signal whether analysis is longitudinal (sometimes also called secular), short- or long-term, generational, centennial, or decadal. There is still room for “then and now” comparisons, although I plead for more diverse and more precise understandings of which past (with date ranges!) provides the appropriate “foreign land” to which a more specific present can be compared. Not only does a more conscious approach to temporality create shared understandings of which “present” or which “past” will be analyzed, it also creates an archive of temporally specific scholarship that lays foundations for future historical analysis. (For example, the surveys, photographs, and maps of both the male and female Chicago schools of the early twentieth century became important sources for social histories of American immigration in the 1970s.)

Finally, world and global historians remind us that historians do in fact theorize as they explain the causes, consequences, experiences, and normalcy of human mobility. Their theoretical challenge deserves at least some response across disciplines. It may well be that historical sociologists or historical geographers will wish to take the lead in developing that response. Together with the small steps recommended above, the result could easily be more reciprocal and more productive cross-disciplinary exchanges since so many scholars in so many disciplines now claim to seek new ways to talk across disciplines.

### Discussion Questions

1. Choose a key teaching text from your own discipline, and after reading it carefully, discuss whether or how periodization figures in it.
2. How would you compare the history of your own discipline to the history of immigration and migration studies offered in this chapter?
3. What are the key “terminologies” for mobile people used in your discipline and how might you go about learning more about their origins and changing meanings?
4. Why do you think the editors of this volume chose to make the discipline of History the first chapter in a collection that addresses cross-disciplinary discussions of migration theory?

5. Viewed from the perspective of your own discipline, what characteristics—if anything—differentiate immigration studies from migration studies or mobility studies?

## Notes

- 1 The author offers thanks to editors Caroline Brettell and Jim Hollifield, as well as to the contributors who participated in two days of online Zoom workshops in December 2020. Their helpful suggestions informed the final revisions of this chapter. I thank also the students who read and discussed revision of the draft manuscript as part of their work for the seminar on migration studies offered by Marta Caminero-Santángelo at the University of Kansas in March 2021.
- 2 I capitalize “History” when referring to the discipline and use the lower case “history” when referring to the object of study. Many disciplines do not conflate discipline and object of study: the object of study in Sociology is not sociology but society; the object of study in Anthropology is not anthropology but humans.
- 3 Story-telling narratives may also advance understanding (*verstehen*) or interpretation (hermeneutics), which are both more valued in the Humanities than Social Sciences.
- 4 Although I cannot explore the significance in any detail here, it is striking that geologists imagine time in vertical sequences, and thus refer to “deep time” for the very distant past, while historians exploring “humanity time” more often create horizontal visualizations of time that replicate the left-to-right directionality of writing conventions in most western languages.
- 5 I am keenly aware of slippage in translations across the European languages I know. Although my focus here is on English terminologies, my hope is native speakers of other tongues will undertake similar analyses. It would constitute a major step away from Anglo- and Euro-centrism and towards a more general clarification of the definitions of key terms across the entire scholarly field.
- 6 In Latin, *migrans* or *migrantis* means migrating; it is the participle of a verb functioning as an adjective. In modern Italian, such participles eventually became nouns (e.g., *migrante*) but no such shift characterized Latin.
- 7 The parallel to modern Hebrew “הַפָּרָדֵז” is striking.
- 8 “Then and now” seem to have drawn on sociology’s powerful association of historical with comparative analysis, which viewed the past as the equivalent of a foreign country. See the American Sociological Association’s comparative analysis, which viewed the past as the equivalent of a foreign country.
- 9 The list of journals surveyed in their article included only one historical journal, the new Europe-based *Journal of Migration History*, founded in 2013), and excluded all older journals that had published most immigration and migration histories since the 1970s, such as the *Journal of American Ethnic History* as well as the more interdisciplinary *Comparative Studies in Society and History* and *Social Science History*.

## References

- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Adams, William Y. Dennis P. Van Gerven, and Richard S. Levy. 1978. “The Retreat from Migrationism.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 7: 483–532.
- Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



- Amrith, Sunil S. 2013. *Crossing the Bay of Bengal*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Avery, Donald. 1979. *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Azuma, Eiichiro. 2005. *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bade, Klaus J. 1983. *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland?: Deutschland 1880–1980*. Berlin: Colloquium.
- . 2003. *Migration in European History*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- , P. C. Emmer, L. Lucssen, and J. Oltmer, eds. 2010. *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Baily, Samuel L. and Eduardo José Míguez, eds. 2003. *Mass Migration to Modern Latin America*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.
- Baker, Brenda J. and Takeyuki Tsuda, eds. 2014. *Migration and Disruptions: Toward a Unifying Theory of Ancient and Contemporary Migrations*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Barkan, Elliott R. 1995. “Race, Religion, and Nationality in American Society: A Model of Ethnicity: From Contact to Assimilation.” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 14: 38–101.
- . 2004. “America in the Hand, Homeland in the Heart: Transnational and Translocal Immigrant Experiences in the American West.” *Western Historical Quarterly* 35: 335–41.
- , Hasia R. Diner, Alan M. Kraut, and Caroline Brettell. 2008. *From Arrival to Incorporation: Migrants to the U.S. in a Global Era*. New York: New York University Press.
- Barrett, James and David Roediger. 1997. “In Between Peoples: Race, Nationality, and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class.” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 16: 3–44.
- Bencivenni, Marcella. 2011. *Italian Immigrant Radical Culture: The Idealism of the Soversivi in the United States, 1890–1940*. New York: New York University Press.
- Bennett, Michael C. 2019. “Migrations.” In *The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global History*, edited by William Pettigrew, 68–95. Leiden: Brill.
- Bevilacqua, Piero, Andreina De Clementi, and Emilio Franzina. 2001–2002. *Storia dell'emigrazione*, Vol. 2. Rome: Donzelli.
- Blegen, Theodore. 1947. *Grass Roots History*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Blewett, Mary H. 1990. *The Last Generation: Work and Life in the Textile Mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, 1910–1960*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Bodnar, John E. 1982. *Workers’ World: Kinship, Community, and Protest in an Industrial Society, 1900–1940*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1985. *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Bommes, Michael. 2005. “Transnationalism or Assimilation?” *Journal of Social Science Education* 1: 1–13.
- Bon Tempo, Carl J. 2009. *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Borges, Marcelo J. 2000. “Migration Systems in Southern Portugal: Regional and Transatlantic Circuits of Labor Migration in the Algarve (Eighteenth-Twentieth Centuries).” *International Review of Social History* 45: 171–208.



- Bosma, Ulbe, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie. 2012. *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan and the United States in Comparison*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Brass, Tom and Marcel van der Linden, eds. 1997. *Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Braudel, Fernand. 1973. *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, 1st US ed. New York: Harper and Row.
- Brettell, Caroline. 2016. *Gender and Migration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brody, David. 1980. *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, Cynthia Stokes. 2007. *From the Big Bang to the Present*. New York: The New Press.
- Buff, Rachel. 2001. *Immigration and the Political Economy of Home: West Indian Brooklyn and American Indian Minneapolis, 1945–1992*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bukowczyk, John J. 1989. "Migration and Capitalism." *International Labor and Working-Class History* 36: 61–75.
- , ed. 2013. Special Issue: "Forum on the Legacy of Oscar Handlin." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 32(3): 1–143.
- Campillo-Carrete, Beatriz. 2013. "South-South Migration: A Review of the Literature." International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Working Paper vol. 570.
- Castro Borego, Silvia Pilar and Maria Isabel Romero Ruiz, eds. 2011. *Cultural Migrations and Gendered Subjects: Colonial and Postcolonial Representations of the Female Body*. New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
- Chang, Chun-shu. 2007. *The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 2: Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.–A.D.157*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Thomas D. Hall. 1994. "The Historical Evolution of World Systems." *Sociological Inquiry* 64: 257–80.
- Chetail, Vincent. 2017. "Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: An Intellectual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel." *European Journal of International Law* 27: 901–22.
- Chudacoff, Howard P. 1976. "The New Immigration History." *Reviews in American History* 4: 99–104.
- Christian, David. 2011. *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cinel, Dino. 1982. *From Italy to San Francisco: The Immigrant Experience*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 1991. *The National Integration of Italian Return Migration: 1870–1929*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clancy-Smith, Julia. 2011. *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: UCL Press and Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Conzen, Kathleen Neils. 1996. "Thomas and Znaniecki and the Historiography of American Immigration." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12: 3–41.
- , David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George Pozetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli. 1992. "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12: 3–41.

- Corti, Louise. 2004. "Archival Research." In *The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, edited by Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., Vol. 1: 21. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cronon, William. 2013. "Storytelling Author(s)." *The American Historical Review* 118: 1–19.
- De Haas, Hein, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller. 2019. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 6th ed. New York: Guilford Press.
- De Ligt, Luuk and Laurens A. Tacoma, eds. 2016. *Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire*. Studies in Global History 23. Leiden: Brill.
- Deegan, Mary Jo. 1988. *Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892–1918*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Devoto, Fernando. 2003. *Historia de la inmigración en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
- DeWind, Josh. 2020. "Blind Men and the Elephant: One View of the Field of Migration Studies." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8:39. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00191-4>.
- Diner, Hasia. 2008. "History and the Study of Immigration." In *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*, edited by Caroline Brettell and James F. Hollifield, 2nd ed., 31–50. New York: Routledge.
- Donato, Katharine, ed. 2006. Special Issue: "Gender and Migration." *International Migration Review* 40(1): 3–26
- Donato, Katharine and Donna Gabaccia. 2015. *Gender and International Migration: From the Slavery Era to the Global Age*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press.
- Ehmer, Josef. 2011. "Quantifying Mobility in Early Modern Europe: The Challenge of Concepts and Data." *Journal of Global History* 6: 327–38.
- Eltis, David. 2000. *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , ed. 2002. *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2007. "A Brief Overview of the Transatlantic Slave Trade." Transatlantic Slave Trade Database. <https://slavevoyages.org/voyage/essays#interpretation/a-brief-overview-of-the-trans-atlantic-slave-trade/introduction/0/en/>.
- Enyeart, John P. 2019. *Death to Fascism: Louis Adamic's Fight for Democracy*. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Feldman, David, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer, eds. 2006. *Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880–2004)*. Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam Press.
- Fogel, Joshua A. 1988. "Introduction: Ito Takeo and the Research Work of the South Manchurian Railway Company." In *Life along the South Manchurian Railway, The Memoirs of Itō Takeo*, transl. by Joshua A. Fogel, pp. vii–xxvii. Armonk: NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Foner, Nancy. 2000. *New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 2006. "Then and Now or Then to Now: Immigration to New York in Contemporary and Historical Perspective." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 25: 33–47.
- and George Fredrickson, eds. 2005. *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Foner, Nancy and Leo Lucassen. 2012. "Legacies of the Past." In *The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, edited by Maurice Crul and John Mollenkopf, 26–43. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Frank, Andre Gunder and Barry K. Gills, eds. 1993. *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Gabaccia, Donna R. 1984. *From Sicily to Elizabeth Street; Housing and Social Change among Italian Immigrants, 1880–1930*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- . 1988. *Militants and Migrants: Rural Sicilians Become American Workers*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- , ed. 1992. *Seeking Common Ground: Multidisciplinary Studies of Immigrant Women in the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- . 1998. *We are What We Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2000. *Italy's Many Diasporas: Elites, Exiles and Workers of the World*. Seattle, WA and London: University College of London Press and University of Washington Press.
- . 2010. "Nations of Immigrants: Do Words Matter?" *The Pluralist* 5: 5–31.
- . 2015. "The Minnesota School and Immigration History at Midwestern Land Grant Universities, 1890–2005." *Journal of Migration History* 1: 171–99.
- . 2018. "Will the Twenty-First Century World Embrace Immigration History?" In *History, Historians and the Immigration Debate: Going Back Where We Came From*, edited by Eureka Henrich and Julian M. Simpson, 209–26. New York: Palgrave.
- . 2022. *Cambridge History of Global Migrations Vol. 1: The Early Modern Era; Vol 2: The Modern Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- and Dirk Hoerder. 2011. *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*. Leiden: Brill.
- Garcia, Maria Cristina. 2017. *The Refugee Challenge in Post-Cold War America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gerber, David A. 1989. *The Making of an American Pluralism: Buffalo, New York 1825–60*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Gerstle, Gary. 2002. *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- and John Mollenkopf, eds. 2001. *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspective on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gilland, Anne J. 2017. "A Matter of Life or Death: A Critical Examination of the Role of Records and Archives in Supporting the Agency of the Forcibly Displaced." *Critical Archival Studies* 1(2): n.p.
- Gjerde, Jon. 1985. *From Peasants to Farmers: The Migration from Balestrand, Norway, to the Upper Middle West*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1999. "New Growth on Old Vines: The State of the Field: The Social History of Immigration to and Ethnicity in the United States." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18: 40–65.
- Goldberg, Barry. 1992. "Historical Reflections on Transnationalism, Race, and the American Immigrant Saga." In *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration*, edited by Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blac-Szanton, 201–16. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- Golden, Peter B. 2002. "Nomads and Sedentary Societies in Eurasia." In *Agricultural and Pastoral Societies in Ancient and Classical History*, edited by Michael Adas, 71–115. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

- Gottschang, Thomas R. 1987. "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration: The Historical Case of Manchuria." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 35: 461–90.
- Green, Nancy L. 2006. "Time and the Study of Assimilation." *Rethinking History* 10: 239–58.
- and François Weil, eds. 2007. *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Green, Nancy L. and Roger Waldinger. 2016. *A Century of Transnationalism: Immigrants and Their Homeland Connections*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Greenwood, M.J. and G.L. Hunt. 2003. "The Early History of Migration Research." *International Regional Science Review* 26: 3–37.
- Gutman, Herbert. 1976. *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History*. New York: Knopf.
- Hahn, Sylvia. 2008. *Migration–Arbeit–Geschlecht: Arbeitsmigration in Mitteleuropa vom 17. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
- Hall, John R. 1980. "The Time of History and the History of Times." *History and Theory* 19: 113–31.
- Halstead, Narmala, Eric Hirsh, and Judith J. Okely, eds. 2008. *Knowing How to Know: Fieldwork and the Ethnographic Present*. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
- Halter, Marilyn and Violet Showers Johnson. 2014. *African and American: West Africans in Post-Civil Rights America*. New York: New York University Press.
- Handlin, Oscar. 1951. *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People*. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
- Hansen, Valerie. 2020. *The Year 1000: When Explorers Connected the World—and Globalization Began*. New York: Scribner.
- Hareven, Tamara K. 1983. *Family Time and Industrial Time: The Relationship between the Family and Work in a New England Industrial Community*. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Modern History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Harper, Marjory and Stephen Constantine. 2010. *Migration and Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harzig, Christiane and Dirk Hoerder. 2009. *What Is Migration History?* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hawkins, Freda. 1989. *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hester, Torrie. 2017. *Deportation: The Origins of U.S. Policy*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hirota, Hidetaka. 2017. *Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States & the 19th Century Origins of American Immigration Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hochstadt, Steve. 1999. *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany, 1820–1989*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Hoerder, Dirk. 2002. *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2004. "Transcultural Societal Studies: Canadian Studies as a Model." In *25 Years Gesellschaft für Kanada-Studien: Achievements and Perspectives*, edited by Dirk Hoerder and Konrad Groß, 202–17. Augsburg: Wißner.
- . 2015. "A Genuine Respect for the People." *Journal of Migration History* 1(2): 136–70.
- . 2021. *Menschen und welten in Bewegung: der Ostalpen- und Donaauraum von den Anfängen bis zum 16. Jahrhundert*. Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, Academic.

- and Inge Blank. 1994. *Roots of the Transplanted*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs and New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoerder, Dirk and Leslie Page Moch. 1996. *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Hoerder, Dirk and Horst Rössler, eds. 1993. *Expectations and Realities in the Immigrant Experience, 1840–1930*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Howells, W.W. 1976. “Explaining Modern Man: Evolutionists Versus Migrationists.” *Journal of Human Evolution* 5: 477–95.
- Hsu, Madeline Y. 2000. *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism, and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ingleheart, Jennifer, ed. 2011. *Two Thousand Years of Solitude: Exile After Ovid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jung, Moon-Ho. 2006. *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2014. *The Rising Tide of Color: Race, State Violence, and Radical Movements Across the Pacific*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- Kamphoefner, Walter D. 1987. *The Westfalians: From Germany to Missouri*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kazal, Russell A. 1995. “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History.” *American Historical Review* 100: 437–71.
- Keil, Hartmut and John B. Jentz, eds. 1983. *German Workers in Industrial Chicago, 1850–1950: A Comparative Perspective*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Kenny, Kevin. 2003. “Diaspora and Comparison: The Global Irish as a Case Study.” *Journal of American History* 90: 134–62.
- . 2013. *Diaspora: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, R. 2012. *Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and a Primer*. Malmö: Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM).
- Kurashige, Lon. 2002. *Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934–1990*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Lary, Diana. 2012. *Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas, over Four Millennia*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lee, Erika. 2003. *At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- . 2019. *America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in the United States*. New York: Basic Books.
- Levy, Nathan, Asa Pisarevskaya, and Peter Scholten. 2020. “Between Fragmentation and Institutionalisation: The Rise of Migration Studies as a Research Field.” *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(1): 1–24.
- Lim, Julian. 2017. *Porous Borders: Multiracial Migrations and the Law in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Low, Kelvin E.Y. 2014. “Chinese Migration and Entangled Histories: Broadening the Contours of Migratory Historiography.” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27: 75–102.
- Lowe, Lisa. 1996. *Immigrants Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lucassen, Jan. 1987. *Migrant Labour in Europe, 1600–1900: The Drift to the North Sea*. London and Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm.

- and Leo Lucassen. 1997. *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*. Bern and New York: Peter Lang.
- . 2009. “The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500–1900: What the Case of Europe Can Offer to Global History.” *Journal of Global History* 4: 347–77.
- . 2011. “From Mobility Transition to Comparative Global Migration History.” *Journal of Global History* 6: 299–307.
- . 2014. *Globalising Migration History: The Eurasian Experience (16th–21st Centuries)*. Leiden: Brill.
- Lucassen, Jan, Leo Lucassen, and Patrick Manning, eds. 2010. *Migration in World History: Multidisciplinary Approaches*. Leiden: Brill.
- Lucassen, Leo. 2005. *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Lucassen, Leo and Aniek X. Smit. 2015. “The Repugnant Other: Soldiers, Missionaries, and Aid Workers as Organizational Migrants.” *Journal of World History* 26: 1–39.
- Luethi, Barbara and Damir Skenderovic, eds. 2019. *Switzerland and Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives on a Changing Landscape*. Cham: Springer International, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luibhéid, Eithne. 2002. *Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 2004. “Global Migration, 1846–1940.” *Journal of World History* 15: 155–89.
- Mahler, Sara and Patricia Pessar. 2001. “Gendered Geographies of Power: Analyzing Gender Across Transnational Spaces.” *Identities* 7(4): 441–59.
- Mann, J.C., ed. 1983. *Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement During the Principate*. London: University of London Press.
- Manning, Patrick. 2009. *The African Diaspora: A History Through Culture*. New York: Columbia University.
- . 2013. *Migration in World History*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- . 2020. *A History of Humanity: The Evolution of the Human System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, Thomas R. *Herodotus and Sima Qian: The First Great Historians of Greece and China: A Brief History with Documents*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McKeown, Adam. 2001. *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Meyer, Gerald. 2000. “Cultural Pluralists versus Americanization: The Contributions of Horace Kallen, Randolph Bourne, Louis Adamic, and Leonard Covello.” *Community Review* 18: 1–37.
- Mitchell, Pablo. 2012. *West of Sex: Making Mexican America, 1900–1930*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Moch, Leslie Page. 1983. *Paths to the City: Regional Migration in Nineteenth-Century France*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- . 1992. *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Molina, Natalia. 2013. *How Race Is Made: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of the Racial Scripts*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Morawska, Ewa. 1994. “In Defense of the Assimilation Model.” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 13: 76–87.
- Morokvasic, Mirjana, ed. 1984. Special Issue: “Women in Migration.” *International Migration Review* 18(4): 31–57.



- Motomura, Hiroshi. 2006. *Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2014. *Immigration Outside the Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nawyn, Stephanie J. “Gender and Migration: Integrating Feminist Theory Into Migration Studies.” *Sociology Compass* 4(9): 749–65.
- Ngai, Mae M. 2003. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Noiriel, Gérard. 1988. *Le creuset français: L'histoire de l'immigration, XIX–XXeme siècles*. Paris: Seuil.
- Nugent, Walter T.K. 1992. *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870–1914*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Panayi, Panikos. 1994. *Immigration, Ethnicity, and Racism in Britain, 1815–1945*. New York and Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Parker, Kunal. 2000. “From Poor Law to Immigration Law: Changing Visions of Territorial Community in Antebellum Massachusetts.” *Historical Geography* 28: 61–85.
- . 2015. *Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600–2000*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pastore, Ferruccio. 2005. “The Policies for the Management of International Migrations from the XX to the XXI Century; A Tale of Territorial Sovereignties and People on the Move.” *Genus* 61: 347–67.
- Pisarevskaya, Asya, Nathan Levy, Peter Scholten, and Janssen Joost. 2020. “Mapping Migration Studies: An Empirical Analysis of the Coming of Age of a Research Field.” *Migration Studies* 8(3): 455–81. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00200-6>.
- Pleck, Elizabeth H. 1978. “A Mother’s Wages: Income Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896–1911.” In *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*, 2nd ed., edited by Michael Gordon. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Potts, Lydia. 1990. *The World Labour Market: A History of Migration*. London: Zed Books.
- Putnam, Lara. 2013. *Radical Moves: Caribbean Migrants and the Politics of Race in the Jazz Age*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ritzer, George, ed. 2007. *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Roediger, David R. 2005. *Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ruggles, Steven and Diana L. Magnuson. 2020. “The History of Quantification in History: The JIH as a Case Study.” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 50: 363–81.
- Ruiz, Vicki L. 1987. *Cannery Men, Cannery Lives: Mexican Women, Unionization, and the California Food Processing Industry, 1930–1950*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.
- Rygiel, Philippe, ed. 2007. Special Issue: “Construction des Sexualités et Migration.” *Migrance* 27.
- Sanchez, George J. 1993. *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidt-Camacho, Alicia. 2008. *Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands*. New York: New York University Press.
- Schrover, Marlou and Deirdre M. Moloney, eds. 2013. *Gender Migration and Categorisation: Making Distinctions between Migrants in Western Countries, 1945–2010*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.



- Schrover, M.L.J.C. and W. Schinkel. 2014. *The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion in Immigration and Integration*. New York: Routledge.
- Scott, Franklin D. 1968. *World Migration in Modern Times*. Englewood: Prentice Hall.
- Selig, Diana. 2008. *Americans All: The Cultural Gifts Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Seller, Maxine Schwartz, ed. 1981. *Immigrant Women*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Seltzer, M. and M. Haldar. 2015. "The Other Chicago School—A Sociological Traditional Expropriated and Erased." *Nordic Social Work Research* 5: 1–17.
- Shah, Sonia. 2020. *The Next Great Migration: The Beauty and Terror of Life on the Move*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Sharpe, Jenny. 1995. "Is the United States Postcolonial?: Transnationalism, Immigration, and Race." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 4(2): 181–99.
- Sheller, Mimi and John Urry. 2006. "The New Mobilities Paradigm." *Environment and Planning* 38(2): 207–26.
- Sigelbaum, Lewis H. and Leslie Page Moch. 2014. *Broad Is My Native Land: Repertoires and Regimes of Migration in Russia's Twentieth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
- Simon, Rita J. and Caroline Brettell, eds. 1986. *International Migration: The Female Experience*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
- Sinke, Susanne M. 2006. "Gender and Migration: Historical Perspectives." *International Migration Review* 40(1): 82–103.
- Smith, Monica. 2020. *Cities: The First 6000 Years*. New York: Viking.
- Spickard, Paul. 2007. *Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Spier, Fred. 2010. *Big History and the Future of Humanity*. Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- Steedman, Carolyn. 2013. "Archival Methods." In *Research Methods for English Studies*, edited by Gabriele Griffin, 17–29. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Steidl, Anne Marie. 2020. *On Many Routes: Internal, European, and Transatlantic Migration in the Late Hapsburg Empire*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
- Takaki, Ronald. 1989. *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Thorvaldsen, Gunnar. 2018. *Censuses and Census Takers: A Global History*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Turner, Jonathan H. 1988. "The Mixed Legacy of the Chicago School of Sociology." *Sociological Perspectives* 31(3): 325–38.
- Vecoli, Rudolph J. 1964. "Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of *The Uprooted*." *Journal of American History* 5: 404–17.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- Wang, Gungwu, ed. 1997. *Global History and Migrations*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Watkins-Owens, Irma. 1996. *Blood Relations: Caribbean Immigrants*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Weber, Donald. 1991. "Reconsidering the Hansen Thesis: Generational Metaphors and American Ethnic Studies." *American Quarterly* 43: 320–32.
- Wellmon, Chad. 2016. *Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Wiedemann, Felix. 2020. "Migration and Narration: How European Historians in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries Told the History of Human Mass Migration or Voelkerwanderungen." *History and Theory* 59: 42–60.
- Wilson, Ben. 2020. *Metropolis: A History of the City, Humankind's Greatest Invention*. New York: Doubleday.
- Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 576–610.
- Wright, Donald R. 2004. *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niimi, The Gambia*, 2nd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wyman, Mark. 1993. *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yans-McLaughlin, Virginia. 1974. "A Flexible Tradition: South Italian Immigrants Confront a New Work Experience." *Journal of Social History* 7: 429–45.
- . 1977. *Family and Community: Italian Immigrants in Buffalo, 1880–1930*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- , ed. 1991. *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zimmer, Kenyon and Cristina Salinas, eds. 2018. *Deportation in the Americas: Histories of Exclusion and Resistance*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

## 2 Demography and Migration

### The Wildcard in Population Dynamics<sup>1</sup>

*François Héran*

A population does not renew itself only through the cycle of births and deaths, but also through the interplay of inward and outward migration. As demography is the quantitative analysis of population renewal, one of its major tasks is to measure the contribution of migration to population dynamics, whether in countries of origin or the host country. This is far from being the case, however. The most formalized demographic analysis tends to reduce migration to a marginal phenomenon. At worst, migration disrupts the normal dynamics of populations; at best, it serves as compensation for demographic decline. The basic assumption, long favored in demographic analysis, is that of a closed population. This choice can be explained in particular by the fact that in- and out-migration is difficult to put into the formulae. Unlike births and deaths, migration is not a singular and irreversible event with a biological basis, but a “repeatable event,” of a social and sometimes political nature, deemed to be exogenous. Ansley Coale (1917–2002), the great American scholar in mathematical demography, used to say that, every year, when the time came in the term to teach migration, he fell ill. Whether true or not, this anecdote reveals the awkwardness of accounting for migration in classic demographic analysis.

But formal demography is only one part of the discipline. Today, for most of its practitioners, demography is not a natural but a social science. While retaining its basic methodology, formal analysis is still at the heart of *population studies*, surrounded by a constellation of disciplines in the human and social sciences (geography, sociology, anthropology, political science, law, history, archeology, socio-linguistics, analysis of discourse, and argumentation—all represented in this volume), but also in life sciences (public health, epidemiology, population genetics, gerontology) and natural sciences (climatology, agronomy, environmental sciences). In this broad conception of demography, situated at the crossroads of population and human sciences, migration occupies an increasingly central place. It is this tension between two visions of the discipline and the role of migration that I present and analyze in this chapter.

## The Mismeasure of Migration in the Classic Demographic Approach

At the national level, no population is totally closed. This reality is reflected in the “fundamental equation” of demography:

$$P_2 - P_1 = (B - D) + (I - E)$$

where  $P_2 - P_1$  is the population growth between the start (population size  $P_1$ ) and the end ( $P_2$ ) of a given period (one year, five years, or even ten if we compare successive censuses);  $(B - D)$  is the difference between the number of births and deaths in the same period; and  $(I - E)$  the difference between the levels of in-migration and out-migration. Populations increase or decrease by the algebraic sum of these two differences: the “natural balance” and the “migration balance.” Each of these balances can be positive or negative. English-speaking demographers speak of “natural increase” (or “decrease”) and “net migration,” respectively. The expressions vary from one language to another, but the meanings are the same. In the technical language of demographers, the fundamental equation shows how “flows” of various origins can account for changes in “stocks.”

### *The False Symmetry of the Demographic Equation*

On the surface, everything is simple: the fundamental equation applies the same treatment to each term of the equation. In practice, however, few countries have the data to account for each variable in the equation. The Netherlands is one of the exceptions. In the year 2018, for example, the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics tallied 168,000 births and 153,000 deaths in the country, or a natural surplus of 15,000 people. In the same year, there were 242,000 entries and 155,000 departures of migrants (native or foreign), i.e., a net in-migration of 87,000 people. Adding the two terms (15,000 + 87,000) therefore gives a total increase of 102,000 people during the year. As the Netherlands has 17.2 million inhabitants in the middle of the period, the rate of natural increase per thousand inhabitants was 0.9 and the net migration rate was 5.1 (a proportion six times higher) in 2018. The two together make a total growth for that year close to 6 per thousand (6‰ or 0.6%), which makes the Netherlands among the most dynamic countries in Europe from a demographic point of view, mainly thanks to in-migration.

Dutch statisticians derive these figures from municipal population registers, classified by household, which in principle record all changes of residence, including arrivals and departures of foreigners. To function properly, these files must be centralized on a national database using an individual identifier. However, the raw data on departures must be corrected, as many foreigners forget to unregister when they leave their residence. Most often, it is the registration of a new occupant in the residence that triggers an administrative inquiry seeking to determine whether or not the previous occupant has left the municipality, or even the country.

National centralization of municipal population registers does not exist in the United States or France. The United Kingdom does not have such a system either, but it compensates for the absence of population records by carrying out a survey of travelers at the border, which is easier to do in an island country like the UK: international travelers are asked if they intend to immigrate or emigrate. In the United States and in France, net migration is estimated only on a residual basis: we know the total growth of the population between two censuses, or two micro-censuses, and we know from vital statistics what share of this increase is due to the excess of births over deaths. The rest of the growth is necessarily attributable to migration, with the caveat that the calculation puts in relation two sources of a different nature, “vital statistics” on the one hand, and simple census declarations on the other:

$$I - E = (P_2 - P_1) - (B - D)$$

In countries that record migrant arrivals but not departures, emigration is estimated by the following equation:

$$E = I - (P_2 - P_1) + (B - D)$$

This can be seen in the example of the Netherlands in 2018 (figures are in thousands):

$$155 = 242 - 102 + (168 - 153)$$

These estimates are biased in that they only record legal migration (or migration resulting from an adjustment of status after several years in the country).

The fundamental equation only appears symmetrical. It suggests that there would be, on the one hand, internal population growth and, on the other, external growth. However, the two components of population growth are not perfectly equivalent, because births counted in a given year can be fueled by the fertility of immigrants who arrived in previous years. Year on year, net migration fuels a natural increase, while the reverse is not true. The proportion of births to foreign mothers and/or foreign fathers is generally known because, in most Western countries, birth certificates contain information on the nationality of the parents. In 2017, 23% of births registered in the United States were to foreign-born mothers (with strong inter-state variation, ranging from 4% in Montana to 38% in New Jersey). The overall figure is less than that for England and Wales (28.7%), but it is close to the levels seen in 2019 in Germany (24.2%) or France (23.9%), for example.

Sometimes we forget that immigrants also die. Should the deaths of immigrants be counted as departures or as deaths? The question is all the less absurd as some of the immigrants arriving at the end of their life prefer to return to their country of origin to be buried there (Attias-Donfut and Wolff 2005; Safi

2008). This phenomenon continues even after death through real posthumous migrations, consisting of repatriating the bodies to the country of origin. Here, we are at the intersection of demography and anthropology (see chapter by Brettell, this volume). Moroccan immigrants who have worked for many years in Spain may leave children behind when they retire to Morocco. They can consider that their own migration cycle is now over: their “natural place” remains their native land. Religion often plays a role in this decision. Muslims want to be buried in a Muslim land. A similar phenomenon can be observed among the Jewish diaspora, some members of which may request to be buried in Israel (Zur 2017).

Whether the deaths of migrants should be counted in the migratory balance or in the natural balance is a question that has no real technical solution: we should remember that migrants have two ways of “leaving” a country, through emigration (returns) or death. The addition of the two phenomena avoids the common misconception that immigration is a constant accumulation of entries, a one-way process, forgetting that departures and deaths work in the opposite direction too. This is called the “destination bias,” viewing migration only from the point of view of the host country—as endless immigration—while it is also an emigration from the country of origin and, eventually, part of a general process which includes return migration or circular migration (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Massey 2020; cf. also chapters by FitzGerald and Brettell in this volume).

### ***Territory, Population, Migration, Length of Stay: Pragmatic Definitions***

Demography, as pointed out above, is the quantitative analysis of population renewal. But what is a population? It is all the permanent residents of a given territory, generally a recognized administrative entity—national, subnational, or supranational—or a clearly identified minority. The word “population” was coined in England and France in the 18th century, a concept closely related to liberal and Enlightenment ideas about the collective well-being improved by a liberal and utilitarian governance, whereas traditional political economies were of the “pastoral” type, consisting in exercising physical and moral control over each individual (a “biopolitical” power, to use Michel Foucault’s phrase). The advent of identity documents and passports after WWI marked a statistical turn, more akin to pastoral control of individuals, including the taking of fingerprints and photographs. Nowadays, all states follow this line and seek to distinguish between foreigners and nationals, and increasingly between immigrants and natives (see box).

Following a European regulation on migration statistics promulgated in July 2007, labor force surveys in Europe must include information on the country of and nationality at birth, which allows for international comparisons of the number and condition of immigrants *stricto sensu*. The same data are collected for parents, which makes it possible to identify the “second generation,” i.e., children born in the host country to foreign parents. However, the database put online by the United Nations Population Division, called International Migrant Stock, does

not have this information; for lack of anything better, it just defines migrants by the difference between country of birth and country of residence, whatever the nationality at birth.

**LATO SENSU, STRICTO SENSU: TWO DEFINITIONS OF THE IMMIGRANT**

Anyone who resides in a country without having its nationality is a *foreigner*: this is a legal status. People who have their habitual residence in a country where they were not born, whether or not they have changed their nationality, are *immigrants*: this is a *de facto* situation. Contrary to a common idea, naturalization does not make immigrants disappear from the statistics. You can be both an immigrant and a citizen of the host country. The concept of international migration therefore remains independent of changes in nationality. Otherwise, international comparisons of the extent of migration would be skewed by variations in nationality law from one country to another.

The distinction between country of birth and country of residence has the merit of simplicity: the information is available in most countries. However, a more stringent definition devised in the United States and disseminated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) does not include among immigrants those born abroad who already had the nationality of the host country before migrating. Thus, a child born in Germany to American parents is American by birth. If brought to the United States by his parents, he is an immigrant in *the broad sense*, but not in *the strict sense*. Hence this new definition: *stricto sensu* immigrants are persons born abroad with a foreign nationality and residing in the host country for a period of at least one year. This definition is not easy to operationalize, as national statistics are often incomplete. To find out the nationality at birth, you have to question people directly.

In 1998, UN statisticians published recommendations revising the rules issued in 1953 and 1976 (UNDESA 1998, pp. 83 et seq.). The UN prefers the *stricto sensu* definition of immigration, which is limited to foreign-born, recognizing that this definition is inapplicable in many countries. Contrary to received wisdom, the criterion of the country of birth to define the immigrant does not constitute “the” standard decreed by the UN. In their view, this is a stopgap, a pragmatic solution that acknowledges the statistical capacities of the member states (Lemaître 2005).

The population of a country includes both foreigners and nationals, provided they reside there most of the time. The problem is that the notion of “length of stay,” crucial in migration demography, is not measured empirically (except in specialized surveys). It is inferred from a statement collected during a census or a survey (where the person declares that she lives and sleeps there most of the year, at least for six months, which is the criterion adopted by the US Census Bureau). The definition of a migrant also can be linked to a residence permit lasting at least one year. Finally, in many European countries, permanent residence is ascertained by registration in a municipal population registry, generally compulsory after three months of residence.



These variations in the application of the duration criterion for defining a migrant blur the identification of residents of a territory, even though they are residents in a legal sense. Add to this the fact that a number of foreigners can reside in the territory *de facto*, without legal status. Migration demographers must acknowledge that uncertainties about the exact contours of migrant and non-migrant populations will never be resolved. The art of demography (as in other social sciences) is to know how to deal with imperfect data. Demographers must be able to navigate between over- and underestimates. This does not prevent scholars from trying to control for the orders of magnitude of the migratory phenomenon, often largely distorted in the public debate, as we can see in the frequent use of aquatic metaphors such as invasion, submersion, tsunami, noria, opening the floodgates, and so on, metaphors that lend themselves to symbolic politics and populist appeals (see the politics chapter by Hollifield and Wong in this volume).

In most cases, demographic analysis of migration revolves around a length of stay of at least one year as a criterion of permanent residence. The reason is quite practical: almost everywhere in the world, the evolution of population growth is followed up on an annual basis. It should be noted, however, that the demographic definition of the minimum residence of one year to characterize a migrant is at odds with the administrative or police practice, generally centered around the threshold of three months, which is the maximum duration of the tourist visa imposed by western countries on most nationals coming from less-developed countries. Foreigners who overstay their tourist visa are of interest to law enforcement but not to demographers, in whose eyes they are not yet immigrants.

There is thus, between the 3-month and the 12-month thresholds, a vast gray area of temporary migration, which is a source of misunderstanding almost everywhere in the world. It includes, on the one hand, people who have temporary employment contracts of less than three months (and who circulate between the origin and host countries), but also, on the other hand, prospective migrants who use the 3-month tourist visa to explore their network of contacts, weighing employment and housing options. The first three months of the stay go by very quickly and persons who overstay become irregular migrants if they do not return to their country of origin when their visas expire.

International students constitute another problematic group in national migration statistics. Are international students migrants? The answer is yes if they are staying in the host country for at least one year. Only the United States deviates from this rule and refuses to apply the universal length of stay rule to foreign students, because students have a non-resident visa. The OECD follows the US model: it counts international students as migrants only when they change their status, i.e., obtain a right of residence for another reason: work, marriage, refuge, health. The rationale put forward is that students “are not supposed to stay.” This amounts to substituting a desirable official standard (temporariness) for the reality of settlement. In fact, there are many reasons why students stay (Han et al. 2015). In France, for example, surveys of foreign students show that one-third plan to leave the following year, one-third plan to stay, and the remaining one-third are unsure of their plans. The stakes in this game of counting migrants are high: of all the categories of

migration around the world, it is the international flow of students that is increasing the most: 2 million in 2001, more than 4 million in 2012, nearly 6 million in 2019, according to UNESCO estimates. The top destinations are the United States (18%), the United Kingdom (11%), France (7%), Australia (6%), and Germany (5%). The proportion of foreign students rises with the level of the degree and can represent 40% of doctoral students (see Chapter 3 on economics in this volume).

***Halley, Euler, Lotka: a Formal Demography That Sees Migration as a Marginal Phenomenon***

The quantitative approach to demography is called *formal demography* in the English-speaking world, and *demographic analysis* in Europe. Europeans also refer to *mathematical demography* if the parameters of the population are expressed in infinitesimal quantities. This branch of demography is a narrow, highly formalized field, endowed with a vocabulary and statistical tools distinct from those of social statistics in general. Anxious to assert its autonomy, formal demography tends to explain population dynamics purely in demographic terms. Faced with a decline in fertility, for example, the first reaction of a formal demographer will not be to propose a social, economic, or political explanation (as the media do), but to understand the demographic mechanism of the decline: is it a delay in marriage, a momentary postponement of births, a decrease in the propensity to have a third child after the second one, or some other simple individual or household decision? Only after the mechanism has been identified will the demographer feel confident enough to publish the results of her analysis, at the crossroads of social science disciplines, where other scholars can put forward their own explanations of basic demographic phenomena.

Along with economics, formal demography is one of the few positivist enclaves in the social sciences (cf. the chapters by Martin and by Hollifield and Wong in this volume). Its central objective is to identify the mathematical relationships that link the various parameters likely to change a population (namely fertility, birth rate, sex ratio at birth, age at maternity, interval between generations, mortality table, life expectancy, age and sex structure, replacement of generations, and so on), and to establish these relationships through period indices (valid for a given year) and longitudinal indices (describing the behavior of cohorts over time).

Formal demography not only measures the parameters of a population but also studies their relationships. If one understands the complex relationship between demographic forces, it is possible, when needed, to account for missing data. A good example is the reconstruction of the complete series of births and deaths in the United States, which were not recorded very well until after WWII (and not just for ethnic minorities). It is a statistical *tour de force* to be able to use the laws of population dynamics to interpolate missing data (Coale and Melvin 1963; Bourgeois-Pichat 1968). “Indirect demographic estimation techniques” or “imperfect demographic adjustment methods” are a real sub-discipline within demography.

An easier exercise is to make population projections into the future, which take advantage of the inertia of demographic phenomena: once they enter an age

pyramid, most people remain there for decades. Each cohort of males and females is given a probability of surviving the following year, as well as a fertility rate. These probabilities are completed by a net migration which adds or subtracts the migrant population from the cohort, and the operation is repeated for the entirety of the age pyramid. In passing, we see that demographic projections can in no way predict migration but can only integrate them as additional elements in the initial scenarios for a population.

However, in order to study the dynamics of a population, it is first necessary to define its contours (the criteria for belonging to the population of interest), to identify the people concerned, and to enumerate the relevant events in the life cycle. The professional formal demographer hardly concerns herself with these preliminary data, leaving this task to the administrative authorities and practitioners. For her, counting is the least interesting part of demographic analysis; the important thing is to understand the dynamics of populations. One could write the history of the discipline of demography in the light of this criterion: its degree of dependence on public administration. Since the 1970s, demographers have attempted with some success to increase their autonomy from the state by moving from aggregate to micro-data, collected in their own surveys and for their own purposes. The field of international migration has gone through a similar process.

The formalization of demography had great forebears. As early as 1692, the London astronomer Edmund Halley (the man who gave his name to the comet) set about constructing life tables, taking as standard the data from the city of Breslau (now Wrocław in Lower Silesia, Poland, but at the time an Austrian city). Why Breslau, when mortality data were available for other major cities of the day? Halley justifies his choice in the following passage:

Both London and Dublin, by reason of the great and casual accession of strangers who die therein, (as appeared in both by the great excess of the funerals over the births) rendered them incapable of being standards for this purpose; which requires, if it were possible, that the people we treat should not at all be changed, but die where they were born, without any adventitious increase from abroad or decay by migration elsewhere.

(Halley 1692)

Here, we can see clearly that migration disturbs demographic projections about the chances of survival for a defined population. We find the same reasoning in the work of another pioneer of demography, the great Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler. In 1760, Euler wrote in French an article (for the Berlin Academy proceedings) on the mathematical relationships between the fertility rate, the mortality curve, and population growth from one year to the next. He anticipates the method of demographic projections. Euler's article ends with a revealing caveat:

It should be noted that, in this calculation which I have just developed, I have assumed that the number of all alive persons in a place remains the same, or that it increases or decreases uniformly, so that it is necessary to exclude from

it both extraordinary devastation, such as loss [of territory], war, or famine, and extraordinary increases such as new settlements. It will also be good to choose such a place where all the newborns remain in the country and where foreigners do not come to live and die, which would overturn the principles on which I based the previous calculations.

(Euler 1767 163)

For Euler, migration is an “extraordinary” phenomenon, the impact of which on population growth is comparable to that of a natural disaster or a war.

The priority accorded to the assumption of a closed population model is reflected in the second part of Alfred James Lotka’s treatise, *Théorie analytique des associations biologiques*, published in Paris in 1939, considered by many to be the birth certificate of contemporary formal demography. Born in 1880 to a French mother and a naturalized American Russian father, Lotka had been educated in Paris, Birmingham, Leipzig, and New York. He embodies the transnational character of a highly formalized discipline that will impose the same demographic language around the world. Lotka pursued his career in the United States as an actuary for MetLife, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. He wrote another important book on longevity and died in New York in 1949, without being able to deliver to Princeton University Press the English version of his *Analytical Theory* (Véron 2008). Although the two volumes of the work were published in French in 1934 and in 1939, it should be noted that they revisit themes of Lotka’s numerous publications in English, in particular an article published in 1907 in *Science* on the mathematical relation between the birth and death rates. The *Analytical Theory* was translated into Spanish in 1969 with the support of CELADE, the Latin American Demographic Center in Santiago. The English version would not appear until 1998, but the work was known and appreciated by American demographers already in the 1940s.

We owe to Alfred Lotka the concept of *stable population* which gives us a baseline against which other types of populations can be compared. A stable population is a population with an invariable age structure and a fixed rate of natural increase. Lotka began with the hypothesis of a population without any immigration. His major discovery is the principle of convergence: a closed population, subjected to invariable fertility and mortality conditions over a long period, tends towards a stable condition with an invariable age structure and rate of growth. A population with a zero-growth rate is a particular type of stable population, called a *stationary population*. From this perspective of a closed population, migration is necessarily an exceptional and disruptive factor. The principle of convergence towards a stable state follows the same logic: we can predict the evolution of a population and its final age structure, provided that migration or the excess mortality caused by wars do not modify the course of its history.

Lotka’s mathematical approach to population dynamics inspired landmark essays and pathbreaking books: Keyfitz (1968), Bourgeois-Pichat (1968), Coale (1972), Henry (1972), Coale and Trussell (1974), Keyfitz and Caswell (1977), Preston and Coale (1982), and Arthur and Vaupel (1984). Roland Pressat’s

handbook (1995) provides a good overview in French of the impact of Lotka's work. Despite its very general title, Ansley Coale's major essay, "The growth and structure of human population: a mathematical investigation" (1972), leaves migration out of the picture. Coale knew, however, that changes in the birth rate in a country like the United States were strongly affected by waves of immigration. Nine years earlier, he had factored in immigration to reconstruct the missing series of births and deaths in the pre-war American vital statistics (Coale and Melvin 1963). His 1972 book adheres to the closed population model, driven by Lotka's "intrinsic rate of increase." The article by Arthur and Vaupel offers another illustration: of the 60 equations presented, the first 53 assume a closed population, and it is only from the 54th equation onward that migration enters the picture as reflected in this sentence: "Consider now a population open to migration." Net migration is then introduced as a factor that modifies the effects of mortality on population change. Tellingly, of the 160 entries in the index of Pressat's handbook (1995), none refers to migration. We must therefore welcome the breakthrough of Louis Henry's book (1972), in which Chapter 9 is entirely devoted to migration, as well as the innovative essay by Le Bras one year earlier (1971).

### ***Immigration as an Equilibrium and Rejuvenation Factor in Population Dynamics***

Such models are part of a general view of population dynamics at equilibrium (sometimes referred to as a homeostatic paradigm), an equilibrium which can include constant growth. For some classical authors, such as Pastor Johann-Peter Süssmilch (1707–1767), the father of German demography, demographic balance is the work of Providence (although it is a theological challenge to justify that an "optimal" demographic regime could allow half of the children to die before the age of seven, as was the case in Prussia in the middle of the 18th century). In the two editions of his treatise, *The Divine Order* (1741, 1761), Süssmilch explains why there are everywhere in the world, including at opposite ends of the planet, 21 male births for every 20 female births: Providence, by a kind of benevolent conspiracy attentive to gender balance, corrects in advance the excess mortality of young men in military expeditions or trips to the colonies, so as to re-establish the balance between the sexes during prime marriage years. In short, it is a question of "replacement fertility" intended to compensate for the deleterious effects of war and emigration (the reverse of the current notion of "replacement migration" which compensates for low fertility rates).

The idea that one demographic factor can replace another in order to adjust the age structure is easy to imagine from a mathematical point of view, whether it is a question of "replacement fertility," "replacement migration," or "replacement through greater longevity." This thought experiment is not totally disconnected from reality. We find precedents in European history in the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as in the New World. Following a war or a conquest, a prince could imagine recruiting settlers to compensate for excess deaths and to settle a new

territory. When Louis XIV decided in 1685 to expel Protestants from the kingdom of France, the Prince-Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, issued the Edict of Potsdam, which offered incentives for the French refugees to relocate to Prussia (Lachenicht 2010). This policy was maintained by his son Frederick I, who became King of Prussia.<sup>2</sup> The idea of “replacement migration” is consistent with optimal governance of populations in the Age of Enlightenment and the mathematical vision of an optimum population where immigration plays the role of a timely instrument to ensure the return to normalcy in periods of economic reconstruction or expansion (compare guestworker programs in post-WWII Europe).

The first demographic statistics in Europe recorded baptisms, marriages, and burials, until European states at the end of the 18th century completed the chronological sequencing of the life cycle by directly recording births, marriages, and deaths, without waiting for the completion of the corresponding rituals. But where is migration in this process? Sweden was the first country in the world, beginning in the 1760s, to attempt to include migration in vital statistics, with immigration treated technically as birth and emigration as death (Le Bouteillec and Rohrbasser 2017). Several other European states (the Netherlands, Spain, Italy) also tried to date and formalize the entry and departure of migrants in parallel with vital statistics. The task is made more difficult by the fact that migrations were seasonal and only became permanent over time. For centuries, in fact, the main population movements between countries were not limited to labor migration of men and women, still quite seasonal, nor were such movements linked to displacement of civilians driven from their lands by war, plague, and persecution. Migration also included forms of mobility that today we would not think of including: armies in the field (often mercenaries hired for years, through a system akin to forced labor); wandering populations or nomads excluded from craft guilds or expelled by local authorities; pilgrims on long journeys (the trips to Rome, Jerusalem, or Mecca could take years); missionaries sent *urbi et orbi*; sailors with long stints at sea; colonists sent to distant lands as indentured labor; and, more generally, all forms of forced migration (slaves, convicts, and criminals sent to penal colonies) or other forms of indentured labor, such as “*engagés*,” “coolies,” and the like, without forgetting the women sent to the New World by criminal justice systems or the leagues of virtue in order to fill the deficit of wives in the settlements (McKeown 2004; Manning 2020 [2004]; Jan and Leo Lucassen 2009).

### ***Migration, an “Impure” Phenomenon***

The major categories of international migration that we know today (work, family, refugees, students, and the like) were commonly accepted during the periods of economic reconstruction following the two world wars, in particular under the aegis of the International Labor Organization (ILO). After this, it became easier for states to identify those crossing a border who intended to migrate. However, compared to births and deaths, in- and out-migration remains to this day a highly

complex phenomenon. For starters, we must recognize that migration is not a single, discreet event or action: one can migrate several times in one's life, either to the same place or to different places. Unlike births and deaths, migration has no biological basis; it is a legal and geographic phenomenon, and therefore demographically alien.

An additional complication is the existence of a two-step process: *de facto* and *de jure* migration, the former defined by entry into the territory and the later by entry into national statistics. The gap between these two processes has increased over the years. After crossing external borders, foreigners come up against "internal borders" that may take years to breach: being able to apply for asylum and be granted refugee status, to obtain a temporary residence permit, avoid deportation, obtain a final status, and acquire citizenship (Gosselin et al. 2016; Fassin 2019). Even today, a large proportion of residence permits granted across the Western world (reflected in data compiled by the OECD for some 30 countries) are in fact granted to people who have already been present in the country for years and who were waiting for an adjustment of status. Migration, like the formation of couples, is not as clear cut in demography as births and deaths.

To add to the complexity of migration, there is a correlation between the formation of couples and the decision to migrate. In most ancient or traditional societies, alliance systems, largely dominated by men, led to the migration of daughters rather than sons. For young women, getting married often involved migrating long distances. Exporting women for purposes of unions was a widespread and favored practice in traditional societies. Genome analysis of human remains has shown that maternally inherited mitochondrial DNA circulated in human evolution more rapidly than paternally inherited Y chromosomes (Underhill and Kivisild 2007; Quintana-Murci 2021).

A classic demographer who is interested in fertility must eliminate from the data all couples who are separated for a variety of reasons, whether divorce, the early death of one of the spouses, forced migration (military mobilization or exile, for example), or the voluntary migration of a spouse. To understand the "force of mortality" within a population and to calculate the survival curves of different cohorts, demographers must control for life courses that have been interrupted by emigration and, conversely, immigration. The quest for "pure" data thus leads classical demography to reduce the size of the populations observed in order to focus on immobile and homogeneous populations. When applied to sample surveys, this quickly reduces the number of observations, making the N value too small for meaningful analysis.

Today, many demographers resort to other methods of standardization, which include keeping everyone under observation through the life cycle from birth to death or departure. Demographers now have the ability to calculate the probabilities of experiencing a particular migratory event as a function of individual or social characteristics, thanks to sophisticated multivariate techniques measuring the probability of life events over time (models of duration and survival models, proportional hazard models, life-course analysis, event history analysis, multilevel life history analysis, and so on). With these new methods,



migration is no longer an anomaly in demographic analysis; it is a part of the life course, neither more nor less random than any other event. It is “endogenous” in models of population dynamics. As a result, demographic analysis is no longer so different from other social sciences from a methodological and statistical point of view.

Apart from the smaller numbers, the major weakness of traditional methods of standardization was an unrealistic assumption of independence. These techniques presupposed that the migrant population exhibited the same behavioral profile (or the same heterogeneity) as the resident population (Toulemon 2011). When we calculate the probability of the first emigration of single persons, we always assume that those who married or who died before migrating would have left their region in the same proportion as those who died or were never married. In the introduction to his chapter on migration, Louis Henry clearly raised the problem. Any act of migration by definition connects two populations; hence it is an open (undefined) phenomenon. Henry laments that,

In the current state of demography, we do not know how to study open phenomena as such. With rare exceptions, we just study them as we do for closed phenomena; this is tantamount to admitting that the changes which the phenomenon of migration brings to the two populations in question do not modify the probability of the event studied in the population of interest, for example emigration from the origin area.

(Henry 1972: 198; see also p. 214)

Yet we know of at least two instances in which this kind of independence assumption does not apply: the interaction between marriage and migration on the one hand, and the interaction between mortality and migration on the other. Let’s take a look at them in turn.

### ***The Relationship Between Migration, Marriage and Fertility***

A major difficulty in demographic analysis of migration today is that migration, marriage, and fertility are often interdependent. Life course specialists held the view that statistical analysis of chronological events made it possible to model causation among these events (Mulder and Wagner 1993). From their perspective, migration followed by marriage was interpreted as migration leading to marriage. But social actors have anticipation strategies that can invalidate the *post hoc, propter hoc* fallacy. The most sophisticated statistical analysis struggles to determine whether women migrate to get married or whether they marry to migrate. Sorting out cause and effect requires field work and ethnographic analysis, bringing anthropology and gender studies together to discern the point of view of each spouse and their relatives and to understand the connection between matrimonial and migration strategy (see the chapter on anthropology by Brettell in this volume). Qualitative methods make it possible to know whether these migration strategies are individual or family-based and, for example, whether a migrant

woman who marries submits to family pressure or, on the contrary, emancipates herself from it.

Likewise, the first stages of migration are strongly linked to the beginnings of fertility. We owe this important discovery to the French demographer Laurent Toulemon: thanks to the biographical Family Survey carried out in conjunction with the 1999 French census, which covered 380,000 people, he showed that immigrant women had on average fewer children upon arrival than native women of the same age (Toulemon 2004). They make up for this lower fertility in the following years, before gradually aligning their behavior with natives in a third phase. There are two reasons for the lower fertility. First is self-selection: at the same age, women who already have children migrate less than women without children. Second is a postponement strategy: many immigrants wait until they have moved to another country to have their first child. These two phenomena together modify the age-specific fertility rates. The discovery of lower fertility of migrant women upon arrival has been confirmed for other major immigration countries in Europe (see the review by Kulu et al. 2019, as well as the eloquent graphs of Tønnessen and Wilson 2020).

The fertility rate of foreigners is therefore overestimated if it is calculated (as is usually done) by counting only births registered in the host country after arrival. If we include the lower fertility, evident before migration and known only by biographical surveys, the fertility rate of foreign women during their lifetime must be revised downwards: in the example of France, examined by Toulemon, it fell from 2.50 children per woman to 2.16 for the period 1900–1998. The physical border and the temporal border therefore have the effect of delaying and intensifying fertility, like a toll barrier which modifies the density of traffic for a time but does not give a correct idea of all traffic flow (Volant et al. 2019).

Subsequently, the level of fertility of migrant women tends to decrease with the length of stay, which most authors explain by an assimilation effect (Desiderio 2020). Toulemon does not foresee a gradual alignment of immigrants with the fertility norm of the host country. He recognizes in immigrants (men and women, because it is a matter of couples) a strategic capacity to manage the decisive life events, which are interrelated in a short period of time: marriage, migration, and family formation. In his pioneering 2004 article, Toulemon underlines the extent of the socialization effect for minor immigrants: young girls who migrated to France before the age of 13 have almost the same fertility rate in adulthood as that of natives of the same age. Clearly, one generation is enough to offset the fertility gap between immigrants and natives. The second generation's behavior diverges from the first and converges with that of the natives. More generally, age at entry is a decisive variable in explaining fertility behavior. The younger the migrant is upon arrival, the greater the likelihood of narrowing the gap with the native population. These phenomena vary from country to country, depending on migratory flows. In the Netherlands, the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan migrants have a more marked rural origin than in France or Germany. We can see in these populations that the fertility norms of the country of origin permeate behavior more and change only slowly

over time. In contrast, the second generation is quickly socialized into the host society (Garssen and Nicolaas 2008).

The in-depth study of the German case by Nadja Milewski (2010), based on the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), confirms Toulemon's findings in the French case, taking into account the diverse origins of immigrants in Germany: Turkish, Greek, Italian, Spanish, and those from the former Yugoslavia. The migrant women in this study were born between 1946 and 1983. The method consists of estimating the probabilities of having a first child, then the second, the third, and so on. Milewski confirms that in the first 18 months after arrival, the chance of having a first child is very high in the first generation (2.5 times greater than in native women) but it is already halved by the second generation (1.2). Unsurprisingly, the most important explanatory variable is the fact of being married, followed by low education and unemployment. Milewski reviews the many hypotheses that may explain the sub- or supra-fertility sequence around migration. She refutes the thesis of marital disruption, which would explain the delayed births by the temporary separation of couples at the time of migration. On the other hand, she confirms the interdependence hypothesis, namely the interweaving of marriage and migration (without the author being able to delve into the nature of the links established, information accessible only through qualitative analysis). She also confirms the hypothesis of a gradual "adaptation" of fertility behaviors to the practices of the host society, but only in a final phase, after the settlement period.

However, Milewski rules out the culturalist argument, which relates over-fertility behavior to a desire to stand out from the host society, once the group discovers its minority status and the extent of discrimination. This hypothesis was advanced to explain the "Mexican paradox," namely the fact that Mexican immigrants in the United States had higher fertility than Mexicans in Mexico (Frank and Heuveline 2005). Setting aside the thesis of a persistence of the pro-natalist norms of the society of origin, the authors fall back on the argument that higher fertility is due to the acquiescence of Mexican immigrants to the norm of a high-fertility racial minority, long prevalent in the United States. But the logic of this conforming to the minority stereotype remains unexplained and it seems impossible to confirm. Everything indicates that a properly demographic explanation of the "Mexican paradox," along the lines of Toulemon and Milewski, would be more accurate.

### ***Migration and Health, a Life-Cycle Interaction***

The classic methods of standardization adopted by demographers face other hurdles. Incoming and outgoing migrants do not run the same morbidity or mortality risks as natives and permanent residents. The experience of migration is not neutral in terms of health and mortality. As a whole, migrants in developed countries tend to have a lower level of mortality than natives. This phenomenon is called the Migrant Mortality Advantage (MMA). According to a literature review commissioned by *The Lancet* from a group of experts and covering nearly one hundred

studies, the risk of mortality for migrants is on average around 70% of the risk for the general population (Aldridge et al. 2018). The comparison is made with standardized mortality rates (SMR), adjusted to the same age structure. The lower mortality of immigrants is confirmed for the majority of the causes of death, with two exceptions: infectious diseases (AIDS, hepatitis, malaria, tuberculosis) and “external” causes of mortality (accidents, violent deaths, overdoses). The authors clearly specify the limits of their review: it mainly covers migration for work, study, or family reunification in high-income countries, which means that refugees, asylum seekers, and people in an irregular situation are not included. Nor is the study generalizable to South–South migration, which largely concerns more marginalized groups.

Lower mortality of migrants in Western host societies contradicts the model that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s, namely the “sick migrant paradigm,” according to which the immigrant was the carrier of contagious diseases. It also contradicts the widely held view that immigrants are a burden on healthcare systems: immigrants weigh less heavily on average than natives. The Migrant Mortality Advantage was spotted from the end of the 1990s in France among Moroccan immigrants (Khlat and Courbage 1996), in Germany among Turkish immigrants, in the Netherlands among Moroccan immigrants, and in the United States among Hispanic immigrants. From the early 2010s, several papers on migrant mortality in Europe were published in a comparative perspective, within the framework of the project Migrant and Ethnic Minority Health Observatory (MEHO), funded by the European Commission. Lower mortality is often referred to as a paradox because it occurs in spite of the lower socio-economic status of many migrant groups within the host society.

A closer look shows that lower mortality rates are the result of opposing forces during the life cycle. First of all, there is a selection bias at entry: migrants admitted to stay are, at the same age, in better health than natives. This is called the “healthy migrant effect.” This self-selection may occur in the country of origin through recruitment that selects “fit for service” candidates or a selection on arrival (of which Ellis Island offers the classic model). But it can also be due simply to self-selection, with people in poor health having a lower propensity to migrate.

Secondly, in a later phase of the process, however, the state of health of migrants deteriorates due to poor living conditions, also linked to reception conditions (population density, overcrowding and poor housing, low-paying jobs, bad working hours, and the like). Some scholars have written about the “exhausted migrant effect” (Bollini and Siem 1995), a model that applies particularly to workers in mines, textiles, or construction and public works, where migrants are exposed to accidents and dangerous work, and also linked to the stress of living in an irregular situation and to inequalities in access to health care, without forgetting the psychological traumas induced by waiting for largely unpredictable and arbitrary decisions regarding migrant status. Migrants are among the most vulnerable in any population. A recent survey on the progression of HIV-AIDS among sub-Saharan migrants in France showed that the vast majority of infections did

not occur in Africa, before migration, but after, due to poor living conditions in the host country (Desgrées du Loué et al. 2015).

Thirdly, the health status of immigrants improves over decades as integration progresses (see the chapter by FitzGerald on sociology in this volume). Migrants may then experience an accelerated version of the “health transition” (Spallek et al., 2011). Access to the healthcare system of the host country helps migrants fight off infectious diseases, as they adopt the Western way of life, although that raises the incidence of colorectal, breast, and prostate cancers. When they finally reach retirement age, some of the aging immigrants return to their native country to end their days there: their return has the effect of reducing the mortality rate of migrants in the host country. This kind of selection by “unhealthy return migration” is known as the “salmon bias.”

Selection biases, which are reversed during the life cycle, refute the independence hypothesis that is linked to more traditional forms of demographic analysis. We cannot pretend that the arrivals or departures of migrants are neutral from a health point of view. The hypothesis of the vulnerable or exhausted migrant must itself be broken down by occupation (migrant women have for a long time been strongly over-represented in textile factories or in personal services, migrant men in mines, the steel industry, and open-air construction sites). The Covid-19 pandemic has drawn more scholarly attention to the relationship between migrant status, class, gender, and health status, as studies during the pandemic of so-called “essential workers” in sectors like healthcare, food processing, and the like have shown (Fasani and Mazza 2020; Bajos et al. 2021).

### **Migration and Demographic Data: From the Macro to Micro Perspective**

The question of data is crucial in demography. Like economics, it is a discipline that is driven in part by the availability of public data, on the one hand, and the data it has created for its own purpose, on the other. Aggregate data are the lifeblood of demographers, who rely on the compilation and harmonization efforts made by international statistical organizations: the UN Population Division, the statistical office of the European Commission (Eurostat), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD produces in-depth studies on the demographic aspects of migration. Since the 1990s, however, demographers have worked hard to produce individual-level data with a strong longitudinal dimension, including for migration.

#### ***The Challenge of Micro-data: A New Generation of Surveys***

Until the 1970s, demographers worked using aggregate data collected by public agencies, far from field studies. Early on, however, they felt the need to fill gaps in the data by launching new surveys. They got involved in the drafting of questionnaires used by national statistical agencies. But above all it has been

by launching their own representative surveys that demographers have been able partially to fill the gaps in administrative data, particularly glaring in the area of migration, and regain a little independence vis-à-vis the public agencies. The revolution in data analysis of the 1980s, together with new statistical packages, paved the way for this change. Demographers were able to design their questionnaires more freely along with sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, economists, and public health scholars. Each of these surveys results in a file containing hundreds of variables, sometimes even thousands, something technically unthinkable in the 1970s. The switch to micro-data, together with the development of powerful statistical software, led demographers out of their disciplinary isolation, into the field, and closer to other social sciences.

Today, a major analytical tool for demographers is the multi-biographical questionnaire, which makes it possible to compare the sequences of personal and family life histories in several areas: family events, change of residence, change of status, jobs, language acquisition, health conditions, experience of discrimination, and so on. A good example is the French *Trajectoires et Origines* (TeO) survey conducted in 2008–2009 jointly by the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) (Beauchemin, Hamel, Simon 2018). A new version of the survey was conducted in 2020. The analysis of the relationship between the various biographies of the same person requires appropriate statistical methods, known as “life-course analysis.” The demographer relies on this analysis to identify “lifelines” with a chronology that shows the length of stay and the age at entry of migrants and these turn out to be decisive variables in migration studies.

### ***The US-Mexican Corridor: A Panoply of Censuses and Surveys***

In the United States, basic data on migration are produced partly by the federal government and partly by scholarly surveys. The current approach to data gathering can be summarized as follows. The centerpiece of US official statistics is the American Community Survey (ACS), run by the Census Bureau, which replaced the now-defunct “long form” decennial census. The ACS sample comprises about 1% of the US population, or more than three million people, including 350,000 foreign-born. The questions asked relate in particular to the country of birth, nationality at birth, and current nationality, but not legal status (authorized or unauthorized) of the migrant. The same questions are asked of parents if the interviewee still lives with them. In addition, there are questions on year of arrival, country of birth, year of naturalization, place of residence 12 months prior, and language spoken at home. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses ACS to estimate the extent of unauthorized immigration by applying differential methods (Hofer, Rytina, and Baker 2012), as does the Pew Research Center (Passel 2019).

Another major survey in the United States is the Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted on a monthly basis by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of

Labor Statistics. This is the equivalent of the Labor Force Surveys carried out in the member states of the European Union. The sample includes 134,000 people, including 14,600 foreign-born. The February–March Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) includes a weighted sample of Hispanics. The nature of the migratory corridor between Mexico and the United States means that American demographers can use Mexican surveys, which contain data on migrants returning from the United States, potential migrants, and non-migrants: the Mexican Census of Housing and Population, the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE), and the Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID), include questions about emigration.

But there are also large-scale survey projects initiated by academics to make up for the shortcomings of official statistics. We can cite the EMIF-N, Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México, run by the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, which is inspired by the British model of the International Passenger Survey, based on a sample of people surveyed at the border. Another survey of academic origin is the MxFLS, the Mexican Family Life Survey, carried out by US and Mexican academics. Its originality lies in the collection of longitudinal data and the fact that respondents were surveyed on three occasions, in 2002, 2005–2006, and 2009–2012, with an initial sample of 35,000 people. In addition to the classic variables, the questionnaire includes information on health and cognitive abilities, trauma, food and consumption, thus shedding light on the “Healthy Migrant Paradox” (Rubalcava and Teruel 2013; Goldman et al. 2014). The challenge of this kind of longitudinal survey, in addition to the cost, is to keep a mobile population under observation for a long period of time. In fact, the MxFLS sample has not been re-run since 2012.

The most famous academic survey of Mexican migration is the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), launched in 1982 by the sociologist and demographer Douglas Massey and the Mexican anthropologist Jorge Durand. The survey began with the idea of sending graduate students into urban and rural areas of northwestern Mexico, which have a long history of sending migrants to the United States. The study was gradually extended to other provinces to make the sample more representative. In 2018, it included 150 municipalities and 25,000 households in Mexico, coupled with a control sample of 960 households in the United States.

The MMP was a pathbreaking study, the first to gather data on return migrants and non-migrants from the country of origin. Before MMP, migrants were studied primarily in the host country, where most scholars lived. By studying migrants only in the host country, the sample is limited to individuals who migrated but never returned (“survivors” in the demographic sense of the term). On the other hand, if you study Mexican migration from Mexico, you break with “methodological nationalism” avoiding “destination bias,” which *de facto* privileges the host country as a major actor in the migration phenomenon (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003; Dumitru 2014; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; see also chapters by FitzGerald, Brettell, and Hollifield and Wong in this volume).

The success of Douglas Massey’s MMP is due to several factors: the decision to study emigration rather than immigration, the strong partnership with a



Mexican university, the determination to fill the gaps in the American federal statistics by studying the circularity of migration and by identification of the motivations of migrants, all of which required a mixed method of observation—an ethno-survey (or *etnoencuesta*)—combining a demographic survey with ethnographic observation (Massey 1987), the use of the observatory to test a wide range of theories of migration by combining demography, sociology, and economics, relying upon a systematic measure of the probability to migrate, to return, or to migrate again from one year to the next, hence the circularity.

Massey also became famous through his leadership (1991–1996) of the Migration Committee of the IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population), which published a very influential review of the world literature on the factors of migration (Massey et al. 1993).<sup>3</sup> The edited volume resulting from this literature review was a bestseller of the IUSSP collection (Massey et al. 1998). The Massey committee identified six theories of migration, which can be summarized succinctly as follows:

1. According to the neoclassical theory of Gary Becker and Michael Todaro (1960s), migration is driven by the differential in earnings between origin and host countries. It is also an investment in human capital, a strategy to get higher returns in a better labor market.
2. For the new economic theory of migration (Oded Stark, 1990s), the decision-making unit is the family, attentive to the economic successes of families who have already migrated.
3. The theory of labor market segmentation (Michael Piore 1979) underlines the chronic need of industrial economies for an easily exploitable and flexible workforce, to bypass the rigidities of socially protected sectors.
4. According to world systems theory developed by Saskia Sassen and following Immanuel Wallerstein and Alejandro Portes, the capitalism of “global cities” destroys local economies (extraction of rare metals, for example) and leads to policies that facilitate the exodus of the uprooted.
5. The theory of “social capital,” supposedly borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu (see below), insists on the decisive role of family solidarity and kinship networks that stimulate chain migration.
6. Finally, the theory of “cumulative causation,” developed by Massey himself, maintains that all these factors perpetuate migration through a feedback loop.

Deeming theories 1 and 2 too micro and theories 3 and 4 too macro, Massey defended the meso approach of theories 5 and 6, which he tested in his Mexican surveys. After laying out the rationale of an ethno-survey, combining demographic and ethnographic data, he opted for a more standardized quantitative approach, in order to measure the respective weight of the various factors likely to explain the propensity to migrate.

With hindsight, it appears that the inventory of theories presented in the Massey Committee report leaves very little room for the role of states and policy, which surged to the fore in the United States in the 1990s with operations Hold the Line

and Gatekeeper to seal segments of the southern border and during the “European refugee crisis” in 2014 (Hollifield et al. 2022; and chapter by Hollifield and Wong in this volume). The French reader of Massey, however, will be perplexed by his use of the theory of social capital. Massey quotes a famous research note by Bourdieu, which exists in a short (1980) and in a longer, more developed version (1986). Bourdieu, if we read him correctly, has always conceived of social capital as the capacity of aristocratic, bourgeois, or intellectual elites to consolidate their control of networks of relationships that unfairly multiply the return on their economic and cultural capital. In Massey’s surveys, the variables that are presumed to measure social capital refer to something quite different: indicators such as having a parent, child, or sibling who has already migrated and settled abroad, or someone who is living in an ethnic enclave in the host country. Massey’s research simply highlights the role of family reunification in perpetuating immigration (so-called “chain migration”) and the local ripple effects that are unrelated to a general theory of social capital. There is a clear gap between the theoretical concept and its operationalization.

Seen from Europe and from a demographic point of view, America before Trump was characterized by a residence permit policy that favored family reunification. According to OECD data, two-thirds of residence permits issued in 2018 by the United States fell into this category. This is the highest proportion in the world: in 2018 alone, some 800,000 people obtained a residence permit in the United States for family reasons. However, this policy is not discussed in the work of Douglas Massey. In his view, the state is essentially an obstacle to migration, and it is the mobilization of social capital that is the primary driver of Mexican migration to the United States; that is to say, migration occurs primarily through the mobilization of family and local networks. It is questionable whether such a capacity to mobilize family sponsors could succeed without the support of federal legislation favorable to family migration. Conversely, when Donald Trump attacked concrete family reunification procedures, the corresponding flows saw a dramatic decrease (Pierce and Bolter 2020). It is a significant challenge for field surveys to combine individual-level data with contextual economic, legal, and political data, so each can serve as explanatory variables in a multi-variate model.

### ***The European Challenge: Launching Intercontinental Surveys on Migration***

In Europe, the heterogeneity of statistical systems between countries is a huge challenge. In the early 2000s, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, succeeded in harmonizing national labor force surveys as well as surveys on living conditions and poverty. The questions about national origins were intended to identify not only the generation of migrants but also that of their children. The variables used are not racial but ethnic (“immigrant of Algerian descent,” “daughter of a Turkish immigrant,” “child of a Spanish immigrant,” and so on). The country of birth and the nationality at birth of the respondents, their spouse and their parents are recorded. Only the United Kingdom and Ireland

have borrowed from the United States a classification of self-reported race or ethnicity. On the whole in continental Europe (and not only in France, as one often imagines), the processing of racial data is done through gathering “ethnic” statistics in the European sense of the term, that is to say identifying the migration background over two generations, classified by region of origin. Questions about the link between skin color and discrimination are possible, but only in carefully regulated research surveys: authorities must approve the purpose of the research and assure that it is done following ethical guidelines (informed consent, protection of the identity of the subjects, professionally trained interviewers, privacy, data protection, and so on).

In this fragmented regulatory landscape, European demographers have set up some Europe-wide surveys. They aspire to study emigration as much as immigration. They are not limited only to out- or in-migration, but aim to describe migratory systems in their entirety, which implies connecting samples of migrants in the countries of origin and the host, being attentive to the fact that migrants have the choice between several destinations. Experience has shown that such research is extremely costly in time and resources.

The first organization to undertake such a complicated study was the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), based in The Hague. NIDI applied successfully for European Commission funding. From 1994, it led a large-scale international effort to meet the challenge of such a major survey, known as *Push-Pull*, to identify the determinants of migration both in the countries of origin (Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, Turkey) and in the host countries (the Netherlands, Italy, Spain). This was a first and a great success. Under the direction of socio-demographer Jeannette Schoorl, the international team had a hard time bringing the research to fruition. In the end, it proved impossible to match samples of migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants between countries of origin and settlement, because the origins were too diffuse. Samples were limited to areas already known for the intensity of their migratory movements, including major urban areas. Massey and Durand encountered the same difficulty with the Mexican Migration Project, which is limited to only two countries. They had to settle for drawing a control sample of no more than 650 Mexican migrants in the United States, because the migration networks were not dense enough to link sending and receiving communities: international migration is not a one-to-one or a one-way journey. The report submitted to the European Commission by NIDI was, however, very rich (Schoorl et al. 2000), even though it was clear after the fact that there were major methodological problems (Schoorl 2008).

The other benchmark survey is the MAFE project, Migration between Africa and Europe—not, the authors stress, African Immigration in Europe. The latter study was led at INED by geographer-demographer Cris Beauchemin with assistance from Bruno Schoumaker, professor of demography at the Catholic University of Louvain. The MAFE project, on the other hand, was inspired by the *Push-Pull* survey of NIDI and the MMP of Massey and Durand. Starting in 2005, the objective was to design a series of surveys to capture circular migration between Africa and Europe, and to avoid the trap of methodological nationalism (Beauchemin

2018a). Partnerships were formed with research centers located in Dakar, Accra, and Kinshasa. Three migratory systems were targeted: circulation between Senegal, France, Spain and Italy, circulation between DR Congo, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, and circulation between Ghana, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The MAFE project covers gender, the trans-nationalist stream, and avoids “destination bias.” Funded by the European Commission, the MAFE survey encountered considerable difficulties in terms of the representativeness of the sample: the drawing of samples and the completion of questionnaires in Africa were limited to large metropolitan areas. It was not possible to construct samples of the same population in the origin, transit, return, and host areas, again for the same reason: migration, even when circular, is not perfectly symmetrical in two countries. But here too, as with the *Push-Pull* study, the difficulties, even the dead ends, were reported with great intellectual honesty (Beauchemin 2015, 2018a). It is instructive to note that these difficulties are similar to those of the Mexican Migration Project (Liu et al. 2016).

These “trans-regional surveys” were worth the money. They showed that visa restriction policies, under the pretext of reducing flows, lead to an increase in “stocks.” Instead of circulating, migrants tend more and more to stay in Europe, for fear of not being able to return, if they leave and have to pass through Africa again. The gender findings underlined the contrast between a society with a strong religious tradition, like Senegal, where brotherhoods are omnipresent, and a country like the DR Congo, where endemic wars destroy families: male domination remains strong in the first case, but it is called into question in the second. While Senegalese women tend to follow their husbands, Congolese women are more autonomous and often make the decision to migrate alone (Vause and Toma 2015). The “trans-regional surveys” resulted in a large number of publications, which can be found on their respective websites, and some findings are reported in edited volumes (Schoorl 2008; Beauchemin 2018b). But the geographic scope of the surveys remains limited and varies from one survey to another. The whole does not fulfill the dream of a global and regular measurement of migratory flows.

### ***How to Measure Unauthorized Migration in Demographic Studies***

Public attention is focused on the issue of unauthorized migration. Many people are convinced that the high number of unauthorized migrants makes official statistics suspect, and authorities are accused of ignoring reality, aware of illegal migration but unable to stop it. Of course, the concerns of the public and political elites must be addressed. But how do we measure unauthorized migration? It can take many forms: clandestine entry, staying in the host country after the expiration of the three-month tourist visa (Schengen visa in Europe), or remaining in the host country after the final rejection of an application for asylum or a deportation order. We will use the terms unauthorized, undocumented, irregular, and illegal interchangeably, while reserving the adjective clandestine for illegal border crossings. In France, humanitarian NGOs speak of “sans-papiers,” an expression that tends to minimize the need to maintain one’s legal status. The methods for

measuring illegal immigration were detailed in a typology put forward by the CLANDESTINO project that was funded by the European Commission (Kraler and Vogel 2008). I will refer to it, while falling back on accepted demographic techniques of measurement.

A first technique is to conduct a survey in industries known for their intense use of unauthorized foreign workers (in agriculture, tourism, garment industry, catering, domestic service, parcel delivery, transport, and so on). However, no one knows which factor to use to extrapolate the results to society as a whole. Another technique, the so-called “capture-recapture” method, has been used in the Netherlands. It exploits the existence of a statistical relationship (Poisson’s law) between the probabilities of being apprehended by the police once, twice, three times, etc. and the size of the overall population. But it is based on the unrealistic assumption that the risks of apprehension at each illegal entry are discreet and unrelated.

The best way to identify irregular migrants is still to legalize them. Legalizations (often called “amnesties” in countries that criminalize irregular migration, like the US) lead to reliable estimates of the unauthorized population if the migrants trust the operation and are encouraged by NGOs to come forward without fear of arrest and deportation. But legalizations are more and more rare. None have been carried out in the OECD countries since 2005, having been replaced by more discreet and limited procedures. It should be noted, however, that a policy of “zero legalization” is unrealistic. A state cannot allow a growing fraction of the population to escape its control, otherwise it risks undermining the social contract (see Hollifield and Wong, Chapter 7 in this volume, and various works of Hollifield). However, authorities fear the negative political repercussions of large-scale legalizations and we know that mass deportation is legally and constitutionally difficult. In Europe it is expressly prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights. Hence, states fall back on so-called “flow-through” legalization or adjustments of status to use the US terminology, done on a case-by-case basis. But such procedures are not enough to eliminate unauthorized migration, even more true since the European refugee crisis of 2015–2016 (Orrenius and Zavodny 2016).

Demographic methods to estimate the number of unauthorized migrants are also available. Sometimes they are used in censuses or micro-censuses, which avoid asking people about their migration status. In the United States, all people who have an address (citizens and non-citizens, authorized or unauthorized immigrants) are included as part of the resident population for the purpose of the census. The same principle prevails in European countries, but what about in practice? In countries where the census is based on a housing database, regularly updated through building permits, the checking of electricity meters, review of tax data, and the like, the inclusion rate of unauthorized migrants in surveys and the census may be high, because a good census of housing is the pre-condition for a good census of the inhabitants. In countries where the census is accompanied by an intense publicity campaign to mobilize minority communities (such as happens in the United States or Germany), the response rate of foreigners is higher.

In the United States, the estimate of the number of undocumented migrants is carried out by the Census Bureau. The political stakes are high: in the decade following each census, the Constitution mandates reapportionment of the House of Representatives on the basis of the new distribution of the population across the states. The Census Bureau takes unauthorized immigrants into account in determining the size of the population in each state. The Census Acting Director called upon the Bureau heads to report how best to count the unauthorized. The results of this internal review were made public in March 2020 (Velkof and Abowd 2020), and they show that the Census Bureau uses two methods to estimate the unauthorized population. Both are “residual,” in the sense that they estimate the target population by subtracting the legal population. Statisticians use aggregate data in the first case, and micro-data in the second. The main source for this measurement is the American Community Survey (ACS).

The aggregate residual method begins by estimating the immigrant population *stricto sensu* (limited to foreign-born), before subtracting legal immigrants. This first step is based on data from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics (including asylum seekers and the naturalized population). Updating the data in December 2020 (the deadline for reapportionment) required the Bureau to subtract immigrants who have left or died since the survey, as well as estimating migration between states. Finally, corrections are needed to align ACS data with census data. The latter has a better response rate due to the intense publicity campaign.

The Census Bureau discovered that different research groups, in-house and private, using the aggregate residual method after the 2010 census, came up with different estimates: the Pew Research Center found an unauthorized migrant population of 10.7 million, compared to an estimate of 10.8 million by the Center for Migration Studies and 11.7 according to the Office of Immigration Statistics of the Department of Homeland Security. These are modest differences in the eyes of a demographer. But they are unacceptable within the framework of the American electoral system, the fragility of which is known worldwide and which requires extreme precision for reapportionment, especially in “swing states” where small population shifts can change the basis for representation in the House of Representatives. However, such precision is not possible when making estimates using iterations from a random sample.

The Census Bureau experts’ note goes on to review the micro-data method, which consists of matching person to person in the individual census data with a dozen administrative files, which I review here in terms accessible to those who are unfamiliar with the American terminology: social security, tax administration, visas, border crossings, allowances for the disabled, health insurance, prison population, file of foreign residents, housing services, food assistance programs, drivers licenses—all of these databases record the legal status of individuals. The data are analyzed using algorithms and an individual identifier (usually the Social Security number). The statistical operations are complex and involve ethical questions about the processing of individual-level data. Individuals who are not found in any of these administrative files are likely to be in an irregular status: this



is why the method is called “residual.” A review of the Census Bureau’s research note makes clear that a great deal of energy has been expended to estimate the number of unauthorized migrants for the purposes of reapportionment, notwithstanding all the limitations on the right to vote in the United States related to race and class.

Unlike other European countries, France does not have population registers. Access to national education and social protection is provided directly with state services and these social services are not tied to a specific residence. A budget line known as “State medical aid” (AME) was created in 2000 to cover the medical costs of individuals without a residence permit (André and Azzedine 2016; Izambert 2019). The AME was used by 320,000 people in 2019. But not all irregular migrants use it. A survey conducted *via* associative networks (Dourgnon et al. 2016) showed that only 51% of eligible people used AME, which suggests that the number of irregular migrants could be around 500,000 people. Out of 4.9 million foreigners, this represents a proportion of 10%, or less than 1% of the total population living in France.

As we can see, estimating the number of unauthorized migrants is not an exact science, but it can deliver a reasonable order of magnitude. Each of these estimates requires choosing between several assumptions. Other sources can be used to estimate the unauthorized migrant population. In most Western countries, unauthorized migrants are never completely devoid of rights (see Hollifield and Wong, Chapter 7, in this volume and various works by each of the authors cited in the references of their chapter). Irregular migrants can send their children to school, earn a salary, pay taxes, and have the right to some health care, and access to the justice system. The countries that have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights are bound by the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg, according to which it would be “disproportionate” to refuse a residence permit to foreigners who have acquired over time sufficient personal and family links with the host country. In its ruling, the Court balances two opposing principles: the right of any State to control immigration versus the principle of non-interference by the State in the private and family life of the individual, a right that is enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Lambert 2007). The application of the first principle must be reconciled with the respect of the second (again see Hollifield and Wong’s discussion of the dilemmas of migration governance in this volume). The website of the French Ministry of the Interior draws the following conclusion in a webpage posted on March 22, 2021, entitled “The right to remain in France under personal and family ties”:

A foreigner who establishes that the center of his private life and family interests is located in France (without any equivalent being found in the country of origin or return) and that a deportation would entail a disproportionate violation of his private and family life, is issued a temporary residence permit for a period of one year. It is up to the applicant to justify the intensity, seniority and stability of his ties in France, including living conditions, integration into French society, the nature of ties to the family in the country of origin.



Clearly, “transnational” activities are strongly discouraged. It is unacceptable, for example, to have a child still living in the country of origin, or to maintain a family home there. This is the paradox of “undocumented” migrants: they spend time accumulating documents to prove that they have established residence de facto in the host country (ties to the territory that are residential, professional, fiscal, educational, medical, and so on). Candidates for legalization can go to public authorities then to try to obtain a special residence permit.

Finally, I want to stress the importance of biographical or longitudinal surveys in shedding light on the extent of irregular migration. The technique is simple: immigrants are interviewed in the institutions they frequent (such as health centers or humanitarian NGOs) and asked about their backgrounds. Researchers start by asking them the date they entered the territory for the first time and when they obtained their first residence permit. By comparing the two dates it is possible to discern how long a migrant was out of status. A survey by the French Ministry of the Interior showed that 40% of people who obtained a residence permit in 2018 for “personal and family reasons” were already in France in 2010, nine years earlier (Jourdan and Prévot 2020). This is the first time that an official French survey measured the waiting time to obtain a particular residence permit. In this long interval, children are born, grow up and live in precarious circumstances.

Another French survey had similar findings for sub-Saharan migrants: the PARCOURS survey conducted in health centers by the National Agency for Research on HIV/AIDS Infection (Gosselin 2016). The median length of stay in France before obtaining a residence permit was almost three years for women and more than four years for men. Seven and eight years, respectively, were needed to meet all three basic elements of a stable life: a one-year permit, personal accommodation, and employment with a steady income. In other words, a significant proportion of the immigrants in good standing today have gone through a period of irregularity. Contrary to popular perceptions, the two populations, regular and irregular, are not so separate and distinct.

### *Use and Abuse of the World Gallup Survey on Intentions to Migrate*

Surveys based on representative samples are caught on the horns of a dilemma: should they carry out an exhaustive survey of a small but specific population, or a narrow survey of a large population? The more general the survey is, the more detail we lose. Some polling organizations now cover the entire planet, but with direct and instantaneous questions, followed by highly aggregate analyses (generally, simple cross tables). The World Gallup Survey is a good example. The idea is to insert a set of identical questions into a large opinion poll or market survey conducted globally. With a global sample, what could be more exciting than a question about intentions to migrate, capable of fueling the fear of invasion by numbers?

“Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?” The

Gallup Institute included this question in surveys conducted in 152 countries between 2015 and 2017 (Esipova et al. 2018). In the population aged 15 and over, 15% answered yes, which, extrapolated to the planet, represents 750 million people wishing to migrate, almost three times more than the migrants currently registered in the world. Of those wishing to migrate, 21% want to go to the United States, which adds up to 158 million potential migrants, whereas Canada would get 47 million, Germany 42 million, France and Australia 36 million each, the United Kingdom 34 million, and Saudi Arabia would garner 24 million of these potential migrants. In various editorials, Joseph Chamie, former head of the UN Population Division (1994–2004) and today “independent demographic consultant” took the results of the Gallup survey uncritically (Chamie 2020), drawing the conclusion that millions of foreigners would rush to Western countries if given the opportunity, hence the need to seal the borders.

The reality of the intention to migrate is, however, quite different. Researchers at the European Commission’s Joint Research Center were able to consult the original data from Gallup (Migali and Scipioni 2018). They found that the question on intention to migrate was paired with a question on the individual’s actual plans to migrate, itself paired with a question on preparations to migrate (Table 2.1). Looking at each question in sequence, we find that the specter of a great wave of migration diminishes significantly. Among those who, in the abstract, have the desire to leave their country for a long time, only 10% think they will do so in the next twelve months, i.e., 1.5% of adults. And when asked if they have started any preparations, only one-third say yes, i.e., 0.5% of the adults. When it comes to international migration for the individual, it is a long way “from the cup to the lip,” from the intention to migrate to actual movement. When pollsters ask highly abstract questions, the answers often are untethered from reality. The Gallup Institute chose to publish only the results of the first question to make a big splash. This example should be included in all the

*Table 2.1* The Three Questions on Intentions to Migrate Asked by the World Gallup Survey in 152 Countries, among Adults Aged 15 and Over, as Revealed by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission

|                        | <i>Survey Question</i>  | <i>“Yes”</i>                 |
|------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| Migration desires      | “Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?” | 15 %                         |
| Migration plans        | <i>If yes:</i><br>“Are you planning to move permanently to another country in the next 12 months, or not?”  | 10 % of 15 %<br>makes 1.5 %  |
| Migration preparations | <i>If yes:</i><br>“Have you made any preparation for this move?”  | 33 % of 1.5 %<br>makes 0.5 % |

Source: Adapted from Migali, Silvia and Marco Scipioni (2018), “A global analysis of intentions to migrate”, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Ispra (Italy), Technical Report 111207, 57 p.

textbooks of methodology in social science: it reveals how the answers to a survey depend on the wording of the questions (see various chapters in this volume). We must refrain from drawing political conclusions from such poorly designed surveys.

## **Migration and Population Growth: A Global Approach**

We must come back down to earth and take a more realistic view of global migration. Let's consider net migration as an indicator, even though we know it is not always the best measure. Variations in net migration around the world—compared to natural increases in population—are of such magnitude that we can learn a lot from them. I will look first at the migration profile of several countries. Then, I will explore migration systems by linking countries of origin with the hosts.

### ***The Black Box of Net Migration***

The main objection to the notion of net migration is that it is a black box that can mask large population movements that cancel out each other. In fact, net migration not only includes entry and departure of foreigners but also the entry and departure of nationals, sometimes referred to as expatriations and repatriations. The labels do not change anything fundamentally: nationals, when they leave their country for at least a year, are emigrants. In many European countries, years spent abroad for higher education are counted as departures. An increase in the number of departures is likely to obscure an increase in immigration in the opposite direction. Likewise, the number of immigrants returning to their country of origin at the end of their working life to live off their retirement pensions has increased. Anti-immigration groups often accuse “official” demographers of using this technique to disguise an increase in immigration. This controversy is unique to Europe; it hardly exists in the United States, one of the “demographic giants” whose nationals rarely emigrate.

This is why, to respond to the “black box” objection, national statistical institutes have worked to break down net migration into two categories: the balance of natives and the balance of immigrants (or the balance of nationals and the balance of foreigners, depending upon available data, but with the caveat that some foreigners become nationals in the interim). The British began by exploiting their border numbers (entries and departures); the Dutch did the same by analyzing the population registers, whereas the French, for their part, took advantage of the annual rotating census formula. The breakdown of net migration is sometimes recorded in detail, broken down by cultural areas of origin. The result of these calculations is mixed: in a transit country like the Netherlands, about half of departures are attributable to natives; net migration offsets (and conceals) net immigration. In the United Kingdom, migration from the old Commonwealth (the Dominions) and the United States blurs the landscape.


## EXPATRIATES OR EMIGRANTS? THE CHALLENGE OF CLASSIFICATION

Technically, expatriation is nothing more than emigration if it takes at least one year. But in Western countries, “expatriate” or “expat” has a positive meaning. In one of my courses at the Collège de France (January 24, 2019), I noticed the title of one of the many written and audiovisual reports devoted to the expatriation of the French. The dominant theme is that of adventure, of the irrevocable and courageous decision: “Expat generation: they dared to seek adventure,” “Expatriates, a new life!,” “They are young and they left France,” “These French people have gone to the end of the world and are so happy to have left France,” “These French people who give up everything to go abroad,” “The dream life of the French in Sydney,” “Change of life: these French people who made their dreams come true,” “Over there, anything is possible!,” “Colombia, new Eldorado for the French,” “New Zealand, new Eldorado of young French people.” Can we imagine such glowing comments for emigrants from the Global South? Certainly not, despite the fact they are expatriates too.

The biases are also striking when we examine the surveys of certain NGOs on the motivation for leaving one’s country: the 2016 barometer of the Viking association establishes the “Top 5 motivations” for the departure of French people abroad: “professional opportunity”: 34%, “love”: 30%, “cultural interest”: 29%, “quality of life”: 29%, “looking for a professional experience abroad”: 25%. What a striking contrast with the official and dull classification of residence permits in the West: labor migration, family reunification, study abroad, asylum seeking. Could we imagine a Haitian, Venezuelan, Moldovan, Sudanese, Syrian, or Afghan exile justifying his application for a residence permit by invoking love, cultural interest, or the quest for a “better quality of life?” This simple exercise of comparison shows how our perception of migration is biased and one-sided, defined by a political and administrative logic. Motivations we consider legitimate for ourselves seem suspect in others. What is ethically called the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) becomes an Iron Rule when it comes to selecting migrants who knock on our doors.

In France, beginning in the 2000s, net migration of French born in France becomes negative (more departures than returns) and partly offsets the increase in the in-migration of foreigners (Héran 2021b). But the indicator remains valid for describing the country’s migratory history since WWII. The same can be said of Germany. In the United States, the Census Bureau caused a stir by announcing that, from 2010 to 2019, the “non-Hispanic White” population had, for the first time in its history, shown a slight decline, of 16,600 people, because it had recorded a surplus of 1,073,210 deaths over births, only partially offset by a net migration of 1,056,600 white migrants (US Census Bureau 2020).

Here, I compare changes in the natural increase and net migration for three European countries and the United States (Figure 2.1). Usually, these balances are represented by curves which start from zero and crisscross in a confusing way. If we superimpose the two balances in the form of additive or subtractive layers,



*Figure 2.1* The two components of population growth in Germany and Spain, from 1950 to 2020. Note: Germany includes both parts of the country, East (ex-GDR) and West (FRG). Source: Author's calculations based on data from national statistical institutes.

the eye is able to compare the thickness of the two layers and the overall evolution becomes clear. Figures are migration rates per thousand inhabitants. The four graphs are therefore on the same scale and perfectly comparable. This is a crucial point in demography: if we want to compare the dynamics of populations at various periods or between populations of different size, it is essential to reason in proportions and standardize the measures, whereas polemicists often look only at the absolute (unstandardized) numbers. Between the four countries selected here, the contrast is striking.


In Germany, the baby boom was late and brief, lasting only a few years around 1965. (Note that I went back in time and merged Western and Eastern Germany, so as to control for the migration from the GDR to the FRG.) In 1972, Germany was the first country in the world to enter permanently into what is now called the “Second Demographic Transition,” i.e., an unbalanced demographic regime, with fewer, later, and less fertile unions, and therefore more deaths than births. Despite the natural decrease, the population is still growing, but only through

migration. In the years 1960–1972, labor immigration was not supposed to last: the *Gastarbeiter* came mainly from southern Europe and Yugoslavia (see also the chapter by Hollifield and Wong in this volume). At that time, migration was still correlated with the business cycle: the years of recession, very visible on the graph, had the immediate effect of halting the flows. But in 1973, following the Yom Kippur War and the quadrupling of oil prices, German authorities suspended foreign labor migration in order to fight rising unemployment. From that time on, the strong variations in net migration no longer reflected fluctuations in the economy but the surge in refugee migration caused successively by the fall of the Wall (1989), the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1990s), the conflict in Kosovo (2000s) and the wars in the Middle East (2014–2016). From the 1990s, Germany became a primary destination for refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. But foreign labor migration was on the rise again, mainly from the new EU member states.

The picture for Spain is quite different. With still a very high natural increase in the population in the 1950s (during the Franco regime, the country had not yet gone through its first demographic transition), there was massive emigration to Northern Europe, interspersed with returns in the years of recession, and then the entry into the European Union in 1986, which eventually reversed migration flows. In the 1990s, Spain became the most important country for immigration in Europe (ahead of Italy): the authorities carried out several massive regularizations (between 300,000 and 500,000 people each time), favoring migrants from the Maghreb, Romania, Ukraine, and Latin America, who were instrumental as sources of labor during the boom in housing construction, tourism, and food production in the boom years. In 2008, the subprime financial crisis triggered the bursting of the housing bubble and hence the migration bubble; the migration flows were reversed in the 2010s (by the departures of both foreigners and nationals), before rising again from 2015 with the so-called refugee crisis.

Metropolitan France (the metropole excluding the overseas territories) maintained a positive natural balance until 2020, which was for a long time the largest in Europe (Figure 2.2). But the last female cohort of the baby boom (born in the years 1965–1974) reached the end of their child-bearing age in the 2010s, leading to an automatic drop in the number of births. Net migration is now about to overtake natural increase as the main factor of population growth. In the years 1955–1974, the post-war reconstruction and economic catch-up (a period dubbed the “Thirty Glorious Years”) was accompanied by a long and impressive baby boom. During that time, France became a major country for immigration. Remarkably, in the years 1955–1965, France welcomed proportionately more migrants than did the United States, where the national origins quota system was still operative (see chapter four on sociology and chapter seven on politics in this volume). This shows incidentally that neither France nor the United States is by definition an “immigration country” or an “emigration country.”<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, in the year 1962 alone, at the end of the Algerian war, the French metropole welcomed around 800,000 “repatriated” Europeans from the colony. By contrast, France’s net migration was modest in the 1980s and 1990s, making it difficult to assess. From the 2000s, France has seen a mix of a net emigration of



*Figure 2.2* The two components of population growth in France and the United States, from 1950 to 2020. Note: France is limited to the “metropolis” (without the overseas territories). Source: Author’s figure drawn from data from national statistical institutes.

nationals and a net immigration of foreigners. The expatriation of French students and young workers, encouraged by freedom of movement within the European Union, has been rising. Since 2007, INSEE calculates separately the net migration of natives and the net migration of foreigners. The line drawn in the figure for the years 2007–2019 represents the migratory balance for foreigners, which is higher than the apparent balance. The scale remains, however, below the Spanish or German levels, but it is approaching levels not seen in France since the 1960s.

The picture is again different for the United States. The United States first experienced a long and massive baby boom, with net migration strongly reduced by the national origins quota system, which was repealed only in 1965 (see FitzGerald in this volume). Mexican migration, previously limited to temporary agricultural work, the so-called Bracero program (1942–1964), grew exponentially in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the United States became the most attractive immigration country in the world, drawing on labor and human capital from all regions of the globe. The combination of this double demographic growth, both natural and migration-driven, is unparalleled in the Western world.

However, a break came in the 2010s. Fertility plummeted across the United States, not just on the East Coast and not only among the non-Hispanic white majority. From 2018, Donald Trump’s migration policy, implemented by his special advisor Stephen Miller through a series of technical measures, drastically



reduced the flow of family immigrants (Pierce and Bolter 2020). At the heart of the new system of immigration restriction lay the public-charge rule, which made it possible to rule out an “alien” candidate “if s/he is more likely than not at any time in the future to become a public charge.” With this probabilistic reasoning, if you were not young, in good health, or fluent enough in English, the immigration officer might infer that a permanent stay could one day place a strain on the public budget in terms of health or education spending. It was up to the migrant applicant to prove the negative! The reform had a powerful deterrent effect, as the number of family reunification applications to the United States fell by half from 2016 to 2019. Since then, President Joe Biden has abandoned the public-charge rule, although it remains on the books.

The year 2020, marked by the Covid-19 pandemic, underscored how demographically vulnerable the United States and France are. The contrast with the end of the 2000s is striking, when both countries could brag about their impressive net migration and natural demographic balance. This turnaround carries a lesson in humility for demographers. No expert can guarantee that, after the shock of the pandemic, the two countries will return to the expansive demographic regime that prevailed in earlier periods.

### *A Global Vision of the Two Components of Demographic Growth*

Keeping the same indicators, we can now broaden our scope to look at the entire planet and reduce the time horizon to the average of the last five years, from July 2015 to June 2020. Obviously, the net migration of humanity is zero by definition. Until further notice, Planet Earth is a closed unit (no aliens are coming from other planets and humans do not yet have the capacity for intergalactic travel), and its population grows only through the interplay of births and deaths, at an annual rate of 11‰ (or 1.1%).

The countries of the **first group** (Figure 2.3) illustrate a general dynamic in the Global South: a largely positive, natural balance, due to high fertility rates, which offsets net emigration. Their populations therefore continue to grow. But two countries are exceptions: Syria and Venezuela, which experienced a massive exodus in the years 2015–2020. Disastrous government and/or civil war can destabilize a society and its population.

The **second group** brings together other countries of the Global South with strong natural growth, but very little or no net migration. There are two categories of countries in this group. The first includes the “demographic giants” of the planet, starting with China and India, each with 1.4 billion inhabitants. They make up together 36% of the world’s population. They live in worlds of their own, with great internal diversity (we will come back to this point, in Figure 2.4). Their inhabitants leave their country but not in large numbers compared to the size of the population; individuals in these countries improve their lot by resorting to internal migration. Although the Indian and Chinese diasporas are quite big (16 million Indians live abroad and 10 million Chinese), they are small compared to the size of the original population: only 1.2% and 0.7%, respectively. This is




Figure 2.3 Natural increase and net migration per thousand inhabitants in selected countries. Notes: Observed or estimated flows from July 2015 to June 2020 in annual average. The algebraic sum of the two rates (represented by a diamond) gives the total growth rate. Groups 1 to 5: classification of countries according to whether the two balances are positive, negative or null. Source: Author’s graph based on UN Population Division, Population Prospects 2019.




Figure 2.4 Proportion of the national population residing abroad around 2019 for the seven “demographic giants” (more than 150 million inhabitants) and a selection of other countries. Source: Created by author based on United Nations International Migrant Stock database.

typical of mega-countries: a tiny fraction of their inhabitants makes a lot of people. Nigeria, with its 200 million inhabitants, follows the same pattern: only 0.6% of its population has emigrated.

The other category in the second group brings together countries with strong demographic growth but whose populations are too poor to be able to emigrate.

This is the case for Niger, for example, the country with the highest birthrate on the planet with an average of 7 children per woman and 14 children per man, due to polygamy and a large age gap between spouses (Schoumaker 2017). Ethiopia is similar. Mexico, on the other hand, is special: net migration is low because of the high number of returns from the United States, which offsets departures.

The **third group** of countries presents a very different picture: both balances are negative. In addition to Greece, severely affected by the euro crisis (2010–2015), this group includes the formerly communist countries of eastern Europe, whose nationals emigrate en masse to Germany and the United Kingdom (at least until Brexit) and, secondarily, to Italy and the Iberian Peninsula (in the case of Romanians and Ukrainians). This group contradicts the popular theory that European countries with a birth deficit automatically attract migrants from the South. The metaphor of a demographic overflow from populous countries that splashes like a tidal wave into a European “demographic desert” has no basis in fact. The Balkan countries, which have very low fertility rates (1.3 children per woman in Greece, Bosnia, Moldova, 1.4 in Serbia, Poland, Ukraine) do not attract migrants, as the pseudo-theory of full and empty containers might suggest. On the contrary, these countries have the highest rate of emigration in the world: more than 20% of the Balkan population lives abroad, twice the level of the Mexican emigration rate of 10%.

The **fourth group** may seem disparate. It brings together countries with low fertility rates, where deaths exceed births, but some of them, by welcoming large numbers of migrants, including exiles from the “refugee crisis” of 2015–2016, manage to stabilize their populations (like Italy) or even to increase it (in the case of Germany). Strictly speaking, the German case could have been removed from this group and made into a category of one, because no other country in the world is able to offset a negative natural balance in this way with a positive migratory balance.

The **fifth and final group** includes countries with positive balances in both categories. They grow both through natural increase and through net migration. Within this group, the diversity of demographic profiles is high. In this category, we find the most attractive countries on the planet for migrants: the United States, the Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), Sweden (the most welcoming country in Europe for refugees), Colombia (the host for most of the Venezuelan exiles) and the Gulf States, major consumers of foreign labor but with a ban on all family and most other types of migration. France is in this last group, in a very modest way and in stark contrast to public perceptions and popular debates.

### ***A Database in the Making: The Global Migration Matrix***

Thus far, we have only drawn comparisons of select countries from around the world. But migration, by definition, connects all countries to all others. In an age of globalization and interdependence, there is an urgent need for a global understanding of migration, which would take the form of a matrix linking all countries of origin to all host countries. Such a database should gather data of “stocks” periodically updated by the censuses. In a second step, the comparison of stocks

of foreign population year on year should make it possible to reconstitute annual flows. In the absence of censuses, it is necessary to resort, as the case may be, to population registers, labor force surveys, and specialized migration surveys (see above), not to mention the intermediate data on major exoduses, like those of the Syrians or the Venezuelans. Without this bilateral migration matrix, most speculation about the forces that tend to displace populations will remain hypothetical and incomplete. During the Middle East “refugee crisis,” for example, top demographers repeated the call to build a global migration observatory (Willekens et al. 2016).

Things are progressing slowly but surely. Only since the decade of the 2000s do we have the collection of census or survey data on a global level (or for a specific category of countries, like the OECD club) that makes it possible for demographers to estimate emigrant stocks in various countries in the form of global bilateral matrices. Three databases of this type are available online, one provided by the UN Population Division, a second by the World Bank, and the third by the OECD. These databases measure the stock of persons of a given national origin living permanently in another country. They do not measure remigration or returns. For now, however, these efforts are worth pursuing.

The International Migrant Stock database maintained by the UN Population Division matches 192 countries and overseas territories of the planet, producing a table with 36,672 cells ( $192^2$  minus the diagonal). The user is free to isolate each country or territory using all kinds of variables: population, fertility rate, GDP per capita, human development index, available agricultural area, languages, geographic coordinates, visa policy, climate, and so on. For each pair of countries, she can create variables characterizing the bilateral relationship: the distance that separates them, the income differential, the visa regime, the language community, whether or not there was a colonial relationship in the past, and so forth. Many economists and demographers have used the matrix in this way. However, information is lacking on the method used by the UN Population Division to estimate the number of migrants in each cell of the matrix. Some migratory corridors are incomplete or undefined. But this does not stop us from exploiting the matrix on a global scale, by continent, or by sub-regions (as, for example, in Héran 2018). The edition of the report available in 2021 uses the round of censuses carried out in 2009–2011, updated by specific surveys or by extrapolation. The mass exodus of Venezuelans does not appear there, and that of Syrians is still limited. However, in the fall of 2021, the UNHCR and IOM relied on information from host countries to estimate the number of Venezuelan exiles at 5.9 million and that of Syrian exiles at 6.6 million.

The second database, developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is an economic version of the UN database, but focusing on monetary transfers (remittances) of migrants. The OECD, for its part, has preferred to build its own bilateral database: the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) is available online, and it counts foreign residents from all origin countries throughout the OECD. The OECD teamed up with the World Bank to create an “extended” database (DIOC-E) which includes, in addition to

the OECD countries, some thirty other countries. According to the available files, the DIOC-E database matches 200 countries of origin with 100 countries of destination. In fact, this number changes from one variable to another and this half-matrix is difficult for the demographer (or social scientist) to use. Nonetheless, the matrix helps to fill some gaps in the UN database. Guy Abel, a statistician at the Population Program of IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems, based in Austria), succeeded in performing a delicate statistical exercise, inferring from the succession of matrices of stocks of migrants an evolution of flows over a five-year period (Abel 2018; Abel and Cohen 2019). This exercise required complex modeling. Make no mistake, however: comprehensive knowledge of migration flows for the planet is still a distant objective, but pursuit of such an objective makes sense and certainly deserves long-term investments so that the data can be updated on a regular basis.

### ***Internal Migration, or the Hidden Face of External Migration***

Another gap to be filled in demography is the separation between the study of internal and external migration, which overlaps with the division of labor between geographers and demographers (see the chapter by Marie Price in this volume). Louis Henry's treatise (1972) is a notable exception in that he talks about both. The annual meetings of the principal population studies associations (discussed below) often deal with internal and external migration in separate sessions. However, a quick look at the unusual distribution of international migrants indicates that internal migration is somewhat like the dark matter of external migration (Figure 2.4). The four most populous countries in the world (China, India, United States, Indonesia) have very little emigration: only 1% of their populations live abroad. They comprise 44% of humanity but do not "produce" more than 14% of international migrants. Each of these countries is a world unto itself, large and diverse enough to retain most of its inhabitants. If the nationals of these countries want to migrate to improve their lot, internal migration is largely sufficient.


Courses on migration, demography, and geography often start with the counterintuitive observation that humanity emigrates very little: around 3.5% of the global population lives abroad for more than one year (281 million out of 7.7 billion). The explanation is simple: it is the low emigration of the "demographic giants" that pulls the average down. Countries with less than 100 million inhabitants migrate at a rate of 6%, six times more than the Top 4 countries. Historically, mega-countries are colonial or continental empires that succeeded in transforming their conquests into settlement migration (the United States is perhaps the most prominent example). China stands apart from this group by the fact that its colonization enterprise is not fully completed and is limited to existing territories (it is still working to reduce Tibetan and Uighur resistance, and building artificial islands in the South China Sea!). Moreover, China treats its internal migration as harshly as external migration, through its permit system, the *hukou*, which discriminates broadly against the rural population and, as a result, generates illegal internal migration, unparalleled in the world.

***The Global Logic of Migration, Between “Laws” and Metaphors***

In 1885, an English geographer of German origin, Ernst Georg Ravenstein, developed a set of “migration laws” using data on internal migration in the British Isles (Ravenstein 1885–1889). His work has become a classic reference in the geography of migration (see the chapter by Price in this volume). Ravenstein was the first to elaborate a mobility model, inspired by Newton’s law of universal gravitation: the migration that circulates between two localities or two nations is proportional to the mass of their respective population and decreases with the square of the distance. Developed in the mid-20th century by various authors (G.K. Zipf, S. Stouffer, and T. Hagerstrand), this type of gravity model has passed into everyday language and is expressed in metaphors like empty or full containers or a natural slope where gravity pulls people downhill. A popular variant is the image of an “overflow,” a scholarly version consisting in opposing the demographic “high pressures” to the “low pressures,” with the idea that, over time, push factors will force surplus migrants to move to underpopulated regions, or to put it in another common phrase “nature abhors a vacuum.” The factors invoked vary (population density, fertility rate, national wealth, income per capita, level of human development, climate situation, and so forth), but the idea remains that sizable inequalities between countries automatically lead to a rebalancing of populations across countries and regions.

Let us examine this hypothesis (and these metaphors) looking at the data. If we put metaphorical schemes to the empirical test of bilateral migration matrices, the reality is quite different, whether we measure it at the individual or collective level. It is simply not true that the poorer a population, the more it migrates to richer societies. When people move, it is most often to other poor countries in the same region (such as Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire). Refugees fleeing international conflicts and civil wars go first to neighboring countries. It is equally false to believe that countries with few children attract over-fertile populations: Eastern Europe, for example, has very low fertility rates but it is one of the regions of the world with the highest emigration rates (around 20%), much higher than those of sub-Saharan countries (around 2%).

The classification of countries arrayed along ten rungs on the human development index (HDI) contradicts the conventional wisdom that emigration is fueled by underdevelopment in a straight causal relationship. The relation that we observe has the shape of a bump (Figure 2.5). People in less-developed countries are too poor to be able to migrate over long distances. Conversely, there is intense migration of relatively rich people to other rich countries. If we take climate change into account, some research shows that increasing drought impoverishes populations and lowers the probability of migrating abroad instead of increasing it (Millock 2019). In fact, the highest emigration rates in the world are observed in intermediate countries (5 or 6 on the 10-level development scale): Mexico, Turkey, the Baltic States, the Balkans, Central European countries, and the Maghreb. The wealth distribution that structures global migration clearly means that it is not enough for an individual to aspire to



*Figure 2.5* Distribution of migrants in the world according to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the birth and residence countries around 2015. Notes: The HDI combines life expectancy, school enrolment, and per capita income. It is divided here into ten groups of equal numbers of countries. The least-developed countries (groups 1 and 2) have very few migrants in the most-developed countries (9–10), in contrast to countries with intermediate or high levels of development. The group 6→10 includes Mexicans in the United States; 4→10 Filipinos and Indians in the United States, Canada, and UK; and 3→10 Pakistanis in the same countries, as well as Syrians in Germany, Austria, and Sweden. France is in group 9. Group 8 includes Russia and the Gulf countries. Source: Author’s graph, based on the UN Migrant Stock.

migrate to achieve her goals, she must also have the means to realize her aspirations. Ultimately, the “pouring out” metaphors, like exodus (Collier 2013), do not stand up to the facts. Just because a metaphor is eloquent does not necessarily mean it is correct.

### **The Rise of Minorities and the “Great Replacement”**

All societies face a major problem: how to absorb the constant influx of two categories of newcomers, namely children on one hand and immigrants on the other. This presupposes in both cases a work of socialization and integration, which can be accomplished through habits over time or by more forceful (policy) interventions. Some countries, like France, promulgate laws, school charters, or “republican contracts” to be signed by newcomers, presumed to instill the “fundamental



values” of the nation into the young and newcomers. The vocabulary used is roughly the same for children and for migrants, which gives a very paternalistic twist to the policy of civic integration of immigrants. Other countries focus more on horizontal forms of sociability: local citizenship, workplace activities, such as joining trade unions, involvement in school life, sports or voluntary associations, and of course the military. We will all be replaced in society one day, but by whom? This concern is now coupled with a fear for national identity: that the newcomers who feed the base or the sides of the age pyramid not only do not integrate into society but gradually undermine it, to the point of making it unrecognizable. One often hears the refrain, “this is not my country anymore.” In 2017, in his unsuccessful campaign to be re-elected as President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy justified his policy of controlling migratory flows by proclaiming that it was necessary to guarantee nationals “the right to historical continuity.” The theme of the “great replacement” that emerged expresses the fear that society (and by extension, the nation) will change irreversibly under the pressure of immigration.

Therefore, there is a strong temptation to turn to demography (even if it means bypassing demographers) to obtain a seemingly objective measure of replacement: when will we finally know if and when the *minority* of foreign origin will become the *majority*? Great hopes are placed in “demographic projections,” capable of expounding reliable prophecies on this subject for decades to come. In such a debate, demographers are seen as oracles who can foretell our socio-political destiny, much like the Pythia of Delphi, who conveyed the prophecies of the god Apollo. The slogan “demography is destiny,” borrowed from a post-war American television show, is frequently revived these days to affirm the inevitability of social change and the coming great replacement.

The United States is unique in this regard: the issue of majority-minority reversal is enshrined in political institutions and in the statistical system. Electoral districts are redesigned in such a way as to guarantee minorities and majorities the possibility of electing their co-ethnics to the Congress (according to the model of diversity locked in geographic silos that prevent mixing). At the same time, the population projections of the Census Bureau have predicted that, within a generation, from 2045, the “non-Hispanic white” majority could become a minority in the country (Vespa et al. 2018). Sociologist Richard Alba challenged this fatalistic use of demographic projections by advancing a qualitative argument: instead of being supplanted by minorities, the majority or the mainstream could take up the challenge of ethno-racial diversity by broadening its self-definition (Alba 2020). He draws an analogy with the historical redefinition of the religious mainstream: long rejected by the WASP majority, Catholics and Jews are now an undisputed component of the majority population. Richard Alba regrets that the Census Bureau is ruling out this scenario of convergence by projecting intangible ethno-racial categories into the future, even if it is possible now to tick the “two or more races” box on the census form.

Alba’s reaction to the great replacement has the merit of rejecting the temptation of “demographism,” which persists in believing that the number of people

explains everything, while the essential engine of diversity is the social creation of ethno-racial categories. A good demographer does not succumb to demographism. Alba's thesis would be misleading if it suggested that the gradual opening of the mainstream to ethnic diversity is a natural process. It is above all a political process. The interplay of political and social forces alone will decide whether or not to move ethno-racial dividing lines (see the chapters by Brettell, Price, FitzGerald, and Hollifield and Wong in this volume).

***A Continuing Source of Confusion: The UN Report on Replacement Migration (March 2000)***

In March 2000, the UN Population Division published a report: "Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and aging populations?" An expanded version was released in September 2000. This document was eagerly awaited because its content had been revealed on January 3 in a very noticed article in *The New York Times*, which predicted an immigrant future for Europe along the lines of the American multicultural model. French newspapers immediately responded with sensational headlines: "According to a United Nations pre-report, there would be no other way out than immigration to compensate for the drastic reduction in the ratio between the active and inactive populations" (*Le Monde*, January 6, 2000); "Immigration, a remedy for old Europe: according to the UN, it would take 160 million immigrants to rebalance the demography of the EU" (*Libération*, January 6, 2000); "The report that alarms Europe" (*Le Figaro*, January 10, 2000). The director of the Population Division, Joseph Chamie, and the report's main editor, the French American demographer Joseph-Alfred Grinblat, had to give dozens of interviews on the subject right up to their retirement from the UN.

These catchy headlines coined by the editors took the opposite view of the articles of many journalists, who were more careful in citing the UN demographers. The report presented five scenarios for 2050 for the large Western countries, the European Union (a set of 15 countries at the time), geographic Europe, Russia, Japan, and Korea, selected for their rapidly aging societies. The report concluded that immigration could halt the decline in national populations or the decline in people of working age *in absolute numbers*, as it was already doing in Western Europe, but in no way freeze the *numerical relationship* between the generations (formalized by a "dependency ratio" or its inverse, the "support ratio"). Betting solely on youthful migration to stop the relative increase of seniors—which was the last scenario envisaged by the report—would require exceedingly high levels of immigration over a long period of time: France was expected to welcome 90 million net migrants over the first half of the 21st century, Germany 182 million, the EU nearly 700 million, and the European continent 1.4 billion! Korea could not import enough Chinese migrants to stop its aging process. And, if the experiment were extended to the whole planet, all of humanity would not be enough to reverse the aging process!

It is important to understand the mechanism at play in this last scenario. All over the world the proportion of elderly people is growing, including in the countries of

the Global South, not only because of a decline in fertility (“aging from below”) but also due to greater life expectancy, or “aging from above” (Héran 2012). If immigrants can rejuvenate the age pyramid at the base to slow down the aging process, these young immigrants will age themselves and it will be necessary constantly to replace them with new migrants. This was equivalent to filling the barrel of the Danaids, according to French demographer, Henri Leridon, who was very critical of this exercise, which he viewed as a demographic fantasy and considered it to be totally futile (Leridon 2000). The report also attracted sarcasm from the British demographer, David Coleman (2002), for the same reasons but with different political intent.

The issue goes much deeper than a problem of communication between demographers and journalists (Teitelbaum 2004). The UN demographers should have stated unequivocally that young migrants can fill labor shortages here and there, but that population aging cannot be stopped. Admittedly, the report explained that the last scenario was “out of reach, because of the extraordinarily large numbers of migrants that would be required” and politically unacceptable as well, but the conclusion nonetheless mentioned the call for immigration to counter population aging, alongside the classic levers of a parametric pension reform: working longer, increasing the activity rate of women, increasing contributions from those of working age, lowering the replacement rate, promoting care work, and so on. Three years after the report came out, Joseph-Alfred Grinblat, its main author, tried to explain the last scenario more clearly: “These figures are obviously unrealistic, and this scenario demonstrates through its sheer absurdity that immigration can in no way stop population aging” (Grinblat 2003: 100). But, for some readers, absurdity was the starting point: it made no sense to imagine that we could stop population aging. We will have to live with it whatever happens. An interesting question of communication is whether an absurd and totally counterfactual argument can be conveyed from the scientific community to the public. Sophisticated journalists who met with the UN experts got the message, but not their editors, who sought only to generate controversy and sell newspapers with sensational headlines.

In the space of 20 years, the UN report on “replacement migration” has become the main scientific backing for extremist or conspiratorial prophecies on the “great replacement” (Héran 2021a). Asked in the fall of 2015 about the “migrant crisis,” Marine Le Pen, president of the *Rassemblement National*, made two revealing statements: “The European Union told us in the 1950s that they wanted us to welcome 150 million foreigners. This policy has been supported by the European Union for decades” (she said in RTL Radio interview, September 4, 2015); “I accuse the United Nations, together with the European Commission, of knowingly calling upon migrants to overrun Europe (“organiser sciemment la submersion migratoire de l’Europe”). Need we remind you that the UN technocrats are asking for 120 million extra-European immigrants to be admitted to our region?” (Strasbourg speech, September 9, 2015). What are these statements based on? In the 1950s, the European Union was still in its infancy and was concerned at most with the migration of Italian workers. In fact, Marine Le Pen

inherited from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the *Front National*, the misinterpretation of the UN report on replacement migration. It was in his eyes a “criminal” plan, which prepared “the outright submersion of the native French” ([frontnational.com](http://frontnational.com), August, 2000). The older Le Pen mistook the counterfactual projection for a real project. But in the space of 15 years, the message underwent other distortions: a UN scenario for Europe had become a European plan, and the 2050 horizon an action starting in the 1950s. But the dominant idea is the specter of a global conspiracy: international organizations (including demographers) are accused of working to destroy national identities by encouraging open borders.

As it turns out, a full account of the genesis of the UN report is now available, signed by Joseph-Alfred Grinblat himself in the form of autobiographical vignettes written in English. One of them is centered on the story of the “replacement migration” report, and the document has been translated by me into French (Héran 2021a). Moreover, I conducted three interviews with the author. Grinblat has since posted his story online (Grinblat 2020). His narrative is the exact opposite of a conspiracy. One day, in December 1999, while heading the Migration section of the Population Division, he was discussing with his director, Joseph Chamie, the number of migrants that would be needed to compensate for the fertility declines in old Europe: an informal conversation, “out of pure intellectual curiosity,” Grinblat says.

Trained at the prestigious National School of Statistics (ENSAE) of INSEE in Paris, Grinblat was an expert in formal demography, certainly one of the more qualified statisticians in the Population Division at that time. For him, replacing one demographic quantity with another was child’s play. His improvisation may sound strange for the uninitiated, but it was in the classic line of inquiry of Lotka, Keyfitz, and Coale. Moreover, Grinblat had been spotted by Coale at an African conference and this is how he was invited to Princeton University to do his PhD. In the 1980s, several demographers were already exploring the scenario of replacement migration, whether in the United States, France, or Belgium: an article by Keyfitz on “Migration as a means of population control” (1972) relaunched the debate. Didier Blanchet of INED updated it (1988), then Ron Lesthaeghe and Page (1988), Wattelar and Roumans (1990). All of them built on a rich body of work, with the same conclusion: we cannot counter population aging simply by attracting young migrants. Grinblat was a master of the scenario technique; after his conversation with Joe Chamie, he sent him an email to clarify his back-of-the-envelope calculations.

A few days later, Chamie met the *New York Times* correspondent at the UN. She was onto an exciting story; for lack of anything better, Chamie forwarded to her the email from Grinblat. She wrote the article referencing an upcoming UN “report,” which did not exist. But it was during the New Year holiday that the *NYT* decided to publish the article. It appeared on January 2, 2000, under the title “Europe stares at a future built by immigrants.” The problem of pensions in Europe is not a very attractive topic for an American audience but giving Europe a good lesson in openness to migration is more eye-catching. The article caused

a sensation; the correspondent of *Le Monde* rushed to Chamie and Grinblat, followed by other French and European reporters. They all made the same mistake: taking the counterfactual UN scenario as gospel, even though the author deemed it absurd and totally unrealistic. Reading these early articles, Jean-Marie Le Pen was convinced of the existence of a global migration plot. For his part, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, was shocked to learn of the report written without previous consultation and to learn that France was expected to welcome millions of migrants to solve its pension problem. He called Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who was completely unaware of the controversy: no one in his office had heard of the report. Caught in this media trap, Joseph Chamie will have to mobilize his troops of the Population Division to produce a real report in the proper format, under the scientific supervision of Grinblat, who came up with the title: “Replacement migrations.” The report came out on March 21, 2000, and sparked a new wave of reactions around the world, and the controversy continues to this day. What was initially a hypothetical exercise in formal demography, of which the UN hierarchy was unaware, gave birth to the idea of a conspiracy by the UN and EU leaders to “replace” national peoples with foreigners.

In 2010, the French writer Renaud Camus coined the term “*grand remplacement*” and his theory toured the planet to great acclaim (Héran 2021a). His book by the same name draws directly from the UN report on replacement migration. The “thesis” (if we can deign to call it that) has three predictions: 1. The replacement of natives by an immigration of peoples with high fertility levels; 2. The resulting “transformation of western, Judeo-Christian civilization” submerged by Islam; and 3. The conspiracy by international organizations to “drown” the western nations in globalization and a wave of immigrants. Demographers are mainly interested in the first part of the thesis, secondarily in the second (the rise of Islam), and very little in the third (the global plot). On the first point, demographers are divided (Wilson et al. 2013). Some consider that, in many countries (especially in Germany and Central Europe), migrants are increasingly contributing to the replacement of generations. But here their paths diverge politically: David Coleman, who was professor of demography at Oxford, saw immigration as a threat to national identity, and the advent of a “third demographic transition” (Coleman 2006). Demographers at the Wittgenstein Center in Vienna admit the reality of a replacement of natives by migrants, but do not see why it should be problematic. In their eyes, the issue is not demographic and this type of realignment of populations has historical precedents. Finally, the proponents of the third thesis (of which Richard Alba is a good representative) consider that the change in the majority must take into account other trends in the opposite direction: the convergence of the fertility rates of the second generation with the fertility rate of the natives (see my discussion above), the increase in mixed-race couples, and, above all, the definition of a more open mainstream, provided that social and political forces move in this direction, which must not be taken for granted. Here again, we are leaving pure and hard demography to dive into politics.

***The Place of Migration Studies Within Demography and Social Science: The Destination Bias***

I conclude with a look at the importance of migration studies within population studies and in the social sciences. Its place is still limited (migration is not the only subject in demography) and the demography of migration is not well developed in some regions of the world, mainly because of “destination bias.” The program of annual meetings of the PAA, the Population Association of America, gives an idea of the diversity of the disciplines involved. In May 2021, the association addressed “16 topics, representing the diversity and interdisciplinary character of population research as conducted by demographers, sociologists, economists, political scientists, geographers, historians, epidemiologists, statisticians, survey specialists, and other health and social scientists.” Each of the 280 sessions of the PAA program in 2021 included four presentations: 13% were focused on migration in general and international migration (only four sessions addressed internal migration, focused mostly on China, India, and the United States). A similar assessment can be drawn from the EAPS, the European Association for Population Studies: 17% of the 131 sessions of the meeting scheduled for 2020 dealt specifically with migration. This is more than in the PAA program. International migration occupies a smaller place in scholarly associations of other regions and disciplines (see various chapters in this volume): 8% in the 9th congress of ALAP, the Latin American Association of Population (December 2020); 7% in the 5th Asian Population Conference (August 2021); finally, 5% at the UAPS conference, the African Union for Population Studies (November 2019).

Why is research on migration weaker in the countries of the Global South? The main reason is “destination bias.” Surveys in countries of origin can only interview the residents who plan to migrate or migrants who have returned to their country. Future research should include more women and men who have migrated and experienced discrimination, whether in the first, second or third generation. But lived experience is not enough. Whatever the origin and status of scholars, it is necessary to know how to balance method and uncertainty, technical mastery and the art of criticism, distance and commitment. Demographers, without thinking too much about it, apply the ethical principle enunciated by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham: “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one.” Everyone counts in demographics, big or small, rich or poor, near or far. This is what makes demography a special discipline and sets it apart from other social sciences. But in the field of migration studies, a second principle is essential: reciprocity of perspectives, which requires treating others as one would like to be treated oneself, the golden rule.

*Discussion Questions*

1. Why is migration considered a marginal factor in demographic analysis?
2. How do demographers define a population and who is considered a migrant?
3. What are the biggest problems in measuring migration and how do demographers seek to overcome these problems?



4. How do demographers use qualitative methods and surveys to address issues of measurement?
5. What is replacement migration and why has this concept become so politicized in current debates?

## Notes

- 1 Translated from the French by the author with the assistance of James F. Hollifield.
- 2 It is noteworthy that the National Museum of the History of Immigration located in Paris decided in 2020 to upgrade its permanent exhibition adding a chronological presentation that begins in 1685. That year evokes two cases of forced migration: the edict of Louis XIV expelling the Huguenots (between 180,000 and 200,000 preferred exile to conversion) and the promulgation of the *Code noir* (“Black Code”) which legitimated the absolute power of the colonists over African captives reduced to slavery in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean.
- 3 As of October 1, 2021, this article had accumulated 8,200 citations on Google Scholar.
- 4 When the young senator John F. Kennedy published in 1958 a book entitled *A Nation of Immigrants*, it was precisely to deplore the fact that the United States was no longer a nation of immigration and to wish that they return to their welcoming tradition.

## References

- Abel, Guy J. 2018. “Estimates of Global Bilateral Migration Flows by Gender between 1960 and 2015.” *International Migration Review* 52 (3): 809–52.
- Abel, Guy J. and Joel E. Cohen. 2019. “Bilateral International Migration Flow Estimates for 200 Countries.” *Scientific Data* 6 (82): 1–13.
- Adamson, Fiona B. and Gerasimos Tsourapas. 2019. “The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management.” *The International Migration Review* 54 (3): 853–82.
- Alba, Richard. 2020. *The Great Demographic Illusion: Majority, Minority, and the Expanding American Mainstream*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Aldridge, Robert W., Laura B. Nellum, Sean Bartlett, et al. 2018. “Global Patterns of Mortality in International Migrants: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” *The Lancet* 392 (10164, 15–21 December): 2553–2566.
- André, Jean-Marie and Fabienne Azzedine. 2016. “Access to Healthcare for Undocumented Migrants in France: A Critical Examination of State Medical Assistance.” *Public Health Reviews* 37 (5): 1–16.
- Arthur, W. Brian and James W. Vaupel. 1984. “Some General Relationships in Population Dynamics.” *Population Index* 50 (2): 214–26.
- Attias-Donfut, Claudine and François-Charles Wolf. 2005. “The Preferred Burial Location of Persons Born Outside France.” *Population* 60 (5–6): 699–720.
- Bajos, Nathalie, Florence Jusot, Ariane Pailhé, et al. 2021. “When Lockdown Policies Amplify Social Inequalities in COVID-19 Infections: Evidence from a Cross-Sectional Population-Based Survey in France.” *BMC Public Health* 21: 705: 1–10
- Beauchemin, Cris. 2015. “Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE): Advantages and Limitations of a Multi-Site Survey Design.” *Population* 70 (1): 13–37.
- . 2018a. “A Manifesto for Quantitative Multi-Sited Approaches to International Migration.” *The International Migration Review* 48 (4): 921–38.
- . 2018b. *Migration between Africa and Europe*. Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York: Springer.



- Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon, eds. 2018. *Trajectories and Origins: Survey on the Diversity of the French Population*. New York: Springer, Ined Population Studies [French original version: Paris, INED, 2015].
- Blanchet, Didier. 1989 [1988]. "Regulating the Age Structure of a Population through Migration." *Population: An English Selection* 44(1): 23–37 [translation of "Immigration et régulation de la structure par âge d'une population", *Population* 43 (2, 1988): 293–309].
- Bollini, Paola and Harald Siem. 1995. "No Real Progress towards Equity: Health of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities on the Eve of the Year 2000." *Social Science & Medicine* 41 (6): 819–28.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. "Le Capital Social: Notes Provisoires." *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 31: 2–3.
- . 1986. "The Forms of Capital." In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by J. Richardson, 241–58. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Bourgeois-Pichat, Jean. 1968. *The Concept of a Stable Population. Application to the Study of Populations of Countries with Incomplete Demographic Statistics*. New York: United Nations.
- Chamie, Joseph. 2020. "How Many Immigrants in the Future?" Inter Press Service, New York, March 9 [online].
- Coale, Ansley J. 1972. *The Growth and Structure of Human Populations: A Mathematical Investigation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- and Melvin Zelnik. 1963. *New Estimates of Fertility and Population in the United States. A Study of Annual White Births from 1855 to 1960 and of Completeness of Enumeration in the Censuses*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- and James T. Trussell. 1974. "Model Fertility Schedules: Variations in the Age Structure of Childbearing in Human Populations." *Population Index* 40 (2): 185–258.
- Coleman, David. 2002. "Replacement Migration, or Why Everyone is Going to Have to Live in Korea: A Fable for Our Times from the United Nations." *Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B Biological Sciences* 357 (1420): 583–98.
- . 2006. "Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition." *Population and Development Review* 32 (3): 401–46.
- Collier, Paul. 2013. *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century*. London: Penguin.
- Desgrées du Loû, Annabel, Julie Pannetier, Andrainolo Ravalihasy, Anne Gosselin et al., and Parcours Study Group. 2015. "Sub-Saharan African Migrants Living with HIV Acquired after Migration, France, ANRS Parcours study, 2012 to 2013." *Euro Surveillance* 20 (46): 1–8.
- Desiderio, René. 2020. "The Impact of International Migration on Fertility: An Empirical Study." *Knomad Paper* 36 (January 2020): 1–28.
- Dourgnon, Paul, Stéphane Guillaume, Florence Jusot and Jérôme Wittwer. 2016. "Étudier l'accès à l'Aide médicale de l'État des personnes sans titre de séjour. L'enquête Premiers pas." *Questions d'économie de la santé* 244: 1–6.
- Dumitru, Speranța. 2014. "Qu'est-ce que le nationalisme méthodologique ? Essai de typologie." *Raisons Politiques* 54 (2): 9–22.
- Esipova, Neli, Anita Pugliese and Julie Ray. 2018. "More than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could." Gallup's Migration Research Center (December 10, 2018). [online].
- Euler, Leonhard. 1767. "Recherches Générales sur la Mortalité et la Multiplication du Genre Humain." *Mémoire de l'Académie royale des sciences et des belles lettres de Berlin*, 16: 144–64.

- Fasani, Francesco and Jacopo Mazza 2020 “Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe’s Covid-19 Response.” *IZA Policy Paper* 155: 1–32.
- Fassin, Didier. 2019. *Deepening Divides: How Territorial Borders and Social Boundaries Delineate Our World*. London: Pluto Press.
- Frank, Reanne and Patrick Heuveline. 2005. “A Crossover in Mexican and Mexican-American Fertility Rates: Evidence and Explanations for an Emerging Paradox.” *Demographic Research* 12 (4): 77–104.
- Garssen, Joop and Han Nicolaas. 2008. “Fertility of Turkish and Moroccan Women in the Netherlands: Adjustment to Native Level within One Generation.” *Demographic Research* 19 (33): 1249–80.
- Goldman, Noreen, Anne R. Pebley, Mathew J. Creighton, Graciela M. Teruel, Luis N. Rubalcava, and Chang Chung. 2014. “The Consequences of Migration to the United States for Short-Term Changes in the Health of Mexican Immigrants.” *Demography* 51 (4): 1159–73.
- Gosselin, Anne, Annabel Desgrées du Loû, Eva Lelièvre, et al. 2016. “How Long Do Sub-Saharan Migrants Take to Settle in France?” *Population and Societies*, 533 (5), May: 1–4.
- Grinblat, Joseph-Alfred. 2003. “Des Scénarios d’Immigration pour une Europe Vieillissante.” *Esprit* 300 (12): 92–101.
- . 2020. *Vignettes of My Life*, vol. 1, Independently published, 168 p.
- Halley, Edmond. 1692. “An Estimate of the Degrees of the Mortality of Mankind, Drawn from Curious Tables of the Births and Funerals at the City of Breslaw.” *Philosophical Transactions* 196: 599–610.
- Han, Xueying, Galen Stocking, Matthew A. Gebbie and Richard P. Appelbaum. 2015. “Will They Stay or Will They Go? International Graduate Students and Their Decisions to Stay or Leave the U.S. upon Graduation.” *PLoS ONE* 10 (3) [online].
- Henry, Louis. 1972. *Démographie: Analyse et Modèles*. Paris: Larousse [English translation by Etienne and Elise Van de Walle, *Population: Analysis and Models*, 2nd ed., London: Edward Arnold, 1976].
- Héran, François. 2012. “The Population Ageing Process in Global Perspective.” In *Global Ageing in the 21st Century: Challenges, Opportunities and Implications*, edited by S. McDaniel and Z. Zimmer, 13–31. Farnham: Ashgate.
- . 2018. “Europe and the Spectre of Sub-Saharan Migration.” *Population and Societies* 558: 1–4.
- . 2021a. “Science et Complot: L’étrange fortune du rapport de l’ONU sur les “Migrations de remplacement” (2000–2020).” In *L’Irrationnel Aujourd’hui*, edited by Jean Baechler and Gérald Bronner, 265–302. Paris: Hermann.
- . 2021b. *Parlons Immigration en 30 Questions*, 3rd ed. Paris: La Documentation française.
- Hofer, Michael, Nancy Rytina and Bryan Baker. 2012. “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011.” Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, *Population Estimates*, March 2012.
- Hollifield, James F., Philip L. Martin, Pia Orrenius, and François Héran, eds. 2022. *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective*, 4th ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Izambert, Caroline. 2019. “Un Accès aux Soins Marqué du Sceau de l’Humanité ? Les Ambiguïtés de l’Accès à la Santé des Étrangers en Situation Irrégulière en France.” *Communications* 104 (1): 95–106.
- Jourdan, Virginie and Marie Prévôt. 2020. “Les Primo-arrivants en 2019, un an après leur premier titre de séjour: premiers résultats de l’enquête ELIPA 2.” *Infos Migrations*, DSED, Ministère de l’Intérieur (France), n° 98, juin.

- Keyfitz, Nathan. 1968. *Introduction to the Mathematics of Population*. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- and Hal Caswell. 1977. *Applied Mathematical Demography*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Khlat, Myriam and Youssef Courbage. 1996. "Mortality and Causes of Death of Moroccans in France, 1979–91." *Population* English edition, 8: 59–94.
- Kraler, Albert and Dita Vogel, eds. 2008. "CLANDESTINO. "Report on Methodological Issues", prepared by Michael Jandl, Dita Vogel and Krystyna Iglicka. Brussels: European Commission.
- Kulu, Hill, Nadja Milewski, Tina Hannemann and Julia Mikolai. 2019. "A Decade of Life-Course Research on Fertility of Immigrants and Their Descendants in Europe." *Demographic Research* 40: 1345–74.
- Lachenicht, Suzanne. 2010. *Hugenotten in Europa und Nordamerika. Migration und Integration in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Frankfurt/Main and New York: Campus.
- Lambert, Héléne. 2007. *The Position of Aliens in Relation to the European Convention on Human Rights*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Le Bouteillic, Nathalie and Jean-Marc Rohrbasser, eds. 2017. *Wargentin. Naissance des Sciences de la Population*. Paris: Institut national d'études démographiques, coll. "Classiques de l'économie et de la population."
- Le Bras, Hervé. 1971. "Équilibre et Croissance de Populations Soumises à des Migrations." *Theoretical Population Biology* 2: 100–21.
- Lemaître, Georges. 2005. "The Comparability of International Migration Statistics: Problems and Prospects." *OECD Statistics Brief* 9 (July 2005): 1–8.
- Leridon, Henri. 2000 "Vieillesse Démographique et Migrations: Quand les Nations Unies Veulent Remplir le Tonneau des Danaïdes..." *Population et Sociétés* 358: 1–4.
- Lesthaeghe, Ron and Hilary Page. 1988. "Are Immigrants Substitutes for Births?" Working Paper Interuniversity Programme in Demography. Brussels: Vrije Universiteit, 1–30.
- Liu, Mao-Mei, Mathew J. Creighton, Fernando Riosmena, and Pau Baizán. 2016. "Prospects for the Comparative Study of International Migration Using Quasi-Longitudinal Micro-Data." *Demographic Research* 35 (26): 745–82.
- Lotka, Alfred J. 1939. *Théorie Analytique des Associations Biologiques, Vol. II: Analyse Démographique avec Application Particulière à l'Espèce Humaine*. Paris: Hermann.
- . 1998. *Analytical Theory of Biological Populations*. Introduction and translation by David Smith and Héléne Rossert. New York: Plenum Press.
- Lucassen, Jan and Leo Lucassen. 2009. "The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500–1900: What the Case of Europe can Offer to Global History." *Journal of Global History* 4(3): 347–77.
- Manning, Patrick and Tiffany Trimmer. 2004. *Migration in World History*. London: Routledge, 3rd ed. (1st ed., 2004).
- Massey, Douglas S. 1987. "The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice." *International Migration Review* 21 (4): 1498–22.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review* 19 (3): 431–66.
- . 1998. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 2020. "Immigration Policy Mismatches and Counterproductive Outcomes: Unauthorized Migration to the U.S. in Two Eras." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8/21: 1–27.

- McKeown, Adam. 2004. "Global Migration, 1846–1940." *Journal of World History* 15 (2): 155–189.
- Migali, Silvia and Scipioni Marco. 2018. "A Global Analysis of Intentions to Migrate." European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 1–57.
- Milewski, Nadja. 2010. *Fertility of Immigrants: A Two-Generational Approach in Germany*. Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, and New York: Springer.
- Millock, Katrin, et al. 2019. "Human Migration in the Era of Climate Change." *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy* 13 (2): 189–206.
- Mulder, Clara H. and Michael Wagner. 1993. "Migration and Marriage in the Life Course: A Method for Studying Synchronized Events." *European Journal of Population* 9: 55–76.
- Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny. 2016. "Irregular Immigration in the European Union." Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Research Department, *Working Paper 1603*, 1–29.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. 2019. "Measuring Illegal Immigration: How Pew Research Center Counts Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S." July 12.
- Pierce, Sarah and Jessica Bolter. 2020. "Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency." Migration Policy Institute [online].
- Piore, Michael J. 1979. *Birds of Passage*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pressat, Roland. 1995. *Éléments de Démographie Mathématique*. Paris: Association internationale des démographes de langue française (Aidelf).
- Preston, Samuel H. and Ansley J. Coale. 1982. "Age Structure, Growth, Attrition and Accession: A New Synthesis." *Population Index* 48: 217–59.
- Quintana-Murci, Lluis. 2021. *Le peuple des humains. Sur les traces génétiques des migrations, métissages et adaptations*. Paris: Odile Jacob.
- Ravenstein, Georg. 1885/1889. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 48 (2): 167–235, and 52 (2): 241–305.
- Rohrbasser, Jean-Marc. 2017. "La Naissance de la Science des Population en Suède." In *Wargentin*, edited by Nathalie Le Bouteillec and Jean-Marc Rohrbasser, 105–51. Paris: INED.
- Rubalcava, Luis and Graciela Teruel. 2013. "Mexican Family Life Survey, Third Wave." *Working Paper*, www.envih-mxfls.org.
- Safi, Mirna. 2008. "The Immigrant Integration Process in France: Inequalities and Segmentation." *Revue Française de Sociologie* [English issue] 49 (5): 3–44.
- Schoorl, Jeannette et al. 2000. "Push and Pull Factors of International Migration. A Comparative Report." European Commission, EUROSTAT, 1–161.
- . 2008. *International Migration in Europe. New Trends and New Methods of Analysis*, Imiscoe Series, edited by Patrick Simon, Jeannette Schoorl, Corrado Bonifazi, and Marek Okólski. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Schoumaker, Bruno. 2017. "Across the World, Is Men's Fertility Different from that of Women?" *Population and Societies* 548: 1–4.
- Spallek, J., H. Zeeb, and O. Razum. 2011. "What Do We Have to Know from Migrants' Past Exposures to Understand Their Health Status? A Life Course Approach." *Emerging Themes in Epidemiology* 8 (6): 1–8.
- Süssmilch, Johann Peter. 1765. *Die göttliche Ordnung in den Veränderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts, aus der Geburt, dem Tode und der Fortpflanzung desselben erwiesen*. Göttingen and Augsburg: Jürgen Cromm Verlag, 1988, three vol., 576 + 130 p., 625 + 77 p., 736 + 68 p. (reproduction of the 3rd ed.; 1st ed.: 1741).

- Teitelbaum, Michael S. 2004. "The Media Marketplace for Garbled Demography." *Population and Development Review* 30 (2): 317–27.
- Tønnessen, Marianne, and Ben Wilson. 2020. "Visualising Immigrant Fertility Profiles of Childbearing and Their Implications for Migration Research." *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 14 (July 2020) [online].
- Toulemon, Laurent. 2004. "Fertility among Immigrant Women: New Data, a New Approach." *Population and Societies* n° 400, April, 1–4.
- . 2011. "Hétérogénéité." In *Dictionnaire de Démographie et des Sciences de la Population*, edited by France Meslé, Laurent Toulemon and Jacques Véron. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Underhill, Peter A. and Toomas Kivisild. 2007. "Use of Y Chromosome and Mitochondrial DNA Population Structure in Tracing Human Migrations." *Annual Review of Genetics* 41: 539–64.
- U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 1998. "Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration. Revision 1." Statistical papers, series M, 58, New York: United Nations, 1–95.
- U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2020. "Estimates of the Components of Resident Population Change by Race and Hispanic Origin for the United States."
- Vause, Sophie and Sorana Toma. 2015. "Is the Feminization of International Migration Really on the Rise? The Case of Flows from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal." *Population* 70 (1): 39–63.
- Velkof, Victoria A. and John M. Abowd. 2020. "Estimating the Undocumented Population by State for Use in Apportionment." U.S. Census Bureau, March 27, 2020, 1–21.
- Véron, Jacques. 2008. "Alfred J. Lotka and the Mathematics of Population." *Electronic Journal for History of Probability and Statistics* 4 (1), 10 p. [available online].
- Vespa, Jonathan, Lauren Medina and David M. Armstrong. 2018. "Demographic Turning Points for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060." Current Population Report, U.S. Census Bureau, 1–15 (issued March 2018, revised February 2020).
- Volant, Sabrina, Gilles Pison and François Héran. 2019. "French Fertility is the Highest in Europe. Because of its immigrants?" *Population and Societies*, n° 568, July/August 2019 [available online].
- Wattelar, Christine and Guido Roumans. 1990. "L'immigration, Facteur d'Équilibre Démographique ? Quelques Simulations." *Futuribles* 145: 3–23.
- Willekens Frans, Douglas Massey, James Raymer and Cris Beauchemin. 2016. "International Migration under the Microscope." *Science* 352 (6288), 20 May, 897–99.
- Wilson, Chris, Tomáš Sobotka, Lee Williamson and Paul Boyle. 2013. "Migration and Intergenerational Replacement in Europe." *Population and Development Review* 39 (1): 131–57.
- Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick-Schiller. 2003. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *The International Migration Review* 37 (2): 576–610.
- Zur, Yarden. 2017. "Jews Abroad Are Just Dying to Be Buried in Israel." *Haaretz (Tel Aviv)*, February 5.

# 3 Economic Aspects of Migration

*Philip Martin*

## Introduction

Economics deals with scarcity and choice. In a world with fewer goods and less money than desired, economics asks how people allocate their time to earn the money needed to buy the goods and services that maximize their utility or satisfaction. In migration terms, why do some individuals and families choose to migrate, including over national borders, while others do not?

Migration subtracts people and workers from one country and adds people and workers to another. Economists examine the impacts of migrants on the economies to which migrants move and on the labor markets and areas they leave behind. Migrants pay taxes and consume tax-supported benefits, raising questions about the fiscal impacts of migration. Finally, migrants are often different from the people they leave behind and the people in the places to which they move in terms of language, culture, levels of education, and other characteristics. These migrant differences can have important socio-economic effects, as the other chapters in this volume emphasize. Migrant differences also affect the economy, influencing entrepreneurship and innovation, internal migration, and economic inequality.

Economics shares with anthropology, sociology, and other social sciences a focus on people. Economists assume that individuals survey the options available to them and make rational choices with full information on where to live and how much to work in order to maximize their well-being. Economists deal with migration selectivity or why only some individuals cross national borders, temporarily or permanently, and the effects of migration, both on the wages and job opportunities of natives and on the people in emigration countries. Anthropology and sociology often focus on groups rather than individuals, and other social sciences often make comparisons over space rather than over time, as when economists chart the earnings of migrants after their arrival.

Economic analyses examine the impacts of migration to offer advice on how many and which migrants to admit. Since more foreigners want to enter rich countries than these countries are willing to admit, and economic analysis focuses on maximizing earnings and GDP, one type of economic analysis asks who to admit to maximize economic benefits for natives. The answer is straightforward: admit young and well-educated immigrants who know the host country's language and



have jobs waiting for them, as Australia and Canada do with their systems that award points for personal characteristics associated with successful economic integration.

The migration policies of the US and other countries often have multiple goals, including to benefit migrants and natives and to provide refuge to persons fleeing persecution. Weighing which goal has higher priority has proven to be very difficult. How should policy weigh the income gains of a rural Mexican who earns ten times more in the US but whose presence may slow wage increases for US farm workers, who may be earlier immigrants from Mexico? Similarly, how many refugees who are escaping persecution should be admitted if they are costly to integrate because they had no time to prepare to begin anew in a safer country?

Economic studies aim to quantify the gains and losses from particular types of immigrants in particular labor markets to help policymakers weigh trade-offs in migration. Economic theory suggests that admitting immigrants should adversely affect similar natives. However, studies of migrant impacts in particular labor markets generally find few or none of these expected negative effects, suggesting that detecting the impacts of migrants is very hard and that the assumptions that must be made to study the moving target of how migrants affect local workers often influence the results.

This chapter begins with a brief review of US migration patterns and policy responses, followed by an assessment of the overall economic impacts of immigrants on the size of the US economy and the distribution of wages and profits before examining the impacts of migrant workers in particular labor markets *via* case studies of particular labor markets and comparisons of cities with more or fewer migrants. The chapter then turns to public finances. Most newcomers begin their American journeys by earning less than similar natives, but the extra drive and ambition that encourages migrants to cross borders enables many to catch up and sometimes surpass similar Americans in US earnings. Finally, the chapter examines the impact of emigration and the return flow of remittances on migrant-sending countries.

## **Immigration Patterns and Responses**

The US is a nation of immigrants whose motto *E pluribus unum* (from many, one) reflects openness to newcomers. Almost all US residents are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants. Most Americans celebrate their immigrant heritage, explaining the many hyphens, from Italian-Americans to Mexican-Americans. Immigrants continue to remake America as they change the size and composition of the population, reshape the economy and labor market, and influence politics, society, and culture. Immigration changes how US residents interact with each other, food preferences, and music and culture.

Immigration to the US occurred in four major waves, beginning with the largely British wave before immigrant admissions began to be recorded in 1820. There was a second wave, dominated by Irish and German Catholics, in the 1840s and 1850s, a third wave, that included many southern and eastern Europeans, between



1880 and 1914, and a fourth wave set in motion by 1965 laws that switched priority for admission from a migrant's country of origin to US sponsors requesting the admission of relatives or needed workers. Waves suggest peaks and troughs, with troughs in the aftermath of the Civil War in the 1860s and World War I from 1914–1917. Legislation in the 1920s prevented a resumption of large-scale immigration from Europe.

There is no end in sight to the fourth wave launched by the 1965 switch from favoring Europeans to giving priority to foreigners whose US relatives sponsored them for immigrant visas. The change from national origins to family unification was not expected to change immigration patterns, but it did. There was little research to counter the assertion of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) in 1965 that a family unification-based selection system would not change “the ethnic mix of this country” (Congressional Digest 1965).

Kennedy was wrong. During the 1950s, 56 percent of the 2.5 million immigrants admitted to the US were from Europe; by the 1970s, fewer than 20 percent of the 4.2 million immigrants admitted were from Europe. Chain migration, as when immigrants and naturalized US citizens sponsor their relatives for visas, was soon apparent, especially because the US has one of the world's most expansive definitions of immediate family, including children up to the age of 21 and the parents of US citizens. The US allows its citizens to sponsor their adult children as well as their adult brothers and sisters for immigrant visas, which can lead to long queues as when, for example, a foreign student marries a US citizen and sponsors his parents and brothers and sisters and their families for immigrant visas. The US offers 50,000 “diversity immigrant visas” each year *via* a lottery that is open to citizens of countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the US during the previous five years, creating new family networks to sponsor relatives for immigration.

## **Immigration Today**

Half a million foreigners arrive in the US every day, including 3,000 who receive immigrant visas that allow them to settle and become naturalized US citizens after five years.<sup>1</sup> Over 500,000 tourists, business visitors, foreign students, and workers arrive every day, persons whom the US Department of Homeland Security calls non-immigrants or temporary visitors because they are expected to leave the US after a few days, weeks, or years.<sup>2</sup> Before the 2008–09 recession, the number of unauthorized foreigners in the US rose by over 1,500 per day. More than 50% eluded apprehension at the Mexico-US border, whereas the others entered legally but violated the terms of their visitor visas by going to work or not departing as their temporary visas required.<sup>3</sup>

The US had 45 million foreign-born residents in 2018, making foreign-born residents almost 14 percent of US residents and approaching the record of 1890, when the foreign-born were almost 15 percent of US residents (Pew 2020). The US has more foreign-born residents than any other country, three times more than the equal-second countries, Germany and Saudi Arabia, which each had 13 million international migrants in 2019 (UN DESA 2019).<sup>4</sup>

The more developed or industrial countries have an average 12 percent foreign-born residents, but there is wide variation between them. Foreigners represent less than 2 percent of the residents of Japan and South Korea, but one-quarter of the residents of Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland were born outside these countries. The US has a lower proportion of immigrants than most European countries, such as with Austria (20 percent) and Germany (16 percent foreign-born residents), and a lower proportion than in Canada, where 21 percent of residents were born abroad in 2019 (UN DESA 2019).

## **Policy Debates**

Most Americans believe that legal immigration is good, that welcoming foreigners who seek to become Americans continues a long tradition and is in the national interest. But public opinion polls find widespread dissatisfaction with the current immigration system, explaining why the adjectives commonly applied to the US immigration system are “failed” and “broken.” The major failure is illegal immigration, involving foreigners who slip across the Mexico-US border without detection and those who enter the US legally but do not depart as required by their visas. One-quarter of foreign-born US residents, almost 11 million in 2019 (Pew 2020), are unauthorized, raising the question as to whether unauthorized foreigners should be allowed to become legal immigrants or whether they should be detected and removed.

Congress has debated immigration reform proposals several times in the 21st century but failed to approve legislation that became law. The Republican-controlled House in December 2005 approved an enforcement-only bill that would have added fences and agents on the Mexico-US border and required all US employers to participate in a hitherto voluntary federal program, E-Verify, that allows employers to submit data provided by newly hired workers so the government can verify that the new employees are legally authorized to work in the US. Migrant advocates reacted strongly against the House bill, mounting demonstrations that culminated in a “Day Without Immigrants” across the US on May 1, 2006. A million immigrants and their supporters refused to work and shop on May 1, 2006, prompting some meatpacking plants, home builders, and restaurants to close for the day.<sup>5</sup>

The May 1, 2006 demonstrations helped to persuade the Democratic-controlled Senate to approve the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) in May 2006. Like the 2005 House bill, CIRA would have required all employers to use E-Verify to check the legal status of newly hired workers and added fences and agents on the Mexico-US border to deter illegal immigration. But CIRA would also have allowed most unauthorized foreigners to “earn” a legal immigrant status by paying fines and working in the US with a probationary legal status for several years before being allowed to make the transition to regular immigrant status, so-called “earned legalization.”<sup>6</sup>

Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama endorsed CIRA’s combination of more enforcement and legalization, but they disagreed on details. For

example, then-Senator Obama (D-IL) voted against the 2007 version of CIRA because it included what Obama considered an excessively large guest worker program. The Senate approved another comprehensive immigration reform package endorsed by then-President Obama in 2013,<sup>7</sup> but the House refused to act on legislation to deal comprehensively with unauthorized foreigners.

## **Trump and Covid-19**

The immigration questions debated in Congress were also debated during the 2016 presidential campaign. Democrat Hillary Clinton endorsed CIRA and promised to make immigration reform, with a path to legalization for most unauthorized foreigners in the US, a priority of her administration. Republican Donald Trump took an enforcement-only approach, promising to build a wall on the Mexico-US border to deter foreigners seeking to enter illegally, to deport unauthorized foreigners inside the US, and to prevent the entry of immigrants and visitors from countries that sponsor terrorism (Martin 2017a).

After being elected, President Trump made reducing unauthorized immigration a priority, issuing executive orders that called on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to plan for the construction of a wall on the Mexico-US border, to step up enforcement against unauthorized foreigners in the US, and to prevent the entry of citizens from seven countries, the so-called Muslim ban (Martin 2017b). These executive orders were challenged in court, and the order barring the entry of citizens of particular countries was revised several times, but many of the executive order provisions eventually went into effect.

The first two decades of the 21st century were marked by sharply rising unauthorized migration until the 2008–2009 recession, a large but shrinking stock of unauthorized foreigners in the US between 2010 and 2020, and the enforcement-first policies of President Trump. The US immigration system is large and complex, but Trump changed its trajectory in several major ways.

Some of Trump's most significant actions involved asylum and refugees (Martin 2020). Trump reduced the annual resettlement of refugees by over 75 percent, ending a half century of the US accepting the highest number of refugees who faced persecution at home. To reduce the number of Central American families traveling through Mexico to apply for asylum in the US, DHS separated children from their parents in May–June 2018 in order to prosecute the parents for unauthorized entry and, in some cases, deported them without their children.<sup>8</sup> The US government persuaded the Mexican government to reduce the transit of Central Americans seeking asylum in the US through Mexico, and required those who entered the US and applied for asylum to wait in Mexico for hearings on their cases.<sup>9</sup>

Congress refused to appropriate as much money for the border wall as Trump requested, leading to the longest government shutdown in modern times when 15 federal agencies closed for 35 days in December 2018 and January 2019.<sup>10</sup> After the government reopened, Trump took funds from the Department of Defense and elsewhere to obtain monies to repair and build fences and barriers

on the Mexico-US border.<sup>11</sup> DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency clashed repeatedly with the leaders of so-called "sanctuary cities" and states that refused to inform federal immigration agents about or to detain suspected unauthorized foreigners after they completed sentences for US crimes.<sup>12</sup>

Many employers of low-wage immigrant workers expected Trump, whose hotel and winery businesses employ guest workers under the H-2A (agriculture) and H-2B (nonfarm) programs, to make it easier for them to hire legal guest workers. There were no major changes to these guest worker programs, a disappointment for many of Trump's employer-supporters. Trump promised to crack down on the H-1B program for college-educated foreign workers, primarily Indians employed in IT occupations, and the DHS's US Citizenship and Immigration Services agency began to check employer and worker applications more carefully to "protect the interest of US workers." Finally, a new DHS public charge regulation, that made it easier to deny immigrant visas to foreigners if they had or were likely to participate in federal social "safety net" programs was allowed by the US Supreme Court to go into effect in 2020.<sup>13</sup>

The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 further restricted the access of foreigners to the US. US borders were closed to non-essential travelers, including foreigners seeking asylum in the US. Democrat Joe Biden, elected in November 2020, promised to end construction of a wall on the Mexico-US border, to raise refugee admissions to 125,000 a year, to reverse the public charge rule, and to encourage Congress to create a path to immigrant status for the 11 million unauthorized foreigners in the US.

## **Macroeconomic Effects**

Immigration increases the size of the labor force. The standard short-run analysis of the economic impacts of migrants on resident workers assumes that, if the supply of labor increases, wages fall, making the first results of immigration higher employment and lower wages.<sup>14</sup> The US President's Council on Economic Advisors summarized the economic effects of immigration as follows:

Although immigrant workers increase output, their addition to the supply of labor ... [causes] wage rates in the immediately affected market [to be] bid down ... Thus, native-born workers who compete with immigrants for jobs may experience reduced earnings or reduced employment.

(1986: 213–214)

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 marked a major turn in US policy toward unauthorized foreigners, then often called illegal aliens. After a decade of debate, Congress approved the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) to "close the labor market door" to unauthorized workers by fining or sanctioning employers who knowingly hired them, and legalized unauthorized foreigners who had lived in the US for at least five years or who did

90 days of qualifying farm work in 1985–1986. Some 2.7 million foreigners, over 85 percent Mexicans, became legal immigrants, with half of them being in California.

IRCA did not legalize immigration of the families of unauthorized foreigners, who were still in Mexico. During the early 1990s, when California was experiencing a severe recession due to reduced defense spending in the aftermath of the collapse of communism, many of the newly legalized Mexicans brought their families illegally to California, increasing the demand for education and health-care services. California and other states sued the federal government, arguing that its failure to prevent unauthorized migration increased state spending at a time of deficits. During the 1994 campaign for governor, Pete Wilson (R-CA) was re-elected in part because he supported Proposition 187, a voter initiative that would have required state-funded institutions, including K-12 schools, to verify the legal status of those seeking services.<sup>15</sup>

Voters approved Prop 187 by a 59–41 percent margin, but most of its provisions were deemed unconstitutional and were not implemented. However, the state suits seeking federal aid to provide services to foreign-born residents prompted a National Research Council study of the economic benefits and costs of immigration (Smith and Edmonston 1997).

Figure 3.1, adapted from the NRC study, summarizes the wage-depressing effect of immigration in 1996, when the US had 15 million foreign-born workers in a labor force of 140 million at a time when hourly earnings averaged US\$ 12.60 at **F**. The consensus of NRC experts was that these foreign-born workers reduced




Figure 3.1 The economic impacts of migration. Source: Created by the author.

average hourly earnings in the US labor market by 3 percent, so that eliminating foreign-born workers would have resulted in a smaller labor force of 125 million US workers, who would have earned US\$ 13 an hour at **E**.

Immigration, or the shift from **E** to **F**, creates two rectangles and a triangle:

- Rectangle **C** is a transfer between natives. The lower wages due to immigration increase the profits of owners of capital and land. The number of pre-immigration US workers is lower at the US\$ 12.60 wage than it would be at the US\$ 13 wage because some US workers dropped out of the labor force at the immigrant-lowered wage.
- The economy expands by rectangle **D** and triangle **B**. Immigrants get most of the benefits of this economic expansion in the form of their wages in rectangle **D**, but owners of capital gain triangle **B** in the form of more profits in the larger economy.

The major economic beneficiaries of immigration are migrants who earn higher wages in the US, gaining **D**, and employers who pay lower wages, gaining **B** and **C** in increased profits. The major losers are workers employed before the arrival of immigrants, who lose the wages represented by rectangle **C**. This static analysis suggests that immigrant workers expand the economy by lowering wages and increasing the returns to capital or profits (Zaretsky 1997).

The size of triangle **B**, the net increase in national income (in percent) due to immigration, can be estimated by using the formula for the area of a triangle, i.e.  $1/2$  (3 percent decrease in US wages due to immigration  $\times$  11 percent immigrant share of US labor force 70 percent share of labor in US national income), or  $1/2 \times 0.002 = 0.001$ , that is, US national income increased by  $1/10$  of 1 percent due to immigration.<sup>16</sup> US GDP was US\$ 8 trillion in 1996, making the net benefit **B** equal to \$8 billion a year. Since economic growth was 3.7 percent or US\$ 292 billion in 1996, the net contribution of immigrants was equivalent to 10 days economic growth.<sup>17</sup>

The NRC estimate that immigration generated net economic benefits of US\$ 8 billion per year yielded two opposite reactions. Admissionists who favor more immigration trumpeted the US\$ 8 billion net gain, while restrictionists who want to reduce immigration emphasized how small the net gain from immigration was to the large US economy.

Assumptions about the nature of the aggregate production function, that combines inputs into outputs of goods and services, the extent of wage depression associated with immigration, and other variables used to estimate the macroeconomic effects of immigrants, can be changed, but the overall conclusion remains the same. Adding immigrants to the labor force expands GDP by slightly lowering wages and increasing returns to capital, with most of the immigrant-induced increase in national income accruing to immigrants in wages and the owners of capital in profits.

This concentration of the benefits of immigration among immigrants and owners of capital leads to the conclusion that the major economic issues associated with immigration are distributional, that is, more immigrants increase GDP, but

most of this additional GDP accrues to migrants and owners of capital. Borjas (1995: 9) concluded:

If the social welfare function depends on *both* efficiency gains and the distributional impact of immigration, the slight benefits arising from the immigration surplus [triangle **B**] may well be outweighed by the substantial wealth redistribution that takes place, particularly since the redistribution goes from workers to owners of capital (or other users of immigrant services).

Immigrant workers expand the economy because their arrival reduces the wages of US workers. Given a negatively sloped demand curve, employers hire more workers at lower wages. However, if immigrants are different in economically important characteristics such as education, they can complement US workers, meaning that more immigrants increase the demand for and the wages of US workers. For example, US carpenters and electricians may be more productive with immigrant helpers, and there may be more jobs for US truck drivers if immigrant farm workers are available to harvest crops.

The 28 million immigrant workers in 2019, one-sixth of all US workers, are different from US-born workers in the most important determinant of US earnings, years of schooling. While neither Bill Gates nor Steve Jobs earned college degrees, they are exceptions to the rule that more years of schooling are associated with higher earnings. Figure 3.2 shows that 20 percent of foreign-born workers did not complete high school, compared with fewer than 5 percent of US-born workers. At the other end of the education ladder, 40 percent of foreign- and US-born workers earned college degrees. The big gap is among persons with some college education. Almost 30 percent of US-born workers have some college education, twice the share of foreign-born workers.




Figure 3.2 Education of foreign- and US-born workers in 2019 (25 and older). Source: [www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm](http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm); not copyrighted.



## **Labor Market Effects**

Differences between foreign- and US-born workers play important roles in determining their labor market impacts. There have been many studies of the effects of immigrants on similar US-born workers, and they find few of the negative effects predicted by economic theory. Adding more workers into the workforce should reduce the wages of some similar US workers, or increase their unemployment rates, but only case studies find these expected effects, while city comparisons and age-earnings studies do not.

## **Case Studies**

Case studies document the impacts of immigrant workers in particular industries and occupations. When unionized Mexican-American citrus workers, employed by grower-formed labor cooperatives in southern California, went on strike for a wage increase in 1982, many growers turned to labor contractors who hired unauthorized workers to get their lemons and oranges harvested. After the strike was settled, the six unionized harvesting co-ops lost business to labor contractors, and co-op costs increased because they could spread their fixed costs over fewer lemons and oranges. What had been a unionized labor market employing US citizens and legal immigrants in 1978 became a non-union and mostly unauthorized worker labor market a decade later. In this case, the wages and the benefits of 10,000 citrus workers declined as 27 labor contractors replaced six co-ops (Mines and Martin 1984; GAO 1988: 37–38).

Case studies of the impacts of immigrant workers in agriculture and construction find the worker displacement and wage depression which was predicted by economic theory. However, these effects can be indirect and hard to measure. The older, unionized Mexican-American farm workers were displaced in a competition between two types of employers: the co-ops that employed them and labor contractors who employed younger, unauthorized workers who could work faster and did not place as much value on benefits, such as health insurance. There were no studies of the displaced farm workers, so we do not know if they eventually found other jobs and whether their new jobs were better or worse than their old citrus picking jobs.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented the change in the 1980s from mostly Black workers employed by unionized, janitorial service firms in Los Angeles to mostly Mexican immigrants employed by smaller, non-union cleaning contractors (GAO 1988: 39–41).<sup>18</sup> Janitorial wages fell from above minimum to the minimum wage, health insurance and other benefits disappeared, and GAO analysts concluded that “illegal aliens may displace native workers” (GAO 1986). A Justice for Janitors campaign organized some of these unauthorized janitors in the 1990s by targeting building owners and tenants rather than the non-union contracting firms that employed janitors, and won wage and benefit increases for workers in particular cities (Erikson et al. 2002).

Two aspects of case studies deserve special note: network hiring and the fate of resident workers. Farm work, janitorial services, and food preparation

are occupations with high worker turnover, so that many employers are always recruiting new workers to replace those who quit. Immigrant networks can reduce this recruitment challenge by encouraging current workers to bring friends and relatives who can perform the job into the workplace. Current workers know the job and who can perform the work satisfactorily, and they often take responsibility for training the new hires that they bring into the workplace.<sup>19</sup> Network hiring has significant advantages for employers, allowing immigrants to take over a personnel function that would otherwise require management time and resources (Waldinger and Lichter 2003).

The second question involves the fate of workers who are replaced by migrants, such as the citrus pickers and janitors. Many farm and service jobs filled by low-skilled workers are not desired by US workers because of the hard work required or other aspects of the job, including night and weekend work. If contractors who hire immigrants take over functions that used to be done by US workers, what happens to the US workers? Are US workers pushed up the job ladder as immigrants willing to work for less replace them, or do they drop out of the labor force? Some analysts conclude that the falling labor force participation rate of Black men and their rising incarceration rate are due in part to the arrival of low-skilled immigrants.<sup>20</sup>

Case studies of immigrant worker impacts may be more useful when they are embodied in analyses of particular industries (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). Analyses of the evolution of migrant employment in construction, care for children and the elderly, and agriculture, sectors that have high proportions of migrant workers, demonstrate the importance of migrant networks in recruitment and the path dependencies that can increase the share of migrants in particular industries over time. For example, if apprenticeship systems that teach construction skills are better maintained abroad than at home, the arrival of trained migrants can weaken support for local apprenticeship systems and increase the need for skilled migrants over time. This is what happened in the British construction industry, where it proved easier to hire trained Polish plumbers than to spend money to train local workers, aggravating the shortage of British plumbers.

Case studies of migrant worker impacts in low-skilled labor markets highlight labor displacement and wage depression, suggesting that governments should restrict such migration to protect local workers. Case studies of immigrants in high-skill industries, by contrast, often focus on particularly successful immigrants and suggest that governments should admit more. For example, one-quarter of Silicon Valley high-tech firms in the late 1990s had had at least one immigrant co-founder, suggesting that admitting more immigrants with tech skills can spur economic growth (Saxenian 1999).

The question is how to identify the global talent that can spur new industries and economic growth. Immigrant co-founders of successful firms such as Google<sup>21</sup> and Intel<sup>22</sup> benefit themselves as well as US workers and the US economy, but how can such individuals be identified before they are successful? As we have seen, many of the most successful US-born tech entrepreneurs did not complete college,<sup>23</sup> but a college degree is normally the minimum requirement to migrate

to another country as a skilled worker. European immigration programs that seek to attract talented immigrants have attracted relatively few, in part because of the relatively stringent education and income-earning requirements to gain entry.

The US experience with H-1B skilled foreign workers is instructive. The H-1B program was created in 1990 when there were believed to be sufficient US workers, as indicated by the unemployment rate of 5.6 percent, but not enough skilled workers to fill all of the jobs being created in the rapidly expanding IT sector. Some 20,000 temporary foreign workers with college degrees, and fashion models without degrees, were being admitted under the then-skilled temporary foreign worker program. The H-1B program made it easy for US employers to recruit and employ up to 65,000 H-1B workers a year. Legislators expected that the number of H-1B visas would start high and decrease over time as US colleges and universities ramped up training and Americans filled more IT jobs.

Instead, the H-1B program expanded slowly, reaching the 65,000 cap in 1997 (Martin 2012). At a time of low unemployment and in anticipation of the Y2K problem of computers not adjusting to the year 2000 properly, US employers persuaded Congress to raise the cap, add another 20,000 H-1B visas for foreigners who earned master's degrees from US universities, and exempt non-profit employers, such as universities, from the visa cap, allowing over 200,000 H-1B workers a year to enter. Since each H-1B worker can stay up to six years, the US soon had over one million H-1B visa holders, demonstrating how quickly migration networks and contractors can expand a labor migration program originally intended to be a short-term bridge.

## **Econometric Studies**

Economists began to study the economic impacts of migrant workers on similar US workers as migration increased. During the 1960s, immigration averaged 320,000 a year, rose to an average 425,000 a year in the 1970s, rose again to an average 625,000 a year in the 1980s, and has averaged over one million a year since 2000. The number of unauthorized foreigners apprehended, most just inside the Mexico-US border, also rose, from less than 100,000 a year in the early 1960s to a million or more a year after the mid-1970s.

What impacts do rising numbers of foreign-born workers have on similar US workers? Most researchers focus on low-skilled and low-wage US workers, since they are the focus of federal and state welfare-to-work programs. One way to examine the impact of migrant on US workers is to compare the wages and unemployment rates of low-skilled US-born Blacks, Hispanics, and women in cities with higher and lower shares of low-skilled immigrant workers. If immigrant workers adversely affected these US workers, the effect should be visible in higher unemployment or lower wages in cities with more immigrants.

Economists have not found negative effects of immigrants on US workers. The most cited study involved the effects of 125,000 Cubans who left from the Cuban port of Mariel for Florida in summer 1980. Half of the Cuban Marielitos settled in Miami, increasing the city's labor force by 7 percent. However, the

unemployment rate of Blacks in Miami was lower than in cities such as Atlanta that did not receive Cuban immigrants during the early 1980s recession (Card 1990).<sup>24</sup> The wage rates of Blacks and other low-skilled US workers, who were expected to compete with newly arrived Cubans, were unchanged, prompting Card (1990) to conclude that Miami-area businesses used labor-intensive techniques to create jobs for the newly arrived Marielitos, meaning they retained US workers and added Marielitos.

Card (2001) also examined how the share of migrant workers in particular occupations in a city in 1990, rather than simply the share of migrants in a city's labor force, affected similar US workers. He found that the average hourly earnings of US-born workers in the 175 largest US cities were lower in some occupations that had a higher proportion of migrant workers, but the effect was small: "despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature on this question does not provide much support for this conclusion" (Friedberg and Hunt 1995: 42).

David Card, an immigrant from Canada, found few negative effects of immigrants on similar US workers, while George Borjas, an immigrant from Cuba, found negative effects.<sup>25</sup> Borjas examined a natural immigration experiment that did not happen. When another wave of Cubans tried to reach Florida in 1994, the US Coast Guard intercepted them and sent them to Guantanamo, a US naval base at the eastern end of Cuba. The unemployment rate of Blacks in Miami rose in 1994 and fell in comparison cities, prompting Borjas to conclude that there are many factors in addition to migrant workers that affect the unemployment rate of Blacks and other similar US workers.

The debate over Marielitos is symbolic of economic controversies on the impacts of migrant workers on US workers. Card's conclusions bolstered immigrant supply-siders who believe that migrant workers expand economic activity in ways that benefit themselves and other residents, analogous to supply-side economists who believe that tax cuts encourage additional work, benefiting those whose taxes go down and others *via* the multiplier effects of increased economic activities. Borjas, by contrast, believes that the demand curve for labor is downward sloping, so that adding immigrants to the supply of labor reduces wages.

A journalist's review of the Marielito controversy emphasizes that the comparison group of US workers, who are selected to check for the impacts of migrants, largely determines the conclusions (Leubsdorf 2017). The more inclusive the group of US workers, such as including US women and teens still in school as US workers who could be hurt by Marielitos, the less likely an analyst will find negative effects of the Marielitos on US workers. Focusing on a narrower group of workers, such as adult US Blacks, increases the chances of finding negative effects from migrants (Borjas 2017).

There have been several explanations offered for why analysts cannot find the expected negative effects of migrants on corresponding similar US workers, including the possibility that similar US workers move away from or do not move to cities with large proportions of migrants.<sup>26</sup> Borjas (2003) tried to determine the

effect of migrants on similar US workers in national labor markets by grouping both US- and foreign-born workers into four education and eight age (as an indicator of work experience) cells. For example, US- and foreign-born workers with less than high-school education and aged 25 to 30 were in one [education  $\times$  age] cell, and high school graduates 25 to 30 years of age or 35 to 40 were in other cells.

In order to use census data for 18- to 64-year-old men between 1960 and 2000 to examine what happened within each cell, Borjas assumed no mobility between the 32 [education  $\times$  age] cells, meaning that 25- to 30-year-old college graduates do not compete with 30- to 35-year-old college graduates, and that foreign-born and US-born workers are substitutes within each cell. Borjas found a labor demand elasticity of  $-0.3$ , suggesting that a 10 percent increase in immigrant workers in a particular [education  $\times$  age] cell reduced wages in that cell by 3 percent. Wage depression was greatest at the extremes of the education distribution, down 8 percent for those who did not finish high school and down 5 percent for college graduates, and wage depression was lowest at the state level, suggesting that the internal migration of US workers reduced wage depression.

By making different assumptions, Foged and Peri (2015) reached different conclusions. They grouped US and immigrant workers into the same four education and eight age cells, but they assumed that migrant and US-born workers within each cell were complements, so that 25- to 30-year-old immigrants with less than a high-school education filled different jobs than US-born workers in that same age and education cell. Their reasoning was that the US-born workers spoke English and understood US cultural norms, so that they likely filled more front-of-house jobs in hotels and restaurants whereas immigrants were concentrated in the back-of-house jobs.

By assuming that migrant and US-born workers were complements, and allowed employers to invest because they had access to a labor force swelled by immigrants, the same data found that more migrants within a cell meant higher wages for US workers in that same cell. Between 1990 and 2000, there was an 8 percent increase in the number of foreign-born workers in the US labor force, which increased the wages of all workers by over 2 percent. By assuming that migrants and US workers are complements within cells,<sup>27</sup> and by allowing investment to respond to the additional immigrant workers, Foged and Peri found more positive than negative effects of migrants on US workers.

The fact that economists must make assumptions about how migrants and resident workers interact, and about how investors and businesses respond to the arrival of migrants means that the results of econometric studies depend significantly on their assumptions. One summary of econometric studies concluded that because “immigration triggers a variety of dynamic responses throughout the economy, [they] do not come close to accurately capturing the full long-run effects of immigration” (Bodvarsson and Van Den Berg 2009: 155).

Perhaps the major message from econometric studies is that it is very hard to measure the changes in labor markets due to the arrival of migrant workers. Immigrants arrive and change as they learn English and become familiar with the US labor market, which changes the jobs available to them and hence changes

their impacts. US-born workers change as well, perhaps moving away from migrant-dominated labor markets, moving up the job ladder because they speak English, or dropping out of the labor force. Employers may respond to the availability of immigrants by creating jobs suited to them, as when farmers plant more labor-intensive strawberries because migrant workers are available to pick them, and builders use more labor-intensive techniques because workers are readily available.

The flexible US economy and labor market makes it hard for snapshot analyses to explain the motion picture of immigrants and adjustments to their presence. One lesson is clear: the more flexible the labor market, meaning the more responsive US-born workers and employers are to an influx of migrant workers, the greater the economic benefits of immigration.

These US findings are broadly similar to studies of migrant worker impacts in other industrial countries. A recent review article concluded that “massive and unexpected immigrant inflows generally induce adverse labor market effects,” supporting Borjas rather than Card and Peri on the labor market impacts of migrant worker inflows (Edo et al. 2020).

## **Economic Mobility**

Economic mobility studies ask how the earnings of immigrants rise after their arrival. There are many stories of poor immigrants who became rich in the US, including Andrew Carnegie (1835–1919), who arrived in the US from Scotland with his parents at age 12, created what became US Steel which was sold for US\$ 303 million in 1901, making Carnegie the richest person in the US. Many immigrants arrive with few assets and initially earn less than similar US-born workers, but as they learn English and gain US work experience, their earnings rise toward those of similar US-born workers and sometimes surpass US worker earnings.

In 2019, the median weekly earnings of foreign-born workers was US\$ 800, which was 15 percent less than the median US\$ 940 a week of US-born workers.<sup>28</sup> The earnings of younger immigrants were more similar to those of younger US-born workers, US\$ 565 versus US\$ 585, respectively, for those in the 16- to 24-year old bracket in 2019, whereas the earnings of white immigrants were 12 percent higher than the earnings of white US-born workers, US\$ 1,140 versus US\$ 1,015, respectively, in 2019. The earnings of immigrants without a high-school education were 18 percent lower than those of US-born workers without a high-school education, whereas the earnings of college-educated immigrants were higher than the earnings of US-born college graduates.

How do the earnings of immigrants change as they are integrated into the US labor market? The first studies of immigrant economic mobility examined the earnings of immigrants who arrived at different times before 1970 and found that immigrants earned 10 percent less than similar US-born men just after they arrived (Chiswick 1978). However, immigrant earnings rose faster than did those of similar, US-born men, so that, after an average 13 years in the US, the earnings of immigrant men equaled their US-born peers, with immigrant men who



arrived in 1957 earning as much as similar US-born men by 1970. The earnings of immigrant men continued to increase faster than their US-born counterparts, so that after 23 years in the US, immigrant men earned on average 6 percent more than similar US-born men.

This economic mobility analysis suggested that the drive that motivates people to migrate also helps them to succeed abroad and to raise average US incomes over time as immigrants climb the US job ladder. However, subsequent analysis found that this immigrant success story reflected a one-time event, the opening of the US to Asian immigrants after 1965. It was very hard for Asians to immigrate to the US until the late 1960s, so that those who were in the US for several decades by 1970 were extraordinarily talented, which helps to explain why they surpassed their US peers in terms of earnings.

During the 1980s, the gap between the earnings of foreign-born and US-born workers widened as more immigrants with little education arrived from Mexico and Latin America. The immigrants arriving in the 1980s had more education than previous immigrants, but the educational level of US-born residents rose even faster, helping to explain the widening gap between immigrants and US-born residents. Almost 20 percent of foreign-born workers in 2019 had not graduated from high school, compared with less than 5 percent of US-born workers. Foreign-born workers without high school diplomas earned almost 10 percent less than their US peers.<sup>29</sup>

Many immigrants, especially those with low levels of education, struggle in the US labor market. These immigrants are better off in the US than they would have been at home, and their children may have more opportunities in the US, but it is unlikely that the self-selectivity that encourages international migration will allow most migrants with little education to close the earnings gaps with similar US-born workers. The Andrew Carnegie story of rags to riches may be harder for immigrants with little education to achieve in the 21st century.

The story may be different at the top of the education ladder. There is no gap between the earnings of foreigners and US-born workers with college degrees. Many foreigners study in the US, earn degrees, and are recruited by US employers, making US universities important immigration gatekeepers, since their decision to admit foreign students opens the door to the US. Over 1.1 million foreign students were in the US in 2018–2019, and most were from Asia, including over 50 percent from China and India combined.<sup>30</sup> Foreign students can work part-time while they study, remain in the US for several years after graduation for optional paid practical training with a US employer, and then work up to six years with an H-1B visa.

The H-1B program is among the most controversial of all temporary worker programs. US tech companies and many researchers decry the quota of 85,000 a year, with 20,000 reserved for foreigners with a master's degree or higher. Critics contend that foreigners who want immigrant visas are willing to work long hours for low wages for employers who will sponsor them for immigrant visas. The foreigners who hold H-1B visas are often better educated than US workers with similar jobs.<sup>31</sup>



## **Immigration and Taxes**

Immigrants earn money, pay taxes, and consume tax-supported benefits. One question is whether immigrants pay their way. If immigrants pay more in taxes than they consume in tax-supported benefits, immigration reduces the tax burden on US-born residents.

Most studies conclude that immigrants pay more in taxes than they consume in tax-supported benefits. There are several reasons, including the fact that most immigrants are in their working years, when the taxes paid by individuals typically exceed the value of tax-supported benefits they receive. Most tax-supported services benefit children, such as schools, or the elderly, including Social Security pensions and Medicare healthcare (Smith and Edmonston 1997: 52–61). Immigrants must pay most taxes, including sales and income taxes, but they are not always eligible for some tax-supported services.

State suits and Proposition 187 in the early 1990s stimulated studies of how much immigrant pay in taxes and the cost of the tax-supported benefits that they receive. Passel and Clark (1994) estimated that immigrants generate a net fiscal benefit of US\$ 27 billion; that is, their taxes paid exceeded the cost of the tax-supported services by US\$ 27 billion. Their critical assumption was that immigrants do not increase the cost of most government services, except for education and welfare assistance. Borjas (1994), on the other hand, assumed that the extra cost of providing services to immigrants was equal to the average cost of providing public services, and estimated that immigrants received tax-supported benefits worth US\$ 16 billion more than they paid in taxes.

These conflicting conclusions prompted the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the effects of immigration on public finances. The NRC reached two major conclusions (Smith and Edmonston 1997). First, the federal government benefits from all types of immigrants because most taxes flow to the federal government in the form of income and Social Security taxes that support programs where the costs do not increase with more residents, such as defense, or serve a group that is different from the immigrants, such as the elderly. Immigrants pay income, sales, and property taxes to state and local governments, but often less than these governments spend to provide immigrants and their families with education, health care, and justice services. In short, immigrants pay most of their taxes to the federal government but consume mostly services funded by state and local taxes, so the federal government “wins” from an immigrant tax surplus, whereas state and local governments may “lose” from an immigrant tax deficit.

The second NRC conclusion emphasized that an immigrant’s fiscal balance varies by income and state. Low-earning immigrants in states that offer a wide array of tax-supported services to low-income residents, such as California and New York, have an immigrant fiscal deficit that is covered in part by US-born residents who pay higher taxes. The NRC estimated that California households headed by Latin American immigrants received an average of US\$ 5,000 more in federal, state, and local services than they paid in taxes in 1996, largely because they had low earnings and more children in public schools (Smith and Edmonston

1997: 52–61). California households headed by US-born persons paid US\$ 2,700 more in federal taxes than they received in federal benefits, whereas immigrants had exactly the opposite fiscal balance, receiving US\$ 2,700 more in federal benefits than they paid in federal taxes. When these fiscal-balance estimates were applied to the entire US population in 1996, the 89 million households with US-born heads paid an extra US\$ 200 each to cover the deficit of the nine million immigrant-headed households (Smith and Edmonston 1997: Table 6.3).

Studies of immigrant taxes paid and benefits received are snapshots. However, immigrants and their families integrate into the US over time, so their earnings usually rise and they may consume more tax-supported services. The NRC constructed a motion picture of immigrant economic integration by projecting the future earnings of immigrants and natives, calculating each group's taxes paid and the value of the government services they are likely to consume, and estimating the taxes paid and value of tax-supported services received by each group's children and grandchildren.

A typical immigrant in 1996 had a positive fiscal balance of US\$ 80,000. This means that, after estimating the taxes paid by and benefits received by immigrants and their US-born descendants, the result is an US\$ 80,000 plus for federal, state, and local governments in 1996 dollars. The US\$ 80,000 net present value of an immigrant reflects a negative US\$ 3,000 for the immigrant and a positive US\$ 83,000 for the immigrants' US-born children, who are assumed to earn exactly as much, and to pay the same taxes, as other US-born children.

The net present value of immigrants varies by their level of education. Immigrants with more than high-school diplomas had a present value of US\$ 105,000 in the mid-1990s and adding the positive fiscal balance from their US-born children increases their present value to US\$ 198,000. By contrast, immigrants with less than a high-school diploma had a negative present value of US\$ 13,000, meaning that they were projected to consume US\$ 89,000 more in tax-supported services than they would pay in taxes despite a US\$ 76,000 fiscal surplus from their US-born children. The NRC concluded: "If the policy goal were to maximize the positive contribution of immigration to public sector budgets, that could be achieved by policies favoring highly educated immigrants and not admitting immigrants over age 50" (Smith and Edmonston 1997: Table 6.3).

The public finance impacts of migrants have a clear implication for migration policy: to maximize the fiscal surplus from immigrants, governments should select young and well-educated migrants who are most likely to quickly find jobs, earn high wages, and pay taxes (Hanson 2005). If countries want to employ low-skilled migrants and avoid their negative fiscal balances, they could admit them as guest workers and bar them from tax-supported public services available to citizens, as many Gulf oil exporters do. Giving migrant workers equal access to tax-supported services could raise their cost to employers and society, which is one reason why there appears to be a trade-off between how many low-skilled migrant workers a country accepts and their access to the social safety net. Sweden gives most guest workers full rights and has few, while Saudi Arabia restricts the access of guest workers to tax-supported services and has many (Ruhs 2013).

The National Academies released a second consensus report on immigration during the presidential election campaign of 2016 (Blau and Mackie 2016). The report estimated that immigrants generated up to US\$ 54 billion in benefits for Americans in 2015, equivalent to 0.3 percent of the US\$ 17.5 trillion US GDP in 2015. This \$18 trillion net benefit reflects a loss in wages to US workers of US\$ 494 billion and a gain in profits for the US of US\$ 548 billion. The conclusion: “the immigration surplus stems from the increase in the return to capital that results from the increased supply of labor and the subsequent fall in wages,” meaning that the arrival of immigrants depresses wages, expands the economy, and increases profits.

The report concluded that immigration bolsters “economic growth, innovation, and entrepreneurship,” and has “little to no” negative effects on US wages in the long term, largely because the models used to estimate immigration’s impacts on the labor market assume that there will be no long-term impacts on wages. The report highlighted the potential negative impacts of newcomers on previous immigrants and US-born workers with little education, including teenagers.

The report found slowing rates of wage convergence, meaning that newcomers to the US begin their American journeys with a larger earnings gap than previous arrivals, and are slower to close this gap as they integrate into the US. One reason for this widening earnings gap is that more newcomers have low levels of education, and some are learning English more slowly than earlier arrivals.

The National Academies report concluded that immigrants pay less in taxes than the cost of the public services they and their families receive, and that their US-born children do not close the fiscal gap because the federal government runs a deficit, meaning that all of the taxes paid by all US residents do not cover federal government expenditures. At the state and local levels, where governments must have balanced budgets, immigrants pay less in taxes than the cost of the tax-supported services they consume, and this immigrant deficit is covered by taxes paid by natives. If the US-born children of immigrants fare as well as other US-born children, over 75 years this immigrant fiscal deficit disappears at the federal level but persists at the state level.

## **Entrepreneurship and Innovation**

Productivity growth, producing more goods and services with fewer inputs, is the ultimate source of economic and income growth.<sup>32</sup> Immigrants are frequently associated with entrepreneurship and innovation, the process of producing a better or more effective product or service, in sectors that range from technology to restaurants. Many studies emphasize that a high proportion of students in science and engineering were born abroad, and that the proportion of patents issued to foreign-born residents is far higher than their share of the US population.

Consider immigrant entrepreneurship, which is often studied by examining workers who are self-employed. The most recent analysis of self-employment uses data from 2009, when the US was in recession and some of those who were laid off became self-employed consultants, reflecting the usual pattern of rising

self-employment in recessions. There were 10 million self-employed workers among the 140 million employed persons in the US in 2009, including 40 percent in management occupations such as consulting, 20 percent in service occupations such as restaurants and gardening, 15 percent in farming and construction occupations, and 15 percent in sales occupations. Self-employment is slightly higher for foreign-born than US-born workers; 7 percent of US-born workers were self-employed in 2009, *versus* 7.4 percent of foreign-born workers (Hipple 2010: 24).<sup>33</sup> There are significant differences in self-employment rates by country of origin, level of education, and other factors. Foreigners from Korea and Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Lebanon and Syria have very high rates of self-employment, perhaps reflecting their relatively high levels of education and access to capital and are visible operating retail shops and other businesses in central cities.

Does self-employment reflect entrepreneurial vigor or a failure to find a “regular” job? Economists believe that most workers prefer to work for wages and benefits, meaning that self-employment falls as farmers shift to wage work and consultants return to wage and salary jobs. Self-employment normally declines as the proportion of farmers falls, and many professions once dominated by self-employed professionals, such as doctors, now involve mostly workers employed for wages and salaries. There are also business-cycle effects, as “self-employment rises during recessions when regular jobs may be harder to find and laid-off executives may enter self-employed ‘consulting’” (Filer et al. 1996: 364).

Are the 1.5 million US immigrants who are self-employed the keys to US economic success? If yes, which self-employed immigrants are crucial to entrepreneurship? Miami has the highest rate of immigrant self-employment in the US, and Portes (1995) credits immigrant entrepreneurs with revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods by creating or expanding businesses that serve fellow immigrants and natives. Other analysts who examine self-employment in Miami point to long hours and low wages for the owners and employees of ethnic businesses.

What about innovation? One-third of the 420 Nobel Prizes won by US residents between 1901 and 2019 went to immigrants; the top three countries of origin were Germany, the UK, and Canada (Nazar et al. 2019). The children of immigrants predominate among the finalists and winners of the (Intel) Science Talent Search for high-school students.<sup>34</sup>

The most studied measure of innovation is patents, the monopolies granted by a government agency to new ideas and products that give the owner a legal right to prevent others from making, using, or selling the invention for a certain period. Patents are public, and patent owners can sue those who infringe or use their intellectual property without permission. A study that compared the proportion of college-educated immigrants in a state to the number of patents issued to residents of the state found that a higher share of immigrants meant more patents (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010). However, another study found no relationship between immigrants and innovation, despite the fact that immigrants are disproportionately involved in science and engineering (Mare et al. 2011).

There is no easy way to assess the impacts of immigration on entrepreneurship and innovation. There are many examples of successful immigrants in all fields of

endeavor, but it is hard to answer the “what if” question of whether an immigrant business or innovation would have been founded or discovered without the immigrant, so the question of whether immigration policy can be fine-tuned to increase entrepreneurship and innovation remains unanswered.

## **Migration and Development**

There are three major ways in which richer countries can help poorer countries to achieve faster economic growth, trade, aid, and migration. Freer trade argues that if richer countries open their borders to more goods from developing countries, goods rather than people will flow from poorer to richer countries. Aid involves money provided by richer to poorer countries to speed development that creates opportunities at home and slows out-migration. Finally, labor migration opens border gates to migrant workers so that remittances and returning migrants can speed development in migrant areas of origin.

The factor–price equalization theorem suggests that freer trade can be a substitute for migration.<sup>35</sup> With freer trade, economies grow faster as capital and labor is reallocated to where it is most productive, including from richer to poorer countries. There are economies of scale in production as firms produce for larger markets, and competition between foreign and domestic firms lowers prices for consumers in all trading countries. Under free trade, fewer low-wage workers should move from poorer to richer countries because there are more jobs in poorer countries that are making goods to export.

If previously closed economies that sent workers abroad open themselves to trade, migration and trade can increase together, creating a migration hump. This is what happened to Mexico-US migration under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that went into effect in 1994. There was large-scale Mexico-US migration beginning in the mid-1970s, when Mexico was a relatively closed economy. As Mexico opened its economy to more trade and investment in the 1980s, workers were displaced from previously protected sectors, and some migrated to the US. NAFTA was controversial and promoted in the US as a substitute for unwanted Mexico-US migration. In reality, NAFTA was a short-term complement to Mexico-US migration, evident as both Mexico-US trade and migration increased between the mid-1990s and the 2008–2009 recession.

International migration involves the movement of people over national borders, while international trade deals with the production of goods or services in one country and their consumption in another. Migration can generate triple wins, for migrants who move and achieve higher incomes, for receiving countries that get jobs filled, and for sending countries that receive remittances from their citizens and development assistance from diasporas. Migrant-sending countries that receive remittances and the return of more skilled workers can experience faster economic growth.

Remittances to developing countries surpassed Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the mid-1990s and have risen steadily to be five times more than ODA today. Aid tends to flow to governments and NGOs, whereas

remittances go to the families of migrants who often live in poor areas. Families that receive remittances spend more on health care and education for their children, so that the parental sacrifices of parents, as with Filipinos who work abroad as domestic workers or on the world's ships, enable their children to obtain college degrees. Many college-educated Filipinos also work abroad, giving the Philippines a migration economy in which remittances are over 10 percent of GDP.

The greatest gains from voluntary migration involve the movement of low-skilled workers to higher-wage countries, since the gaps in wages and opportunities between countries are largest for low-skilled workers. One study found that the average wage gains of low-skilled workers who move to the US, even after adjusting for the fact that living costs are higher in the US, were four to ten times. For example, low-skilled workers who earned an average US\$ 400 a month in Mexico earned \$1,600 a month in the US, and some of those earning US\$ 200 a month in Vietnam earned US\$ 2,000 a month in the US (Clemens et al., 2009). Several economists have estimated that world GDP, US\$ 88 trillion in 2020, could double if low-skilled migrants were allowed to move freely from poorer to richer countries and, once there, they found jobs without displacing any local workers.<sup>36</sup>

The Mexico-US migration hump reflected a combination of freer trade, rapid Mexican labor force growth, and slow job creation for a fast-expanding Mexican labor force. Many rural Mexicans followed well-established networks to the US in the 1990s and early 2000s, where employers who had been hiring Mexicans for decades hired more. Rural Mexicans were leaving for the US before NAFTA, but the free trade agreement speeded up changes, such as rural outmigration, that were already occurring in Mexico, compressing a transition that may otherwise have stretched over several decades into 15 years. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced NAFTA in 2020, is unlikely to restart large-scale Mexico-US migration for reasons that range from slower Mexican labor force growth to more opportunities and an expanded social safety net in Mexico.

US policy toward unwanted immigration from neighboring countries calls for freer trade and investment to create jobs that keep migrants at home. By contrast, the European Union often provides aid and advice to induce changes in countries seeking to join the EU before their citizens gain freedom of movement rights, hoping that rising wages and more opportunities at home translate into relatively little intra-EU migration when the citizens of new EU member states gain freedom of movement rights. However, there was significant migration from eastern to western Europe after 2004, and the belief that there were too many eastern European migrants in the UK was one reason that a majority of British voters supported Brexit in 2016.

## **Conclusions**

Three facts shape economic analyses of migration and migration policy. First, more migration is associated with a larger economy and labor force, so economists



normally favor immigration as a way to increase the size of the economy. Second, migrants are the major “winners” from migration, since most have higher incomes and more opportunities in destination countries. Third, immigration generates a net economic benefit in the form of more profits for owners of capital, so that immigration changes the distribution of income.

Overall, immigration is economically beneficial to migrants and has small positive effects on the migrant-receiving economy. Individuals have economic incentives to move from poorer to richer countries, and some employers want to hire migrants, so governments “manage migration” by spending tax monies on controls to keep migration below the level it would reach with few or no controls. The US government has often adopted a policy of “benign neglect” to unauthorized Mexico-US migration in particular, allowing migrants to enter the US and work on farms.

Immigration increases the size of the destination country’s economy and changes the distribution of income, but how do immigrant workers affect US workers and US taxpayers? Case studies show that US workers can be replaced by immigrants, but studies that seek to find lower wages or higher unemployment among US workers in cities with more immigrants fail to find significant negative effects. One reason may be that immigrants, who are similar to US workers in terms of age and education, are still different enough in the labor market that they complement rather than substitute for US workers, as when US workers serve food to customers in restaurants and immigrants cook and clean. Immigrants win a higher share of science prizes than the proportion of immigrants in the US population, but there is no clear evidence that more immigration spurs entrepreneurship and innovation.

In a world of 200+ countries, it is far better to have the problem of managing in-migration rather than out-migration. Migrants move to opportunity, generally from poorer to richer places, which means governments in destination countries must answer three questions: how many immigrants to admit, who to admit, and the status of newcomers—are they future citizens or temporary workers? The immigration policies of most destination country governments seek to welcome the skilled, regulate the low-skilled, and minimize unauthorized migration.

Channeling and managing newcomers has proven to be very difficult for governments, prompting some social scientists to argue that nation states are unable or unwilling to “manage” or control migration. They emphasize that family and other transnational networks limit the ability of governments to select migrants, and that international obligations and national laws limit the ability of governments to restrict the entry of some foreigners, such as refugees fleeing persecution.

The migration state is defined by Hollifield (2004) as one that sees managing or controlling increasing migration pressures as a central challenge.<sup>37</sup> There are many reasons why migration from poorer to richer countries is likely to increase, from demographic and economic inequalities to human rights conventions and laws that extend rights to all residents and limit the ability of governments to prevent some entries or effectuate some removals (Hollifield 2012).

Citizenship confers political, social, and economic rights on insiders that Milanovic (2019) calls citizenship premiums or rents, including the higher



incomes that accrue to those in rich countries. Milanovic (Chapter 4, this volume) wants more migration from poorer to richer countries, and believes that guest workers with restricted rights abroad are the optimal way to allow the labor mobility that leads to higher wages for workers in poorer countries but minimizes a nativist political backlash because guest workers are denied access to the welfare state.<sup>38</sup> Societies with guest workers tend to be authoritarian, such as Gulf oil exporters and Singapore.

Managing migration is likely to become more complex and challenging, but will emerging migration states be more or less open to newcomers? For two centuries, economists have preached the virtues of freer trade, arguing that comparative advantage ensures that most people in trading countries are better off because winners win more than losers lose, so that winners can compensate losers and leave everyone better off. Free trade became a guiding principle of the post-WWII international order, supported by all major political parties whose leaders urged displaced manufacturing workers to train and retrain for jobs in the expanding service economy. Sandel (2020) criticizes the hubris of the well-educated high earners who structured national and global economies in ways that benefited them and points out the resentment and shame of globalization losers who turned to populist politicians who were both anti-trade and anti-migration.<sup>39</sup>

A familiar quip in economics says that it is easy to become famous without ever being right, as demonstrated by those who predict stock markets and economic growth. Migration researchers and policymakers are similar in making predictions that have proven to be wrong, from the 1965 assertion that a family unification immigration system would not change who or how many people immigrate to the 1986 promise that employer sanctions and legalization would end illegal immigration. Migration researchers were spectacularly wrong when some predicted in the 1970s, when there were fewer than two million Mexican-born US residents, that Mexicans were sojourners rather than settlers and would not settle in the US.<sup>40</sup> Forty years later, there were 12 million Mexican-born persons in the US, plus an additional 18 million children born to them in the US.

These considerations should make policymakers and researchers humble about predicting the future of migration. Migration means change, as those who move change residences, jobs, and often aspirations. Employers who hire migrants may change employment practices and investment plans. The societies that migrants enter changes as residents adjust to the newcomers and the newcomers adjust to life in a new society. The countries migrants leave are also changed, as remittances and new ideas from migrants abroad can reduce poverty and put the country on a path to faster growth, or allow the dis-satisfied to leave and slow change at home. Understanding these complex changes is a major challenge in the 21st century.

## **Discussion Questions**

1. Explain how immigration can both expand the economy and redistribute income?

2. Why might case studies exaggerate the costs of migration for low-wage workers and exaggerate the benefits of migration for high-wage workers?
3. Why do immigrants have a net positive present value when considering the taxes they pay and the cost of tax-supported benefits they receive?
4. Who are the major winners and losers from labor migration?
5. Migrants are concentrated in host country cities. How can the effects of migrants in cities be measured, and what do studies find?
6. Do migrants pay their way, that is, do they pay more in taxes than they receive in tax-supported services?
7. How can migration speed development?
8. What is the migration hump?

## Notes

- 1 Immigration was 1.1 million in FY18, the same as FY17 but down slightly from 1.2 million in FY16 (DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 1). Over half of US immigrants are already in the US when they are “admitted” as immigrants.
- 2 There were 186 million nonimmigrant admissions in FY18, up from 181 million in FY17. About 44 percent of nonimmigrant admissions are I-94 admissions, meaning that border inspectors stamp visitors’ travel documents. Most short-term visitors from Canada and Mexico are excluded from non-immigrant admissions data (DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 25).
- 3 Pew estimates that the number of unauthorized foreigners peaked at 12.2 million in 2007, up from 3.5 million in 1990 and 11.1 million in 2005, or up an average of 1,500 a day between 2005 and 2007.
- 4 The UN considers people born in Puerto Rico and other US territories who move to the US mainland to be international migrants, yielding a total of 51 million international migrants in the US according to UN data.
- 5 <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3201>
- 6 <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3199>
- 7 <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3838>
- 8 The 1997 Flores agreement that settled litigation between migrant advocates and the government over the treatment of foreign children who enter the US illegally or apply for asylum generally limits unauthorized children to a maximum 20 days in detention. In practice, most foreigners under 18 are released to join US relatives. Flores dealt with teens but not families who entered the US illegally. In 2015, a federal judge ruled that the Flores settlement also prevents the detention of children who arrive in the US with their parents for more than 20 days, and the Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this maximum 20-day detention ruling in 2016. <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2347>
- 9 Since January 2019, the Migrant Protection Protocol or Remain in Mexico program has required adults who enter the US illegally or at ports of entry and apply for asylum to wait in Mexico. <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2347>
- 10 <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2281>
- 11 The wall is generally two parallel fences 30-feet high with 6-inch square bollards to prevent entries. The bollard tubes have a rebar core filled with concrete for the first ten feet.
- 12 President Trump used the State of the Union address in February 2020 to attack sanctuary cities and states, citing cases of foreigners who were released after arrests or convictions for US crimes and went on to commit more crimes against US citizens. <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2418>

- 13 The USCIS public charge regulation allows the agency to deny immigration visas to foreigners who used or are “more likely than not” to use Medicaid, housing assistance, or food stamps for at least 12 months in a 36-month period. The new regulation does not apply to refugees and is not retroactive. <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2419>
- 14 Resident workers include immigrant workers who arrived previously. In some cases, previous immigrants are most similar to newcomers, so any effects of newcomers are concentrated among settled or established immigrant communities.
- 15 [http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492\\_0\\_2\\_0](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492_0_2_0)
- 16 The underlying NRC model assumed constant returns to scale in a two-factor production function with homogeneous labor and full employment, meaning that immigration did not change long-term returns to capital and labor. Wage depression due to immigration lasts for about a decade if immigrants arrive in one period and then immigration stops. If labor is heterogeneous, meaning that immigrants are different from natives, the arrival of immigrants has long-term distributional consequences, helping complementary workers and hurting those who are substitutes.
- 17 Nominal GDP was US\$7.9 trillion in 1996, when nominal growth was 3.7 percent. Tables B-1 and B-4 of the Economic Report of the President.
- 18 In one non-union janitorial firm, 94 percent of workers were unauthorized. The number of Black janitors fell from 2,500 in 1977 to 600 in 1985 (GAO, 1988, p 40). GAO noted that “illegal alien workers ... exerted downward pressure on wages and working conditions within low-wage, unskilled jobs in the agricultural, food processing, and janitorial sectors [while] stimulating business and expanded employment opportunities for legal and native workers in other sectors, including the garment industry.”
- 19 Migrant workers from lower-wage countries can also be relatively more skilled than the local workers they replace, since their frame of reference is the lower wages that prevail at home (Piore, 1979). The so-called A8 migrants from Central European countries working in the UK after 2004 often had more education than the British workers employed in farming and similar occupations alongside them.
- 20 About 20 percent of US-born Black men without high-school diplomas are imprisoned. “Using data drawn from the 1960–2000 US Censuses, we find a strong correlation between immigration, Black wages, Black employment rates, and Black incarceration rates. As immigrants disproportionately increased the supply of workers in a particular skill group, the wages of Black workers in that group fell, the employment rate declined, and the incarceration rate rose. Our analysis suggests that a 10-percent immigrant-induced increase in the supply of a particular skill group reduced the Black wage by 3.6 percent, lowered the employment rate of Black men by 2.4 percentage points, and increased the incarceration rate of Blacks by almost a full percentage point” (Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 2006).
- 21 Sergei Brin was six years old when his family migrated to the US from Russia, meaning that he was educated in the US.
- 22 Andy Grove migrated from Hungary to the US at age 20 in 1956 and co-founded Intel with Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore in 1968.
- 23 Bill Gates of Microsoft dropped out of Harvard, Steve Jobs of Apple dropped out of Reed College, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook dropped out of Harvard, while Larry Ellison of Oracle dropped out of both the Universities of Illinois and Chicago.
- 24 The unemployment rate of Blacks in Miami in 1979 was 8.3 percent and rose to 9.6 percent in 1981. However, in the four comparison cities of Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles and Tampa-St Petersburg that did not receive Cuban migrants, the unemployment rate of Blacks rose from 10.3 percent in 1979 to 12.6 percent in 1981.
- 25 Sociologist Douglas Massey attributed Borjas’s finding that there are negative effects of migrant workers to prejudice, saying that Borjas apparently believes that “Mexicans aren’t as good as Cubans like him” (Lowenstein 2006).

- 26 Immigrants may also be attracted to cities with low unemployment and fast job growth, which could result in spurious positive correlations between the share of immigrants in the city labor forces and unemployment rates.
- 27 The US work force includes persons 16 and older. Ottaviano and Peri included US-born high school students with migrants in the “young and not-completed secondary school” group, which explained why migrants and US students were complements within cells, according to Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008).
- 28 These data are from: <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t05.htm>
- 29 <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t05.htm>
- 30 <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=2447>
- 31 Many employer ads say: bachelor’s degree required, master’s preferred, making it lawful to hire a foreigner with a master’s degree for a bachelor’s degree salary under the H-1B program.
- 32 There are many definitions of entrepreneurship, but a common one considers entrepreneurs to be persons who transform innovations into economic goods. Some definitions stress the risks accepted by entrepreneurs when it is not clear that they will be successful, whereas others emphasize the quest of many entrepreneurs for capital to launch their businesses.
- 33 Some 7.5 percent of foreign-born workers who had become naturalized US citizens were self-employed and unincorporated in 2009, *versus* 7.3 percent of foreign-born non-US citizens.
- 34 Some 2,000 high school students enter the Science Talent Search each year; Intel stopped supporting the competition in 2015: <https://www.societyforscience.org/regenon-sts/>
- 35 The factor–price equalization theorem holds that, as the prices of goods equalizes across countries, so do the wages of workers who make these goods. With similar wages in trading countries, workers have few incentives to move.
- 36 *The Economist* (July 13, 2017) summarized the argument for mass migration doubling world GDP. The critical assumption is that large-scale migration would not increase unemployment nor change the institutions that led to growth in rich countries. The article dismisses worries about more crime, wage depression, crowding, and changing culture, and suggests that newcomers could be restricted from voting to preserve growth-enhancing institutions. [www.economist.com/news/world-if/21724907-yes-it-would-be-disruptive-potential-gains-are-so-vast-objectors-could-be-bribed](http://www.economist.com/news/world-if/21724907-yes-it-would-be-disruptive-potential-gains-are-so-vast-objectors-could-be-bribed)
- 37 Nation states are also garrisons, providing security from threats for their residents and trading states, allowing trade to speed economic growth. The relative importance of defense, trade, and migration change over time and with circumstances.
- 38 Milanovic (2019) also argues that mobility is creating “new citizens” who may live and work outside their country of citizenship, or buy citizenship in a country where they do not live or participate politically. He argues for the creation of a less-than-full-citizen status that would limit full political and other rights but allow more labor mobility between poorer and richer countries.
- 39 Sandel argues that meritocracy allows those on the top rungs of the economic ladder to believe that they got there by merit, and to believe that those on the bottom rungs of the economic ladder are there because of their lack of ability or effort. Sandel criticizes rule-setting elites who benefit from the rules they set for society. As a professor at Harvard, Sandel says that many of his students believe they worked their way up from the bottom floor of a ten-story building, but they in fact started their journeys on the ninth floor.
- 40 Massey (2020) argues that migrants would circulate between Mexico and the US if the US government allowed them to enter and work. US border enforcement efforts, Massey argues, make it harder to circulate, so migrants settle in the US and form or unify their families when governments close borders. No one knows what would have happened if there had not been more border enforcement, but at least some migrants settle even when circular migration is permitted, as within the EU. The choice for many

rural Mexicans was not whether to circulate between US jobs and small farms that left them in poverty, but whether to seek opportunities in Mexican or US cities.

## References

- Blau, Francine and Christopher Mackie, eds. 2016. *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/23550>.
- Bodvarsson, Örn Bodvar and Hendrik Van Den Berg, eds. 2009. *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*. New York: Springer. <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9781461421153>.
- Borjas, George. 1994. "The Economics of Immigration." *Journal of Economic Literature* 32: 1667–717.
- Borjas, George. 1995. "The Economic Benefits of Immigration." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9(2): 3–22.
- Borjas, George. 2003. "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(4): 1335–74.
- Borjas, George. 2017. "The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, (21588).
- Borjas, George, Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2006. *Immigration and African-American Employment Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment, and Incarceration to Labor Supply Shocks*. NBER WP 12518. [www.nber.org/papers/w12518](http://www.nber.org/papers/w12518).
- Borjas, George, Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon Hanson. 2008. *Imperfect Substitution between Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal*. NBER WP 13887. [www.nber.org/papers/w13887](http://www.nber.org/papers/w13887).
- Card, David. 1990. "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43: 245–57.
- Card, David. 2001. "Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration." *Journal of Labor Economics* 19: 22–64.
- Chiswick, Barry. 1978. "The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men." *Journal of Political Economy* 86: 897–921.
- Clemens, Michael, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett. 2009. *The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the US Border*. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-004. <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4412631/Clemens%20Place%20Premium.pdf?sequence=1&sa=U&ei=5XFQU8nFAcqzyATciYHgCw&ved=0CFAQFjAJ&usq=AFQjCNEt7UC3z08FQcyAA6PyGZy44q0AaQ>.
- Congressional Digest, May 1965, 152. <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008315096>.
- Edo, Anthony, Lionel Ragot, Hillel Rapoport, Sulin Sardoschau, Andreas Steinmayr, and Arthur Sweetman. 2020. "An Introduction to the Economics of Immigration in OECD Countries." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 53(4): 1365–403.
- Erickson, Christopher, Catherine Fisk, Ruth Milkman, Daniel Mitchell, and Kent Wong. 2002. "Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three Rounds of Negotiations." *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 40(3): 543–67.
- Filter, Randall, Daniel Hamermesh, and Albert Rees. 1996. *The Economics of Work and Pay*. New York: Harpercollins College.
- Foged, Mette, and Giovanni Peri. 2015. "Immigrants' Effect on Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal Data." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 8(2): 1–34.

- Friedberg, Rachael and Jennifer Hunt. 1995. "The Impact of Immigrants on Destination Country Wages, Employment and Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9: 23–44.
- GAO (Government Accountability Office). 1986. *Limited Research Suggests Illegal Aliens May Displace Native Workers*. PEMD-86–9BR April 21. [www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-86-9BR](http://www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-86-9BR).
- GAO (Government Accountability Office). 1988. *Influence of Illegal Workers on Wages and Working Conditions of Legal Workers*. PEMD-88–13BR March 10. <http://www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-88-13BR>.
- Hanson, Gordon. 2005. *Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Hipple, Steven. 2010. "Self-Employment in the United States." *Monthly Labor Review*. September: 17–32. <https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/09/art2full.pdf>.
- Hollifield, James. 2004. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* 38(3): 885–912.
- Hollifield, James. 2012. "Migration and International Relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc Rosenblum and Daniel Tichenor, 345–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunt, Jennifer and Marjolaie Gauthier-Loiselle. 2010. "How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?" *American Economic Journal* 2(2): 31–56.
- Leubsdorf, Ben. 2017. "The Great Mariel Boatlift Debated." *Wall Street Journal*. June 16.
- Lowenstein, Roger. 2006. "The Immigration Equation." *New York Times Magazine*. July 9. [www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/magazine/09IMM.html?pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/magazine/09IMM.html?pagewanted=all).
- Mare, David, Richard Fabling, and Steven Stillman. 2011. "Immigration and Innovation." *Motu WP* 11–05. May. [http://www.motu.org.nz/publications/detail/immigration\\_and\\_innovation1](http://www.motu.org.nz/publications/detail/immigration_and_innovation1).
- Martin, Philip. 2012. "High-Skilled Migrants: S&E Workers in the United States." *American Behavioral Scientist* 56(8): 1058–79.
- Martin, Philip. 2017a. "Election of Donald Trump and Migration." *Migration Letters* 14(1): 161–71.
- Martin, Philip. 2017b. "President Trump and Migration after 100 Days." *Migration Letters* 14(2): 319–28.
- Martin, Philip. 2020. "President Trump and Migration at 3." *Migration Letters* 17(1): 191–200.
- Massey, Douglas. 2020. "Immigration Policy Mismatches and Counterproductive Outcomes: Unauthorized Migration to the U.S. in Two Eras." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(21). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00181-6>
- Milanovic, Branko. 2019. *Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System that Rules the World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mines, Richard and Philip Martin. 1984. "Immigrant Workers and the California Citrus Industry." *Industrial Relations* 23(1): 139–49.
- Nazar, Kevin, Michele Waslin, and James Witte. 2019. *The 2019 Foreign-Born US Nobel Laureates*. George Mason University Institute for Immigration Research. <https://iir.gmu.edu/publications/nobelprize>.
- Passel, Jeffrey and Rebecca Clark. 1994. *How Much Do Immigrants Really Cost? A Reappraisal of Huddle's the Cost of Immigration*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Pew Research Center. 2020. Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2018, Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States. August 20. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.

- Piore, Michael J. 1979. *Birds of Passage*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1995. "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: An Overview." In *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, edited by Alejandro Portes, 1–41. New York: Russell Sage.
- Ruhs, Martin and Bridget Anderson, eds. 2010. *Labor Shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy*. Oxford and London: Oxford University Press.
- Ruhs, Martin. 2013. *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sandel, Michael. 2020. *The Tyranny of the Meritocracy: What's Become of the Common Good?* New York: Macmillan.
- Saxenian, Anna Lee. 1999. *Silicon Valley's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs*. San Francisco, CA: PPIC. [www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=102](http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=102).
- Smith, James and Barry Edmonston, eds. 1997. *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration*. Washington, DC: National Research Council.
- UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2019. "International Migration 2019 Wall Chart." United Nations. [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019\\_Wallchart.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019_Wallchart.pdf).
- Waldinger, Roger and Michael Lichter. 2003. *How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Zaretsky, Adam. 1997. *A Burden to America? Immigration and the Economy*. St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. <https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-1997/a-burden-to-america-immigration-and-the-economy>



## 4 The Sociology of International Migration

*David Scott Fitzgerald*

International migration is a fundamental concern of sociology to a degree unparalleled in neighboring disciplines (Levy 2020: 18). It has not always been so. In Europe, the founding lights of the discipline barely considered migration. Émile Durkheim (1984 [1893]: 235–237) considered internal migration to cities a driver of progress that weakened tradition but had little to say about international movements. Karl Marx (1975 [1853]), who was himself an exile in London, argued that the concentration of economic production was the main cause of “forced emigration” from the Irish and British countryside. Max Weber (1895: 551) criticized Polish labor migration to Prussia for displacing German workers because of what he called the proclivity of the Slavic race to accept lower wages and living standards. With the exception of an essay by Georg Simmel (1971 [1908]) on “the stranger” who comes to live in a community without ever fully forming part of it, all of these writings lie outside the core of the founders’ corpora. Pierre Bourdieu, arguably the leading contemporary sociological theorist, wrote about forced resettlement of Algerian peasants by French forces during the Algerian war of independence (1954–1962). The international influence of these writings languished relative to his other work, in part because they were not translated into English until decades later (Bourdieu and Sayad 2020 [1964]). There was little sustained sociological work on migration in Europe until the 1970s, when it became clear that guest workers in Western Europe were permanently settling (Sciortino 2014).

In the United States, by contrast, immigration was a foundational concern of sociology, which was created as an academic discipline at the same time as immigration levels peaked. Edward Ross, who was to become president of the American Sociological Association, coined the term “race suicide” in a keynote address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Expressing a common racist view, Ross (1901) warned that inferior immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe jeopardized white Americans descended from Western Europe stock who had been positively self-selected for their strength and enterprise. Writing in the flagship *American Journal of Sociology*, Edwin Grant (1925) called for “a systematic deportation” that “eugenically cleanses America” of the “Scum from the Melting-Pot.” The early Chicago School focused on the social problems blamed on foreigners in the city, but also sought to understand migration processes rather than jumping straight to policy recommendations. Thomas and

Znaniecki (1918–1920) examined contexts of origin in Poland and destinations in the United States as well as the ongoing linkages that migrants forged. Wirth (1928) helped found the field of urban sociology by uncovering the micro-spatial dynamics where immigrants settled in cities. Park and Burgess (1924) launched generations of studies on assimilation.

The study of immigration to the United States has disproportionately shaped the study of migration in other countries because of the oversized influence of the United States and English-language publications in the global academy more generally. The extraordinary, sustained volume of immigration to the United States has also driven scholarly interest. During the long nineteenth century, more Europeans moved overseas to the United States than to the rest of the world put together (McKeown 2004). The 51 million migrants in the United States in 2019 still represented more than the total migrant populations of the next four biggest destinations combined (Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the UK).<sup>1</sup>

The world's migration axis is tilting away from North America, however. In 2019, 31% of the world's migrants lived in Asia, 30% in Europe, 22% in North America, 10% in Africa, 4% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 3% in Oceania.<sup>2</sup> The production of academic knowledge lags behind the migratory shift toward Asia in recent decades (Asis and Piper 2008). Of English-language migration articles catalogued by Levy et al. (2020), 44% were from authors based in North America, 40% in Europe, 6% in Asia, 5% in Oceania, and 5% in the Middle East, Africa, and South America combined. The geographic locations of authors' home institutions and the migrations they study do not perfectly overlap, but there is no question that the field has been dominated by scholars who are based in the Global North, write in English, and study a handful of cases of migration to rich countries. In the spirit of full disclosure, my own profile fits the first two characteristics. Migrations within the Global South are especially understudied, and their theorization underspecified vis-à-vis concepts developed in the Global North, to the detriment of sociological understanding everywhere (Nawyn 2016).

Canonical accounts that mistake the US case for the norm are shot through with unwarranted assumptions about key characteristics of migration. The notion that the phenomenon is constituted by long-distance, more or less permanent immigration of people whose children will assimilate betrays the field's roots in understanding the transatlantic European migrations of the turn of the twentieth century when sociology was becoming institutionalized as a discipline. Skepticism about the ability of states to control migration flows have been disproportionately influenced by the case of Mexico-US migration, which is unusual for the length of its shared border, large size of the wage disparities between the two countries, and more than a century's history of large flows, all of which dampen state control capacity. The lack of theorization of forced migration in the US-dominated sociology of migration is an artifact of the field being defined before the post-WWII refugee regime created favorable admissions for some migrants fleeing persecution.

The logic of a US-centric discipline built around assessing how immigrants and their descendants are faring in a multigenerational competition for resources and status, a sort of ethnic Olympic Games where the most assimilated group

wins the gold, begins to crack when a broader range of mobilities are considered. Assumptions that immigrants eventually will assimilate, or that the host society wants them to assimilate, clearly do not apply in contexts such as the wealthy countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which have the world's highest rates of in-migration relative to their population, yet which make the integration of foreigners all but impossible (Fargues 2011). Many refugees are in protracted situations of statelessness and/or exile, where their children inherit their inability to belong to the polity despite a lifetime living in a host state's territory (Hanafi and Long 2010). Where migrants' sojourns are forced to be temporary, even if they are recurrent, the intergenerational drivers of assimilation are missing (Hennebry 2012). By contrast, the mobilities paradigm in British sociology and the field of geography have considered a wider range of people crossing international borders, including tourists, international students, border commuters, and highly skilled expatriates (Urry 2012). These groups typically fall out of the sociology of migration, with notable exceptions (see Smith and Favell 2006; Lan 2011; Benckendorff and Zehrer 2013; Chávez 2016; and Cebolla-Boado et al. 2018). A comparative and historical perspective shows that the types of migrations in leading sociological accounts are quite limited relative to this broader universe. Surveying the entire landscape identifies fields for more productive research.

## **Sociological Perspectives**

The sociology of international migration is eclectic in method and amoebic in structure. It readily appropriates ideas and evidence from neighboring disciplines in the social sciences, history, and law. Sociology, defined by Max Weber (1968 [1921]: 4) as "a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences," is itself a capacious concept. Apply that definition to the study of human beings who move, or are descended from people who moved, and the sociology of migration has few inherent limits. This chapter does not pretend to exhaustively review the entire field. Rather, it synthesizes six broad areas of inquiry: immobility, drivers of international migration, assimilation/integration, transnationalism, dissimulation, and return. Long-distance internal migration and international migration share many similarities that geographers have explored more systematically (King and Skeldon 2010). What makes international migration distinctive is its political quality. Migrants cross the borders that states have created to control movement, define sovereignty, and establish membership (Zolberg 1999). Analyzing the political context and its ramifications is thus the starting point for understanding international migration.

### ***Immobility***

Theories of international migration focus on why people leave their homes to move to another country. However, immobility is far more prevalent than mobility (Carling 2002). In 2019, 96.5% of the world's people were living in the same

country where they were born.<sup>3</sup> From an economic standpoint, it is puzzling why so few people move to another country given the extremely high inequalities among countries that make life chances much better in some places than others. Researchers who ask people why they don't move have found a mixture of limited aspirations to move and/or limited capabilities to achieve those aspirations. Micro-level accounts show that peoples' reasons to stay home often include economically irrational considerations, such as family ties, a sense of religious belonging to a particular place, and other ideational motives (Schewel 2019).

At a more macro level, sociologists such as Schmitter Heisler (1985), Oishi (2005), and FitzGerald (2009) have followed Zolberg's (1999) work on the "exit revolution" by describing the changes in policies of countries of emigration that allow and shape international migration in the first place. John Torpey (2018) showed that the very notion of comprehensive state control over movement across borders is a recent historical accomplishment. States of origin, transit, and destination monopolized "the legitimate means of movement" by taking away the authority to control their subjects' movement from private actors like enslavers, feudal lords, and employers of indentured servants. Controls by destination states prevent many potential migrants from ever leaving home. Zolberg (1999) coined the concept of "remote border control" to describe the nineteenth and early twentieth century innovation of a system of visas issued by consulates abroad and outbound passenger screening. The passport did not become a widespread requirement for international travel until around WWI, but it quickly became standardized. Remote controls have expanded to include all kinds of visa restrictions, sanctions on transportation companies for carrying inadmissible passengers, anti-smuggling campaigns, and other strategies. These controls are not always effective, but they certainly create more immobility than would otherwise be the case (FitzGerald 2020).

### ***Drivers of International Migration***

Theories of international migration attempt to explain population movements across international borders—an ambitious task given the many rationales for why someone might move. In practice, most theorizing attempts to explain labor migration. Economists show how migration for the purpose of work is shaped by wage differentials between countries, diversification strategies of household economic portfolios, credit market failures, structural demand for immigrants in modern economies, and liquidity constraints on financing movement. Sociologists have played key roles in cross-disciplinary syntheses of economic and other migration theories while also making more distinctly sociological contributions (Massey et al. 1998; de Haas et al. 2020).

The sociology of migration, particularly in the United States, has paid comparatively little theoretical attention to questions of forced migration, including issues around refugees who are outside their country because of violence or persecution (FitzGerald and Arar 2018). Sociologists in Europe, Canada, and Australia have paid much greater attention to refugees in part because of the

more sustained political salience of refugee and asylum policy in those places (Bloch 2020). “Refugee studies” or “forced migration studies” as a distinct scholarly field with its own research centers, journals, professional associations, and research paradigms developed in the 1980s. It has been UK-centric in its institutional base, though much more global in the contexts it studies. Legal, policy, and advocacy issues have long dominated the field. Sociology was not as central to refugee studies in the 1980s and 1990s as it has been to international migration studies (Castles 2003; Stepputat and Nyberg Sørensen 2014). That dynamic may be changing, however, as the public reaction to larger numbers of asylum seekers trying to reach Europe and the United States and other refugee situations around the world has engendered an outpouring of work by sociologists (e.g., Paris Pombo 2017, Jensen 2018; Belloni 2019; Galli 2020; McMahon and Sigona 2020).

Economic sociologists have analyzed the diverse factors promoting labor migration, such as the structural demand for immigrants in global cities arising from the concentration of higher-skilled professionals seeking lower-skilled labor to provide personal services (Sassen 1999), the efforts of capitalist states to separate the sites of economic production from the sites of family reproduction by recruiting temporary male labor migrants (Burawoy 1976), and the economic disruptions to the world system created by capitalism (Portes and Walton 1981). World systems theory emphasizes that colonialism and market penetration generate migration streams in the opposite direction. Anglophones migrate to Britain, francophones migrate to France, and Filipinos and Vietnamese migrate to the United States. As immigrant activists in Britain put it, “We are here because you were there.” Feedback mechanisms derive from military as well as economic interventions.

The “new economics of labor migration” framework is based on the idea that households spread their bets around to manage economic risks. The risks include unemployment, family business failures, or economic crises. Bets are spread by making sure that not all members of the household are working in the same place. Some stay home while others migrate to domestic or international destinations, so that collectively they can withstand economic shocks to any given part of their household portfolio (Stark 1991). In contexts of violence and persecution, risk extends from the economic domain to physical security. Yet not everyone flees when they can even if they face lethal threats. Oftentimes some family members leave while others stay behind to protect economic assets or family members unable to safely move (Steele 2009). The attempt to manage economic and physical risks can generate new risk-taking behaviors, especially for irregular migrants who risk their lives to reach a destination where they are safe and have the possibility of a dignified life (Belloni 2019). In all of these processes within the household, hierarchies of gender and age shape decisions, which can be contentious and resist consensus (Nobles and McKelvey 2015).

Sociologists have also emphasized demographic conditions that shape migration, such as the size of the population cohort entering working age in migrant source countries and the aging of the work force in countries of destination

(Héran, this volume). Demographers and economists are also concerned with the characteristics of those who migrate compared to those who remain in the country of origin. There is considerable debate about the extent to which some migrant groups are positively selected with respect to education, for example. Economist George Borjas (1999) claimed that Mexican emigrants had lower levels of education than those who stayed in Mexico, though sociologist Cynthia Feliciano (2005) disputed these findings. The differences in their accounts are a matter of a few months. There is no question that, in some countries, emigrants are positively selected for education to an extreme degree. For example, most of the population of India does not complete high school, while over 80 percent of Indian emigrants to the United States have completed a bachelor's degree or higher (Aguilar Esteva 2013). High levels of self-selection help explain the rapid upward mobility of Indians and other ethnic groups in the United States (Lee and Zhou 2015).

One of the main sociological contributions to theories of migration has been to explain the importance of social capital—the capacity of migrants to mobilize their networks to achieve their goals. The reason why people from one community migrate while people from communities in similar economic situations do not can often be traced back to potential migrants' access to border-spanning networks of family, friends, and people from the same hometowns (Boyd 1989; Faist 2000). Networks allow people within them to share information, fund travel and lodging, and arrange jobs. Power is unevenly distributed through these networks. Pioneer migrants and patrons are hubs which play an outsized role in shaping exchanges (Bashi 2007). Norms about the costs and benefits of migration are also channeled through networks. These norms can generate a culture of migration, in which young people grow up expecting to leave for particular destinations as a rite of passage (Massey et al. 1987; Ali 2007; Garip and Asad 2016). People fleeing violence often rely on their networks as well, including networks established during earlier labor migrations (Koser 1997; Silva and Massey 2015). On the other hand, refugees in situations of ongoing violence may avoid their network contacts altogether because interacting with them makes refugees visible and thus vulnerable (Arar 2016).

Once migrants arrive in the host country, social networks shape their integration. Immigrant entrepreneurs use their networks to access investment capital through rotating credit associations, establish ethnic enclaves, and find jobs in immigrant niches of the economy (Portes 1995, Waldinger and Lichter 2003, Nazareno et al. 2019). Although businesses in ethnic neighborhoods can trade on their status to encourage cosmopolitan consumption (Aytar and Rath 2012), networks comprised exclusively of people with limited resources and information about good jobs eventually can become barriers to social mobility. The networks themselves degrade when zero-sum competition over scarce resources overwhelms bonds of mutual obligation (Menjívar 2000). Networks that promote mobility to rich countries can snare migrants in exploitative relationships and cycles of indebtedness on arrival. Information about exploitation within the network is self-censored by migrants who seek status in their places of origin by pretending to have hit gold abroad. When those left behind hear the stories, they



are more likely to leave, and to rely on the same relationships that will trap them as well (Rosales 2020).

Scholars of the “migration industry” point out that people smugglers, labor recruiters, and travel agents enable migration without social networks, at least for those fortunate to be able to pay their own way (Hugo 1990; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013; Hernández León 2013). For those who do not have liquid assets or access to credit, social networks interact with the migration industry as friends and family finance the costs of relocation. Labor recruitment schemes enable migrants to move long distances without access to start-up capital or network ties (Oishi 2005). Recruitment by employers based in rich countries is a principal mechanism in world systems theories of migration. The availability of the migration industry is also critical for asylum seekers to be able to circumvent the obstacles placed in their path by the prosperous and powerful states of the Global North (FitzGerald 2019). Non-profit charitable organizations like migrant shelters and NGOs that rescue migrants at sea also ease travel for those who do not have access to networks, capital, or legal pathways (McMahon and Sigona 2020).

The ability of migrants to reach a particular destination is shaped by policies of admission, which are in turn the product of the politics of immigration. Political sociologists emphasize the role of states in shaping migration flows. These researchers engage in dialogue with political scientists, especially a group whose work is practically indistinguishable from sociologists (e.g., Zolberg 1999; Guiraudon 2003, Cornelius 2005). Scholarship on state policy is especially developed in Europe, given the relatively greater weight of the state in European social life and an intense interest in the way that the European Union is shifting many aspects of immigration policy into an unprecedented supranational dimension, whether through direct legal mechanisms or informal policy convergence (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Research funding by the EU and a supranational entity that still contains much national variation is especially conducive to comparative studies within Europe (Morawska 2008). One result of an overreliance on EU funding, according to Sciortino (2014: 262), is that the sociology of migration in Europe “still lacks a sufficient detachment from political structures that are implicitly entrusted with the task of managing the ‘problem’ of migration by means of an adequate integration policy or blamed for not doing so in the correct way.”

A puzzle for political sociology is the enormous gap between public opinion surveys that typically show majoritarian demands for greater restriction of immigration and policies that continue to admit more immigrants than the public wants. Christian Joppke (1998) has written compellingly about this paradox in his work on why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. His answer is the “self-limited sovereignty” of independent judiciaries, client politics, and cultural norms of nationhood based on immigration in settler societies and norms of obligation toward formerly colonized peoples in some European countries. While Joppke (2005) argues that liberal states have all but ended their explicit selection of immigrants by ethno-racial criteria because liberal democracy is inherently incompatible with racism, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín (2014) challenge this



thesis by showing that in the Western Hemisphere, liberal democratic states were leaders in promoting ethnic discrimination and laggards in its formal elimination. Indeed, political systems with high degrees of societal inclusion, such as democracies and populist regimes, have been especially vigorous in promoting policies of ethnic selection. The administrations of Donald Trump in the United States and Viktor Orbán in Hungary overtly sought to reintroduce restrictions on Muslims. Political scientists Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) argue that policies of allowing more immigration than publics want, along with other forms of undemocratic liberalism, have sometimes generated an illiberal democratic backlash, in which populist leaders crack down on immigration with widespread public support.

The Japanese case presents a further puzzle for claims of liberal democracies' inherent openness to immigration and economic accounts of advanced market economies' structurally embedded demand for high levels of immigration (cf. Hollifield 1992). Japan has very little immigration despite its status as a rich, liberal democracy with a market economy. Only 1.6 percent of the population was foreign-born in 2010, an anomaly that Skrentny et al. (2012) argue lies in a widely shared understanding of immigration in Japan that emphasizes the perceived sociocultural costs of introducing foreigners. Iwata and Nemoto (2018) argue that the combination of racist hierarchies in Japan and ideas imported from the West are especially prejudicial to acceptance of immigrants from the Global South.

Foreign policy rationales have been underappreciated in most analyses of immigration policy. With the exception of studies of refugee policy, most research looks within the boundaries of a nation-state to explain changes over time (Fitzgerald 1996). However, political sociologists increasingly attend to foreign policy considerations. For example, FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014) show how pressures to end negative ethnic discrimination in the United States and Canada began in Latin America and Asia as part of the geopolitics of decolonization and the Cold War. Brubaker and Kim's (2011) account of favorable ethnic selection policies in Germany and South Korea highlight the unsung foreign policy considerations that only favored particular groups of ethnic Germans and Koreans, revealing that these policies were not simply about generic ethnic solidarity, but rather foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Communist neighbors. In a similar vein, Surak (2008) highlights the efforts of Japanese government officials to raise Japan's international prestige through mostly symbolic openings in immigration policy.

Most studies of international migration focus on a single case study or compare several countries as if the country is the obvious unit of comparison and any differences in state policy can be attributed to internal differences within a case. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) strongly criticize this stance as "methodological nationalism." Understanding the policy in a given country may also require understanding the interactions among the migration policies of different countries. For example, Cook-Martin (2013) shows how the nationality policies of Argentina, Spain, and Italy were shaped by the policies of each other as they competed for the bodies and political loyalties of mobile citizens. Similarly, the immigration policies of countries throughout the Americas can only be explained

by tracing distinct mechanisms of policy diffusion in which policy shifts in one country caused changes elsewhere (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald 2019). Geography matters in these explanations more than sociologists would like to admit. Reitz (2012) points out that geographic position can shape immigration policy more than national institutions such as official multiculturalism. In his account, Canada's geographic isolation and ability to use the United States as a buffer with Latin American countries of emigration explain the success of Canadian policies in attracting a greater proportion of highly skilled permanent immigrants than most destination countries. One way to avoid the problem of methodological nationalism is through studies that center the city (Favell 2008; García 2019) or the state/provincial level (FitzGerald and Skrentny 2021), rather than the nation-state alone.

### ***Assimilation and Integration***

The question of what happens to immigrants on arrival in their countries of destination was first studied in the United States under the rubric of assimilation. Post-WWII studies in Europe, as well as some US scholarship, has preferred the concept of "integration" instead, based on the logic that integration is more ideologically neutral, less colored by the specificity of the US experience, and better allows for an understanding of how immigration changes both host societies as well as immigrants themselves (Favell 2001; Alba and Foner 2015). However, contemporary empirical studies of assimilation and integration tend to look indistinguishable when it comes to operationalizing their constitutive components. The choice of terms appears to express political preferences and academic socialization in particular national contexts more than a fundamentally different analytical stance. The partial exception to this pattern is that in some contexts, such as Germany, researchers focus on labor market and social welfare state integration rather than on questions of cultural boundaries created by language and intermarriage (Bommes 2010). Scholars of forced migration in the Middle East have long understood that it is possible for refugee groups to be structurally integrated into an economy and polity while maintaining ethno-religious boundaries that show no signs of waning across generations (Chatty 2010).

Park and Burgess (1924) initiated the classical canon of assimilation studies in the United States. They defined assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." The definition implies an "ultimate homogeneity" of American culture at the end of the process. Two typologies from Milton Gordon (1964) later sharpened analytical tools in the sociological kit. First, Gordon highlighted different modes of assimilation: the Anglo-conformity desired by earlier authors, the melting pot, and pluralism. Anglo-conformity represented the mode in which immigrants to the United States changed to become like the Anglo-Saxon majority, a concept made transportable outside the US context by Horowitz (1975), who termed it "incorporation." By

contrast, in the melting pot, both immigrants and natives change to accommodate each other through the creation of a new national entity. In the pluralist mode, which aligns with contemporary US understandings of multiculturalism, immigrants adapt to the host society in some ways while still retaining some ethnic difference. Gordon's second typology unpacked the idea of assimilation, whatever its mode, into different dimensions of change such as acculturation, intermarriage, and acceptance by the host society in attitudes and actions. The direction and pace of change in each dimension, and patterned sequences of change across dimensions, can be systematically measured.

The term "assimilation" was widely discredited in the US academy during the ethnic revival of the 1970s for its association with forced assimilation, or at least the assumption that Anglo-conformity was a good thing and that the moral responsibility for change lay in the hands of immigrants alone (see Brubaker 2001). Alba and Nee (2003) revived the use of the term, despite pushback from critical race theory (Sanchez and Romero 2010), by distancing themselves from its use in *promoting* assimilation. Alba and Nee's definition of assimilation as "the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences" (2003: 11) is useful because of its focus on "distinction." A given cultural practice or representation is only a source of ethnic distinction if it is a significant boundary marker in the perception of actors in a given context (Barth 1969). By viewing assimilation as a process of boundary dissolution or reconfiguration, the anthropological insights of Barth can be applied to assimilation in a way that both broadens the kinds of circumstances studied, while more carefully specifying the mechanisms involved (Wimmer 2008). Assimilation studies differ in the extent to which they describe the *process* of assimilation—whether immigrants and natives are converging in some way—or claim that, at a given *endpoint*, assimilation either happened or remained incomplete. The endpoint is usually determined as a practical matter by the availability of quantitative data, such as survey questions asking the birth place of the respondent and their parents' places of birth, rather than any theoretical rationale.

The general starting assumption of assimilation studies in the United States is that over time, and certainly over the course of generations, immigrants want to assimilate, and the host society wants them to assimilate. Whole-family migration, or the migration of a pioneer followed by family reunification, drives permanent settlement. This perspective fits many examples in US history, but it struggles to accommodate other basic facts. For example, in the United States, as throughout most of the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth century, policymakers recruited male Chinese temporary workers considered different from natives in ways that made them better workers. In the United States, Chinese were legally segregated on the West Coast and then later blamed for refusing to assimilate, thus legitimizing further exclusionary measures (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Interviews with Canadian agricultural employers of temporary migrant workers show that many employers prefer Mexicans to West Indians because they consider Mexicans less likely to assimilate or protest working conditions, given their limited English skills and the lack of an established Mexican community

(Preibisch and Binford 2007). Temporary migrant workers are often preferred because they are different, not because they are considered more assimilable.

It would be a mistake to think that US models of assimilation apply globally. Governments and public opinion in countries with large populations of permanent immigrants do not always want them to integrate. For example, Rogers Brubaker's (1992) comparison of nationality in France and Germany argued that the French policy of *jus soli*, the principle of attributing nationality to birth on the national soil, differed from the German policy of *jus sanguinis*, the principle of attributing nationality based on descent, in large part because of the cultural meaning of the nation in France as being framed by the borders of the state, in contrast to German understandings of the nation as extending to a community that had been divided by wars and mass emigration to stretch across state borders. The effect was to make it extremely difficult for immigrants to naturalize in Germany compared to France. Although Brubaker's predictions of policy continuity and interpretation of historical details came under attack from other scholars (Joppke 1999; Weil 2008), the book showed the importance of differential configurations of political culture and the effect of path dependency on shaping the very possibility of immigrants achieving political incorporation through citizenship. Access to rights is constitutive of political integration and shapes the possibilities of full economic and educational integration. Soysal (1994) argued that universal personhood—the quality of being a human being—is more important than territorial personhood—the quality of membership in a particular place-based community, in justifying the extension of social rights to non-citizen residents of a territory. Soysal's argument that a more universalistic, post-national moment had arrived was widely criticized for misrepresenting the source of rights and the applicability of the argument beyond the unique setting of the EU (Hansen 2009), but it was spectacularly successful at opening a debate and was cited more than 6600 times in 26 years.<sup>4</sup>

Gino Germani (1966) extended the comparative study of assimilation by examining the Argentine case together with the United States, Brazil, and Canada. Germani argued that the two main demographic conditions for full assimilation, or “fusion,” were when the stock of foreign-born residents was larger than that of older inhabitants and when the native population was initially small. However, the subsequent growth of mass migration to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council shows that such demographic factors are insufficient bases for assimilation. Naturalization is all but impossible for most migrants in the Gulf. Lower-skilled male workers are often housed in barracks while women often work as atomized live-in domestics with limited interactions with the rest of the native-born society. Workers from non-Arab countries are desired because they are different from the native-born and thus can be more easily controlled and excluded (Fargues 2011; Ishii et al. 2020). Political interests matter as much as demographic factors in shaping the possibilities of integration.

Comparative studies of official multiculturalism have been one way to understand the institutions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. Unfortunately, “multiculturalism” has contradictory meanings and intentions

(Koopmans 2013). In Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, multiculturalism refers to a state-sponsored celebration of ethnic difference that should be maintained among permanent immigrants and their descendants, under the umbrella of a common national identity. In the Netherlands of the 1970s, by contrast, multiculturalism referred to a policy of maintaining the ethnic difference of foreigners expected to return to their countries of origin. Teaching the second generation in their parents' native languages was aimed at preventing a full integration into Dutch society that would retard eventual return to countries of origin, such as Morocco (Entzinger 2006).

In the early twenty-first century, studies increasingly attend to how state policies and domestic politics affect immigrant integration in the United States. Bloemraad (2006) draws on the greater promotion of multiculturalism in Canada relative to the United States to explain higher levels of naturalization in the former even though naturalization requirements are quite similar. Fox's (2012) historical reconstruction of social policy toward immigrants, beginning with the New Deal in the 1930s, highlights how early policies favored southern and eastern Europeans relative to Mexicans, with lasting consequences. Alba and Nee's (2003) optimistic assessment for the assimilation of the second generation of post-1965 immigrants is predicated in part on official anti-discriminatory policies, which stand in contrast to the pre-Civil Rights era, in which open, often legal discrimination against despised racial groups was rampant. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) have charted increased Islamophobia in the United States. Shams (2020) shows how the politics of the Middle East and terrorist attacks in Europe affect South Asian immigrants in the United States who have no ancestral ties to either of those places.

Sociologists have taken the lead in attempting to establish the extent to which the legal status of immigrants, and the legal status of their parents, affects assimilation. An estimated 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in 2017, just under half of whom were from Mexico, leading to concerns that overall levels of assimilation will be slower for Mexicans than other groups.<sup>5</sup> Bean et al. (2015) and Donato and Armenta (2011) warn that unauthorized status has a wide range of negative outcomes for unauthorized individuals, their children, and even grandchildren. Dreby (2015) and Gonzales (2016) highlight the emotional distress of growing up in an unauthorized status or in a household with unauthorized family members, a situation that affects millions of US citizens, authorized immigrants, and unauthorized immigrants alike, given the prevalence of mixed-status families (Menjívar and Abrego 2012).

Beginning in the 1990s, prominent scholars began to argue that the second generation of US immigrants was assimilating downward in what Gans (1992) called "second-generation decline." Portes and Rumbaut (2001) point out that immigrants can assimilate not only toward native whites, but also toward marginalized native minority groups, thus forming part of a "rainbow underclass." The "segmented assimilation" perspective advanced by these authors is distinguished by its assertion that the target toward which immigrants assimilate is differentiated by race and class, such that immigrants and their descendants assimilate

into different segments within US society. Portes and Rumbaut are particularly concerned with a mode of “dissonant acculturation,” in which the second generation takes on values of US street culture and learns English much faster than immigrant parents. By contrast, in the pattern of “consonant acculturation,” children and parents become Americanized at a similar pace. “Selective acculturation” has many of the same characteristics of consonant acculturation, except that both parents and children retain some aspects of their immigrant ethnic culture, allowing them to be bicultural and more upwardly mobile than in the other modes of segmented assimilation.

Scholars have sharply disputed how common the pattern of dissonant acculturation is, and more generally, how much downward assimilation is actually occurring. Waters et al. (2010: 1185) argue that dissonant acculturation is “the exception, not the norm.” Alba et al. (2011) suggest that the second generation may have unrecognized advantages given their capacity to act as cultural brokers in the diverse metropolis of New York City. Haller and his colleagues (2011) vigorously defend the notion of downward assimilation, noting that the local mode of incorporation affects the extent to which a particular group can assimilate upward. In particular, given the majority-white host society’s negative views of Blacks and Mexicans, the authors argue that the downward assimilation experienced by second-generation Mexicans, Haitians, and Jamaicans/West Indians is unsurprising. Telles and Ortiz (2008) are particularly pessimistic about the assimilation of latter generations of Mexican Americans based on their study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio in 1965 and 2000. However, Alba and Holdaway (2013) argue that, because Telles and Ortiz conflate different cohorts of immigrants with different generations, the study missed important changes that have taken place over time. The second generation born in 1945 faced a different set of challenges and opportunities than the second generation born in 1965 or 1995. Average educational attainment stagnates but does not decline after the second generation. There is also considerable intermarriage that masks the upward mobility of individuals and their children who fall out of the Mexican or any other single ethnic category (Alba 2020).

Sociologists working in Europe also have raised the specter of downward integration. The recency of large-scale, extra-continental immigration to most of Europe and limited data on ethnicity and immigrant generation in some national censuses hampers understanding of assimilation as a multigenerational process and the extent to which particular groups, typically non-whites and Muslims, face discrimination. Major resources subsequently poured into projects such as TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation). A team of political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists surveyed the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Morocco living in fifteen European cities in eight countries (Crul et al. 2012). Bean et al. (2012) compared the incorporation of the second generation in two US cities and eleven European cities to tease out important local as well as national effects. Alba and Foner (2015) compared integration outcomes of low-status immigrant groups in the United States, Canada, Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands, arguing that standard



“grand narratives” about differences among these cases are misleading, and that the role of state educational institutions is particularly important in shaping life chances of immigrants. In France, Beauchemin et al. (2018) found that the second generation is generally doing better than the first across a wide range of socio-economic outcomes, but ethnic segregation remains. European-origin immigrants are less segregated than African- and Turkish-origin minorities. Hans Vermeulen (2010) notes that as quantitative studies try to establish the risk of “downward assimilation” among various immigrant groups in Europe, they generally fail to show that there is an existing “oppositional culture” or “underclass” that would be a cognate to the one putatively driving downward segmented assimilation in the United States. Crul (2016) argues that majority-minority cities in Europe do not have a single target mainstream into which immigrants assimilate, nor do individuals assimilate into a single segment of a “super-diverse” city (see Vertovec 2007). Rather, immigrants integrate into an intersectional constellation of identities and practices that defy categorization as a discrete social group.

Scholarship on Britain stands out in terms of greater attention to racialized dynamics than in the rest of Europe (Solomos 1993; Morawska 2008). Nancy (2005) compares how the presence of an established Black native population in New York caused different racial experiences for West Indians in New York than for those in London. West Indians are usually portrayed as a success story vis-à-vis native African Americans in New York, while in London, West Indians are portrayed as disadvantaged vis-à-vis native Britons and Asian immigrants. The presence of an established African American population in New York created the conditions for a pan-Black political alliance that strengthened the political power of West Indians, yet West Indians often have sought to telegraph their ethnic distinctiveness in daily life to avoid being lumped together with African Americans and suffering the same discrimination in daily life. Political incorporation and acculturation in the two cities are thus shaped by different racial historical contexts.

Discussions of downward assimilation reveal the normative historical baggage that scholars working in the new assimilation paradigm have struggled to throw overboard. The language of a “downward” trajectory inevitably invokes a negative image. An obvious question is who decides what constitutes up or down. For example, there is overwhelming evidence that when immigrants adopt a mainstream US diet, their health outcomes suffer (Dubowitz et al. 2010). Does eating burgers and fries constitute upward assimilation toward the US cultural norm, or downward assimilation toward higher rates of obesity that most health researchers would consider a negative outcome?

Conflating the direction of change with moral judgments about the desirability of change sets up a convoluted understanding of what awaits the children of very highly educated immigrants. Given the well-known processes by which educational inequality is perpetuated across generations, immigrants selected on the basis of their very high levels of education are likely to have offspring with disproportionately higher levels of education compared to the children of immigrants with low levels. Yet educational advantage does not reproduce perfectly. Children



of immigrant PhDs will not all achieve the highest levels of education that their parents did, and on average, will have lower levels of education. Does such a process constitute downward assimilation, even if the second generation became fluent in the dominant language, intermarried, and bought a house in an affluent neighborhood? Calling every form of social change and mobility “assimilation” leads to such contradictions. *Similarity* among groups and individuals and *social mobility* are two distinct issues. The degree to which similarity and mobility overlap in a given context varies, to a degree that can only be assessed by heuristically separating the questions.

Further clouding studies of assimilation is establishing the reference point against which immigrants and their descendants are measured. In standard US sociology, native whites are the touchstone against which all other groups’ “achievement” is measured, a practice that many observers have criticized for perpetuating the idea that only whites fully belong in the United States, or that to be a full member of US society is to have achieved categorization as white. Jiménez and Horowitz (2013) argue that the educational mainstream in some communities in California is now defined by Asian Americans, many of whom come from highly select professional family backgrounds. The local segmented norm to which upwardly mobile native white students aspire is defined by Asian Americans. Native-born Americans are often highly ambivalent about the effects of immigration and a significant minority is extremely hostile, but many embrace some aspects of everyday multiculturalism (Jiménez 2017). Defining a particular ethnic group as setting a timeless standard against which all other change is measured would not allow the analyst to take into account local and historical variation. Furthermore, there is no stagnant group against which immigrants can be measured, because the boundaries of each group change over time (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014), vary situationally (Maghbouleh 2017), and new pan-ethnic groups are invented (Okamoto and Mora 2014).

Finally, the notion of upward and downward assimilation exacerbates the sense that every domain of social life is part of a group competition—a sort of ethnic Olympic Games in which national or racial groups are entities sparring with each other as they move through time. Brubaker (2004) cautions that such notions of eternal “groupness” should be the object of analysis rather than an assumption about the world, but in the sociology of immigration’s version of the Games, sociologists are record-keepers in the grand competition. How are the reds doing *versus* the blues this year in the high school completion event? In the incarceration event? In the home ownership event? Are the reds learning the language of the blues at the same speed as the greens, or at the same speed as the yellows did at the Games eighty years ago? The most sophisticated analysts scour the team rosters to determine how many reds are defecting to play for the blues and on which roster to place the purples who are products of blue/red unions.

The sociology of immigration to the United States has typically analyzed the experience of refugees through the assimilation lens as it would any other group of immigrants. Whether there is something distinctive about refugees is typically

limited to considering whether the US government gave them any special legal status and settlement benefits (e.g., Portes and Bach 1985; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Luthra et al.'s (2018) study of the United States uses nationality of origin as a proxy for the refugee category, and finds that, at a group level, populations from countries with high levels of refugee admissions have similar educational outcomes to immigrants who arrived through other channels. They suggest that meager resettlement benefits may have little long-term effect, and the real benefit of refugee status is lawful permanent residency with the security and access to the legal job market that it affords. Tran and Lara-García (2020) demonstrate the importance of English-language courses and job training for refugees' educational and workplace success. Pedraza-Bailey (1985) argues that nationality should not be used as a proxy for the refugee category, because different cohorts of refugees from the same country of origin have distinctive experiences. Some cohorts fit a sociological definition of a refugee as a person fleeing violence or persecution better than others.

Around 85 percent of refugees are living in the developing countries of the Global South. Reception policies vary, but, in general, host states expect that refugees will be temporary residents rather than permanent settlers on track to become members of the polity. These states protect refugees' most important human right, the right to life, by allowing them in, but often restrict their political, civil, and social rights. Many do not allow refugees to work or run their own businesses. The kinds of assimilation that take place over generations in immigrant settler societies cannot be assumed when statelessness is inherited from one generation to the next. As a result of these restrictions, refugee integration remains fundamentally blocked (FitzGerald and Arar 2018). Cawo Abdi's (2015) work comparing Somalis in the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, and the United States highlights the different salience of religious, racial, and political boundaries across reception contexts that shape the integration possibilities of refugees from the same country of origin in different domains of their lives. Further nuance comes from assessing how integration is not simply mediated by the state, but by a "surrogate state" of international organizations—namely the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and their "implementing partner" non-governmental organizations, which together take on many functions usually reserved for governments (Kagan 2012).

### ***Transnationalism***

The sociology of assimilation focuses on processes in the country of destination, but the study of international migration has never neglected the emigrant homeland altogether. The notion of diasporic ties stretches back to antiquity (Dufoix 2011). Thomas and Znaniecki's five-volume *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–1920) analyzed processes in both Poland and the United States and the communications that sustained ties between them. Influential works by anthropologist Manuel Gamio (1930) and economist Paul Taylor (1933) examined how

migration affected emigrant source communities in Mexico, followed by political scientist Wayne Cornelius (1976) and sociologists Rafael Alarcón and Douglas Massey and anthropologist Jorge Durand (1987). British anthropologists sought to understand the effects of labor migration on communities of origin in Britain's African colonies by investigating changes such as the gendered division of labor (Richards 1939). Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, an explicitly transnational perspective arising out of anthropology in the Mexican, Filipino, and Caribbean cases has revived attention being paid to migrant homelands, highlighting processes encompassing all points in a migration circuit (Rouse 1989; Glick Schiller et al. 1992).

Authors writing in the transnationalism framework emphasize that those who move abroad are not definitively immigrants or emigrants, but rather people whose lives span international borders. Whether migrants physically move back and forth or participate vicariously in the lives of their places of origin by sending remittances or through their communications, migrant experiences cannot be understood from the perspective of the destination country alone. The more postmodern versions of transnationalism in anthropology and geography reject altogether the dichotomous categories of origin and destination, emigrant and immigrant, and even the geographic spaces of here and there—arguing instead that a single community, social field, or third space has emerged across international borders. This perspective emphasizes the reproduction of community. Rather than compare the differences between various groups of sedentary and mobile people, this body of literature emphasizes how even people who do not move are affected by processes of migration. For example, people living on Caribbean islands with high levels of emigration become part of a “transnational community” linked to islanders in New York. These accounts undermine the notion that nation-states are “containers” for distinct national cultures (Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Smith 2006; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007).

The research agendas of sociologists and economists have coincided in their studies of the possibility of using migrant remittances to spur economic development in places of origin. Remittances worldwide constitute more than twice the level of direct foreign aid received by developing countries. In many developing countries, remittances exceed foreign direct investment. Economists and sociologists share a concern with understanding the effects of such remittances, but they differ in that sociologists are much more likely to conduct case studies of remittance dependency, pay special attention to collective remittances, and explain the policies of countries of origin that aim to increase remittances (Rahman and Fee 2012; Carling 2014).

Earlier versions of the transnationalism literature positioned themselves against assimilation by correctly pointing out that a rigid focus on dynamics within the destination country had blinded researchers to the ongoing ties between migrants and their places of origin (Basch et al. 1994). Subsequent sociological revisions argued that assimilation and transnationalism are compatible processes (Smith 2006; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Erdal and Oeppen (2013) offer a useful typology for the variable way that integration relates to transnationalism

along multiple dimensions. Within each dimension, interactions may be additive, synergistic, or antagonistic to duality. Snel et al.'s (2006) survey of immigrants in the Netherlands from Morocco, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Dutch Antilles, Japan, and the United States shows that the degree to which transnational practices and integration into the destination country coexist depends on the country of origin. Portes and Fernández-Kelly's (2015) anthology on transborder action in the United States, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium establishes that these interactions are shaped by both origin and host states and the extent to which migrations are dominated by working class or more highly skilled migrants. The tendency to organize along pan-ethnic rather than national-origin lines in countries as diverse as France and the United States promotes a focus on host country issues at the expense of country-of-origin concerns. Most evidence for substantial cross-border ties is limited to the first generation, with the exception of contexts in which there is a perceived major threat to the homeland, in which case subsequent generations may become seriously involved (Schan 2009; Soehl and Waldinger 2010). Examining the concept of transnationalism in the light of refugee experiences reveals a wider range of engagement, from remittances to the cross-border raids of "refugee warriors," and the conditions in countries of origin and destination that facilitate or impede transborder activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001; Banki 2016).

The sociology of transnationalism quickly encountered skepticism both within and outside the discipline. Historians debunked incautious claims of a novel new phenomenon by showing that return migration was substantial during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that migrants to the United States had maintained similar and even stronger ties to their places of origin in the past (Wyman 1993; Hsu 2000; FitzGerald 2016). Analyses selecting on the dependent variable of high levels of cross-border interaction assumed a phenomenon that needs to be explained. Waldinger and FitzGerald (2004) note that the study of migrant transnationalism conflates long-distance nationalism, plural affiliations, and universalisms that transcend the particular. They ask what conditions foster cross-border interactions given the border-closing activities fundamental to activities that make nation-states. Although much of the transnationalism literature has emphasized that new transportation and communication technologies are responsible for new forms of cross-border ties, a decline in wars between states that reduces charges of dual allegiance, norms of cultural pluralism, and the diffusion of policy models from countries that have successfully reached out to embrace emigrants abroad are probably more consequential than technological shifts.

At the source country level, strong state-led nationalism and an antagonistic relationship with destination states makes it more difficult for source country governments to accept dual citizenship. For example, India allows a limited form of dual citizenship for Americans and Canadians, but not Pakistanis (Naujoks 2015). In the destination country there is a curvilinear relationship between the degree of assimilation and the flexibility of migrants to pick and choose from a large menu of practices. In the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, naturalization and most forms of social assimilation are all but impossible for most

migrants, so it is difficult to parlay having their feet in two countries to their advantage. On the other extreme, the political culture of highly assimilationist countries such as France renders ethnic lobbies of the American sort illegitimate. Canada encourages a pluralistic form of assimilation that has an elective affinity with dual nationality and dual affiliations. At the individual level, migrants who are unauthorized, live under Temporary Protected Status or some other liminal legal category, or who have low levels of various kinds of capital, have less flexibility to define their citizenship (Menjívar 2006). Conversely, professionals and entrepreneurs are best positioned to take out multiple citizenships as an “insurance policy” in case conditions deteriorate in a given country. They diversify their portfolio of visas and passports as a measure of protection against the risk of economic and political turmoil in a given country (FitzGerald 2012b; Harpaz 2019). Political conditions in countries of origin and destination and socioeconomic status deeply shape variation in the ability of migrants to live their lives across borders.

### *Dissimilation*

Building on the assimilation and transnationalism perspectives, the concept of *dissimilation* offers a third approach. Dissimilation, the process of becoming different, is the forgotten twin of assimilation, the process whereby groups and individuals become similar. As immigrants and their children become similar to other members of the destination country, they become dissimilar from the non-migrants they leave behind. The degree of difference is shaped by the possibilities of assimilation. Migrants denied the opportunity to assimilate in the destination country, if they wish, are less likely to dissimilate from their places of origin. Patterns that hold in the case of Algerian migration to France or Mexican migration to the United States are not universal. Yet in contexts in which much assimilation does occur, the differences that develop between migrants and their children, on the one hand, and those who stay in the country of origin, on the other, are often much greater than the small differences in the country of destination upon which scholars of assimilation focus their microscopes (Jiménez and FitzGerald 2007).

The dissimilation perspective draws on the work of Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), who wrote of the cultural changes in Algerian villages wrought by emigration to France. His work emphasized that migration engendered not the reproduction of community and the continuities found in the transnationalism literature, but rather the *absence* created by outmigration. FitzGerald (2009) extended the concept of a politics of absence in describing how the Mexican government and the Catholic Church in Mexico developed techniques and institutions to embrace absent migrants living in the territory of another country. International migrants upset the neat distinctions between insiders and outsiders. Immigrants are subject to the laws of the host country by virtue of their presence in its territory, but they are not (yet) considered members. By virtue of their absence, emigrants are not directly subject to the laws of their country of origin, but they may still be considered part of the legal and cultural nation. The presence of foreigners and the absence of

citizens cracks apart the fusion of polity, society, and territory that constitutes the nation-state as a specific form of political organization.

Policy-makers and scholars have viewed some immigrants' adoption of urban youth culture in the United States as a failure of assimilation (Gans 1992), but the same set of facts is viewed in Mexico as evidence of Americanization. Non-migrants commonly claim that migrants are "neither from here nor from there." In other words, migrants have dissimilated from the Mexican mainstream, but they do not belong to the US mainstream either. Alarcón (1988) explained that communities of origin had become "northernized," in the sense that they were more affected in some cases by migration to the North (the United States) than processes linking them to the rest of Mexico. Return migration, even if temporary, carries risks for nationalists when migrants introduce noxious ideas and practices associated with a foreign competitor. Case studies around the world suggest that many non-migrants consider these cultural imports to be prejudicial to morality and the national culture (see Guarnizo 1997 on the Dominican Republic; and Sayad 2004 on Algeria).

As with assimilation, dissimilation can be parsed into different domains of social life. Migration may dramatically open opportunities for marrying outside the group, for example, while doing little to change some aspects of the cultural content encountered in the place of destination. It is difficult to measure migration's independent effect on cultural change in the country of emigration, because flows of media, goods, and tourists introduce heterogeneity in countries of emigration and immigration. Migrants become different from those who stay behind, while those who stay behind also change, as places of origin experience vast transformations only partly attributable to migration. Alarcón, Escala Rabadán, and Odgers Ortiz (2016) show how long-term settlement has severed many immigrants' ties with their places of origin and even hometown associations are increasingly turning their attention to life in the destination community. This is not simply an idiosyncrasy of recent Mexican migration, but rather a pattern that applies to the largest groups of contemporary Latino migrants in the United States (Waldinger 2015).

The dissimilation perspective shares the transnational approach's attention to the country of origin and the possibility of migrants' new and ongoing ties across borders, but the dissimilation perspective differs in important ways. Against the transnationalism literature's focus on the reproduction and *similarity* in a community spread across international borders, the concept of dissimilation focuses attention on the creation of *difference* between populations divided by the border. Dissimilation questions the very concept of community by highlighting negotiations over who is a legitimate member of the community, what kinds of behavior are acceptable, and struggles over where the boundaries of the community begin and end.

### ***Return***

Studies of the effects of return migration have a long but thin history (e.g., Taylor 1933). After many years as a backwater topic, return has become a major area of



inquiry around the world (Cassarino 2004). The ongoing relevance of places of origin in the transnationalism literature, the role of return in drawing contrasts between those who have migration experience and those who stayed behind in studies of dissimilation, economic sociology's interest in return as a driver of development, and studies of deportation have increased attention being paid to the topic. Carling et al. (2011) catalogue more than 1,100 academic studies of return since the 1960s.

Political factors in countries of origin, transit, and destination shape the experiences of returnees. International organizations such as the International Organization for Migration assist returns of stranded migrants, rejected asylum seekers, and refugees (Geiger and Pécoud 2020). European countries have developed schemes to convince migrants to return since the 1970s. These efforts often target particular groups, such as guest workers or refugees from countries where a conflict has subsided. States use positive and negative selective incentives and outright deportation (Scalettaris and Gubert 2018). In both liberal and illiberal countries, deportability poses a major risk to the ability of migrants to integrate in host states. Deportees are unable to fully take advantage of their time abroad because their return is unplanned and often splits families. Deportees often face great stigma upon repatriation (Golash-Boza 2015; Khosravi 2017).

Return migrants, particularly if they repatriate voluntarily, often take advantage of human capital upgrades as well as remitted savings. The extent to which knowledge acquired abroad is economically useful upon return varies according to occupational experiences abroad, their pre-existing human capital endowments and demographic characteristics, and an economic structure in the home country where return migrants' newfound skills are compatible. Even where return appears to be economically transformative, Hagan and Wasink (2020) point out that internal migration can sometimes create equal or better opportunities than international migration. A novel wrinkle on the migration industry is the development of public-private partnerships with governments of countries of origin to recruit the return of highly skilled migrants desired for their language skills, international connections, know-how, and prestigious credentials (Cohen 2021). Local governments can even use returnees to promote their cosmopolitan brand (Liu 2022). The sociology of return is a likely "growth sector" in the production of academic knowledge about migration.

## **Methods**

The sociology of international migration deploys every methodological tool in the discipline's box. Quantitative work is dominated by analyses of national censuses, surveys, and administrative data. Survey data experiments are rarer than in political science but are emerging (e.g., Flores and Schachter 2018). The reconstruction of a century's worth of administrative records and censuses—even linking records of the same person found in countries of origin, destination, and in transit—is a new avenue for economic historians and sociologists to better understand migrant selectivity, assimilation over the life course, and



intergenerational change (Catron 2019, 2020; Connor 2019). Qualitative work is dominated by ethnographic participant-observation and in-depth interviews with different degrees of structure (FitzGerald 2006). Historical and comparative work often draws on archival research in ways that are difficult to distinguish from the approach of historians (FitzGerald 2012b). Content analysis of mass media, social media, and documents varies in its degree of systematicity (Bleich et al. 2015). It may be easier to specify which social scientific techniques the sociology of international migration does *not* use. Although there are exceptions, formal game theory, laboratory experiments, field experiments, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and the most elaborate econometric modeling have not shaped the canon.

## **Conclusion**

The variety of ways that scholars frame the sociology of international migration leaves ample room for innovative questions that borrow from neighboring disciplines. That same variety poses significant challenges to creating a coherent research program. One way forward is to more systematically specify when, how, and why different processes of immobility, drivers of international migration, assimilation/integration, transnationalism, dissimilation, and return take place. A comparative-historical sociology of international migration stands positioned to establish the scope conditions of theoretical claims and the conditions under which particular patterns emerge (FitzGerald 2012b).

Theories of international migration could better define what kinds of migration they are attempting to explain. Types of mobility left out of those theories could then be subjects of their own theorization efforts which could point out similarities and differences in the factors driving multiple forms of mobility. For example, there is much more to learn about the role of social networks in driving tourism, student migration, and forced migration. Under what conditions do governments and employers attempt to select migrants who are more or less easy to assimilate, in their view, over what period of time, and with what rights?

The assimilation research program can be revitalized by questioning systematically the conditions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. To what extent do government policies matter relative to the actions of migrants themselves, non-migrants, and the institutions of civil society? Sociologists no longer cheer on the Germans against the Poles or northwestern Europeans against everyone else, in contrast to Max Weber and the early Chicago School, but the sociology of assimilation continues to recreate its own Olympic Games with the release of every census. Analyses that more carefully attend to boundary-making and transforming processes, rather than taking the multigenerational group as a self-contained organism, reproducing itself, offer subtler understandings of the interactions among immigrants, their offspring, and diverse native populations. All modern societies are highly segmented, and all assimilation is segmented. To more clearly specify the reference groups and the rationales for

their selection in tracing processes of change is one way to avoid the methodological nationalism of slipping back into faulty assumptions that the nation-state contains a society.

Debates about whether transnationalism exists have helped to sharpen analysis of the different and sometime contradictory notions within this paradigm, from long-distance nationalism to binational ties to universalisms that reject nationalism in all its forms. Sociologists are breaking new ground in dialogue with other disciplines to answer the questions raised by transnationalism. Along with economists, they are seeking to determine not simply whether remittances promote or inhibit economic growth in the country of origin, but under what conditions remittances promote or inhibit specific kinds of economic activity. Along with political scientists, they are measuring the effects of the new institutions promoting migrant long-distance political participation and dual engagement. Along with historians, they are determining what really is new about cross-border connections relative to earlier ages of migration, and the institutional, technological, geopolitical, and other forces that explain changes over time.

The dissimilation literature is less developed, but it offers a way of looking at the world that yields different insights vis-à-vis the scholars of transnationalism, who highlight the reproduction of ties between migrants and their countries of origin, and the newly institutionalized possibilities for dual nationality and cultural pluralism. Where migration streams are dominated by patterns of circularity or short-term flows, long-distance ties may prevail. Assessments of the strength of assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation should not be articles of faith, but rather the subject of empirical investigation in different contexts.

At a time of increasing border walls and remote controls, the success of populist parties in many countries demanding greater restriction, and the demonstration during the Covid-19 pandemic that motivated states do have the capacity to all but shut down international migration, transnationalist scholars must take seriously the constraints as well as the possibilities of life across borders. These developments will give a major push to the immobilities paradigm. Likewise, the fact that so many migrants have been forced to return to their countries because of deportations or hardships imposed by the pandemic and state policies makes plain the need to better understand return. Sociologists of migration must grow out of their parochial roots to rise to these challenges.

## **Discussion Questions**

1. What are the unstated assumptions that often distort the sociology of migration?
2. What are the key differences among different strands of the sociology of migration?
3. What is distinctive in the questions, methods, and contributions of sociologists of migration relative to other disciplines?
4. What are the similarities and differences between labor migrants and refugees?
5. How do political factors shape the social processes of migration?

## Notes

- 1 [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019\\_Wallchart.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019_Wallchart.pdf)
- 2 [https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr\\_2020.pdf](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf), p. 24
- 3 [https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr\\_2020.pdf](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf), p. 22
- 4 <http://scholar.google.com/>
- 5 <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nation-of-immigrants/>

## References

- Abdi, Cawo M. 2015. *Elusive Jannah: The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim Identity*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Aguilar Esteva, Arturo Alberto. 2013. *Stayers and Returners: Educational Self-Selection Among US Immigrants and Returning Migrants*. IZA Discussion Papers. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Al-Ali, Nadje, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser. 2001. "Refugees and Transnationalism: The Experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27(4): 615–34.
- Alarcón, Rafael. 1988. "El Proceso de Norteñización: Impacto de la migración internacional en Chavinda, Michoacán." In *Movimientos de Población en el Occidente de México*, edited by Thomas Calvo and Gustavo López Castro, 337–358. Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán.
- Alarcón, Rafael, Luis Escala, and Olga Odgers. 2016. *Making Los Angeles Home: The Integration of Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Alba, Richard. 2020. *The Great Demographic Illusion: Majority, Minority, and the Expanding American Mainstream*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Alba, Richard, and Jennifer Holdaway. 2013. *The Children of Immigrants at School: A Comparative Look at Integration in the United States and Western Europe*. New York: NYU Press.
- Alba, Richard, and Nancy Foner. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Alba, Richard, Philip Kasinitz, and Mary C. Waters. 2011. "The Kids are (Mostly) Alright: Second-Generation Assimilation: Comments on Haller, Portes and Lynch." *Social Forces* 89(3): 763–73.
- Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ali, Syed. 2007. "'Go West Young Man': The Culture of Migration among Muslims in Hyderabad, India." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33(1): 37–58.
- Arar, Rawan. 2016. "How Political Migrants' Networks Differ from those of Economic Migrants: 'Strategic Anonymity' among Iraqi Refugees in Jordan." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(3): 519–35.
- Asis, Maruja M.B., and Nicola Piper. 2008. "Researching International Labor Migration in Asia." *The Sociological Quarterly* 49(3): 423–44.
- Aytar, Volkan, and Jan Rath. 2012. *Selling Ethnic Neighborhoods: The Rise of Neighborhoods as Places of Leisure and Consumption*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bakalian, Anny, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. 2009. *Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Banki, Susan. 2016. "Transnational Activism as Practised by Activists from Burma: Negotiating Precarity, Mobility and Resistance." In *Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar*, edited by Renaud Egreteau and François Robinne, 234–59. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Barth, Fredrik. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and the Deterritorialized Nation-State*. Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach.
- Bashi, Vilna. 2007. *Survival of the Knitted: Immigrant Social Networks in a Stratified World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bean, Frank D., Susan K. Brown, and James D. Bachmeier. 2015. *Parents Without Papers: The Progress and Pitfalls of Mexican American Integration*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Bean, Frank D., Susan K. Brown, James D. Bachmeier, Tineke Fokkema, and Laurence Lessard-Phillips. 2012. "The Dimensions and Degree of Second-Generation Incorporation in US and European Cities: A Comparative Study of Inclusion and Exclusion." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 53(3): 181–209.
- Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel, and Patrick Simon. 2018. *Trajectories and Origins: Survey on the Diversity of the French Population*. New York: Springer.
- Belloni, Milena. 2019. *The Big Gamble: The Migration of Eritreans to Europe*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Benckendorff, Pierre, and Anita Zehrer. 2013. "A Network Analysis of Tourism Research." *Annals of Tourism Research* 43: 121–49.
- Bleich, Erik, Irene Bloemraad, and Els de Graauw. 2015. "Migrants, Minorities and the Media: Information, Representations and Participation in the Public Sphere." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(6): 857–73.
- Bloch, Alice. 2020. "Reflections and Directions for Research in Refugee Studies." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 43(3): 436–59.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bommes, Michael. 2010. "Migration Research in Germany: The Emergence of a Generalised Research Field in a Reluctant Immigration Country." In *National Paradigms of Migration Research*, edited by Dietrich Thränhardt and Michael Bommes, 127–85. Göttingen: V&R Unipress GmbH.
- Borjas, George J. 1999. *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Abdelmalek Sayad. 2020 [1964]. *Uprooting: The Crisis of Traditional Agriculture in Algeria*. Translated by Paul A. Silverstein. Cambridge: Polity.
- Boyd, Monica. 1989. "Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas." *International Migration Review* 23(3): 638–70.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(4): 531–48.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Brubaker, Rogers, and Jaeeun Kim. 2011. "Transborder Membership Politics in Germany and Korea." *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 52(1): 21–75.
- Burawoy, Michael. 1976. "The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Materials from Southern Africa and the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 81(5): 1050–87.
- Carling, Jørgen. 2002. "Migration in the Age of Involuntary Immobility: Theoretical Reflections and Cape Verdean Experiences." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28(1): 5–42.
- Carling, Jørgen. 2014. "Scripting Remittances: Making Sense of Money Transfers in Transnational Relationships." *International Migration Review* 48: S218–62.
- Carling, Jørgen, Elin Berstad Mortensen, and Jennifer Wu. 2011. *A Systematic Bibliography on Return Migration*. Oslo: PRIO Paper.
- Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2004. "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited." *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 6(2): 253–79.
- Castles, Stephen. 2003. "Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation." *Sociology* 37(1): 13–34.
- Catron, Peter. 2019. "The Citizenship Advantage: Immigrant Socioeconomic Attainment in the Age of Mass Migration." *American Journal of Sociology* 124(4): 999–1042.
- Catron, Peter. 2020. "The Melting-Pot Problem? The Persistence and Convergence of Premigration Socioeconomic Status During the Age of Mass Migration." *Social Forces* 99(1): 366–97.
- Cebolla-Boado, Héctor, Yang Hu, and Yasemin Nuhuğlu Soysal. 2018. "Why Study abroad? Sorting of Chinese Students across British Universities." *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 39(3): 365–80.
- Chatty, Dawn. 2010. *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chávez, Sergio. 2016. *Border Lives: Fronterizos, Transnational Migrants, and Commuters in Tijuana*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Nir. 2021. "Israel's Return Migration Industry." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47(17): 4100–4117.
- Connor, Dylan Shane. 2019. "The Cream of the Crop? Geography, Networks, and Irish Migrant Selection in the Age of Mass Migration." *The Journal of Economic History* 79(1): 139–75.
- Cook-Martin, David. 2013. *The Scramble for Citizens: Dual Nationality and State Competition for Immigrants*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Cook-Martin, David, and David Scott Fitzgerald. 2019. "How Their Laws Affect Our Laws: Mechanisms of Immigration Policy Diffusion in the Americas, 1790–2010." *Law & Society Review* 53(1): 41–76.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. 1976. *Mexican Migration to the United States: The View from Rural Sending Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Migration and Development Study Group, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. 2005. "Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993–2004." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31(4): 775–95.
- Crul, Maurice, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie. 2012. "The European Second Generation Compared: Does the Integration Context Matter? IMISCOE Research: Amsterdam University Press.

- Crul, Maurice. 2016. "Super-Diversity vs. Assimilation: How Complex Diversity in Majority-Minority Cities Challenges the Assumptions of Assimilation." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(1): 54–68.
- De Haas, Hein, Mark J. Miller, and Stephen Castles. 2020. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Red Globe Press.
- Donato, Katharine M., and Amada Armenta. 2011. "What We Know About Unauthorized Migration." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37: 529–43.
- Dreby, Joanna. 2015. *Everyday Illegal: When Policies Undermine Immigrant Families*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Dubowitz, T., L.M. Bates, and D. Acevedo-Garcia. 2010. "The Latino Health Paradox: Looking at the Intersection of Sociology and Health." In *Handbook of Medical Sociology* (6<sup>th</sup> edition), edited by Chloe E. Bird et al., 106–23. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Durkheim, Émile (1984 [1893]). *The Division of Labor in Society*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dufoix, Stéphane. 2008. *Diasporas*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Entzinger, Han. 2006. "Changing the Rules while the Game is On: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands." In *Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos*, edited by Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdaku, 121–144. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Erdal, Marta Bivand, and Ceri Oepfen. 2013. "Migrant Balancing Acts: Understanding the Interactions between Integration and Transnationalism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(6): 867–84.
- Faist, Thomas. 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Fargues, Philippe. 2011. "Immigration without inclusion: non-nationals in nation-building in the gulf states." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 20(3–4): 273–92.
- Favell, Adrian. 2001. "Migration, Mobility and Globaloney: Metaphors and Rhetoric in the Sociology of Globalisation." *Global Networks* 1(4): 389–98.
- Favell, Adrian. 2008. *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Feliciano, Cynthia. 2005. "Educational Selectivity in US Immigration: How Do Immigrants Compare to Those Left Behind?" *Demography* 42(1): 131–52.
- Fitzgerald, David. 2006. "Towards a theoretical ethnography of migration." *Qualitative Sociology* 29(1):1–24.
- FitzGerald, David. 2009. *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Its Migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- FitzGerald, David. 2012a. "Citizenship à la Carte: Emigration and the Strengthening of the Sovereign State." In *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks*, edited by Peter Mandaville and Terrence Lyons, 197–212. New York: Columbia University Press.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2012b. "A Comparativist Manifesto for International Migration Studies." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35(10): 1725–40.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2016. "150 Years of Transborder Politics: Mexico and Mexicans Abroad." In *A Century of Transnationalism: Immigrants and Their Homeland Connections*, edited by Nancy L. Green and Roger Waldinger, 106–31. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2019. *Refuge Beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2020. "Remote Control of Migration: Theorising Territoriality, Shared Coercion, and Deterrence." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46(1): 4–22.



- FitzGerald, David Scott, and Rawan Arar. 2018. "The Sociology of Refugee Migration." *Annual Review of Sociology* 44: 387–406.
- FitzGerald, David Scott, and David Cook-Martin. 2014. *Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- FitzGerald, David Scott, and John D. Skrentny, eds. 2021. *Immigrant California: Understanding the Past, Present, and Future of US Policy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fitzgerald, Keith A. 1996. *The Face of the Nation: Immigration, the State, and the National Identity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Flores, René D., and Ariela Schachter. 2018. "Who Are the 'Illegals'? The Social Construction of Illegality in the United States." *American Sociological Review* 83(5): 839–68.
- Foner, Nancy. 2005. *In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration*. New York: New York University Press.
- Fox, Cybelle. 2012. *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Galli, Chiara. 2020. "Humanitarian Capital: How Lawyers Help Immigrants Use Suffering to Claim Membership in the Nation-State." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46(11): 2181–98.
- Gamio, Manuel. 1930. *Mexican Immigration to the United States*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen, eds. 2013. *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gans, H. 1992. "Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15(2): 173–92.
- García, Angela S. 2019. *Legal Passing: Navigating Undocumented Life and Local Immigration Law*. University of California Press.
- Garip, Filiz, and Asad L. Asad. 2016. "Network Effects in Mexico–US Migration: Disentangling the Underlying Social Mechanisms." *American Behavioral Scientist* 60(10): 1168–93.
- Geddes, Andrew, and Peter Scholten. 2016. *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: SAGE.
- Geiger, Martin, and Antoine Pécoud, eds. 2020. *The International Organization for Migration: The New 'UN Migration Agency' in Critical Perspective*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Germani, Gino. 1966. "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 2(11): 165–82.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda G. Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton. 1992. *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered*, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- Golash-Boza, Tanya Maria. 2015. *Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism*. New York: NYU Press.
- Gonzales, Roberto G. 2016. *Lives in Limbo: Undocumented and Coming of Age in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.



- Grant, Edwin E. 1925. "Scum from the Melting-Pot." *American Journal of Sociology* 30(6): 641–51.
- Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo. 1997. "The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and the Mirage of Return Migration among Dominican Transmigrants." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 4(2): 281–322.
- Guiraudon, Virginie. 2003. "The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach." *Journal of European Public Policy* 10(2): 263–82.
- Hagan, Jacqueline Maria, and Joshua Thomas Wassink. 2020. "Return Migration Around the World: An Integrated Agenda for Future Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 46: 533–52.
- Haller, William, Alejandro Portes, and Scott M. Lynch. 2011. "Dreams Fulfilled, Dreams Shattered: Determinants of Segmented Assimilation in the Second Generation." *Social Forces* 89(3): 733–62.
- Hanafi, Sari, and Taylor Long. 2010. "Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 23(2): 134–59.
- Hansen, Randall. 2009. "The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration, and the New Europe." *Theory and Society* 38(1): 1–24.
- Harpaz, Yossi. 2019. *Citizenship 2.0: Dual Nationality as a Global Asset*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hennebry, Jenna. 2012. "Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration in Canada." Institute for Research on Public Policy, Monograph Series, , Number 26. Montreal, Quebec.
- Hernández-León, Rubén. 2013. "Conceptualizing the Migration Industry." In *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*, edited by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hanssen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, 42–62. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hollifield, James F. 1992. "Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community." *International Migration Review* 26(2): 568–95.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1975. "Ethnic Identity." In *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, 111–40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hsu, Madeline Y. 2000. *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and South China, 1882–1943*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hugo, Graeme. 1990. "Recent International Migration Trends in Asia: Some Implications for Australia." *Australia Population Association Conference*, Melbourne.
- Ishii, Masako, Naomi Hosoda, Masaki Matsuo, and Koji Horinuki, ed. 2020. *Asian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States*. Leiden: Brill.
- Iwata, Miho, and Kumiko Nemoto. 2018. "Co-Constituting Migrant Strangers and Foreigners: The Case of Japan." *Current Sociology* 66(2): 303–19.
- Jensen, Katherine. 2018. "The Epistemic Logic of Asylum Screening: (Dis) Embodiment and the Production of Asylum Knowledge in Brazil." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41(15): 2615–33.
- Jiménez, Tomás. 2017. *The Other Side of Assimilation: How Immigrants Are Changing American Life*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jiménez, Tomás, and David FitzGerald. 2007. "Mexican Assimilation: A Temporal and Spatial Reorientation." *Du Bois Review* 4(2): 337–54.

- Jimenez, Tomas R., and Adam L. Horowitz. 2013. "When White Is Just Alright: How Immigrants Redefine Achievement and Reconfigure the Ethnoracial Hierarchy." *American Sociological Review* 78(5): 849–71.
- Joppke, Christian. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, Christian. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, Christian. 2005. *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kagan, Michael. 2012. "The UN Surrogate State and the Foundation of Refugee Policy in the Middle East." *UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy* 18(2): 307–42.
- Khosravi, Shahram. 2017. *After Deportation: Ethnographic Perspectives*. New York: Springer.
- King, Russell, and Ronald Skeldon. 2010. "'Mind the Gap!' Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(10): 1619–46.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2013. "Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross-National Comparison." *Annual Review of Sociology* 39: 147–69.
- Koser, Khalid. 1997. "Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: The Case of Iranians in the Netherlands." *International Migration Review* 31(3): 591–611.
- Lan, Pei-Chia. 2011. "White Privilege, Language Capital and Cultural Ghettoisation: Western High-Skilled Migrants in Taiwan." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(10): 1669–93.
- Lee, Jennifer and Zhou, Min, 2015. *The Asian American Achievement Paradox*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Levitt, Peggy, and B. Nadya Jaworsky. 2007. "Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 129–56.
- Levy, Nathan, Asya Pisarevskaya, and Peter Scholten. 2020. "Between Fragmentation and Institutionalisation: The Rise of Migration Studies as a Research Field." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(1): 1–24.
- Liu, Jiaqi M. 2022. "Diasporic Placemaking: The Internationalisation of a Migrant Hometown in Post-Socialist China." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 48(1): 209–227.
- Luthra, Renee, Roger Waldinger, and Thomas Soehl. 2018. *Origins and Destinations: The Making of the Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Maghbouleh, Neda. 2017. *The Limits of Whiteness: Iranian Americans and the Everyday Politics of Race*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Marx, Karl. 1975. "Forced Emigration." In *Articles on Britain*, edited by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 160–64. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Massey, Douglas S., Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González. 1987. *Return to Aztlán: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1998. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- McKeown, Adam. 2004. "Global Migration, 1846–1940." *Journal of World History* 15(2): 155–89.

- McMahon, Simon, and Nando Sigona. 2020. "Death and Migration: Migrant Journeys and the Governance of Migration During Europe's 'Migration Crisis'." *International Migration Review* 55(2): 605–28.
- Menjívar, Cecilia. 2000. *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Menjívar, Cecilia. 2006. "Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 111(4): 999–1037.
- Menjívar, Cecilia, and Leisy Abrego. 2012. "Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 117(5): 1380–21.
- Morawska, Ewa. 2008. "Research on Immigration/Ethnicity in Europe and the United States: A Comparison." *The Sociological Quarterly* 49(3): 465–82.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naujoks, Daniel. 2015. "The Securitization of Dual Citizenship. National Security Concerns and the Making of the Overseas Citizenship of India." *Diaspora Studies* 8(1): 18–36.
- Nawyn, Stephanie J. 2016. "New Directions for Research on Migration in the Global South." *International Journal of Sociology* 46(3): 163–68.
- Nazareno, Jennifer, Min Zhou, and Tianlong You. 2019. "Global Dynamics of Immigrant Entrepreneurship: Changing Trends, Ethnonational Variations, and Reconceptualizations." *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research* 25(5): 780–800.
- Nobles, Jenna, and Christopher McKelvey. 2015. "Gender, Power, and Emigration from Mexico." *Demography* 52(5): 1573–600.
- Oishi, Nana. 2005. *Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Okamoto, Dina, and G Cristina Mora. 2014. "Panethnicity." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40: 219–39.
- París Pombo, María Dolores. 2017. *Violencias y migraciones centroamericanas en México*. Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
- Park, Robert Ezra, and Ernest Watson Burgess. 1924. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Pedraza-Bailey, Silvia. 1985. "Cuba's Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration." *International Migration Review* 14(1): 4–34.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1995. *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach. 1985. *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Patricia Fernández-Kelly. 2015. *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Portes, Alejandro, and John Walton. 1981. *Labor, Class, and the International System*. New York: Academic Press.
- Preibisch, Kerry, and Leigh Binford. 2007. "Interrogating Racialized Global Labour Supply: An Exploration of the Racial/National Replacement of Foreign Agricultural Workers in Canada." *Canadian Review of Sociology* 44(1): 5–36.

- Rahman, Md Mizanur, and Lian Kwen Fee. 2012. "Towards a Sociology of Migrant Remittances in Asia: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(4): 689–706.
- Reitz, Jeffrey G. 2012. "The Distinctiveness of Canadian Immigration Experience." *Patterns of Prejudice* 46(5): 518–38.
- Richards, Audrey I. 1939. *Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: An Economic Study of the Bemba Tribe*. London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of African Languages & Cultures.
- Rosales, Rocío. 2020. *Fruterros: Street Vending, Illegality, and Ethnic Community in Los Angeles*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ross, Edward A. 1901. "The Causes of Racial Superiority." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 18: 67–89.
- Rouse, Roger. 1989. *Mexican Migration to the United States: Family Relations in the Development of a Transnational Migrant Circuit*. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University.
- Sanchez, Gabriella, and Mary Romero. 2010. "Critical race theory in the US sociology of immigration." *Sociology Compass* 4(9): 779–88.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1999. "Beyond Sovereignty: De-Facto Transnationalism in Immigration Policy." *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 1(2): 177–198.
- Sayad, Abdelmalek. 2004. *The Suffering of the Immigrant*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Scalettaris, Giulia, and Flore Gubert. 2019. "Return Schemes from European Countries: Assessing the Challenges." *International Migration* 57(4): 91–104.
- Schans, Djamilia. 2009. "Transnational Family Ties of Immigrants in the Netherlands." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32(7): 1164–82.
- Schewel, Kerilyn. 2019. "Understanding Immobility: Moving Beyond the Mobility Bias in Migration Studies." *International Migration Review* 54(2): 328–55.
- Schmitter Heisler, Barbara. 1985. "Sending Countries and the Politics of Emigration and Destination." *International Migration Review* 19(3): 469–84.
- Sciortino, Giuseppe. 2014. "A European Sociology of Migration?" In *Routledge Handbook of European Sociology*, edited by Sokratis Koniordos and Alexandros Kyrtis, 252–66. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Shams, Tahseen. 2020. *Here, There, and Elsewhere: The Making of Immigrant Identities in a Globalized World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Silva, Adriana Carolina, and Douglas S. Massey. 2015. "Violence, Networks, and International Migration from Colombia." *International Migration* 53(5): 162–78.
- Simmel, Georg. 1971. "The Stranger." In *On Individuality and Social Forms*, edited by Donald N. Levine, 143–49. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Skrentny, John D., Micah Gell-Redman, and Jack Jin Gary Lee. 2012. "Japan, the United States, and the Philosophical Bases of Immigration Policy." *American Behavioral Scientist* 56(8): 995–1007.
- Smith, Michael Peter, and Adrian Favell, eds. 2006. *The Human Face of Global Mobility: International Highly Skilled Migration in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Smith, Robert C. 2006. *Mexican New York: The Transnational Lives of New Immigrants*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Snel, Erik, Godfried Engbersen, and Arjen Leerkes. 2006. "Transnational Involvement and Social Integration." *Global Networks* 6(3): 285–308.
- Soehl, Thomas, and Roger Waldinger. 2010. "Making the Connection: Latino Immigrants and their Cross-Border Ties." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(9): 1489–510.

- Solomos, John. 1993. *Race and Racism in Britain*. 2nd ed. Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Soysal, Yasemin N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Stark, Oded. 1991. *The Migration of Labor*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- Steele, Abbey. 2009. "Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(3): 419–29.
- Stepputat, Finn, and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen. 2014. "Sociology and Forced Migration." In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, 86–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Surak, Kristin. 2008. "Convergence in Foreigners' Rights and Citizenship Policies? A Look at Japan." *International Migration Review* 42(3): 550–75.
- Taylor, Paul S. 1933. *A Spanish-Mexican Peasant Community: Arandas in Jalisco, Mexico*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Telles, Edward, and Vilma Ortiz. 2008. *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Thomas, William I., and Florian Znaniecki. 1918–1920. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Boston, MA: Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press.
- Torpey, John C. 2018. *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tran, Van C., and Francisco Lara-García. 2020. "A New Beginning: Early Refugee Integration in the United States." *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 6(3): 117–49.
- Urry, John. 2012. *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Routledge.
- Vermeulen, Hans. "Segmented Assimilation and Cross-National Comparative Research on the Integration of Immigrants and Their Children." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(7): 1214–30.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2007. "Super-Diversity and its Implications." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(6): 1024–54.
- Waldinger, Roger. 2015. *The Cross-Border Connection: Immigrants, Emigrants, and Their Homelands*. Harvard University Press.
- Waldinger, Roger, and David FitzGerald. 2004. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(5): 1177–95.
- Waldinger, Roger, and Michael Lichter. 2003. *How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Waters, Mary C., Van C. Tran, Philip Kasinitz, and John H. Mollenkopf. 2010. "Segmented assimilation revisited: Types of acculturation and socioeconomic mobility in young adulthood." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(7): 1168–93.
- Weber, Max. 1895. *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Akademische Antrittsrede*. Freiburg.
- Weber, Max. 1968 [1921]. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster.
- Weil, Patrick. 2008. *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4): 970–1022.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 576–610.

- Wirth, Louis. 1928. *The Ghetto*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Wyman, Mark. 1993. *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Zhou, Min, and Carl Bankston. 1998. *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. 1999. “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy.” In *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, edited by Philip Kasinitz Charles Hirschman, and Josh DeWind, 71–93. New York: Russell Sage.

# 5 Theorizing Migration in Anthropology

## The Cultural, Social, Phenomenological, and Embodied Dimensions of Human Mobility

*Caroline B. Brettell*

In the late 1920s, while conducting fieldwork in Manus, New Guinea, Margaret Mead noted that young boys spent two, five, sometimes seven years away from their villages working for the white man. “This is the great adventure to which every boy looks forward. For it, he learns pidgin, [and] he listens eagerly to the tales of returned work boys” (Mead 1930: 119). Similarly, 52 percent of the Chambri (Tchambuli) men between the ages of 15 and 45 were working as migrant laborers and therefore absent from the Papua, New Guinea village where Mead was living in 1933. Despite these observations, Mead’s ethnographic descriptions of life in New Guinea at this time are largely portraits of discrete and timeless cultures unaffected by the outside world. This mode of representation was characteristic of the anthropology of Mead’s time and of the functionalist paradigm that shaped much anthropological analysis until 1960. It was an anthropology that contained a “sedentarist bias” (Malkki 1995: 208) and a bounded definition of culture, both of which explain why anthropology, by comparison with other social science disciplines, especially sociology, did not give the study of migration and mobility high priority as an area of research until the late 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>1</sup> As anthropologists progressively rejected the idea of “cultures” as discretely bounded, territorialized, relatively unchanging, and homogeneous units, thinking and theorizing about migration became increasingly possible.

Ultimately, anthropologists had to pay attention to migration because in those regions of the world that had traditionally been their arenas for ethnographic fieldwork—Africa, Oceania, and increasingly Latin America and the Caribbean—people were beginning to move in significant numbers from the countryside to the growing urban centers of the developing world. The interest in migrants grew in conjunction with the rise of urban anthropology as anthropologists began to focus on “peasants” or “tribesmen” in cities.

Since the 1970s, migration studies within anthropology have expanded significantly. Research has been extended to include populations in most parts of the world, to address both internal and international migrants, to document and analyze both South–North and South–South movements, and to explore the impacts (on both people and places) of population mobility in emerging economies, particularly China (Loyalka 2013; Xiang 2016; Ling 2020). It is noteworthy that, in



the past two decades, anthropologists have authored several review articles that reflect critical issues and debates in the anthropology of migration (De Genova 2002; Silverstein 2005; Dick 2011; Fassin 2011; Suarez-Orozco et al. 2011; Vertovec 2011; Green 2013; Brettell 2017).

In anthropology, as in other disciplines, theorizing about migration has been shaped by a particular epistemology that generates a specific set of questions. For anthropology, a discipline sensitive to place but also comparative in its perspective, these questions have focused less on the broad demographic scope of migration flows than on the articulation between the place whence a migrant originates and the place or places to which he or she moves.<sup>2</sup> Equally, anthropology's focus on culture, which includes the study of the interaction between beliefs and behavior, of corporate groups, and of social relationships, has resulted in an emphasis in migration studies on social and cultural change and on modes of sociality that are characteristic of both the migration process and the immigrant community. Finally, anthropology's attention to meaning and to embodied lived experiences has yielded studies of migrant subjectivities and identities.

In this chapter, I address the anthropological approach to migration, beginning with a brief review of research methods. This is followed by a discussion of the formulation of typologies, as well as theories of articulation between sending and receiving societies. I then focus on the relational and gendered dimensions of migration and settlement before turning to a discussion of race and ethnicity, identity, citizenship and belonging, and the role of governmentality and the state in the lives of immigrants. Throughout, I situate theorizing about migration in relation to broader, theoretical frameworks within anthropology (political economy, feminist anthropology); in relation to a few important subfields of cultural anthropology (e.g., medical anthropology); and in relation to concepts and approaches in other disciplines. The range of topics explored within the anthropology of migration, not all of which can be treated here, reflect the breadth of the discipline itself.

## **A Brief Comment on Methods**

Anthropologists, as ethnographers, usually generate their own data in the course of long-term field research in a particular place or places. The aim is to emerge with a "thick description" (Geertz 1973) of what is going on and how life, in this case im/migrant life, is experienced.

In the field, ethnographers use a variety of research methods including structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, surveys and questionnaires, the collection of narratives and life histories (Eastmond 2007), key informant interviews (for example, with policy makers, community leaders, or service providers), and participant observation—the latter the signature method of the ethnographer (Bocagni and Schrooten 2018). Participant observation requires in-depth immersion in a social and cultural context and generates detailed written field notes (and sometimes audio recordings) that are later analyzed (often using qualitative data analysis software such as Dedoose, NVivo, ATLAS.ti) to tease

out patterns and themes. Sometimes, these notes capture informal conversations, while other times they record detailed observations of events or activities that take place within the research community. Depending on the research questions, interviews, which are usually based on an open-ended interview schedule, may include, for example, the collection of data on social networks, or on physical and mental health, or on employment and migration histories. Although anthropologists may work with more quantitative data, depending largely on sample size and resources available, ethnographic research is by nature qualitative in order to access what it means to be a migrant or refugee from an insider perspective. Often, anthropological research is supplemented by census data, historical documents, legal and policy data, or data from media sources, all of which provide an understanding of the broader context.

Perhaps what is most distinctive about ethnographic methods is how they are deployed in relationship to theory. As Glick Schiller (2003: 111) emphasizes, “in ethnography, systematic explanations of the relations between variables are constantly explored and reformulated in the course of research.” Anthropologists engage in an iterative analytical process which is quite different, as Glick Schiller notes, from a social survey and statistical sampling approach where hypotheses are generated before research begins. Ethnographers generate hypotheses while they are carrying out research and these are continually reassessed and reformulated. Glick Schiller continues: “This process enables ethnographers to change research questions as new situations, not expected within the initial set of assumptions, present themselves” (p. 111). The ethnographic approach, as Holmes and Castañeda (2014: 266) put it, allows the researcher to remain open to “new meanings and realities that they might not have conceptualized before entering the field.” Ethnography allows the anthropologist to document a range of subjective understandings of events, processes, policies, and experiences.

### **Patterns of Mobility: From Typologies to “Lived Realities”**

Since its beginnings as a comparative and cross-cultural science, anthropology has relied on typologies as a way to theorize about similarity and difference. Anthropologists have delineated distinct and diverse kinship and marriage systems, classified forms of religious behavior and belief, and explored different practices of economic exchange or political organization. Springing from this tradition, Nancie Gonzalez (1961), based on research in the Caribbean region, offered an early formulation of five types of migratory wage labor—seasonal, temporary non-seasonal, recurrent, continuous, and permanent. This typology underscores the fact that population movements, especially those across international boundaries, cannot be defined exclusively as one-way and definitive. Thus, in early research in Africa, anthropologists identified some migrants as weekly commuters, others as seasonal and circular movers, and still others as temporary sojourners or permanently displaced (Du Toit 1975). More recently, scholars working in Nepal have added “education migration” to the mix (Childs and Choedup 2018), documenting a transitional period in the Himalayan region

that depletes rural places of their youthful population. All of these types (in more contemporary language, we could refer to them as dimensions of mobility) encompass theories about the motivations for migration, about how migration is shaped by local, regional, national, and international economies, about the linkages between sending and receiving societies, about the relationship between migration on the one hand and family structure and household strategies on the other, and about how migration fits into and is given meaning within localized cultural contexts.

Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the present, several anthropologists carrying out research in different parts of the world added the study of “return migration”—and more recently “roots migration” (Sala and Baldassar 2017)—to the varied patterns of movement both across and within national borders (Rhoades 1978a; Lockwood 1990; Gmelch 1992; Long and Oxfeld 2004; Rottman 2013; FitzGerald, this volume). In an early theoretical formulation of return migration, Gmelch (1980) distinguished between emigrants who intend their departure to be permanent and those who intend it to be temporary. He also observed that strong family ties, rather than economic factors (failure to achieve financial success), are the major incentive for return. Return can also be part of the initial migration strategy, albeit frequently postponed. Thus, the concept of sojourner, as opposed to settler (Dahya 1973; Chavez 1988; Park 2006), has been deployed to describe individuals who aim to make as much money as possible abroad to fulfill a goal (building a house, starting a business, etc.) back home. Often these goals are represented as part of a culturally embedded migration ideology. According to this ideology, thinking about returning and actual return are distinct dimensions of migration (Brettell 2003a). But when there is actual return, it often comes with the dislocational experience of no longer belonging, such that migrants feel like outsiders in their home communities, often mocked or labeled with a new descriptive category, such as the term *Alamanyali* (the “German-like”) applied to repatriated Turks from Germany (Mandel 1989). Osella and Osella (2000) identify four local categorizations that have emerged in association with male migrants who return from the Persian Gulf to South India ranging from the *gulfan* (an immature, unmarried male) to the *kallan* (a self-interested maximizer) to the *pavam* (an innocent, good guy, generous to the point of self-destruction) to the mature householder (a successful man holding substantial personal wealth and supporting many dependents and clients). Clearly, and as Xiang et al. (2013: 4) argue in a book about return migration across several Asian nations, “the heterogeneity of the experiences of return and the ambiguity of its meaning should not be seen as difficulties in studying return; they can be turned into sources of theoretical innovation.”

Thirty years after introducing her initial migration typology, which obviously encompassed forms of return migration, Nancie Gonzalez (1992) added the concept of “conflict migration” to describe population movement that is stimulated by violent conflict in the home society.<sup>3</sup> Others have referred to “enforced migration” (Indra 1999), but broadly speaking these conceptual formulations mark the increasing attention that anthropologists, like sociologists (FitzGerald,

this volume), have paid to the lived experiences of refugees in camps and in resettlement (Allan 2013; Besteman 2016; Feldman 2018; Inhorn 2018; Belloni 2019), and to the debate about whether and how to differentiate analytically between migrants and refugees. The latter are assumed to be people who leave their home region involuntarily, but their experiences, once abroad, are often similar to those of migrants, with the exception of their inability to return readily and freely to their homeland. Some anthropologists have recently argued that all migration is involuntary, forced, for example, by poverty, debt, or food insecurity in the homeland (Carney 2015; Heidbrink 2019), whereas others prefer to maintain the conceptual and analytical distinction between migrant and refugee, partly because it remains significant in particular research contexts. For example, Horton (2004) traces the differential categorization of refugees and the undocumented as deserving and undeserving immigrants, respectively, and the impact of this categorization on access to health care (see also Sargent 2012; Willen 2012; Holmes and Castañeda 2016). In other words, in daily life, the category of refugee carries diverse meanings. Some time ago, Liisa Malkki (1996) was in fact critical of the homogenizing, and ultimately dehumanizing, dimensions of the term “refugee,” arguing that the specific histories and politics of particular refugee populations are “leached out” by efforts to “constitute the refugee as a singular category of humanity within the international order of things” (p. 378).

Classifying typologies and the analytical concepts associated with them delineate various migration strategies or differing experiences of mobility and/or displacement. They also serve to identify distinct immigration policies of host societies and their relationship to migrant, refugee, and political asylee experiences. Thus the post-WWII German concept of *gastarbeiter* (guest worker) came into common use to describe a particular approach to foreign labor reminiscent of the United States *bracero* program (Rhoades 1978b; Mandel 1990) and to current temporary foreign labor and debt peonage programs in the Middle East that have been studied by anthropologists (Gardner 2010; Alajmi 2014). In addition, the meaning-laden categories of undocumented migrant worker or illegal alien have become well known within the United States (Heyman 2001; Coutin 2005; Plascencia 2009) as well as in post-WWII Europe (as the illegal/*sans papiers* or clandestine immigrant) and in a host of countries in the developing world. Very recently, anthropologists have theorized the “precarity,” “abject status,” or “lived reality” of those classified as illegal or undocumented immigrants in different receiving societies (Willen 2007a, b; Quesada 2011; Gonzales and Chavez 2012; Monroe 2014; Gomberg-Muñoz 2016a) as well as the “benevolent cruelty,” state control, and “politics of suffering” directed toward or experienced by refugees or asylum seekers in some contexts, including the Global South (Frischkorn 2015; Gabiam 2016; Ramsay 2017; Shrestha 2019). Drawing on data from field research in Israel, Willen (2005: 66–67) views illegality from a critical, phenomenological perspective. It is not just a juridical status and social condition, she argues, but also a mode of being in the world. Illegality “influences how migrants think about and experience time, space, and their bodies in ways that fundamentally structure their basic sense of self.” Willen’s perspective reflects an important direction for

recent research in anthropology across the globe, research that moves beyond typological classification to describe and analyze the embodied experiences of living without papers or in a refugee camp, of refugee psychic and/or physical trauma, of working as a day laborer, of deportation (a form of forced return) and securitization, of waiting at borders or border immobility, of enforcement, of evading and challenging the state, or even of the liminal status and structural violence of the journey itself (Fassin and d'Halluin 2007; Vogt 2013; Reeves 2013; Andersson 2014a, b; Mathews et al. 2014; Oka 2014; Ordóñez 2015; Boehm 2016; Kallius et al. 2016; Getrich 2019; Willen 2019; Frank-Vitale 2020; Heidbrink 2020).

To summarize, typologies have both etic (outsider) and emic (insider) dimensions. Emically, categorizing migrants and refugees is often part of the political and cultural fabric of host societies and hence must be explored for its impact on the lived experience of those individuals and their families. Etically, anthropologists still rely on typologies to capture and compare different migration strategies, but they also recognize that typologies generally offer a static and homogeneous picture of a process that is flexible over the life course of an individual migrant or the domestic cycle of a household, varied within a population, subject to change over time, and laden with culturally contextualized meanings. Nevertheless, the analytical typologies formulated by anthropologists have directed research to the diverse nature of the process and to the fundamental relationship between sending and receiving societies, whether conceived in the macro terms of a global economy or in the more micro terms of social networks and emotional relationships that link households and individuals to both areas.<sup>4</sup>

### **Articulating Micro and Macro/Global and Local/Here and There**

The delineation of types of migration is one way to theorize how sending areas are articulated with receiving areas (Kearney 1986). In anthropology, four additional analytical approaches to articulation have developed: one emerging from modernization theory; a second rooted in an historical-structuralist/political economy approach that emphasizes the impact of global capitalism; a third related to the formulation of a “culture of migration;” and a fourth framed by concepts of transnationalism and diaspora.

Much of the early anthropological work on migration was formulated within a bipolar analytical model that separated and opposed sending and receiving areas, and the push factors of out-migration from the pull factors of in-migration. Focusing on the motivations of individual migrants, some anthropologists, working within a modernization theory framework, emphasized the rational and progressive economic decisions made in response to differentials in land, labor, and capital between where a migrant lives and the locale to which he or she has chosen to migrate—an approach that clearly resonates with that of economists.

One of the underlying assumptions of modernization theory was that the movement of people from areas that had abundant labor but scarce capital to

areas that were rich in capital but short of labor would ultimately contribute to economic development in both sending and host societies. Modernization theory, in other words, encompassed an equilibrium model of development, the result of which would be a more equitable balance between resources and population pressure and the ultimate elimination of differences between rural-agrarian and urban-industrial areas. It was argued that migrants, through savings and investment, would become agents of change in their home communities. However, much of the early anthropological work on emigrant remittances demonstrated that migrant savings were often spent on consumer items (Rhoades 1978a; Gmelch 1980; Donnan and Werbner 1991). Rather than being a form of development aid given by rich countries to poor countries, population movements have often resulted in migration-dependent communities and the generation of further migration through the diffusion of consumerism (Massey et al. 1994). By contrast, recent ethnographic research in Thailand, Mexico, Peru, and South Korea (Cohen 2011; Gullette 2012, 2013; Kwon 2015; Paerregaard 2015) offers a different and more complex view of the relationship between remittances and development and echoes some of the work of economists on this topic (see Martin, this volume).

Although the push and pull elements of modernization theory still prevail to order discussions of why people migrate, the shortcomings of the equilibrium model of linear development with which modernization theory has been associated have stimulated interest in a historical-structuralist/political economy approach. This approach, drawing broadly on Marxist thought and more specifically on the work of dependency theorists such as André Gunder Frank (1967) and world systems theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), shifts attention from the motivations and adaptations of individual migrants to the macro-level processes that shape and sustain population movements. Here, migration is framed in the context of a global economy, core-periphery relations, and the development of under-development. Within this perspective, concepts such as the international division of labor or the internationalization of the proletariat have emerged to describe the inequities between labor-exporting, low-wage countries and labor-importing, high-wage countries. Rather than stemming migration, development encourages it, because development creates inequality and raises awareness about the larger society and hence enhances a sense of relative deprivation (Gonzalez and McCommon 1989). The net economic value of migration accrued to the city and not the countryside, to the core and not the periphery.

The unit of analysis in this body of theory is not the individual migrant, but rather the global market and the way that national and international economic and political policies, and particularly capitalist development, have disrupted, displaced, or even attracted local populations, thereby generating particular migration streams. A recent example of this approach, but one more adapted to the complexities of the twenty-first century, is Glick Schiller's (2015) call for a "multi-scalar global perspective" that emphasizes processes of displacement and dispossession within global historical conjunctures (Glick Schiller 2015, 2018; see also Caglar and Glick Schiller 2018). Another example is Biao Xiang's (2006)



analysis of global “body shopping,” a labor management system that farms out Indian IT workers to the developed world.

Within anthropology, there are those who express dissatisfaction with a macro approach that often portrays migrants not as active agents but as passive reactors at the mercy of the world capitalist system. This has resulted in new forms of theorizing about the articulation between sending and receiving societies, theorizing that is more anthropological and rooted either in ideas about a “culture of migration” characteristic of households and sending communities, or in the concept of transnationalism.

The phrase “culture of migration” directs attention to the history and sociocultural dimensions of the sending community. It describes a situation where “migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people’s behaviors, and values associated with migration become part of the community’s values” (Massey et al. 1993: 452–453). Such a culture of migration has a long history in northern Portugal (Brettell 1986), in the islands of the Caribbean (Olwig 1999), in Mexico (Cohen 2004), and in a host of other parts of the world (Cohen and Sirkeci 2021). In his work on migrants from Oaxaca, Mexico, Cohen (2004) stresses that using the term “cultural” to describe the migration process does not mean that it is hard-wired. Instead, he describes migration as “one response among many to patterns and processes that link households and rural communities to global labor markets, flows of goods, and personal demands” (p. 5). Elsewhere, Cohen and Sirkeci (2011: 12) argue that, from this framework, migration “makes sense as a cultural process, an economic move, and a social event ... [and the] outcomes of moving, regardless of the conclusions, are executed strategically and in a rational fashion.”

The “culture of migration” perspective steers us to a consideration of the embeddedness of migration in local values and hence emphasizes issues of place and context. This is well illustrated in Mains’s (2007) research on urban Ethiopian youth. Whereas on the one hand a study of how the structural adjustments of neoliberal capitalism have impacted young Africans, Mains also illuminates how ideas about status and shame (*viluññta*) influence decisions about and experiences of migration and offer young people a solution to their sense of stasis or going nowhere. Ethiopian youth, he argues, “evaluate progress in terms of social relationships and they conceive of spatial movement as the solution to their inability to experience changes in their social position with the passage of time” (Mains 2007: 660). A similar approach can be found in Melly’s (2011) analysis of “missing men” in Dakar, Senegal. She describes gender and class hierarchies that are predicated on particular forms of mobility.

The “culture of migration” approach is one way to interrogate the integral and meaning-laden relationship between sending and receiving societies for those who migrate. The transnational perspective, which captures a social process whereby migrants operate in social fields that transgress geographic, political, and cultural borders, is another (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: ix). As a theoretical construct about immigrant life and identity, transnationalism aptly suits the study of population movements in a world where improved modes of transportation, as well as the



images that are transmitted by means of modern telecommunications, have shortened the social distance between sending and receiving societies.

Transnationalism, a concept that has attracted sociologists and geographers as much as it has anthropologists, emerged from the realization that immigrants abroad maintain their ties to their countries of origin, making “home and host society a single arena of social action” (Margolis 1995: 29). From a transnational perspective, migrants are no longer “uprooted,” but rather move freely back and forth across international borders and between different cultures and social systems (Vertovec 1999, 2009). These migrants bring change to localized communities not only through economic remittances but also social remittances (Levitt 1998b; Cohen 2011), which, as Zharkevich (2019) argues based on research in Nepal, are a substance of relatedness that sustains transnational families.

Glick Schiller et al. (1995: 49) argue that transnationalism in anthropology is “part of an effort to reconfigure anthropological thinking so that it will reflect current transformations in the way in which time and space [are] experienced and represented.” It also helps to move migration studies away from methodological nationalism—“the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 301). In research across the globe, anthropologists who have adopted the transnational framework have discussed and analyzed transnational social fields within which migrant actors operate (Gamburd 2000; England 2006); transnational identities that challenge processes of immigrant assimilation or incorporation (Koven 2004; DeJaeghere and McCleary 2010); variations in transnational practices, including religious practices, at both the individual and institutional level (Riccio 2001; Mankekar 2002; Grillo 2004; Chu 2010); transnational families and intimate “affective circuits” (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Whitehouse 2009; Yarris 2014; Coe 2014; Cole and Groes 2016; Shaw 2020); transnational parenting (Salih 2003; Horton 2008; Madziva and Zontini 2012); transnational policies that foster an enduring relationship between a state and their nationals abroad (Harney 2002; Richman 2008; Baker-Cristales 2008); and transnational development projects in sending communities (Grillo and Riccio 2004; Riccio 2011).

The conceptualization of transnational social fields reflects the more general move in anthropology away from bounded units of analysis and localized community studies. Conceived as social action in “a multidimensional global space with unbounded, often discontinuous, and interpenetrating sub-spaces” (Kearney 1995: 549), transnationalism is closely linked with broader interests emerging from postmodernist, poststructuralist, and feminist theory, as well as a geographical turn that has theorized space and place in new ways. One outcome of this work is new research on borderlands (Dorsey and Diaz-Barriga 2015; Fleuriet and Castañeda 2017); another is research on the embodied experience of the migration journey (Holmes 2013), whereas a third is research on diasporic communities and families (Tseng 2002; Werbner 2002; Brodwin 2003; Watson 2005; Parreñas and Siu 2007; Vora 2008; Thiranagama 2014; Dossa and Coe 2017).

To summarize, transnationalism offers an alternative to and a critique of earlier manifestations of articulation theory that “posit a primeval state of autonomy

(usually labeled precapitalist), which is then violated by global capitalism” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 8). It has generated new ideas about the representation and incorporation of immigrants and the deterritorialization of nation-states (Appadurai 1996; Gupta 1992), and it lies behind efforts to merge migration studies with diaspora studies. Immigrants in the transnational and global world are involved in the nation-building of more than one state; thus, national identities are not only blurred but also negotiated or constructed. As Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 9) have observed, “We live in a world where identities increasingly come to be, if not wholly deterritorialized, at least differently territorialized. Refugees, migrants, displaced and stateless peoples—these are perhaps the first to live these realities in their most complete form.”

### **The Social Organization of Migration: Kinship, Networks, and Gender**

The anthropologist generally locates transnational processes within the lives of individuals and families and particularly in the personal, economic, and social connections that articulate the world they have left with the world they have entered. In other words, if the roots of the discipline are in the study of kinship and social organization, then these roots are also at the core of migration research in anthropology and revolve in particular around the concept of the social network, which gained importance as anthropologists turned their attention to the study of complex societies and urban populations.<sup>5</sup> Although considered by many to be no more than a tool of research and a method of analysis, in fact theories about how social relationships are forged and how social systems are constructed are at the foundation of network analysis.

In a wide range of cross-cultural contexts, anthropologists have examined the role of social networks in the process of chain migration or what Wilson (1994) has labeled “network-mediated migration” (see also Poros 2001; Olwig 2007). Migrants look for work in places where they have family members or friends. Thus, Tamar Wilson (1994: 275) argues, migration networks must be conceived as “facilitating rather than encapsulating, as permeable, expanding, and fluid, rather than as correlating with a metaphor of a rigid and bounded structure.” Wilson prefers this network approach to a market theory approach that involves immigrants in a cost-benefit analysis of the most favorable destination. Thus, she concurs with the conclusion drawn by sociologist Douglas Massey and his collaborators (1993: 449), who suggest that networks can become self-perpetuating in migration because “each act of migration itself creates the social structure needed to sustain it. Every new migrant reduces the costs of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives, and some of these people are thereby induced to migrate, which further expands the set of people with ties abroad.” The theory of network-mediated migration is quite distinct from theories rooted in the rational choice and decision-making models of migration preferred by some economists and political scientists.

Although anthropologists, and increasingly sociologists and historians, have recognized the significance of social networks to the process of migration, they

have theorized the role of networks in the process of settlement and adaptation in the society of immigration—that is, how networks provide social capital (Poros 2001; Avenarius 2002; Clarke 2004). For example, Werbner (1990) stresses the central role of networks not only in the processes of distribution and credit among Pakistani entrepreneurs in Manchester, England, but also as the foundation for complex relationships of gift exchange that bind the community together. However, it is worth noting that more recently some authors have cautioned that social networks can be detrimental to immigrants as mechanisms of exploitation and stagnation (Rosales 2014).

Immigrant women are often at the center of immigrant networks. They both initiate and maintain them. Ryan (2008) discusses the kinship networks that undergird the migration of Irish nurses to Britain—most were encouraged to leave their homeland by “a sister in England.” O’Connor (1990; see also Fitts and McClure 2015) describes the female-centered informal networks based on the Mexican tradition of *confianza* (trust) that emerged among Mexican women working in a wholesale nursery in California. These networks help immigrant women to cope successfully “with the conditions imposed by the Anglo-dominated political and economic structure” (O’Connor 1990: 97) or to “discover ways to negotiate patriarchal barriers” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994: 94). Married women in particular use them to facilitate their own migration, often without the knowledge of their husbands.

For much of the twentieth century, women were generally ignored in the social scientific study of migration. If considered at all, it was as dependents and passive followers of the initiating male migrant. Alternatively, women were the ones who waited in the countryside, assuming many of the responsibilities that had once been in the hands of men. This particular conceptualization of the relationship between women and the process of migration suited modernization theory—women represented the traditional pole of the continuum and men the pole of modernity. Today, it is apparent that not only are women often the first to migrate (sometimes they receive the initial job contract), but they also outnumber men in some international migration streams as part of the global care chain (Constable 2007; Liebelt 2011). Gender has been shown to be important in the decision to migrate (when, where, and who) as well as in the process of settlement in the receiving society. It has, as anthropologists Sarah Mahler and Patricia Pessar (2006) have argued, been brought from the periphery to the core of migration studies.

While anthropologists have been at the forefront in theorizing about the significance of gender in migration (Brettell and deBerjeois 1992; Gmelch and Gmelch 1995; Pessar 2003; Brettell 2016), many sociologists have also made important contributions (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, Parreñas 2001; Kilkey et al. 2013). Indeed, sociologist Stephanie Nawyn (2010: 760) has observed that “it is easier to capture the dynamic nature of gender in ethnographic work than with the snapshots in time that survey data usually represent.” Shaped by a broader, feminist anthropology, the gendered approach to migration has focused on a range of topics including: the changes that occur in family and kinship patterns, as well as

in affective relationships, as a result of migration; the gendered structure of labor force participation and of immigration policies and laws; the impact of salaried employment on domestic roles and domestic power; health issues and reproduction; and political consciousness-raising and patterns of resistance (Hirsch 2003; Boehm 2012; Abrego 2014; Schmalzbauer 2014; Keough 2016; Ameeriar 2017; Hannaford 2017; Haenn 2020). As research has developed, gender has increasingly become a category of analysis in the study of male migrants as well, with an emphasis on how it impacts ideas of masculinity (Osella and Osella 2000; Pribilsky 2012; Abdi 2014). Of utmost importance for anthropologists is to access the inner subjectivity of immigrant men and women—that is, their own assessment of how migration impacts their gendered lives. This is often achieved by presenting narratives of how immigration and labor policies are experienced, as Constable (2014) does in her study of Indonesian and Filipina women in Hong Kong.

The extensive anthropological research on the intersection of gender and migration indicates a set of complex and varied responses to the necessity of balancing work and family life that often includes the decision to be a transnational parent (Horton 2009; Boehm 2012; Carling et al. 2012). Furthermore, anthropologists have also observed that the experiences of immigrant women can be distinctly different from those of men precisely because their reproduction is often politicized (Willen 2005; Sargent 2006; Castañeda 2008; Chavez 2008, 2016). And finally, gender is imperative to an understanding of human trafficking, including sex trafficking, an often under-considered dimension of population mobility and exploitation but one that has certainly captured the attention of both anthropologists and sociologists (Cole 2006; Giordana 2008; Parreñas 2011; Taliani 2012; Brennan 2014).

In summary, from its beginnings as a “just-add-women-and stir” approach, research on gender and migration now emphasizes intersectionality, whereby gender is framed in relation to differences of race, ethnicity, class, nationality, and sexuality. Gender is formulated as a “system of power relations that permeates every aspect of the migration experience” (Nawyn 2010: 760).

### **Theorizing Migration/Theorizing Ethnicity, Race, and Identity**

Some time ago, anthropologist Michael Kearney (1995: 559) observed that “at the heart of current anthropological concerns with transnationalism, identity politics, migration, and human rights is the persistence, resurgence, or *de novo* emergence of ethnicity at a time when, according to modernization theory, it was to have been attenuated by robust nation-states.” He links the growing interest in the concept of identity and, by extension, ethnicity to the “implosion” of the concept of culture.

Anthropological consideration of ethnicity has its origins in the research of the first generation of urban anthropologists working in Africa. Seminal work by Mitchell (1957), Epstein (1958), and Cohen (1969) challenged the assumption that detribalization was the inevitable outcome of the movement of rural dwellers to cities—clearly another critique of modernization theory. These studies wrestled

with the conceptual differences between “tribe” and “ethnic group” and resulted in the delineation of three distinct theoretical approaches to the study of ethnicity.<sup>6</sup> The primordialist approach, which prevailed until the 1960s, argues that ethnic identity is the result of deep-rooted attachments to group and culture, whereas the instrumentalist approach focuses on ethnicity as a political strategy that is pursued for pragmatic interests, and the situational approach, emerging from the theoretical work of Frederik Barth (1969), emphasizes the fluidity and contingency of ethnic identity which is constructed in specific historical and social contexts (see also Banks 1996).

In anthropological studies of migration, the instrumentalist and situational approaches have attracted the most attention, not only because they suit the more emergent and interactive understanding of culture and the poststructuralist emphasis on the multiple and shifting basis of self-representation (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), but also because the act of migration brings populations of different backgrounds into contact with one another and hence creates boundaries. It is the negotiation across such boundaries, themselves shifting, that is at the heart of ethnicity and the construction of migrant identities. As Tseng (2002: 386) has observed, ethnic identification is “dialogic, in the sense that it is created, preserved, reaffirmed, and even rejected through a continuous set of contrasts between one’s own group and others.” Similarly, Andreas Wimmer (2008: 970) has argued that ethnic boundaries are “the result of classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field.”

Several anthropologists working in the United States context have argued that race and ethnicity need to be considered together in any theoretical formulations of the construction of immigrant identity (Goode and Schneider 1994; Lessinger 1995; Gibau 2005; Brettell 2007). They often draw on critical race theory to emphasize the racialized lives of immigrants (Garcia 2017). Stepick (1998), for example, describes how Haitian immigrant youth construct their identity in relation to or in contrast to that of African Americans. He characterizes the first case as a “Haitian cover-up” and reveals some intriguing differences between boys who choose to be monocultural (either Haitian or African American) and girls who choose to be multicultural (both Haitian and African American). The same tensions are experienced by immigrants from other parts of the Caribbean (Foner 1987b, 2005; see also Foner and Fredrickson 2004).

Researchers working on immigration in the European context have also discussed processes of racialization as well as shifting and fluid hierarchies of identity (Silverstein 2004, 2005). The identity of Sikh immigrants in Britain, for example, is crosscut by differences of class and caste as well as by differences between “twice migrants” and direct migrants (Bhachu 1993). White (1997: 754) argues that Turkish identities in Berlin “are forged from class, ethnic, and religious loyalties, from institutional and media ethnoscapes (created by Germans and by Turks themselves), from shared regularities of interpersonal expectations of generalized reciprocity, and in reaction to how Turks are defined (and redefined after reunification) by Germans.” She focuses on the processual, community-building aspects of identity rather than on those that rely on fixed and external markers such as

language. More recently, Amrute (2016) has explored the embodied, racialized, and classed nature of Indian programmers in Berlin. These workers, she argues, “reframe the incommensurabilities between the way they are positioned as raced cognitive workers and as members of the Indian middle class” (p. 20).

Two final examples illustrate how these issues have been addressed in contexts other than Europe and North America. In a study of Japanese Brazilians who have migrated back to Japan, Tsuda (2003, 2007) situates ethnicity within a transnational framework, arguing that, rather than being viewed as “something that is racially inscribed (essentialized),” ethnic identity should instead be seen as “something that is culturally contingent and actively negotiated in various contexts (de-essentialized).” He continues: “Racially essentialized ethnic identities become harder to sustain under transnational migration because it disengages relatively static, ethnic meanings from a certain locale and re-engages them in a new social context, causing them to be challenged and redefined” (Tsuda 2007: 247). Lan (2016) examines the changing meanings of race in relation to African migrants in China, meanings that are shaped by the neo-colonial Chinese presence in Africa as well as by both local and global media and the internet. Although Lan concludes that it is perhaps premature to speak about “fully developed institutionalized racism” in China, she argues that this may emerge in the near future, given the force of racism at the individual level (p. 314).

Finally, it would be remiss not to mention that anthropologists, together with sociologists, geographers, and historians, have also explored the role of religious institutions and activities in the formation of personal and social identities within immigrant populations (Ralston 1992; Bava 2011; Kivisto 2014; Saunders et al. 2016). Park (1989: 290) suggests that many Korean immigrants “go from being non-religious to becoming believers.” In New York City, where a new Korean church was founded every six days in the mid-1980s, the church provides an ethnic forum for socializing and status seeking. She contrasts the double role of Christian churches to both promote Americanization and preserve Korean identity with the emphasis on the preservation of Korean culture in Buddhist churches. Tweed (1997) argues that Cuban exiles in Miami view the shrine of Our Lady of Charity as a place to express diasporic nationalism and construct a translocal identity, while Levitt (1998a) describes a transnational religious system connecting Dominican immigrants in Boston with their home island. These religious connections are part of what she labels social remittances, the “ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt 1998a: 76). Other scholars, across a range of disciplines, but including anthropology, have noted the significance of religious institutions to place-making, civic engagement, and the construction of community among immigrant populations (Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Min and Kim 2002; Leonard et al. 2005; Levitt 2007; Stepick et al. 2009; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). Lastly, several anthropologists have analyzed how religion, identity (or identities), and civic pride are manifested in ethnic festivals and cultural performances (Schneider 1990; Cohen 1993; Werbner 1996; Bramadat 2001; Brettell and Nibbs 2009; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012; David 2012;



Garbin 2012, 2013; Saint-Blancat and Cancellieri 2014). This body of research challenges unidirectional theories of assimilation, adds agency and fluidity to the process of incorporation, reinforces the theory that ethnicity is culturally constructed and a fundamental dimension of the cultural politics of migration, and illuminates the multiple ways in which religion, as an aspect of identity, intersects with migration.

### **Identity, Citizenship, and Belonging/Inclusion and Exclusion**

Some anthropologists have argued that the transnational arrangements constructed by “ordinary migrants, their families, and their friends, have undermined both the political dominance exerted by the state and its cultural authority” (Rouse 1995: 358; see also Appadurai 1996). This has led to an exploration of citizenship and belonging (i.e. claims of identity, intimacy, and inclusion) both within and across national boundaries (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; Kelley 2013; Petryna and Follis 2015; Paz 2019). Michel Laguerre (1998: 12–13), for example, has formulated a concept of diasporic citizenship to describe an individual whose subjective sense of belonging is located within two or more nation-states. Similarly, in her study of Chinese immigrants in Panama, Lok Siu (2005) draws on diasporic citizenship to describe “the processes by which diasporic subjects experience and practice cultural and social belonging amid shifting geopolitical circumstances and webs of transnational relations” (p. 5). Aihwa Ong (1999: 112) writes instead about “flexible citizenship,” which she defines as the “strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family relocation” (see also Fong 2011). Vora (2011: 315), inspired by Ong’s concept, argues that Indians in Dubai are both diasporic and latitudinal subjects who “impact the form of citizenship in both countries.” On the one hand, they legitimize “the UAE nation-state and its racial and religious foundations,” and, on the other, they “recuperate classed, gendered, ethnic, caste, and religious divisions within transnationalism.” All these anthropologists approach citizenship not simply as a political or legal status or as a set of rights and obligations, but as a flexible, dynamic, and contingent cultural and social process. The meaning of citizenship, as Gálvez (2013: 721) argues “is never static, but subject to resignification through ... negotiated participation.” This approach has its roots in Werbner and Yuval-Davis’s (1999: 4) distinction between political science definitions of citizenship that derive from “the relationship between the individual and the state” and those that “define citizenship as a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging.”

Important in this context is the concept of cultural citizenship which, in anthropology, has acquired two somewhat different meanings, one emphasizing immigrant agency and the other processes of governmentality and subject-making. As formulated by Rosaldo and Flores (1997: 57), cultural citizenship is defined as “the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with



respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state's democratic processes." Cultural citizenship accommodates "multicultural conceptions of political belonging" (Baker and Shryock 2009: 11) and draws attention to how people practice citizenship in their daily lives (Flores 2003; Maira 2004; Giordano 2008; Coll 2010; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). These participatory forms of citizenship are often the "strategic actions" of immigrants who may or may not be legal citizens (Coutin 2003a; Stephen 2003; Brettell 2008; Glick Shiller and Caglar 2008). Furthermore, citizenship practices are not necessarily the same within and between different immigrant populations. Bloch (2013: 4) makes precisely this point in her study of Moldovan migrants in post-Soviet Russia. The ideals and practices of citizenship, she argues, are shaped by historical experience and by the prevailing politics of inclusion and exclusion.

The politics of inclusion and exclusion figure more strongly in Aihwa Ong's (1996: 737) formulation of cultural citizenship to describe a "process of subjectification in the Foucauldian sense of self-making and being-made by power relations that produce consent through schemes of surveillance, discipline, control, and administration." In her study of Cambodian Americans, Ong (2003:15) describes the "social policies and practices beyond the state that in myriad mundane ways suggest, define, and direct adherence to democratic, racial, and market norms of belonging." She suggests that it is in the everyday spaces of encounter that citizenship is exercised and given meaning. Leo Chavez, in his book *The Latino Threat* (2008), picks up this argument by arguing that "feelings of belonging and a desire for inclusion in the social body exist in a dialectical relationship with the larger society and the state, which may or may not find such claims for cultural citizenship convincing."

In recent years, Chavez (2001) and other anthropologists, including medical anthropologists, have explored the discourses of inclusion, exclusion, and stigma that are part of debates about immigration both in Europe and the United States (Grillo 1985, 2005, 2010; Cole 1997; Modood and Werbner 1997; Borneman 1998; Riccio 2000; Angel-Ajani 2002; Mai 2002; Pero 2007; Ewing 2008; Wessendorf 2008; Partridge 2012). Erickson (2011), for example, compares the reception of Muslims in Switzerland and Catalonia, Spain, the former characterized by polarization and the other by pluralism. He analyzes the role of ideas about "*covivencia*" that are deeply rooted in Spanish history but used as a "resource ... for the mutual accommodation of difference" (p. 116) in present-day Catalonia (see also Rogozen-Soltar 2012). Reviewing several ethnographic studies of local reactions to diversity in Italy, Grillo and Pratt (2002: xxi) suggest that they demonstrate "how the processes of incorporation and exclusion experienced by migrants are shaped by processes and cleavages internal to Italian society, and conversely how the migrant presence has regenerated discourses about Italian unity and diversity." Research on the reception of immigrants reveals much about issues of national identity as well as about who is deemed to be "deserving of the privileges of citizenship" (Chavez 2008: 17). This is illustrated in a particularly intriguing way by Miriam Ticktin (2011), who argues that in France a regime

of care plays an important role in the politics of immigration. Battered women or immigrants who are considered sick and hence deserving can make a legitimate claim to cross borders, whereas those who are simply fleeing poverty, and hence undeserving, cannot. Conversely, in her research on mixed-status families, Gomberg-Muñoz (2016b: 349–50) unmasks what she calls the “illusion of citizenship” and instead reveals some of its dehumanizing dimensions. Women in mixed-status families “join millions of others, both citizens and non-citizens, whose autonomy and agency are circumscribed as components of their lives come under the control of state agents.”

### **The State, the City, and Multiculturalism**

Anthropologists, like political scientists and legal scholars, are interested in the impact of the state and the law on the lives of immigrants.<sup>7</sup> However, they generally approach these questions from a poststructuralist, theoretical perspective that critically examines processes of governmentality, discipline, and surveillance. Their focus has often been on “the ideologies and technologies at work in the policing of borders and the production of boundaries” (Fassin 2011: 222) or on the “temporal economics of illegality” that imposes waiting and immobility on migrants (Andersson 2014a). Cunningham and Heyman (2004: 293, 295) have formulated a mobilities-enclosure continuum to describe borders “as sites where movement is structured within the context of unequal power relations. ... Enclosures and mobilities thus join at borders, in the multifarious processes of entering, avoiding, detecting, classifying, inspecting, interdicting, facilitating, and revaluing.” Borders both enable and restrict movement. They are sites at which people are identified by means of passports or visas, and inspected, surveilled, and sometimes “entrapped” (De Genova 2017; Núñez and Heyman 2007) through various forms of more or less sophisticated technology. Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013: 189) label these international regulatory and surveillance administrations “regimes of mobility” that control individual movement.

A number of studies of illegality, asylum-seeking, and deportation have emerged in association with this turning of the anthropological lens on the politics of borders and on how states strive to control population movement. Writing about the militarized border between India and Bangladesh, Ghosh (2019) describes a political economy of migrant illegality rooted in detectability and based on three modes of policing—the interceptive, the judicial-determinative, and the certificatory. The border, Ghosh argues, is a space of “hyperdocumentation” and “is marked as a pre-eminent site of intervention for the state to dramatize its security apparatus to its domestic and international audiences” (p. 873). Others focus on the traumatic injuries that result from “tactical infrastructure” and heightened surveillance at the border (Jusionyte 2018). As they explore these issues, and as part of a broader interest in practices of “walling in and walling out” (McAttackney and McGuire 2020), anthropologists often emphasize the subjective and embodied experiences of state processes of regulation (Willen 2007a, b). Writing about a

group of Somalis deported from the United States and Canada after 9/11, Peutz (2006: 223) claims:

the deportee body is doubly stigmatized—polluted and polluting—both in the host society and at home. Simply put, deportable bodies exude the danger of their transnational state(s) ... and as aliens, they are all the more outcasts. Similarly, deported bodies are suspected of carrying with them the pollution contracted abroad while also remaining anomalies at home, their forced return subverting the fetishized immigrant success story.

Some of this relatively new anthropological work focuses on the documents that define the lives of regulated immigrant bodies, whether legal or illegal (Reeves 2013; Ghosh 2019). One example can be found in Cabot's (2012) study of the "pink card" (*roz karta*) in Greece. This card is the identity document used by agents of the Greek state to control the movement of those seeking protection. It leaves people in a limbo status but not necessarily without agency. Hence, Cabot (2012: 12–13) argues that the pink card in fact "serves to make asylum seekers *illegible* to both the state and themselves. The pink card is not simply a technology or regulation; it facilitates highly variable reconfigurations of regulatory activities, as both police and asylum seekers engage with, handle, and use the document" (see also Cabot 2013).

In a similar vein, Fassin and d'Halluin (2005: 598) explore the role of medical certificates (that attest to torture) in applications for asylum in France. They observe that the "regime of truth" associated with these certificates has emerged "in the context of a profound delegitimization of asylum" throughout Europe. This has resulted in a dramatic increase in undocumented foreigners; in the development of "spaces of exception" at national borders to contain unwanted immigrants; and in overall suspicion of political asylum itself. Fassin and d'Halluin conclude that the governance of refugees operates through a "dual process of subjectification and subjection—in other words, of production and submission of the subject whose body is supposed to deliver the 'ultimate truth'" (p. 606). In that certificate, they assert, lies "the entire existence—both physical and political—of the asylum seeker."

In the United States, several anthropologists have examined the process of application for asylum as well as the ethnographic reality of deportation hearings (Coutin 2003b, 2005). Ordoñez (2008: 39), for example, argues that those seeking political asylum subject themselves to state surveillance "by making their situation visible to the very authorities they have been avoiding since entering the US." This results in both stress and fear, and, if the outcome and the appeal are not favorable and they face deportation, they have "indirectly caused their own expulsion by coming forward in the first place." This author also observes that, in preparing their case for asylum, undocumented immigrants must redefine their identities and their memories to match the legal definition of a refugee. For many, the entire process is confusing and marginalizing. Similarly, Haas (2017:

76) describes the “dual positionality” of asylum seekers who exist in an “existential limbo,” either as “citizens-in-waiting” or “deportee-in-waiting.”

Fassin (2011) views these regulatory measures in some sense as a response to the perceived failure of the multicultural experiment, particularly in early twenty-first century Europe. Several anthropologists have engaged in a “cultural analysis of the politics of integration” (Epstein 2011: 19; see also Moodood and Werbner 1997; Vertovec 2010a; Glick Schiller 2011), exploring multiculturalism on the one hand, as a set of policies that recognize difference (Grillo and Pratt 2002), and, on the other, as the source of fears about an “excess of alterity” (Grillo 2010). Often, anthropologists focus their attention on particular incidents where difference and divisiveness come head-to-head. Bowen (2007), for example, offers a detailed analysis of the 2004 law in France that banned headscarves from public schools. He argues that critical principles of the French Republic and French identity (secularism and communalism) are at the center of this debate. He also notes that the media plays a powerful role in defining what kind of Muslim is accorded the right to speak (p. 246) and therefore what kind of Muslim is deemed acceptable in a country that emphasizes assimilation rather than multiculturalism. In Britain, a country with a more multicultural approach to immigrant integration than that of France, controversies over Muslim dress have also erupted. One emerged from debates over the right of a young Muslim woman to wear the long black garment (*jilbab*) to a school that had already developed a Muslim-sympathetic uniform option that was approved by local Muslim religious authorities (Tarlo 2010). This case made its way to the highest court and the House of Lords and decisions were made and reversed along the way. Tarlo effectively illustrates the political agendas embedded in the multicultural project.

A final example of how anthropologists interrogate the multicultural project is offered by the work of Unni Wikan, a Norwegian anthropologist who, in two intriguing and highly provocative books, argues that an excessive tolerance for difference has resulted in a “generous betrayal” of immigrants. Culture, she argues, has become like race, a concept that subverts human rights, particularly those of women and children, as it supports ethnic difference and identity politics. “Immigrants are largely perceived as *products* of culture ... and therefore unable to exercise independent judgment” (Wikan 2002: 81). She suggests that immigrants themselves invoke culture as an explanation or excuse for certain behaviors, thereby “belittling themselves as acting, thinking, willful human beings, and they run down the very qualities that have brought them here: initiative, courage, perseverance.” Wikan clearly is offering not only a powerful critique of a policy of multiculturalism, but of the concept of culture as well. Her position is even more evident in her book *In Honor of Fadime* (Wikan 2008), a poignant analysis of an honor-killing and, more broadly, of second-generation Muslims whose identities may be more in line with their host societies than with the country of origin of their parents. Western democracies, in her view, must be sensitive to these intra-cultural variations, particularly those between parents and children.

In the United States, these questions about multiculturalism have been largely explored by anthropologists in relation to the law and the so-called “cultural

defense.” As defined by Renteln (2004: 5), the cultural defense requires “judges to consider the cultural background of litigants in the disposition of cases before them.” This defense has often been used in relation to immigrants and has been invoked for crimes ranging from homicide, to rape, to child abuse, to custody battles, to employment discrimination, to the treatment of animals and the dead. While some anthropologists view this defense as paternalistic and orientalist (Koptiuch 1996), others view it in relation to broader human rights (Renteln 2004). Still others situate it within larger debates in anthropology regarding the difference between moral and cultural relativism as well as those regarding assimilation *versus* multiculturalism (Shweder 2003). When such cases come to the courts, they raise fundamental questions about how to manage diversity.

This diversity is mostly to be found in the cities around the world where the majority of international migrants have settled. In recent years, anthropologists have turned their attention anew to the study of cities and to the hyperdiverse neighborhoods they contain (Vertovec 2010b; Epstein 2011). There has been a renewed interest in the varying contexts for immigrant settlement that cities provide (Foner 1987a; Lamphere 1992; Brettell 2003b). There has equally been a developing interest, drawing on a concept critical to geographers, in city scale (Caglar and Glick Schiller 2018; see also Caglar 2010). Rather than to view cities as “containers, providing spaces in which migrants settle and make a living,” anthropologists who have focused on city scale explore how migrants “actively contribute to the restructuring and repositioning of either their cities of settlement or those to which they are transnationally connected” (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2011: 2). Migrants, from this perspective, are “agents and subjects of the global processes that reposition localities” (p. 3). The city-scale approach offers a comparative theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding how the global and the local intersect and interact, and the role and experiences of migrants in these processes.

## **Conclusion**

Although migrants around the globe have common experiences, migration itself is a complex and diverse phenomenon. Migrants can be differentiated by sex, class, education, ethnicity, the nature of their labor force participation, their reasons for migrating, the stage of the lifecycle at which they move, the form of the migration (internal, international, temporary, and so on), and the nature and impact of global economic and political policies that affect population movement. A consideration of all these factors, from a comparative perspective, offers the best understanding of the process of migration and of migrant culture. It assumes that migrants act and are “acted upon” with reference to their social, cultural, and gendered locations.

But for anthropologists whose central interest is in the human dimensions of this global process and the lived (embodied) experience of being a migrant, there are further considerations that guide their research. These considerations have their roots in several key concepts of the discipline that in turn ground anthropological theory.

Thus, the distinction between nature and culture is at the foundation of theories of ethnicity that reject a primordial and inherent identity in favor of one that is socially constituted. The connections between society and culture, as well as an understanding of community that has both local (micro) and global (macro) dimensions, helps to explain how migrants as transnationals can operate in or between two (or more) worlds. An acceptance of the common disjunction between the ideal and the actual permits more complex formulations of the processes of change and adaptation that are part of being a migrant. An awareness of the differences between participant's models (the emic perspective) and observer's models (the etic perspective) lends subtlety to our knowledge of similarities and differences and solidity to our theories about the particular and the general in the experience of migration. Furthermore, an observer's model rooted in the interaction between structure and agency accepts the fact that migrants shape and are shaped by the context (political, economic, social, cultural) within which they operate, whether in the sending society or in the receiving society.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the holistic perspective draws anthropologists to an exploration of a range of social and cultural phenomena (religious rituals, for example) that both have an impact on and are affected by migration.

Much of what is written by anthropologists on the subject of migration may, at first glance, be dismissed as largely descriptive ethnography, but a closer examination indicates that, while often "located" in the study of a specific migrant community or population, most of this research is implicitly, if not explicitly, theoretical. If a theory is defined as "an explanation of a class of events, usually with an empirical referent, providing insight into how and what is going on, and sometimes explaining why phenomena exist" (Barrett 1997: 40), then much of this ethnographic work makes a significant and sometimes unique contribution to our theoretical conversations across the disciplines.

Finally, given that anthropology has been described as the most scientific of the humanistic fields and the most humanistic of the sciences (Wolf 1964), it should not be unexpected that those anthropologists who focus their attention on the mobility of people in particular would reach out to other disciplines—sociology, geography, political science—and other interdisciplinary fields (cultural studies, for example) for ideas and concepts to write with, write against, or nuance as they formulate their own understanding and interpretations of the meaning and experience of migration.

## Discussion Questions

1. Why does context matter in the study of migration?
2. What are some of the similarities and differences in how anthropology, by comparison with other disciplines, deploys ideas of transnationalism, place, and gender?
3. What is meant by migrant subjectivity and why is it important?
4. How can the experiences of refugees and economic migrants be compared and contrasted from an anthropological as well as from other disciplinary perspectives?

5. What are some of the distinctive approaches of an anthropology of migration, when compared with other disciplines, and how are these approaches influenced by the methodological tools and sources of data that each discipline deploys?

## Notes

- 1 However, anthropologist Franz Boas studied immigrants in America and there are indications of a growing interest in immigration in the 1950s (see Brettell 2018).
- 2 See Foner (2005) and Brettell (2009, 2020) for discussion of the comparative perspective in the anthropological study of migration. This essay focuses on cultural anthropology but readers should be aware of work in other subfields of the discipline (for example, Gregoricka 2021).
- 3 For a recent anthropological formulation of the relationships among conflict, insecurity, and mobility, see Sirkeci, Cohen and Yazgan (2016).
- 4 For further debate on the role of typologies in anthropology and sociology, see Schweizer (1998) and Portes (1997), respectively.
- 5 Social networks were first studied by British social anthropologists working among urban migrants in Africa in the 1960s (Epstein 1961; Gutkind 1965; Mitchell 1971).
- 6 For more thorough discussions than can be offered here, see Banks (1996) and Jenkins (1997).
- 7 This interest has emerged in relation to a broader anthropology of the state that explores how the presence of government is routinized in the lives of citizens through processes of embordering, emplacing, and surveilling (Trouillot 2001: 125; see also Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and Gupta (2006).
- 8 Ortner (1996:12) conceptualizes this interaction as “the challenge to picture indissoluble formations of structurally embedded agency and intention-filled structures, to recognize the ways in which the subject is part of larger social and cultural webs, and in which social and cultural “systems” are predicated upon human desires and projects.”

## References

- Abdi, Cawo Mohamed. 2014. “Threatened Identities and Gendered Opportunities: Somali Migration to America.” *Signs* 5(2): 459–83.
- Abrego, Leisy J. 2014. *Sacrificing Families: Navigating Laws, Labor and Love across Borders*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Alajmi, Abdullah. 2014. “Debt, Peonage and Dependency in the Kafalah System: Hadrami Migratory Experience in Kuwait.” *Anthropology of the Middle East* 9(1): 18–41.
- Allan, Diana. 2013. *Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ameeriar, Lalaie. 2017. *Downwardly Global: Women, Work, and Citizenship in the Pakistani Diaspora*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- Amrute, Sareeta. 2016. *Encoding Race, Encoding Class: Indian IT Workers in Berlin*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Andersson, Ruben. 2014a. “Time and the Migrant Other: European Border Controls and the Temporal Economics of Illegality.” *American Anthropologist* 116(4): 795–809.
- . 2014b. *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Angel-Ajani, Asale. 2002. “Diasporic Conditions: Mapping the Discourse of Race and Criminality in Italy.” *Transforming Anthropology* 11(1): 36–46.



- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. "Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography." In *The Geography of Identity*, edited by Patricia Yaeger, 40–58. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Avenarius, Christine. 2002. "Work and Social Network Composition among Immigrants from Taiwan to Southern California." *Anthropology of Work Review* 23: 3–15.
- Baker, Wayne, and Andrew Shryock. 2009. "Citizenship in Crisis." In *Citizenship and Crisis: Arab Detroit after 9/11*, edited by Detroit Arab American Study Team, 3–32. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Baker-Cristales, Beth. 2008. "Magical Pursuits: Legitimacy and Representation in a Transnational Political Field." *American Anthropologist* 110(3): 349–59.
- Banks, Marcus. 1996. *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions*. New York: Routledge.
- Barrett, Stanley R. 1997. *Anthropology: A Student's Guide to Theory and Method*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
- Barth, Frederik, ed. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Bava, Sophie. 2011. "Migration and Religious Studies in France: Evolving toward a Religious Anthropology of Movement." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 493–507.
- Belloni, Milena. 2019. *The Big Gamble: The Migration of Eritreans to Europe*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Besteman, Catherine. 2016. *Making Refuge: Somali Bantu Refugees and Lewiston, Maine*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- Bhachu, Parminder. 1993. "Twice and Direct Migrant Sikhs: Caste, Class and Identity in Pre- and Post-1984 Britain." In *Immigration and Entrepreneurship*, edited by Ivan Light and Parminder Bhachu, 163–83. New Brunswick: Transaction Press.
- Bloch, Alexia. 2013. "Citizenship, Belonging, and Moldovan Migrants in Post-Soviet Russia." *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology* 78(3): 1–28.
- Boehm, Deborah A. 2012. *Intimate Migrations: Gender, Family and Illegality among Transnational Mexicans*. New York: New York University Press.
- . 2016. *Returned: Going and Coming in an Age of Deportation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Boccagni, Paolo, and Mieke Schrooten. 2018. "Participant Observation in Migration Studies: An Overview of Some Emerging Issues." In *Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies*, edited by R. Zapata Barrero and E. Yalaz, 209–25. Berlin: IMISCOE Research Series, Springer.
- Borneman, John. 1998. "Emigrées as Bullets/Immigration as Penetration; Perceptions of the Marielitos." In *Subversions of International Order: Studies in the Political Anthropology of Culture*, edited by John Borneman, 249–72. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Bowen, John R. 2007. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bramadat, Paul A. 2001. "Shows, Selves, and Solidarity: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Spectacles in Canada." *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal* 33: 78–100.
- Brennan, Denise. 2014. *Life Interrupted: Trafficking into Forced Labor in the United States*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- Brettell, Caroline B. 1986. *Men Who Migrate, Women Who Wait: Population and History in a Portuguese Parish*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2003a. "Emigrar para Voltar: A Portuguese Ideology of Return Migration." In *Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity and Identity*, edited by Caroline B. Brettell, 57–74. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.

- . 2003b. “Bringing the City Back In: Cities as Contexts for Immigrant Incorporation.” In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, edited by Nancy Foner, 163–96. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- . 2008. “Immigrants as Netizens: Political Mobilization in Cyberspace.” In *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, edited by Deborah Reed-Danahay and Caroline B. Brettell, 226–43. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- . 2009. “Anthropology, Migration, and Comparative Consciousness.” *New Literary History* 40(3): 649–671.
- . 2016. *Gender and Migration*. London: Polity Press.
- . 2017. “Marriage and Migration.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 46: 81–97.
- . 2018. “Conceptualizing Migration and Mobility in Anthropology: An Historical Analysis.” *Transitions: Journal of Transient Migrations* 2(1): 3–21.
- . 2020. “Thinking with Comparison in the Anthropology/Historical Anthropology of Migration.” In *Comparing Cultures: Innovations in Comparative Ethnography*, edited by Michael Schnegg and Edward D. Lowe, 23–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brettell, Caroline B., ed. 2007. *Crossing Borders/ Constructing Boundaries: Race, Ethnicity and Immigration*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Brettell, Caroline B., and Patricia A. deBerjeois. 1992. “Anthropology and the Study of Immigrant Women.” In *Seeking Common Ground: Multidisciplinary Studies of Immigrant Women in the United States*, edited by Donna Gabaccia, 41–64. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Brettell, Caroline B., and Faith E. Nibbs. 2009. “Lived Hybridity: Second-Generation Identity Construction through College Festival.” *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 16: 678–99.
- Brettell, Caroline B., and Deborah Reed-Danahay. 2012. *Civic Engagements: The Citizenship Practices of Indian and Vietnamese Immigrants*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brodwin, Paul. 2003. “Marginality and Subjectivity in the Haitian Diaspora.” *Anthropological Quarterly* 76: 383–410.
- Bryceson, Deborah, and Ulla Vuorela. 2002. *The Transnational Family: New European Frontiers and Global Networks*. Oxford: Berg.
- Cabot, Heath. 2012. “The Governance of Things: Documenting Limbo in the Greek Asylum Procedure.” *POLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 35(1): 11–29.
- . 2013. “The Social Esthetics of Eligibility: NGO Aid and Interdeterminacy in the Greek Asylum Process.” *American Ethnologist* 40(3): 452–66.
- Caglar, Ayse. 2010. “Rescaling Cities, Cultural Diversity and Transnationalism: Migrants of Mardin and Essen.” In *Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, edited by Steven Vertovec, 113–138. New York and London: Routledge.
- Caglar, Ayse, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2018. *Migrants and City-Making: Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban Regeneration*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Carling, Jorgen, Cecilia Menjivar, and Leah Schmalzbauer. 2012. “Central Themes in the Study of Transnational Parenthood.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(2): 191–217.
- Carney, Megan A. 2015. *The Unending Hunger: Tracing Women and Food Insecurity across Borders*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Castañeda, Heide. 2008. "Paternity for Sale: Anxieties over "Demographic Theft" and Undocumented Migrant Reproduction in Germany." *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 22(4): 340–59.
- Chavez, Leo. 1988. "Settlers and Sojourners: The Case of Mexicans in the United States." *Human Organization* 47: 95–107.
- . 2001. *Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2008. *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2016. *Anchor Babies and the Challenge of Birthright Citizenship*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Childs, Geoff, and Namgyal Choedup. 2018. *From a Trickle to a Torrent: Education, Migration, and Social Change in a Himalayan Valley of Nepal*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chu, Julie Y. 2010. *Cosmologies of Credit: Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Clarke, Darryl Victor. 2004. *Mapping Yoruba Networks: Power and Agency in the Making of Transnational Communities*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Coe, Cati. 2014. *The Scattered Family: Parenting, African Migrants, and Global Inequality*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Cohen, Abner. 1969. *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- . 1993. *Masquerade Politics: Explorations in the Structure of Urban Cultural Movements*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cohen, Jeffrey H. 2004. *The Culture of Migration in Southern Mexico*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- . 2011. "Migration, Remittances and Household Strategies." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 103–14.
- Cohen, Jeffrey H., and Ibrahim Sirkeci. 2011. *Cultures of Migration: The Global Nature of Contemporary Mobility*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Cohen, Jeffrey H., and Ibrahim Sirkeci, eds. 2021. *Handbook of Culture and Migration*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Cole, Jeffrey. 1997. *The New Racism in Europe: A Sicilian Ethnography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. "Reducing Damage: Dilemmas of Anti-Trafficking Efforts among Nigerian Prostitutes in Palermo." *Anthropologica* 48(2): 217–27.
- Cole, Jennifer, and Christian Groes. 2016. *Affective Circuits: African Migrations to Europe and the Pursuit of Social Regeneration*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Coll, Kathleen M. 2010. *Remaking Citizenship: Latina Immigrants and New American Politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Constable, Nicola. 2007. *Maid to Order in Hong Kong*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2014. *Born Out of Place: Migrant Mothers and the Politics of International Labor*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2003a. *Legalizing Moves; Salvadoran Immigrants' Struggle for US Residency*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- . 2003b. "Suspension of Deportation Hearings and Measures of Americanness." *The Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 8(2): 58–95.
- . 2005. "Being En Route." *American Anthropologist* 107: 195–206.

- Cunningham, Hilary, and Josia M. Heyman. 2004. "Introduction; Mobilities and Enclosures at Borders." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 11: 289–302.
- Dahya, B. 1973. "Pakistanis in Britain: Transients or Settlers." *Race* 14: 241–77.
- Das, Veena, and Deborah Poole, eds. 2004. *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*. Oxford: James Currey.
- David, Ann R. 2012. "Sacralising the City: Sound, Space and Performance in Hindu Ritual Practices in London." *Culture and Religion* 13(4): 449–67.
- De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. "Migrant 'Illegality' and Reputability in Everyday Life." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31: 419–47.
- De Genova, Nicholas, ed. 2017. *The Borders of Europe: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*. Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press.
- De Jaeghere, Joan G., and Kate S. McCleary. 2010. "The Making of Mexican Migrant Youth Civic Identities: Transnational Spaces and Imaginaries." *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 41(3): 228–44.
- Dick, Hilary Parsons. 2011. "Language and Migration to the United States." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 227–40.
- Donnan, Hastings, and Prina Werbner, eds. 1991. *Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Dorsey, Margaret E., and Miguel Díaz-Barriga. 2015. "The Constitution Free Zone in the United States: Law and Life in a State of Carcelment." *PolAR* 38(2): 204–25.
- Dossa, Parin, and Catie Coe, eds. 2017. *Transnational Aging and Reconfigurations of Kin Work*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Du Toit, Brian. 1975. "A Decision-Making Model for the Study of Migration." In *Migration and Urbanization: Models and Adaptive Strategies*, edited by Brian Du Toit and Helen I. Safa, 49–74. The Hague: Mouton.
- Eastmond, Marita. 2007. "Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20(2): 248–64.
- Ebaugh, Helen Rose, and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, eds. 2000. *Religion and the New Immigrants*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- England, Sarah. 2006. *Afro Central Americans in New York City: Garifuna Tales of Transnational Movements in Racialized Space*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Epstein, A.L. 1958. *Politics in an Urban African Community*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- . 1961. "The Network and Urban Social Organization." *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal* 29: 29–62.
- Epstein, Beth S. 2011. *Collective Terms: Race, Culture, and Community in a State-Planned City in France*. New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books.
- Erickson, Brad. 2011. "Utopian Virtues: Muslim Neighbors, Ritual Sociality, and the Politics of Convivencia." *American Ethnologist* 38(1): 114–31.
- Ewing, Karen P. 2008. *Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fassin, Didier. 2011. "Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40(1): 213–26.
- Fassin, Didier, and Estelle d'Halluin. 2005. "The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence for Asylum Seekers." *American Anthropologist* 107(4): 597–608.
- . 2007. "Critical Evidence; the Politics of Trauma in French Asylum Policies." *Ethos* 35(3): 300–29.

- Feldman, Ilana. 2018. *Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Fitts, Shanan, and Greg McClure. 2015. "Building social Capital in Hightown: The Role of Confianza in Latina Immigrants' Social Networks in the New South." *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 46(3): 295–311.
- Fleuriet, Kathryn Jill, and Heide Castañeda. 2017. "A Risky Place? Media and the Health Landscape in the (In)secure US-Mexico Borderlands." *North American Dialogue* 20(2): 32–46.
- Flores, William V. 2003. "New Citizens, New Rights: Undocumented Immigrants and Latino Cultural Citizenship." *Latin American Perspectives* 30(2): 87–100.
- Foner, Nancy. 1987a. "Introduction: New Immigrants and Changing Patterns in New York City." In *New Immigrants in New York*, edited by Nancy Foner, 1–33. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1987b. "The Jamaicans: Race and Ethnicity among Migrants in New York City." In *New Immigrants in New York*, edited by Nancy Foner, 195–217. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2005. *In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration*. New York: New York University Press.
- Foner, Nancy, and George Fredrickson, eds. 2004. *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Fong, Vanessa. 2011. *Paradise Redefined: Transnational Chinese Students and the Quest for Flexible Citizenship in the Developed World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Frank, Andre Gundle. 1967. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frank-Vitale, Amelia. 2020. "Stuck in Motion: Inhabiting the Space of Transit in Central American Migration." *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 25(1): 67–83.
- Frischkorn, Rebecca. 2015. "Political Economy of Control: Urban Refugees and the Regulation of Space in Lusaka, Zambia." *Economic Anthropology* 2(1): 205–23.
- Gabiam, Nell. 2016. *The Politics of Suffering: Syria's Palestinian Refugee Camps*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Gálvez, Alyshia. 2013. "Immigrant Citizenship: Neoliberalism, Immobility and the Vernacular Meanings of Citizenship." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 20(6): 720–37.
- Gamburd, Michele Ruth. 2000. *The Kitchen Spoon's Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka's Migrant Housemaids*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Garbin, David. 2012. "Marching for God in the Global City: Public Space, Religion and Diasporic Identities in a Transnational African Church." *Culture and Religion* 13(4): 425–47.
- . 2013. "The Visibility and Invisibility of Migrant Faith in the City: Diaspora Religion and the Politics of Emplacement of Afro-Christian Churches." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(5): 677–96.
- Garcia, San Juanita. 2017. "Bridging Critical Race Theory and Migration: Moving Beyond Assimilation Theories." *Sociology Compass* 11(6): 1–10.
- Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. *City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." In *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, edited by Clifford Geertz, 3–30. New York: Basic Books.
- Getrich, Christina M. 2019. *Border Brokers: Children of Mexican Immigrants Navigating U.S. Society, Laws, and Politics*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
- Ghosh, Sahana. 2019. "Everything Must Match: Detection, Deception, and Migrant Illegality in the India-Bangladesh Borderlands." *American Anthropologist* 121(4): 870–83.
- Gibau, Gina. 2005. "Contested Identities: Race and Ethnicity in the Cape Verdean Diaspora." *Identities* 12: 405–38.
- Giordano, Cristiana. 2008. "Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy." *American Ethnologist* 35(4): 588–606.
- Glick Schiller, Nina. 2003. "The Centrality of Ethnography in the Study of Transnational Migration: Seeing the Wetlands Instead of the Swamp." In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, edited by Nancy Foner, 99–128. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- . 2011. "Localized Neoliberalism, Multiculturalism and Global Religion: Exploring the Agency of Migrants and City Boosters." *Economy and Society* 40(2): 184–210.
- . 2015. "Explanatory Frameworks in Transnational Migration Studies: The Missing Multi-Scalar Global Perspective." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38(13): 2275–82.
- . 2018. "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times." *Nordic Journal of Migration* 8(4): 201–12.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, eds. 1992. *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- . 1995. "From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transitional Migration." *Anthropological Quarterly* 68: 48–63.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, and Ayse Caglar. 2008. "'And Ye Shall Possess It, and Dwell Therein': Social Citizenship, Global Christianity, and Nonethnic Immigrant Incorporation." In *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, edited by Deborah Reed-Danahay and Caroline B. Brettell, 203–25. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, and Ayse Caglar, eds. 2011. *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Eugene Fouron. 2001. *Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Glick Schiller, Nina, and Noel B. Salazar. 2013. "Regimes of Mobility across the Globe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(2): 183–200.
- Gmelch, George. 1980. "Return Migration." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 9: 135–59.
- . 1992. *Double Passage: The Lives of Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back Home*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gmelch, George, and Sharon Bohn Gmelch. 1995. "Gender and Migration: The Readjustment of Women Migrants in Barbados, Ireland, and Newfoundland." *Human Organization* 54: 470–73.
- Gomberg-Muñoz, Ruth. 2016a. "Criminalized Workers: Introduction to Special Issue on Migrant Labor and Mass Deportation." *Anthropology of Work Review* 37(1): 3–10.



- . 2016b. “The Juárez Wives Club: Gendered Citizenship and US Immigration Law.” *American Ethnologist* 43(2): 339–52.
- Gonzales, Roberto G., and Leo R. Chavez. 2012. “Awakening to a Nightmare: Abjectivity and Illegality in the Lives of Undocumented 1.5 Generation Latino Immigrants in the United States.” *Current Anthropology* 53(3): 255–81.
- Gonzalez, Nancie L. 1961. “Family Organization in Five Types of Migratory Wage Labor.” *American Anthropologist* 63: 1264–80.
- . 1992. *Dollar, Dove and Eagle. One Hundred Years of Palestinian Migration in Honduras*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gonzalez, Nancie, and Carolyn S. McComon, eds. 1989. *Conflict, Migration and Expression of Ethnicity*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Goode, Judith, and J.A. Schneider. 1994. *Reshaping Ethnic and Racial Relations in Philadelphia: Immigrants in a Divided City*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Green, Sarah. 2013. “Borders and the Relocations of Europe.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42: 345–61.
- Gregoricka, Lesley. 2021. “Moving Forward: A Bioarchaeology of Mobility and Migration.” *Journal of Archaeological Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10814-020-09155-9>.
- Grillo, Ralph. 1985. *Ideologies and Institutions in Urban France. The Representation of Immigrants*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004. “Islam and Transnationalism.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30(5): 861–78.
- . 2005. “‘Saltdean Can’t Cope’: Protests against Asylum-Seekers in an English Seaside Suburb.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28(2): 235–60.
- . 2010. “An Excess of Alterity? Debating Difference in a Multicultural Society.” In *Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, edited by Steven Vertovec, 19–38. New York: Routledge.
- Grillo, Ralph, and Jeff Pratt. 2002. *The Politics of Recognizing Difference: Multiculturalism Italian-Style*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Grillo, Ralph, and Bruno Riccio. 2004. “Translocal Development: Italy-Senegal.” *Population, Space and Place* 10: 99–111.
- Gullette, Gregory S. 2012. “State Tourism, Labour Mobilities, and Remittance Potentials within Huatulco, Oaxaca.” *International Journal of Tourism Anthropology* 2(4): 299–317.
- . 2013. “The Role of Urbanity, Status and Identity on Migrant Remittance Management and Rural Development Potentials in Thailand.” *Human Organization* 72(2): 132–43.
- Gupta, Akhil. 1992. “The Song of the Non-aligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism.” *Cultural Anthropology* 7: 63–79.
- Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. 1997. “Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the End of an Era.” In *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, edited by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, 1–29. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Gutkind, Peter C. W. 1965. “African Urbanism, Mobility and the Social Network.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 6: 48–60.
- Haas, Bridget M. 2017. “Citizens-in-Waiting, Deportees-in-Waiting: Power, Temporality, and Suffering in the U.S. Asylum System.” *Ethos* 45(1): 75–97.
- Haenn, Nora. 2020. *Marriage after Migration: An Ethnography of Money, Romance, and Gender in Globalizing Mexico*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hannaford, Dinah. 2017. *Marriage without Borders: Transnational Spouses in Neoliberal Senegal*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.



- Harney, Nicholas. 2002. "Building Italian Regional Identity in Toronto: Using Space to Make Cultural Material." *Anthropologica* 44: 43–54.
- Heidbrink, Lauren. 2019. "The Coercive Power of Debt: Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth." *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 24(1): 263–81.
- . 2020. *Migranthood: Youth in a New Era of Deportation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Heyman, Josiah McC. 2001. "Class and Classification at the U.S.-Mexican Border." *Human Organization* 60(2): 128–40.
- Hirsch, Jennifer S. 2003. *A Courtship after Marriage: Sexuality and Love in Mexican Transnational Families*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Holmes, Seth M. 2013. *Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farm Workers in the United States*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Holmes, Seth M., and Heide Castañeda. 2014. "Ethnographic Research in Migration and Health." In *Migration and Health: A Research Methods Handbook*, edited by Marc B. Schenker, Xóchitl Castañeda, and Alfonso Rodríguez-Lainz, 265–77. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Holmes, Seth M., and Heide Castañeda. 2016. "Representing the "European Refugee Crisis" in Germany and Beyond: Deservingness and Difference, Life and Death." *American Ethnologist* 43(1): 12–24.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. 1994. *Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Horton, Sarah. 2004. "Different Subjects: The Health Care System's Participation in the Differential Construction of the Cultural Citizenship of Cuban Refugees and Mexican Immigrants." *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 18(4): 472–89.
- . 2008. "Consuming Childhood: 'Lost' and 'Ideal' Childhood as a Motivation for Migration." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81(4): 925–43.
- . 2009. "'A Mother's Heart is Weighed Down with Stones': A Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Transnational Motherhood." *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 33: 21–40.
- Indra, Doreen, ed. 1999. *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Inhorn, Marcia C. 2018. *America's Arab Refugees: Vulnerability and Health on the Margins*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Jenkins, Richard. 1997. *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Jusionyte, Ieva. 2018. "Called to 'Ankle Alley': Tactical Infrastructure, Migrant Injuries, and Emergency Medical Services on the US-Mexico Border." *American Anthropologist* 120(10): 89–101.
- Kallius, Annastiina, Daniel Monterescu, and Prem Kumar Rajaram. 2016. "Immobilizing Mobility: Border Ethnography, Illiberal Democracy, and the Politics of the Refugee Crisis in Hungary." *American Ethnologist* 43(1): 1–13.
- Kearney, Michael. 1986. "From the Invisible Hand to Visible Feet: Anthropological Studies of Migration and Development." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15: 331–404.
- . 1995. "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 547–65.
- Kelley, Carol E. 2013. *Accidental Immigrants and the Search for Home: Women, Cultural Identity, and Community*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

- Keough, Leyla J. 2016. *Worker-Mothers on the Margins of Europe: Gender and Migration Between Moldova and Istanbul*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Kilkey, Majella, Diane Perrons, and Ania Plomien. 2013. *Gender, Migration and Domestic Work: Masculinities, Male Labour and Fathering in the UK and USA*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kivisto, Peter. 2014. *Religion and Immigration: Migrant Faiths in North America and Western Europe*. London: Polity Press.
- Koptiuch, Kristin. 1996. "Cultural Defense and Criminological Displacements: Gender, Race, and (Trans)nation in the Legal Surveillance of U.S. Diaspora Asians." In *Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity*, edited by Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, 215–33. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Koven, Michele. 2004. "Transnational Perspectives on Sociolinguistic Capital among Luso-Descendants in France and Portugal." *American Ethnologist* 31: 270–90.
- Kwon, June Hee. 2015. "The Work of Waiting: Love and Money in Korean Chinese Transnational Migration." *Cultural Anthropology* 30(3): 477–500.
- Laguerre, Michel S. 1998. *Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lamphere, Louise, ed. 1992. *Structuring Diversity: Ethnographic Perspectives on the New Immigration*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lan, Shanshan. 2016. "The Shifting Meanings of Race in China: A Case Study of the African Diaspora Communities in Guangzhou." *City and Society* 28(3): 298–318.
- Leonard, Karen Isaksen, Alex Stepick, Manuel A. Vasquez, and Jennifer Holdaway. 2005. *Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- Lessinger, Johanna. 1995. *From the Ganges to the Hudson: Indian Immigrants in New York City*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Levitt, Peggy. 1998a. "Local-Level Global Religion: The Case of U.S.-Dominican Migration." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37: 74–89.
- . 1998b. "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion." *International Migration Review* 32: 926–48.
- . 2007. *God Needs No Passport: Immigrants and the Changing American Religious Landscape*. New York: The New Press.
- Liebelt, Claudia. 2011. *Caring for the "Holy Land": Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel*. New York: Berghahn.
- Ling, Minhua. 2020. *The Inconvenient Generation: Migrant Youth Coming of Age on Shanghai's Edge*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lockwood, Victoria S. 1990. "Development and Return Migration to Rural French Polynesia." *International Migration Review* 24: 347–71.
- Long, Lynnelly D., and Ellen Oxfeld. 2004. *Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stayed Behind*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Loyalka, Michelle. 2013. *Eating Bitterness: Stories From the Front Lines of China's Great Urban Migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Madziva, Roda, and Elisabetta Zontini. 2012. "Transnational Mothering and Forced Migration: Understanding the Experiences of Zimbabwean Mothers in the UK." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 19: 428–43.
- Mahler, Sarah J., and Patricia R. Pessar. 2006. "Gender Mattes: Ethnographers Bring Gender from the Periphery toward the Core of Migration Studies." *International Migration Review* 40: 27–63.

- Mai, Nicola. 2002. "Myths and Moral Panics: Italian Identity and the Media Representation of Albanian Immigration." In *The Politics of Recognizing Difference: Multiculturalism Italian-Style*, edited by Ralph Grillo and Jeff Pratt, 77–94. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Mains, Daniel. 2007. "Neoliberal Times: Progress, Boredom and Shame among Young Men in Urban Ethiopia." *American Ethnologist* 34(4): 659–73.
- Maira, Sunaina. 2004. "Youth Culture, Citizenship and Globalization: South Asian Muslim Youth in the United States after September 11th." *Comparative Studies of South Asian, Africa and the Middle East* 24: 18–30.
- Malkki, Liisa H. 1995. "Refugees and Exile: From "Refugee Studies" to the National Order of Things." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 495–523.
- . 1996. "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism and Dehistoricization." *Cultural Anthropology* 11(3): 377–404.
- Mandel, Ruth. 1989. "Ethnicity and Identity among Guestworkers in West Berlin." In *Conflict, Migration, and the Expression of Ethnicity*, edited by Nancie L. Gonzalez and Carolyn S. McCommon, 60–74. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- . 1990. "Shifting Centers and Emergent Identities: Turkey and Germany in the Lives of Turkish Gastarbeiter." In *Muslim Travelers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination*, edited by Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, 153–71. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Mankekar, Purnima. 2002. "India Shopping: Indian Grocery Stores and Transnational Configurations of Belonging." *Ethnos* 67: 75–98.
- Margolis, Maxine. 1995. "Transnationalism and Popular Culture: The Case of Brazilian Immigrants in the United States." *Journal of Popular Culture* 29: 29–41.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review* 19: 431–66.
- . 1994. "An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case." *Population and Development Review* 20: 699–751.
- Mathews, Gordon, Dan Lin, and Yang Yang. 2014. "How to Evade States and Slip Past Borders: Lessons from Traders, Overstayers, and Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong and China." *City & Society* 26(2): 217–38.
- McAttackney, Laura, and Randall H. McGuire, eds. 2020. *Walling In and Walling Out: Why Are We Building New Barriers to Divide Us?* Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research.
- Mead, Margaret. 1930. *Growing Up in New Guinea*. New York: Mentor Books.
- Melly, Caroline M. 2011. "Titanic Tales of Missing Men: Reconfigurations of National Identity and Gendered Presence in Dakar, Senegal." *American Ethnologist* 38(2): 361–76.
- Min, Pyong Gap, and Jung Ha Kim, eds. 2002. *Religions in Asian America: Building Faith Communities*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- Mitchell, J. Clyde. 1957. "The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia." *Rhodes Livingstone Papers*, no. 27. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- . 1971. *Social Networks in Urban Situations*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Modood, Tariq, and Pnina Werbner, eds. 1997. *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community*. London: Zed Books Limited.
- Monroe, Kristin. 2014. "Labor and the Urban Landscape: Mobility, Risk, and Possibility among Syrian Delivery Workers in Beirut." *Anthropology of Work Review* 35(2): 84–94.

- Nawyn, Stephanie. 2010. "Gender and Migration: Integrating Feminist Theory into Migration Studies." *Sociology Compass* 4(9): 749–65.
- Núñez, Guillermina Gina, and Josiah Mc Heyman. 2007. "Entrapment Processes and Immigrant Communities in a Time of Heightened Border Vigilance." *Human Organization* 66(4): 354–65.
- O'Connor, Mary. 1990. "Women's Networks and the Social Needs of Mexican Immigrants." *Urban Anthropology* 19: 81–98.
- Oka, Rahul Chandrashekhar. 2014. "Coping with the Refugee Wait: The Role of Consumption, Normalcy, and Dignity in Refugee Lives at Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya." *American Anthropologist* 116(1): 23–36.
- Olwig, Karen Fog. 1999. "Narratives of the Children Left Behind: Home and Identity in Globalized Caribbean Families." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25(2): 267–84.
- . 2007. *Caribbean Journeys: An Ethnography of Migration and Home in Three Family Networks*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1996. "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States." *Current Anthropology* 37: 737–62.
- . 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2003. *Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ordoñez, Juan Thomas. 2008. "The State of Confusion: Reflections on Central American Asylum Seekers in the Bay Area." *Ethnography* 9(1): 35–60.
- . 2015. *Jornalero: Being a Day Laborer in the USA*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ortner, Sherry. 1996. "Making Gender: Toward a Feminist, Minority, Postcolonial, Subaltern, etc., Theory of Practice." In *Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture*, edited by Sherry Ortner, 1–20. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Osella, Filippo, and Caroline Osella. 2000. "Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 6(1): 115–31.
- Paerregaard, Karsten. 2015. *Return to Sender: The Moral Economy of Peru's Migrant Remittances*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Park, Kyeyoung. 1989. "Born Again": What Does it Mean to Korean-Americans in New York City." *Journal of Ritual Studies* 3: 287–301.
- Park, Yoon Jung. 2006. "Sojourners or Settlers: Early Constructions of Chinese Identity in South Africa." *African Studies* 65(2): 201–23.
- Parreñas, Rachel S. 2001. *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2011. *Illicit Flirtations: Labor, Migration, and Sex Trafficking in Tokyo*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Parreñas, Rhacel S., and Lok C. D. Siu, eds. 2007. *Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Partridge, Damani J. 2012. *Hypersexuality and Headscarves: Race, Sex, and Citizenship in the New Germany*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Paz, Alejandro I. 2019. "Communicating Citizenship." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 48: 77–93.
- Pero, Davide. 2007. *Inclusionary Rhetoric/Exclusionary Practices: Left-Wing Politics and Migrants in Italy*. New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books.

- Pessar, Patricia R. 2003. "Anthropology and the Engendering of Migration Studies." In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigrants*, edited by Nancy Foner, 75–98. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- Petryna, Adriana, and Karolina Follis. 2015. "Risks of Citizenship and Fault Lines of Survival." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 44: 401–17.
- Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. "Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal." *Current Anthropology* 47(2): 217–41.
- Plascencia, Luis F. B. 2009. "The 'Undocumented' Mexican Migrant Question: Re-examining the Framing of Law and Illegalization in the United States." *Urban Anthropology* 38(2–4): 375–434.
- Poros, Maritsa. 2001. "The Role of Migrant Networks in Linking Local Labour Markets: The Case of Asian Indian Migration to New York and London." *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 1: 243–60.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1997. "Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities." *International Migration Review* 31: 799–825.
- Pribilsky, Jason. 2012. "Consumption Dilemmas: Tracking Masculinity, Money and Transnational Fatherhood between the Ecuadorian Andes and New York City." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(2): 323–43.
- Quesada, James. 2011. "'No Soy Welferero': Undocumented Latino Laborers in the Crosshairs of Legitimation Maneuvers." *Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in Health and Illness* 30(4): 386–408.
- Ralston, Helen. 1992. "Religion in the Life of South Asian Immigrant Women in Atlantic Canada." *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion* 4: 245–60.
- Ramsay, Georgina. 2017. "Benevolent Cruelty: Forced Child Removal, African Refugee Settlers, and the State Mandate of Child Protection." *PoLAR* 40(2): 245–61.
- Reed-Danahay, Deborah, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds. 2008. *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Reeves, Madeleine. 2013. "Clear 'Fake': Authenticating Documents and Persons in Migrant Moscow." *American Ethnologist* 40(3): 508–24.
- Renteln, Allison D. 2004. *The Cultural Defense*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rhoades, Robert E. 1978a. "Intra-European Migration and Rural Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case." *Human Organization* 37: 136–47.
- . 1978b. "Foreign Labor and German Industrial Capitalism 1871–1978: The Evolution of a Migratory System." *American Ethnologist* 5: 553–75.
- Riccio, Bruno. 2000. "The Italian Construction of Immigration: Sedentarist and Corporatist Narratives Facing Transnational Migration in Emilia-Romagna." *The Anthropological Journal on European Cultures* 9(2): 53–74.
- . 2001. "From 'Ethnic Group' to 'Transnational Community'? Senegalese Migrants' Ambivalent Experiences and Multiple Trajectories." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27: 583–99.
- . 2011. "Rehearsing Transnational Citizenship: Senegalese Associations, Co-Development and Simultaneous Inclusion." *African Diaspora* 4: 97–113.
- Richman, Karen E. 2008. "'Call Us Vote People': Citizenship, Migration, and Transnational Politics in Haitian and Mexican Locations." In *Citizenship, Political Engagement, and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States*, edited by Deborah Reed-Danahay and Caroline B. Brettell, 162–180. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Rogozen-Soltar, Mikaela. 2012. "Managing Muslim Visibility: Conversion, Immigration and Spanish Imaginaries of Islam." *American Anthropologist* 114(4): 611–23.

- Rosaldo, Renato, and William V. Flores. 1997. "Identity, Conflict, and Evolving Latino Communities: Cultural Citizenship in San Jose, California." In *Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights*, edited by William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor, 57–96. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Rosales, Rocio. 2014. "Stagnant Immigrant Social Networks and Cycles of Exploitation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(14): 2564–79.
- Rottman, Susan. 2013. "Cultivating and Contesting Order: European 'Turks' and Negotiations of Neighborliness at 'Home.'" *Anthropology of the Middle East* 8(2): 1–20.
- Rouse, Roger. 1995. "Thinking through Transnationalism: Notes on the Cultural Politics of Class Relations in the Contemporary United States." *Public Culture* 7: 353–402.
- Ryan, Louise. 2008. "I Had a Sister in England": Family-Led Migration, Social Networks and Irish Nurses." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34(3): 453–70.
- Saint-Blancat, Chantal, and Adriano Cancellieri. 2014. "From Invisibility to Visibility? The Appropriation of Public Space through a Religious Ritual: The Filipino Procession of Santacruzán in Padua, Italy." *Social and Cultural Geography* 15(6): 645–63.
- Sala, Emanuela and Loretta Baldassar. 2017. "Leaving Family to Return to Family: Roots Migration among Second-Generation Italian-Australians." *Ethos* 45(3): 386–408.
- Salih, Ruba. 2003. *Gender in Transnationalism: Home, Longing and Belonging among Moroccan Migrant Women*. New York: Routledge.
- Sargent, Carolyn F. 2006. "Lamenting the "Winter" of French Fertility: Politics, Power, and Reproduction among Malian Migrants in Paris." *Curare* 29: 71–80.
- . 2012. "'Deservingness' and the Politics of Health Care." *Social Science and Medicine* 74: 855–857.
- Saunders, Jennifer B., Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Susanna Snyder, eds. 2016. *Intersections of Religion and Migration: Issues at the Global Crossroads*. New York: Palgrave-McMillan.
- Schneider, Jo-Anne. 1990. "Defining Boundaries, Creating Contacts: Puerto Rican and Polish Presentation of Group Identity through Ethnic Parades." *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 18: 33–57.
- Schmalzbauer, Leah. 2014. *The Last Best Place? Gender, Family, and Migration in the New West*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Schweizer, Thomas. 1998. "Epistemology: The Nature and Validation of Anthropological Knowledge." In *Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology*, edited by H. Russell Bernard, 39–87. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- Sharma, Aradhana, and Akhil Gupta, eds. 2006. *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Shaw, Jennifer E. 2020. "Tender Labor: Transnational Young People and Continuums of Familial Care." *Anthropology of Work Review* 41(1): 14–23.
- Shrestha, Tina. 2019. "Asylum-Seeking Work, Precariousness, and the Making of Claimant-Workers." *Anthropology of Work Review* 40(1): 47–57.
- Shweder, Richard A. 2003. "The Moral Challenge in Cultural Migration." In *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, edited by Nancy Foner, 259–94. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- Silverstein, Paul A. 2004. *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- . 2005. "Immigration, Racialization, and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration and Immigration in the New Europe." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34: 363–84.
- Sirkeci, Ibrahim, Jeffrey Cohen, and Pinar Yazgan. 2016. *Conflict, Insecurity and Mobility*. London: Transnational Press.



- Siu, Lok C. D. 2005. *Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Stephen, Lynn. 2003. "Cultural Citizenship and Labor Rights for Oregon Farmworkers: The Case of Pineros y Camposinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN)." *Human Organization* 62(1): 27–38.
- Stepick, Alex. 1998. *Pride against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States*. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Stepick, Alex, Terry Rey, and Sarah J. Mahler. 2009. *Churches and Charity in the Immigrant City: Religion, Immigration and Civic Engagement in Miami*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo, Tasha Darbes, Sandra Isabel Dias, and Matt Sutin. 2011. "Migrations and Schooling." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 311–28.
- Taliani, Simona. 2012. "Coercion, Fetishes and Suffering in the Daily Lives of Young Nigerian Women in Italy." *Africa* 82(4): 579–608.
- Tarlo, Emma. 2010. *Visibly Muslim: Fashion, Politics, Faith*. Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers.
- Thiranagama, Sharika. 2014. "Making Tigers from Tamils: Long-Distance Nationalism and Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto." *American Anthropologist* 116(2): 265–78.
- Ticktin, Miriam. 2011. *Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 2001. "The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization." *Current Anthropology* 42(1): 125–38.
- Tseng, Yen-Fen. 2002. "From 'Us' to 'Them': Diasporic Linkages and Identity Politics." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9: 383–404.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2003. *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2007. "When Minorities Migrate: The Racialization of the Japanese Brazilians in Brazil and Japan." In *Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions*, edited by Rhacel S. Parrenas and Lok C. D. Siu, 225–51. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Tweed, Thomas A. 1997. *Our Lady of the Exile: Diasporic Religion at a Cuban Catholic Shrine in Miami*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven. 1999. "Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22: 447–62.
- . 2009. *Transnationalism*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2010a. "Introduction: New Directions in the Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism." In *Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, edited by Stephen Vertovec, 1–17. New York and London: Routledge.
- . 2010b. "Super-Diversity and Its Implications." In *Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, edited by Steven Vertovec, 65–95. New York and London: Routledge.
- . 2011. "The Cultural Politics of Nation and Migration." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 241–56.
- Vogt, Wendy A. 2013. "Crossing Mexico: Structural Violence and the Commodification of Undocumented Central American Migrants." *American Ethnologist* 40(4): 764–80.
- Vora, Neha. 2008. "Producing Diasporas and Globalization: Indian Middle Class Migrants in Dubai." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81(2): 377–406.
- . 2011. "From Golden Frontier to Global City: Shifting Forms of Belonging, 'Freedom' and Governance among Indian Businessmen in Dubai." *American Anthropologist* 113(2): 306–18.



- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- Warner, R. Stephen, and Judith G. Wittner, eds. 1998. *Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Watson, James L. 2005. "Virtual Kinship, Real Estate, and Diaspora Formation—The Man Lineage Revisited." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 63: 893–910.
- Werbner, Pnina. 1990. *The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts, and Offerings among British Pakistanis*. New York: Berg Publishers.
- . 1996. "Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: Zikr and the Sacralizing of Space among British Muslims." In *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe*, edited by Barbara Daly Metcalf, 167–85. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2002. "The Place Which is Disapora: Citizenship, Religion and Gender in the Making of Chaordic Transnationalism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28: 119–34.
- Werbner, Pnina, and Nira Yuval-Davis. 1999. "Introduction: Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship." In *Women, Citizenship and Difference*, edited by Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina Werbner, 1–38. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Wessendorf, S. 2008. "Culturalist Discourses on Inclusion and Exclusion: The Swiss Citizenship Debate." *Social Anthropology* 16: 187–202.
- White, Jenny. 1997. "Turks in the New Germany." *American Anthropologist* 99(4): 754–69.
- Whitehouse, Bruce. 2009. "Transnational Childrearing and the Preservation of Transnational Identity in Brazzaville, Congo." *Global Networks* 9(1): 82–99.
- Wikan, Unni. 2002. *Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2008. *In Honor of Fadime: Murder and Shame*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Willen, Sarah S. 2005. "Birthing 'Invisible' Children: State Power, NGO Activism, and Reproductive Health among 'Illegal' Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 1(2): 55–88.
- . 2007a. "Exploring 'Illegal' and 'Irregular' Migrants' Lived Experiences of Law and State." *International Migration* 45(3): 2–7.
- . 2007b. "Toward a Critical Phenomenology of 'Illegality': State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel." *International Migration* 45(3): 8–38.
- . 2012. "How is Health-Related 'Deservingness' Reckoned? Perspectives from Unauthorized Immigrants in Tel Aviv." *Social Science and Medicine* 74: 812–21.
- . 2019. *Fighting for Dignity: Migrant Lives At Israel's Margins*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Wilson, Tamar Diana. 1994. "What Determines Where Transnational Labor Migrants Go? Modifications in Migration Theories." *Human Organization* 53: 269–78.
- . 1998. "Weak Ties, Strong Ties: Network Principles in Mexican Migration." *Human Organization* 57: 394–403.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multi-Level Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4): 970–1022.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and Social Sciences." *Global Networks* 2(4): 301–34.

- Wolf, Eric. 1964. *Anthropology*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Xiang, Biao. 2006. *Global "Body Shopping": An Indian International Labor System in the Information Technology Industry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2016. "Beyond Methodological Nationalism and Epistemological Behavioralism; Drawing Illustrations from Migrations within and from China." *Population, Space and Place* 22(7): 669–80.
- Xiang, Biao, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, and Mika Toyota, eds. 2013. *Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- Yarris, Kristin E. 2014. "'Quiero Ir Y No Quiero Ir' (I Want to Go and I Don't Want to Go): Nicaraguan Children's Ambivalent Experiences of Transnational Family Life." *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology* 19(2): 284–309.
- Zharkevich, Ina. 2019. "Money and Blood: Remittances as a Substance of Relatedness in Transnational Families in Nepal." *American Anthropologist* 121(4): 884–96.

# 6 Geographical Theories of Migration

## Exploring Scalar, Spatial, and Placeful Dimensions of Human Mobility

*Marie Price*

Geography is a discipline closely associated with maps and spatial reasoning. Maps, especially thematic ones, challenge us to visualize spatial distribution of phenomena across space and over time at various scales. Anything that is unevenly distributed is eminently mappable and thinking in maps invites us to consider spatial arrangements. The varied movement of people has been an irresistible subject for geographical inquiry and theorization since the inception of the modern discipline. Why is a cluster of migrants located in one place and not another? How are clusters linked through networks and how do these distributions influence space and place? What structural or environmental forces are driving human mobility? Mapping forces one to select a scale of analysis; consequently, geographers have a proclivity to shift scales, from the local to the global, and even jump scale when necessary. Not limited to any single container of convenience, such as the territorial state, geographers consider various socio-legal containers when theorizing about migration from neighborhoods, to cities, to meta-regions such as Europe or Africa. Geographic scholarship is increasingly interested in how these containers are enforced, deformed, and reconstituted in response to migration. Finally, geography is concerned with a deeper understanding of context and placemaking, seeing space as layered with information such as: the physical environment, the ethnic composition of residents, and their socioeconomic well-being. Human mobility is often a response to and a catalyst for these layers, and thus the social and environmental contexts of areas of departure and reception invite geographical theorization.

This chapter will consider some of the foundational theories that shape geographical understandings of migration and human mobility. It argues that, as a discipline, geography has a long-standing thematic interest in human migration, because the movement of people “continually disrupts and remakes geography, as spatial linkages and interconnections both form and dissolve when people move” (Skop 2019: 108). As international migration has intensified since the 1990s, geographic scholarship that empirically demonstrates these flows and theorizes their impact has steadily increased (Price and Benton-Short 2008; King 2012; Czaika and de Haas 2014; Winders 2014; Yeoh and Ramdas 2014; Ehrkamp 2017, 2019, 2020; Collins 2020). Theoretically, geographers have worked across disciplines,

and have modified existing theories, as well as inserted innovative theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. At the core of much of this work is a profound interest in explaining spatial patterns and human networks, as well as a sensitivity to scalar shifts and bordering practices. Human geographers offer theoretical insights about the migrant experience, limits to human mobility, practices of placemaking, development, and integration, as well as the intersectionality of gender, race, and class in understanding migration (Silvey and Lawson 1999; Carling 2002; van Riemsdijk 2014; Yeoh and Lam 2016). Because of geography's inclination to examine the relationship between society and environment, there is also a growing research interest in the environmental drivers of migration, especially connected to climate change (Hugo 1996; Pigué 2010; Pigué, Kaenzig, and Guélat 2018; Jockish et al. 2019).

Within the sub-disciplines of geography, population geographers have an obvious interest in migration. The *International Journal of Population Geography*, later renamed *Population, Space, and Place*, began to showcase new theoretical and methodological openness to migration research in the 1990s. In particular, two important articles by Paul White and Peter Jackson (1995) and Elspeth Graham and Paul Boyle (2001) urged population geographers to be more critical of the categories and data sets employed, embrace the social theory debates swirling around human geography and the social sciences in general, and open traditional subject areas to new interpretations. To be clear, theorizing human mobility and its consequences has never been limited to population geography, as an array of specialties in human geography such as cultural, political, economic, urban, ethnic, historical, and environmental geography all consider human migration within their research.

In reviewing the literature over the past decade, the heightened visibility of migration studies in mainstream geography journals is striking. Examples include the two special issues of the *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*: one on *Migration* in 2014, edited by Richard Wright, and then another on *Mobilities* in 2016, edited by Mei Po Kwan. In 2015, the *Journal of Latin American Geography* devoted an issue to lifestyle migration and transnationalism within Latin America, edited by Matthew Hayes. *Progress in Human Geography* featured multiple review articles on the “geographies of migration” (Ehrkamp 2017, 2019, 2020; Collins 2020). The feminist geography journal *Gender, Place, and Culture* published a special issue on gender and (im)mobilities in 2018, edited by Marianna Pavlovskaya, Siri Gerrard, and Marit Aure. In 2019 and 2021 there were two special issues of the *Geographical Review* devoted to migration. The first, guest edited by Emily Skop and Karen Culcasi, theorized the spatial and temporal dimensions of the global refugee “crisis.” The other, guest edited by Felicitas Hellman and Michael Samers, considered transatlantic perspectives on urban transformation and migration governance. Also in 2019, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* published a special issue entitled “Measuring Segregation: Challenges, Innovations and Future Directions,” edited by Aneta Piekut, Gwilym Pryce, and Wouter van Gent. The *Singapore*

*Journal of Tropical Geography* had a special section on “State-Led Diaspora Strategies in Asia” in 2015. Similarly, geographers are contributors to and/or editors of many interdisciplinary journals concerned with migration and human mobility such as *International Migration Review*, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Diaspora*, *Global Networks*, *Mobilities*, and *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, to name but a few. Economists and geographers collaboratively edit *The Journal of Economic Geography*, first published in 2001, which regularly includes studies on the selectivity of migrants, labor market impacts, and barriers which migrants face.

Geographers bring to migration an empirical orientation (often through field work), a facility with spatial thinking expressed through mapping and modeling, an inclination to consider society–environmental dynamics, and a sensitivity to scale that ranges from the individual to the global. In addition, geographers share with practitioners of many disciplines an appreciation for how migration impacts places and that the experience of migrants varies greatly by locality and the individual characteristics of the migrants themselves.

The following sections will elaborate on the foundational theories developed by geographers including Ravenstein’s laws of migration, Zelinsky’s mobility transition theory, and Tuan’s theorizing of space and place. It will then consider socio-spatial theories in geography, particularly variations on spatial assimilation. Following these foundations, there will be a discussion of the prominent methodologies used in geography. Then, the chapter will consider the transnational turn in the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as related work on the migration–development nexus and diasporas. In the past decade, forced displacement, reinforcement of borders, and growing (im)mobilities has brought the border and (geo)politics to the forefront of theories about the limits of human mobility.

## **Geographical Foundations of Migration Theory**

### ***Laws of Migration***

E.G. Ravenstein presented his research in the 1880s to the Royal Statistical Society in London with the provocative title “Laws of Migration” (1885, 1889). Both papers were lengthy, and handsomely illustrated with maps and tables. The first paper was a deep dive into the 1880s census of the United Kingdom, which at that time included all of Ireland as well as Scotland, Wales, and England, with the intent to “consider migration generally, and to determine, if possible, some law or rule by which it is governed” (1885: 218). His second, longer paper compared many European countries as well as North America.

Surprisingly, much of the spatial and temporal framing used by Ravenstein would easily be recognizable to scholars today. His migrant classification systems included local migrants, short-journey migrants, long-journey migrants, temporary migrants, as well as foreign migrants. Much of the movement occurred between parishes, what we could call internal migration. He considered migration in stages, counties of absorption and dispersion, the significance of border

towns, how migration flows produced counter-flows, mobility by gender, and the importance of migration to the major urban centers of London, Glasgow, and Dublin. To support his conclusions, he deployed many maps, some with arrows to indicate directionality of flows as well as choropleth maps to show the intensity of migrant absorption and depletion (what would be called today areas of reception and departure).

He addressed the potential skepticism about greater female mobility, asserting that figures in the census proved the point. His explanation for this gendered mobility was by no means an endorsement of female empowerment, when he explained “nor do women migrate merely from the rural districts into the towns in search of domestic service, for they migrate quite as frequently into certain manufacturing districts, and the workshop is a formidable rival of the kitchen and scullery” (1885: 196). Although he ignored the role of marriage in explaining female movements, he was prescient in acknowledging the gendered dimensions of migration. Although women may have been more migratory than men within the United Kingdom, Ravenstein did observe that men were the majority of international migrants. He prefaced the seven laws outlined in the 1885 paper by stating that “the call for labour in our centres of industry and commerce is the prime cause of those currents of migration” (1885: 198), which underscored labor demands as a major driver which fit into neoclassical economics of migration.

Ravenstein’s Seven Laws of Migration (1885)

1. The majority of migrants only move a short distance.
2. Absorption processes are mostly from the inhabitants immediately surrounding a rapidly growing town, often in a step-by-step process. Gaps left in rural populations are filled by migrants from more remote districts.
3. Dispersion processes are the inverse of absorption ones and exhibit similar features.
4. Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current.
5. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry.
6. The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country.
7. Females are more migratory than males.

While each of these purported “laws” would require qualifications today, and some would be outright rejected, the categories created and the spatial framing used (at various scales from local, national and international) are still very much relevant. Russell King observed that “Ravenstein’s laws echo across more than a century and a quarter as migration theory’s foundational statement” (King 2012: 139). It should be noted that the paper was delivered at the height of the British Empire, and Ravenstein’s concluding remarks underscored the utility of this analysis in reference to colonization in tropical areas (1889: 288). At the time, however, he did not speculate on the potential counter-flow from the then-colonies that his model predicted.


### ***Mobility Transition***

Geographer Wilbur Zelinsky's model takes a spatial and temporal approach in defining regularities in human migration in response to modernization, or what we would now call development. "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition" first appeared in the pages of the *Geographical Review* fifty years ago and has been widely cited. In many ways, it was a product of its time, inspired by the demographic transition but consciously injecting human migration into five stages of modernization. The hypothesis contended that "there are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process" (Zelinsky 1971: 221–222). Like the demographic transition model, Zelinsky outlined five stages of human mobility that occur over time and through space at different rates.

*Phase 1: Premodern Traditional Society* sees relatively little residential migration save from changing land utilization strategies, social visits, commerce, warfare, or religious pilgrimages. In *Phase 2: Early Transitional Society*, there is massive movement from the countryside to cities and towns. There are also rural people moving to frontier areas or outflows of emigrants to other countries, including some skilled workers. Overall, various types of circulation increase in this phase. *Phase 3: Late Transitional Society* is when Zelinsky anticipates a slackening, but still significant, flow from rural areas to the city; fewer migrants colonizing frontier areas, and emigration to other countries declining or ceasing altogether. Within this stage there is greater complexity and volume of circulation overall. In *Phase 4: Advanced Society*, movement from the countryside to the city has declined but there is much movement of migrants from city to city and within metropolitan areas. The settlement frontier has stagnated but there is net immigration of unskilled and semiskilled workers from underdeveloped areas occurring. There is significant international migration or circulation of skilled and professional persons, as well as increased movements tied to pleasure, such as tourism. In *Phase 5: A Future Advanced Society*, there may be a decline in residential migration and a deceleration in some forms of circulation as better communication and delivery systems are instituted. Most residential migration will be inter-urban and intra-urban in nature. There will be some further immigration of relatively unskilled labor from less-developed areas. Further acceleration of current forms of circulation and perhaps new forms will be created. Interestingly, Zelinsky anticipated that strict political control of internal as well as international movements may be imposed (Zelinsky 1971: 230–231). How these phases might appear through space and over time are illustrated in Figure 6.1, from Zelinsky's original paper. He models the types of movement diffusing differentially over time and through space so that in the future most areas are in phases 3, 4, or 5.

Zelinsky's model of mobility transition strongly influenced migration research in geography and other social sciences, presenting sweeping concepts that linked human migration, development, technological change, and regulation in important ways (Skeldon 2012). The most consistent criticism was the theory's





GEOGR. REV., APR., 1971

Figure 6.1 Zelinsky's Model of Mobility Transition. Note: A schematic visualization of Wilbur Zelinsky's Mobility Transition across space with less mobility at the beginning of modernization and greater mobility over time. He argued that certain seminal zones of socioeconomic development have strong historical and spatial continuity. He also noted that more work had to be done on how colonization impacted the mobility transition. Source: Reproduced from Zelinsky (1971) with permission from the American Geographical Society.

outdated embrace of modernization theory with its assumptions that mobility trends observed in Europe or North America would be replicated elsewhere (King 2012). Similarly, others were critical that the theory overlooked key structural dimensions of inequality and exploitation that drive human migration, especially from the developing world to more developed countries (Samer 2010; Torres and Carte 2016; Skop 2019).

A recent retrospective of Zelinsky's work by Cooke, Wright, and Ellis (2018) found much to admire even though some particular aspects of the model did not hold up, such as the failure to anticipate the rise of global cities dependent on low- and high-skilled immigrant labor (Sassen 1991; Price and Benton-Short 2008). Yet, in their reappraisal of the Mobility Transitions, Cooke et al. were especially impressed by the set of mobility forecasts in phase 5, observing that

many of these predictions have now come to pass, including a general decline in international and internal migration and residential change, the increasing regulation of migration—especially internally, and the possibility that the widespread adoption of information and communication technologies has impacted human geographic mobility.

(Cooke et al. 2018: 503)

Zelinsky's work as a universal explanation for the stages of migration did not hold up to scrutiny, and Zelinsky himself recognized its limits (Zelinsky 1983). At the same time, the mobility transition model pointed geographic inquiry into many important directions. In particular, the ongoing multidisciplinary interest in theorizing the relationship between migration and development is still very much alive (Skeldon 1997; Jones 1998; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Silvey 2009; de Haas 2010; Bastia and Skeldon 2020). Although there are no definitive theories to cement a universal relationship between migration and development, there are important meso-theories that point to the heterogeneous aspects of the migration–development relationship that are increasingly sensitive to spatial and temporal scales of analysis. As human geographer and sociologist Hein de Haas asserts, “migration is not an independent variable “causing” development (or the reverse), but is an endogenous variable, an integral part of change itself, and a factor that may enable further change” (Haas 2010: 253).

### ***Space and Place***

Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan's seminal book, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, was published in 1977 and has been cited over 13,000 times. It is not a book about migration theory *per se*, but it provided a much-needed humanistic perspective for human geography at a time when positivistic and quantitative approaches dominated. More importantly, the work infused geographical research with a deeper theoretical appreciation of the concepts of space and place that are sensitive to shifting scales and change over time. To Tuan, *space* was the more abstract concept, linked to specific locations, patterns, distributions,

networks, or exchanges. When geographers map migration, they create spatial interpretations or abstractions about patterns of settlement, dispersal, or networks. These spatial abstractions are not necessarily neutral, as they can be politically and socially charged—such as the power given to one side of a border over another. Engagement with *place*, however, gets at the experiential level of migrants and non-migrants interacting and transforming localities.

Tuan was born and raised in China, but educated in Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom, and finally earned his PhD in geography at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1957. Having experienced migration and settlement in several distinct cultural settings, he was sensitive to the experience of place, how it shifts through one's lifespan and can be understood at different scales, from the hearth or bedroom to the nation-state. With regard to mobility, Tuan explained that "if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place" (Tuan 1977: 6). For Tuan, it was those pauses that fostered human experience, attachment, and meaning to places. In fact, for Tuan it was the human engagement and creation of settings that made "place" possible.

Human geographic research, especially cultural geography, has a long-standing interest in questions of immigrant placemaking and belonging, which has been enriched by feminist scholarship, critical race theory, and the intersectionality and multiscale dimensions of identity and place creation (Pred 1984; Massey 1994; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio 2003; Ehrkamp 2005; Hume and Hardwick 2005; Nelson and Hiemstra 2008; Li 2009; Ralph and Staeheli 2011; Gilmartin and White 2013; van Riemsdijk 2014; Furusest, Smith, and McDaniel 2015; Lobo 2016; Bastia 2019; Ehrkamp 2019; Huang, Zhao, Liu, and Xue 2020). The edited volume by geographer Daniel Arreola, *Hispanic Spaces, Latino Places: Community and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary America* (2004), provides a rich example of how space and place inform the experience of US Latinos, both newly arrived and native-born. In a series of contributions, various geographers wrestle with the *spatial* patterning of *Hispanics* (a term codified by the US Census) in contrast with the *placemaking* experience of *Latinos* (a term widely used in the 2000s but now being replaced by *Latinx*). In exploring this duality and intersection of space and place, the volume considers many new communities created and experienced by Latino immigrants, but also how the geographical imagination constructs those communities in relationship to other groups and other spaces.

## **Socio-spatial Theories and the Importance of Scale**

The theoretical and empirical insights from geographic research on migration often come from the discipline's intrinsic interest in spatial and scalar aspects of human mobility. This section will highlight three important theories developed or influenced by geographers: spatial assimilation, ethnoburbs, and heterolocalism. Before discussing these socio-spatial theories, further discussion of how geographers use scale is warranted. Scale is a fundamental aspect of any map. Counterintuitively, a small-scale map shows a relatively large area such as a state,

a continent, or the world, while a large-scale map shows a smaller area such as a neighborhood or small town. And, of course, the level and type of information that can be shown at any particular scale varies considerably. With digital maps, such as Google Earth, we have become accustomed to telescoping in and out of areas with a flick of the finger. Hence, the fixed aspect of scale, so obvious in the printed realm, is changing. That said, geographers are attuned to scale as a concept which influences our theoretical view of both vertical and horizontal socio-spatial interactions (Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005).

Scale matters because it is fluid, socially constructed, and, depending on the context, scale can be meaningful, arbitrary, or indifferent to theorizing the socio-spatial experience of migrants (Marston 2000; Chacko and Price 2020). Take for example our understanding of segregation, a concept that is fundamental in measuring assimilation and immigrant inclusion. In *Navigating Ethnicity*, geographer David Kaplan makes the point that

a high level of segregation at an extremely localized scale (say a cluster of buildings as part of social housing) may show up as less segregated and more diverse at the larger scale of the neighborhood. Increase the size of the units to the scale of a municipality and the segregation may increase again, only to decrease at the level of the county.

(Kaplan 2018: 84–85)

Geographers call this the modifiable areal unit problem, meaning that the unit of measure selected can dramatically influence the results of study—in this case, our measures of segregation.

Geographical research on migration is not limited to a single scale, say, the territorial state. If anything, attention to scale invites discernment of human mobility from structural approaches to ones that emphasize individual agency. Shifts in scale also draw attention to the units themselves and how these socio-legal containers shape the opportunity structures that influence mobility.

### ***Individual***

At the scale of the individual, neoclassical migration models tend to view migrants as having the knowledge and the ability to move for their betterment. A range of scholars in the social sciences have revised such models to account for the complex influences of household, gender, human capital, race, and the context of departure and reception. The research of Norwegian geographer Jørgen Carling, grounded in the experience of migrants and would-be migrants from Cape Verde, led to the important concept of *involuntary immobility* (Carling 2002). Through long-term individual and household surveys, he grasped the personal, household, and legal barriers to immigration from this island nation that had long sent migrants to Europe. Though there were migrants and voluntary non-migrants, it was the involuntary non-migrants that interested him. These individuals aspired to leave but were unable to do so as a result of various barriers, most notably the

restriction of the European immigration interface that made mobility highly risky and expensive. The rise of involuntary immobility runs counter to assumptions of the free movement of labor, and yet such barriers to migrant aspirations are increasingly evident, especially in the past decade (Carling and Schewel 2018).

Importantly, even the economic concept of free labor is being challenged through examination of immigrant control policies. Research by the sociologist and geographer team of Rhacel Parreñas, Krittiya Kantachote, and Rachel Silvey (2021) makes the case for “unfree labor” through the study of contracted domestic labor in Singapore. The domestic immigrants may be mobile (able to migrate), but once in Singapore, their mobility is severely restricted, their passports are controlled by the employer, and, if they decide to leave their employer, they must return to their country of origin. Similarly in the cities of the Arab Gulf States, restrictive and relatively unfree labor practices are often the norm among low-skilled immigrants (Malecki and Ewers 2007).

### ***Household***

The New Economics of Labor Migration encouraged, and in some cases redirected, migration research to consider household dynamics in the decision-making processes of who migrates and the livelihood consequences. Quantitative efforts by geographers to measure household impacts and migration dynamics underscore that the decision to move is never just better employment or income opportunities but that considerations by gender, age, race, distance, and neighborhood effects are contributing factors in diverse global settings (Ellis, Wright, and Parks 2006; Clark and Maas 2015; Drbohlav et al. 2017). The longitudinal household-level research by Claudia Radel and Birget Schmook (2008), linking Yucatan migrants to the US, show that remittances influence agricultural practices and land use policies. And, as Victoria Lawson emphasized in her 1998 article, household is not a neutral unit of analysis, and scholars should be mindful of its cultural, hierarchical, and contextual complexity (Lawson 1998).

### ***Cities/Suburbs/Other Sub-state Scales***

There is significant and sustained scholarship of the immigrant experience at sub-national units, especially in cities, suburbs, and small towns (Clark and Blue 2004; Smith and Furuseh 2006; Forrest, Poulson, and Johnston 2006; Fonseca 2008; Price and Chacko 2009; Nelson and Nelson 2011; Winders 2013; Teixeira and Li 2015; Grant and Thompson 2015; Lobo 2021; Oner, Durmaz-Drinkwater, and Grant 2021; Hillman and Samers 2021). Since the distribution of immigrants is uneven, and there is a tendency for immigrants to seek out metropolitan areas, researching at various urban scales is widely practiced throughout the social sciences. The value of working at this scale is the ability to illuminate how places are transformed by and respond to new arrivals. Moreover, scholars interpret such settings as nodes of powerful economic, political, and cultural change. And, while national governments are often the authority with regard to who does and

who does not receive legal entry, research at the urban scale reveals how local authorities are exerting their influence (Winders 2007; Varsanyi 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Walker 2014; Blue, Hartsell, Torres, and Flynn 2020).

An excellent example of how scalar sensitivity brings about new conceptions of how immigrants are changing the US is the book *Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*, edited by the multidisciplinary team of Audrey Singer, Susan Hardwick, and Caroline Brettell (2008). By focusing on suburban settlement, the research underscores how immigrants and refugees, especially in new immigrant gateways, are going directly to the suburbs and bypassing central cities. The reception and perception of these newcomers in suburban areas is mixed, as is the official local response to “manage” these arrivals. Working at this scale also reveals the complexity of social, political, and ethnic networks in migrant decision-making, processes of adjustment, and identity retention. By selecting a range of destinations and focusing on suburbs, a distinct socio-spatial process of immigrant incorporation in the US is revealed.

Geographers have actively contributed to the literature on global cities, sparked by sociologist Saskia Sassen (1991). Not only are global cities key nodes in a constellation of globalized financial and innovation networks, but many of them rely upon vast numbers of immigrants, both highly skilled and low skilled (Benton-Short, Price, and Friedman 2005; Chacko 2007; Beaverstock and Hall 2012). Of particular interest in research at this scale are conflicting experiences of exclusion and non-integration as well as reports of greater tolerance and cosmopolitanism (Warf 2015; Baas, Karoui, and Yeoh 2020). There is empirical interest in the formation of new immigrant destinations (Winders 2014) as well as distinguishing urban localities that are hyper- or super-diverse (Vertovec 2007; Price and Benton-Short 2007). A recent economic geography article examining immigrant-led diversity in US cities concluded that urban immigrant diversity produces spillover effects for US workers and may generate broad economic benefits (Kemeny and Cooke 2018).

### ***National Scales***

National-level work is well represented in migration research (Fan 2008; Tyner 2010; DeWind et al. 2012; Gilmartin 2015). The territorial state is often the default scale for comparative work, and global databases from the UN Population Division generate comparable national-level data over time that are extremely helpful. Rather than seeing migration in terms of sending or receiving states, geographers have been drawn to examine states that once produced large numbers of emigrants and now experience positive net migration rates (DeWind, Kim, Skeldon, and Yoon 2012; Janska, Čermák, and Wright 2014; Gilmartin 2015; Gordon 2016). As Gilmartin argues in her study of contemporary migration in Ireland:

too often migration is discussed in unidirectional terms. The focus tends to be either on the places people move to (often developed, wealthy countries or

cities) or on the places people leave (often poorer or conflict ridden regions or countries). As a result the relationship between migration to *and* from a particular place is rarely considered.

(Gilmartin 2015: 2–3)

Geographers, often grounded in a field tradition similar to anthropologists, research places that have experienced significant out-migration over decades (Gamlen 2008), framing it in the context of the sending countries such as Ecuador, the Philippines, Morocco, or Bolivia, that develop institutions to support the out-flow of migrants (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Collyer, Cherti, Lacroix, and van Heelsum 2009; Tynes 2010; Ryburn 2018).

Beyond the territorial state, regional groupings such as Asia or Europe, or even global analysis can answer different kinds of questions and support distinct theoretical perspectives concerning migration. The point is that there is no default scalar unit, and that the limits defining particular scales may be just as important as the unit as a whole. Consideration of scale, jumping between scalar units, and acknowledging the utility of looking at phenomena at different scales is fundamental to geographical inquiry, especially concerning human mobility (Wright, Ellis, Holloway, and Wong 2014).

## **Spatial Assimilation**

Spatial assimilation theory, with its roots in sociology, is fundamental in geographical analysis about immigrant settlement, distribution over time, and incorporation. Spatial assimilation considers not just measures of socioeconomic attainment but how immigrants are distributed throughout urban spaces and how changing patterns of settlement may influence or affect their integration into the host society. Original formulations assumed that immigrants initially cluster in enclaves in the inner city with other co-ethnics, and that over time they settle and become homeowners in suburban areas among the native-born population, which is often assumed to be white in the case of the US. Yet spatial assimilation analysis has been applied by geographers in other national contexts (Peach 1997; Wessel, Andersson, Kauppinen, and Andersen 2017; Vogiazides 2018).

The model may work for some places in particular eras but many geographers challenge the assumption that spatial dispersion is necessarily a sign of assimilation or socioeconomic attainment (Allen and Turner 1996; Ellis, Wright, and Parks 2006; Godwin-White 2018). Efforts by the team of Richard Wright, Mark Ellis, and Virginia Parks (2005) in metropolitan Los Angeles found that established immigrants are more dispersed residentially than recent co-national arrivals, though the effect varies by group, which led them to advance a modified spatial assimilation thesis. They worry that “spatial assimilation theory remains fixed on the normative objective or propinquity to whites in suburban locations” (2005: 16) even though the evidence from metropolitan Los Angeles is that many majority non-white neighborhoods exist that are not of inferior quality, as the model might suggest, and they are in suburban or central city settings. They stress



that Black immigrants remain stubbornly segregated from whites and are much likely to live near native-born Blacks. Given the sheer scale of the Los Angeles metro area, with its large and diverse immigrant population, their analysis invites a deeper appreciation for the experiences of distinct groups, along with the roles of nativity, ethnicity, and race in residential location and long-term socioeconomic attainment. A recent analysis by geographer Jamie Goodwin-White, also studying Los Angeles, considered ethnic concentrations, generational movement patterns, and wages, concluding that “concentrations have positive wage effects for the second generation overall and for immigrants who choose them through secondary migration” (Goodwin-White 2018: 12). Such findings turn basic spatial assimilation assumptions on their side, suggesting the socioeconomic value of concentration within ethnic or pan-ethnic groups.

The significance of dispersed or clustered immigrant populations and greater socioeconomic attainment as proposed in spatial assimilation models has been explored in northern European countries as well. The research of Wessel et al. (2017), examining spatial assimilation of immigrants in four Nordic capitals (Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm), found weak links between improved earnings and upward spatial mobility. In particular, the context of strong distributive welfare policies affected spatial integration “through a double compression of differences, first in the system of social stratification and next in the social hierarchy of places ... It further implies that poor neighborhoods have been lifted to a higher standard through subsidies and regulations” (2017: 814). Thus, the motives to move out of initial areas of immigrant settlement may not be as pressing as in other contexts. Yet, perhaps an unintended consequence of a strong welfare system is prevailing segregation, especially among non-European immigrants. The question of forced dispersal among resettled refugees in Europe was examined by an international team of geographers: Vaughan Robinson, Roger Andersson, and Sako Musterd (2003). Again, the question of clustered refugees is viewed as a problem, with the solution being the forced dispersion among different cities and towns to “spread the burden.” Implicit in this policy is the belief that dispersion is the best path to integration and service provision. Yet it ignores the common desires of newcomers to settle among co-ethnics and assumes that such clustering behavior is disadvantageous.

## **Ethnoburbs**

Geographer Wei Li is credited with her ethnoburb theory about suburban immigrant settlement formation. Her monograph, *Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America*, is the culmination of nearly two decades of research and writing on the Chinese suburban immigrant experience in North America. Li herself is a Chinese immigrant who earned a PhD in geography at the University of Southern California. When she moved to California, she was introduced to Monterey Park, a Los Angeles suburb known for its Chinese commercial centers and residents. This led her on an intellectual journey to examine immigrant settlement and the creation of ethnic spaces that are both economically integrated with

their surroundings but also ethnically distinct. Through her detailed examination of Monterey Park, Wei Li introduced the concept of ethnoburbs—suburban ethnic clusters in large metropolitan areas that are multiethnic communities in which one ethnic minority group has a significant concentration but is not necessarily the majority. A settlement feature of metropolitan America, ethnoburbs challenge dominant views of spatial assimilation and yet their populations can “integrate into the mainstream society through economic activity, political involvement, and community life” (Li, 2009: 4).

The most original aspect of Wei Li’s research is on ethnoburb formation and anatomy. Through an analysis of US Census data, Chinese yellow pages, interviews, and photographs, she charts the movement of ethnic Chinese from downtown Los Angeles to the suburbs, an outflow that began to intensify after the Watts Riots in 1965. Rather than generally dispersing into the suburbs, she documents the steady formation of Chinese residential and business communities in places such as Monterey Park, Alhambra, and Arcadia along the northern tier of Los Angeles County. By the 1980s, Chinese immigrants were directly settling in these suburbs, bypassing the urban core entirely. A transnational dimension of this settlement is also documented as linkages formed with companies and financial institutions in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and later the Chinese mainland (Li et al. 2002). Li has examined other ethnoburb formations among Pacific Rim countries (2006).

Li accords considerable agency to ethnoburbs but suggests that other enclave formations may be more passive. Yet as Ceri Peach (1996) stressed a quarter of a century ago, the forces affecting residential segregation/clustering vary even though the spatial patterning of segregation may look the same. Peach distinguishes between “ethnic communities” (which are much like ethnoburbs) and ethnic enclaves. Ethnic communities are settlements of choice that form voluntarily and provide refuge or social protection for minority groups. In contrast, ethnic enclaves or ghettos form largely in response to social or economic discrimination and exclusion. They are seldom communities of choice. One could go a step further and argue that some immigrant enclaves are deliberately formed as a structural response to exclusionary impulses driven by prejudice and racism, which leads to robust discussions of segregation that geographers are also engaged with, whether linking it to immigrant communities or along racial and ethnic lines (Manley, Johnston, and Jones 2018; Piekut, Pryce, and van Gent 2019).

## **Heterolocalism**

The theory of heterolocalism is a blend of the geographical and sociological imaginations concerning immigrant settlement, social networks, and community formation. Put forward by geographer Wilbur Zelinsky and sociologist Barrett Lee (1998), their work reminds social scientists that community among immigrant co-ethnics indeed exists without residential propinquity. According to Zelinsky and Lee, heterolocalism has four attributes that set it apart from other models, and a fifth that is shared.

1. There is immediate or prompt spatial dispersion of heterolocal immigrants within the host country.
2. Residence and workplace are usually widely separated, and there is also a frequent lack of spatial overlap between residence on the one hand and shopping districts and sites of social activity on the other.
3. Despite the absence of spatial propinquity, strong ethnic community ties are maintained *via* telecommunications, visits, and other methods at the metropolitan, regional, national, and even international scale.
4. Heterolocalism is a time-dependent phenomenon. Although we can detect some partial manifestations in earlier periods, its full development is conceivable only under the socioeconomic and technological conditions of the late twentieth century.
5. As is the case with the other models, heterolocalism can be observed in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan settings.

(Zelinsky and Lee 1998: 285)

According to this theory, even without residential propinquity following initial immigrant settlement, the ethnic identities and ties of even dispersed groups can remain strong at varying scales through organizations and social networks. In essence, heterolocalism provides an alternative model to the Chicago School “invasion and succession” approach for analyzing the connections between immigration residential patterns and their assimilation rates and shifting identities. It also allows for important co-ethnic networks to function that are less dependent upon forming an enclave or an ethnoburb. The work of Susan Hardwick on refugees from the former Soviet Union who resettled in the western US and Canada in the 1990s is instructive. She found that, although scattered through metropolitan Portland, Oregon, these Christian refugees were strongly organized by their faith and the formation of places of worship sustained heterolocalism (Hardwick and Meacham 2005). In addition, Hardwick came to view refugee resettlement throughout metropolitan Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver, Canada as forming nodal heterolocalism, and that these refugees (mostly from Russia and the Ukraine) were linked across metropolitan areas and across the US-Canada border (Hardwick 2006).

Geographers and sociologists have employed heterolocalism to explain how immigrants are socially linked while exhibiting dispersed settlement. In metropolitan Washington, a research team found that extremely diverse flows of new immigrants dispersed throughout the suburbs formed community linkages that were heterolocal in nature (Price, Cheung, Friedman, and Singer 2005). Using a mobilities framework, Halfacree (2012) found heterolocal aspects of internal circulations that linked urban residents with rural second homes in the United Kingdom and Nordic countries. More recently, sociologists Mukherjee and Pattnaik (2021) focused on heterolocal dynamics of Bengali immigrants in suburban Kansas City, Missouri, noting that these associations provided comfort and preserved identity in a context in which assimilation was segmented and slow.

## Methodological Tools

Research methods used by geographers studying migration are mixed, relying on quantitative and qualitative approaches, and exhibiting robust eclecticism in recent years. In terms of primary sources, geographers use the same administrative data, censuses, surveys, and archival materials that other disciplines depend upon. Given its disciplinary roots, geography's fieldwork tradition encourages single and multi-sited field studies in both sending and receiving locations. Another source of data for immigration scholars is the landscape itself. Analysis of the built environment, or cultural landscape, and experience of place is a strong tradition in human geography (Mendoza and Morén-Alegret 2013). Landscape, in the words of Pierce Lewis, is "our unwitting autobiography, reflecting our tastes, our values, our aspirations, and even our fears, in tangible, visible form" (Lewis 1979: 12). For migration scholars, the cultural landscape produced through the lived experience of immigrants, whether as new settlers or remitters to areas of origin, is a critical starting point for gathering primary data (Schein 1997, 2006; Kaplan and Li 2006; Boccagni and Erdal 2021).

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, mapping may be the signature tool of the discipline and is commonly used to analyze spatial patterns generated through migration. The ability to create maps at multiple scales, using geospatially coded data and geographic information systems, has transformed spatial analysis. In addition to census data, the use of satellite images or the location of cell phones through telemetry are being deployed to map human mobility in innovative and highly quantitative ways. Spatial statistics, such as the index of dissimilarity or the index of segregation and various threshold measures, are used to denote relative segregation and spatial assimilation (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest 2007; Yao, Wong, Bailey, and Minton 2018). A creative "mobile" interview study by Evans and Jones (2011) demonstrated that what people say and where they say it matters. They measured the qualitative and quantitative differences between data generated when walking *versus* sedentary interviews. Their data showed that walking interviews were profoundly informed by the areas in which they took place, emphasizing the importance of environmental factors when gathering qualitative information, which is a valuable approach for human mobility research. Agent-based modeling has become a fundamental technique for predicting complex human–environmental interactions, especially those linked to human vulnerability and climate change (Piquet 2010).

In many ways, feminist geographers have been at the forefront in challenging epistemologies reliant upon unquestioned categories and strictly quantitative approaches. In particular, they have encouraged more qualitative and mixed methods, and have increased the acceptance of small-scale case study approaches. Ethnography, especially institutional ethnography, has been effectively used by geographers to illuminate the inner workings of government institutions exerting spatial control over everyday actions of immigrants and asylum seekers (Mountz 2010; Mountz and Hiemstra 2014; Hiemstra 2014, 2019). Feminist geographer Rachel Silvey explains that "feminist studies of migration have contributed to

reworking a range of canonical approaches to the structures, scales, subjects, and spatial logics at the foundation of geographic migration research. At the center of this work is attention to the roles that gender and other social differences play in shaping unequal geographies of mobility, belonging, exclusion, and displacement” (2006: 65). Consequently, although not exclusively linked to feminist theory, there is growing use of migrant life stories, focus groups, diagramming, photo solicitation, community histories, and participatory mapping to capture and document different migrant experience through space and over time (Skop 2006; Torres and Carte 2014; Price and Rojas 2021).

### **The Transnational Turn**

The transnational turn in migration research was led by anthropologists but other disciplines quickly and enthusiastically embraced it in the early 1990s. In their book *Nations Unbound* (1994), the anthropological research team of Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc introduced a way of looking at migration that took on the primacy of the nation-state, jumped scale, and interjected much-needed migrant agency in terms of social networks that crossed borders and shaped identities. Specifically, by examining different migrant streams that settled in New York City in the 1980s and early 1990s, the authors perceived transnational migration as the movement across international borders in which individuals maintain or build multiple networks of connection to their countries of origin, while at the same time settling in a new country. What made transnational migration distinct, in their analysis, was the real possibility of sustained connection with two places over time.

The framing of migration as a transnational experience occurred at a time when the world map was being redrawn, the limits of political borders were being questioned, and new technologies were unfolding that supported social connections across greater distances. Even today, transnationalism “serves as a useful concept for examining the multitude of state, economic, and social practices across international borders” that migrants both construct and are intrinsically influenced by in their journeys (Ehrkamp 2020: 1205).

Transnationalism facilitated thinking across scales, from the logics of transnational households to the global flow of remittances, and the efforts by states to ensure emigrants retained attachments to their places of origin (Blue 2004; Yeoh and Ramdas 2014; Collyer and King 2015; Jones 2020; Bastia and Skeldon 2020). This line of inquiry interested some geographers because it played into a field tradition, with scholars engaging in multi-sited research in both sending and receiving areas, which helped to articulate transnational networks (Bailey, Wright, Mountz, and Miyares 2002; Jockish 2002; Walton-Roberts 2004; Mensah, Williams, and Aryee 2013; Swanson and Torres 2016).

Transnational migration theories are interdisciplinary in scope and widely applied. Although many scholars were excited about the possibilities of framing migration this way, others critiqued it as a continuation of long-held practices, such as anthropologist Nancy Foner (1997). Sociologists Waldinger and Fitzgerald

(2004) argued that the concept had been over-extended (not all immigration is transnational) and misapplied (highly particularistic attachments to a few places is not the same as truly transnational organizations such as multinational corporations or even the Catholic Church). Geographers critiquing transnationalism and migration worried that scale, time, context, and place were not adequately examined in this transnational circuitry. Katharyne Mitchell (1997a) expressed a need to “respatialize” and “reground” transnational scholarship. Mitchell was also concerned about the ongoing hype of hybridity and transnationalism’s disarticulation from history and political economy (1997b). A few years later, Adrian Bailey (2001) added his critique about the under-theorization of migrant “agency” and hybridity in transnational scholarship and a continuing attachment to rigid categories of migrants (such as defining them only as “immigrants” and “refugees”) as “the focii of empirical investigation and theorization despite the complexity of the more nuanced experiences of contemporary migrants” (Bailey 2001: 416).

For over two decades, geographer Brenda Yeoh at the National University of Singapore’s Asian Research Institute has been a global leader in transnational, gendered, and political dimensions of contemporary immigration and labor networks within Asia (Yeoh, Huang, and Lam 2005; Yeoh 2016), and especially in highly globalized Singapore (Yeoh and Lam 2016). Her collaborations across disciplines have increased awareness of the impacts on migrant households navigating transnational labor markets, especially those in which women become the dominant contributors to household income (Hoang and Yeoh 2011). In an impactful essay by Geraldine Pratt and Brenda Yeoh (2003), these two geographers consider the gendered dimensions of transnational space as *(counter)topographies*, arguing that transnationalism is not inherently emancipatory or transgressive. Whereas transnational networks forged by female migrants can produce gains in gender equity and mobility, they can also reinforce patriarchal norms, as illustrated by the work of Walton-Roberts on Punjabi marriage selection and migration to Canada (2004). In summarizing the contributions of feminist geographers to transnational research, Yeoh and Ramdas claim that “feminist researchers have drawn attention to the embodied experiences of migrants as they straddle the multiple places of being ‘here’ and ‘there’ simultaneously, and how this informs the emancipatory and constraining nature of gendered migrant spatialities and identity politics” (Yeoh and Ramdas 2014: 1198).

Transnational spaces and lives form complex webs that can be both emancipatory and constraining depending on local contexts and migrants’ social and political capital. A special issue of the *Journal of Latin American Geography* presented a series of articles on “Lifestyle” migration and transnational mobilities. In the opening essay, Matthew Hayes explains how these migrants of privilege are drawn to settings in Latin America “to take advantage of landscapes, climate, or lifestyles,” with the hope of a more fulfilling cosmopolitan and transnational experience (Hayes 2015: 7). In this issue, scholars theorized on the economic, class, and racial dimensions of wealthier individuals and households from the “north” settling in desirable settings such as Boquete, Panama; Cuenca, Ecuador; and Mérida, Mexico. States often promote such amenity or retirement migration provided that the “migrant” has a sustainable and external source of income. But such

migration has its own counter-mobilities, with local residents being displaced by outsiders, driving up real estate costs and access to basic services. Another contributor to this issue, anthropologist María Amelia Viteri (2015), underscores how amenity destinations are marketed to US and Canadian residents, who themselves fear their diminishing economic security in retirement and use their mobility to relocate to more affordable settings such as Cotacachi, Ecuador. Collectively, these papers show cascading levels of privilege and precarity working in tandem to create these transnational settings.

Interest in the maintenance of transnational networks, their duration, and the consequences for identity formation are interwoven into transnational research. In a recent article, Marta Bivand Edral and Jørgen Carling (2020) investigate the economics of transnational living with migrants living within Europe and between Europe and other parts of the world. They consider the sustained attachment across borders as transnational living but highlight overlapping economic spheres that include housing, livelihood, social protection, and legal matters. David Ley's (2013) multi-year research on wealthy businessmen with ties between East Asia and Vancouver, Canada underscores an insistence on transnationalism to the detriment of integration. As Ley writes:

the spatial bifurcation of resources, with economic opportunities in East Asia and social and political benefits in Canada, created two nodes in a transnational field requiring constant movement to sustain these complementary but separated resource poles. The astronaut household in orbit between these nodes integrated the two shores of the Pacific Ocean into a single region of opportunity.

(2013: 933)

Yet Ley also admits that the intensity of the transnational space created and maintained in his case study may not be the norm. Outside of economic activity, religious networks have also been studied as key to immigrant integration in new settings and maintaining social ties across borders (Hardwick 2006; Mensah, Williams, and Aryee 2013).

Perhaps the most common phenomenon among less-resourced migrants is a decline in transnationalism over time. Geographer Richard Jones has studied transnational migration in Mexico (1998) and Bolivia (Jones and de la Torre 2011). In 2020, he put forward his theory of *transitional social gravity* to explain how economic, social, and psychological transnationalism might be strong and stable for several years but eventually begin to decline as the migrant's time away increases and an inflection point is reached. The basis for this theory was a large household survey in Bolivia's Valle Alto, a recognized area of out-migration. From this work, he ascertained four key trends:

1. For a migrant's time abroad, social transnationalism remains stable up to an inflection point and then declines, and this decline comes later than it does for economic transnationalism.



2. A migrant's family is supportive of migration as beneficial up to an inflection point after which this support declines, and this decline comes later than for the migrant's social and economic transnationalism.
3. The ultimate decline in a migrant's social and economic transnationalism is directly related to his or her increased social bonding to family at the destination, as opposed to that at the origin.
4. The ultimate decline in a migrant family's support of migration is inversely related to its migrants' social bonding to the origin.

(Jones 2020: 2692–2693)

One of the important aspects of Jones' transitional social gravity model is his consideration of time. Although robust transnational networks certainly do exist, it is rare that they continue for long periods of time, especially when migration flows are interrupted or returns are limited due to legal status (Miyares, Wright, Mountz, and Bailey 2019).

## **Development and Diasporas**

Closely aligned with the transnational turn is the growth in research on diasporas and development. Multidisciplinary in nature, geographers often consider and problematize the migration–development nexus (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; de Haas 2010; Bastia and Skeldon 2020). Similarly, the contemporary reformulation of diaspora as a socially and spatially contingent force that can influence development processes and challenge national identities invites theoretical and empirical investigation by a range of disciplines, including geography (Boyle 2001; Carter 2005; Blunt 2007).

Among academics, a robust debate exists concerning the alleged benefits of migration to development. In a recent, edited volume, Tanja Bastia and Ronald Skeldon contend that “almost since their inception, studies of migration have been concerned with development in the broadest sense” (2020: 4). This is seen in some of the oldest geographical models, such as Ravenstein's laws of migration or Zelinsky's mobility transition. Key questions persist about who and what places benefit from migration, with many of the more quantifiable economic benefits occurring in destination areas rather than the sending ones. A sense of optimism arose in the early 2000s regarding the migration–development nexus having positive effects, in part due to the growing value of remittances being sent by migrants to far-flung destinations of origin. But there are skeptics as well, especially those who see rising restrictions to human mobility increasingly imposed by state governments.

Hein de Haas (2010: 229) organizes the opposing views on migration and development into optimists and pessimists, with each side tracking particular theoretical orientations. Optimists typically fall into neoclassical, modernization, and functionalist camps; whereas pessimists are more likely to hold structuralist, neo-Marxist, or dependency views. There is, however, growing consensus that migration alone does not bring about development at a national scale. Or, put

in other words, “the relationship between development and migration is reciprocal but strongly asymmetrical” (de Haas 2020: 28). Development is the larger process, with migration an integrated subprocess. And, as countless studies have demonstrated, migrants and their families make rational decisions based on perceived opportunities to improve well-being. As economic development occurs in countries, migration tends to increase rather than decrease. Models of who moves and when consider the aspirations as well as the capabilities of potential migrants (Carling and Schewel 2018). From a spatial perspective, migrants are often viewed as circulating along well-defined migration corridors, many of them linking developing (South-to-South migration) as well as flows from developing to developed states (South-to-North).

Diasporas and development also emerged in the 2000s as part of the transnational turn (Waters 2005). Alison Blunt explains that “the cultural geographies of diaspora encompass the material and imaginative connections between people and a ‘territorial identity’, often over transnational space and *via* transnational networks” (2007: 689). Historians have added much to our understanding of diasporas by examining their formation and discursive reach from settings as diverse as Ireland, China, and Africa (Kenny 2003; Wang 2009; Manning 2010). Increasingly, diaspora groups are marked as potential players in the development process by major intergovernmental organizations. “Homeland” governments see the potential of these distant but related communities to boost development efforts and intentionally engage with them (Delano 2014).

Margaret Walton-Roberts, Jonathan Crush, and Abel Chikanda highlight three socio-spatial dimensions of diaspora engagement regarding policy, place, and people (2019). From a policy perspective, they caution against an uncritical orthodoxy that exists about how diaspora groups contribute to development. In terms of place, there are perils in viewing diasporas as unproblematic extensions of the homeland, and, depending on the context of departure, diasporas can also be seen as a threat to “state” interests. With regard to people, it is also clear that diasporas are tied to particular areas in a country or specific ethnic or racial groups. Thus, engaging with diasporas could inadvertently lead to heightened social and economic inequalities in the origin state. In short, there needs to be a deeper appreciation for the process of diaspora formation and influence over time and how such groups and their networks can contribute to new economies. Interestingly, transnational migrants and diasporas emerged as alternative agents to a state-driven migration system. Yet, in the past decade, as stark differences in human mobilities and immobilities grew, migration scholarship by geographers re-inserted theories of boundaries, geopolitics, and embodiment. In short, the meaning and practice of borders and bordering are a growing concern.

### **Bringing Borders and (Geo)Politics Back**

In the past few years, a disturbing milestone was reached: there are more displaced people in the world now than at the end of WWII. International agreements

that were crafted to assist refugees and asylum seekers instead perpetuate continued insecurity and displacement. In the book *The Next Great Migration* (2020), a wide-ranging reflection on race, mobility, and biological construction of sedentarism, science journalist Sonia Shah concludes: “as the myth of the sedentary past evaporates, a previously obscured question emerges: not why people migrate but why their movements inspire terror?” (Shah 2020: 304).

The global refugee “crisis” and the “threat” of uncontrolled human mobility dominate both media coverage and contemporary academic literature (Jones 2017; Smith 2019). Permeating migration studies is a shared interest in the rise of refugees and displacement, (im)mobilities, detention and removal, securitization, and the concept of mobility justice (Mountz 2010; Ehrkamp 2017; Carling and Schewel 2018; Sheller 2018; Culcasi, Skop, and Gorman 2019; Gilmartin and Kuusisto-Arponen 2019). In sharp contrast to the fluid deterritorialized imaginaries of transnational migration, current research is more focused on immobilities and expanded bordering practices. The multiscalar reactions of governing authorities to the perceived “uncontrolled” movement of people has led to changing territorial practices and political strategies.

### ***Borders and Bordering***

Geographical scholarship has called attention to how states have reconstituted or distorted their borders to keep out unwanted migrants. By definition, immigrants cross international boundaries with the intent to reside in another state for some period of time, making “borders” unavoidable but usually not central to migration scholarship. The renewed multidisciplinary focus on borders and bordering goes beyond concerns with enforcing the territorial edges of nation states or wall construction, seeing bordering as a contested and evolving process of human mobility control (De Genova 2017; Mountz 2020; Casteñada 2021). In particular, geographers are concerned with processes that move the functional border inward (deep within state interiors) and outward (to areas well outside the territorial state) (Mountz and Hiemstra 2014, Hiemstra 2019). In the US, scholars note a differentiated landscape with regards to migrant rights, inclusion and exclusion, depending upon the city, county, state, or region of the country (Winders 2007; Varsanyi 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Leitner and Strunk 2014; Walker 2014; Price and Svajlenka 2021). Similar studies based in Europe explore complex and multiscalar bordering practices and variances (DeGenova 2017; Koca 2019). Michael Collyer’s work (2007) envisions fluid transit spaces, spanning several countries, that present opportunities for migrant access and state control, especially movements between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Such work is concerned with how the physical and technological infrastructures of borders and boundaries are altered in response to shifting migration flows (Jones 2017).

Alison Mountz is a leading scholar on bordering practices, particularly as they pertain to asylum seekers. In an institutional ethnography she conducted in the early 2000s with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC),

Mountz observed how government actors at different levels responded to human smuggling of Chinese migrants into Canada. In *Seeking Asylum*, Mountz developed the “long-tunnel thesis” in which immigrants were kept in interstitial processing zones within the territorial state but legally separate from it.

The elongation of the tunnel raises questions about the power of states to alter the relationship between geography and the law. Migrants struggle to land on sovereign territory to work or to access the claimant process, and states alter time and space in response

(Mountz 2010: xv)

Mountz’s scholarship expanded to highlight the concept of the “enforcement archipelago,” the use of remote islands as migration control sites to detain and deflect possible migrants from arriving formally within the territorial state (Mountz 2011). Island settings such as Nauru, Lampedusa, and Guantánamo are extensions of the long tunnel in which remote and less visible settings far from mainland territorial states are used as ambiguous zones where states can exert their power but also limit the legal claims of migrants seeking refuge (Figure 6.2). As a book to over a decade of scholarship, in *The Death of Asylum: Hidden Geographies of the Enforcement Archipelago* (2020) is a culmination of over a decade of research by Mountz in which she documents the failure of the global asylum system to protect millions of people. This work theorizes the intentional geopolitical strategies deployed by states to isolate and exclude unwanted migrants by building walls, fences, and detention centers.




Figure 6.2 Islands where asylum-seekers are detained. Note: Modified and redrawn from Figure 6.1 in Mountz (2011), in which the Enforcement Archipelago is described as part of a securitization strategy that can indefinitely delay asylum claims. This figure is drafted for this chapter by Richard Hinton, George Washington University. Source: Adapted from Mountz (2011).

### **Securitization**

The securitization discourse frames migrants themselves as potential threats to citizen safety or the power of the state to defend its sovereign territory (Ehrkamp 2017). Various scalar logics are deployed to exclude or detain migrants deemed as unworthy or undesirable. Gilmartin and Kuusisto-Arponen (2019) contend that critical migration studies engage in two distinct theoretical approaches and scales: geopolitics (the impact of geographical distributions and divisions on the conduct of world politics); and biopolitics (the embodied experience of migrant status, race, gender, and sexuality). The socio-spatial logic to exclude Central Americans from securing asylum in the US is explained by Cynthia Gorman (2019). Based upon the interpretation of the “particular social group” provision, Gorman argues that refugee definitions construct specific relationships between people and territory. In the case of Central Americans seeking asylum due to gang violence, the US Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that violence is so common in Central America that it does not warrant protection unless a migrant can demonstrate that he or she has been singled out. In other words, the scale of violence (limited vs. widespread) is critical in determining one’s rights to asylum. This interpretation has been challenged in US courts, but it shows how scalar forms of bordering work within the legal justifications of asylum claims.

The geopolitical and biopolitical logics employed in the detention and removal of migrants is also a major area of research. Refugee camps, detention centers, and asylum processing sites have proliferated around the world. In the past two decades, the US led the world in the deportation of migrants (Price and Breese 2016). Nancy Hiemstra, engaging in a transnational ethnography, details the operations of detention centers in the US and the consequences of deportation on the country of Ecuador (Hiemstra 2014, 2019). As countries reject asylum claims and make legal entry more challenging, detention and deportation are becoming normalized. Hiemstra argues that these punitive systems are not deterring migrants. Moreover, the privatization of detention centers in the US means that companies are profiting from large government contracts to detain people. In a perverse incentive structure, as it is more difficult to enter certain territorial states, smuggling fees are more expensive for migrants and more lucrative for smugglers, whose criminal networks continue to expand.

The rise of immobility research highlights the barriers that immigrants and refugees face around the world. Bélanger and Silvey (2020) refer to an im/mobility turn in migration research in which the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, citizenship, gender, education levels, socioeconomic class, and legal status profoundly influence who is stuck in immobility and who leads mobile lives. The complex power dynamics and the inequity of migration is embodied in the *mobility justice* work of sociologist Mimi Sheller. Sheller contends that “mobility justice is an overarching concept for thinking about how power and inequality inform the governance and control of movement, shaping the patterns of unequal mobility and immobility in the circulation of people, resources, and information” (2018: 14). This understanding of mobility justice is far broader than the universal declaration

of human rights that asserts the right to move within one's country and the ability to leave or return to one's country. Geographers have applied the mobility justice thesis when looking at access to transportation in the urban context, but it could easily be applied to concerns about immobility and securitization.

### ***Multiterritorialized Governance***

In a special issue of the *Geographical Review*, Felicitas Hillman and Michael Samers (2021) put forward a multiterritorialized view of migration governance that avoids any single scalar or territorial analysis but insists upon a more layered and dynamic understanding of socio-territorial effects. Bringing together case studies from North American and European cities, the issue underscores how different territorial jurisdictions overlap and shape the lives and practices of migrants in distinct cities.

Such multiterritorial governance might entail supranational rules, regulations, and practices of the EU, the immigration policies of Canada's federal government, EU member states, or the US federal government, regional governance in Europe, or state, or provincial governance in North America, as well as municipal governments of both continents.

(Hillman and Samers 2021: 175)

This concept of multiterritorialized governance allows for both migrant agency and state power, recognizing that migrants shape cities and governance through NGOs, political organizations, businesses, unregulated migration, and social movements, while the state also exerts its ability to control immigration and settlement through various national and local enforcement mechanisms (Hillman 2010).

Urban settings are ideal for analyzing multiterritorialized governance. Migrants are often key components in an urban regeneration process that is relational, processual, and multiscalar (Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2021), and urban immigrant destinations can be centers of political mobilization for rights and even sanctuary movements (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016; Mayer 2018). At the same time, urban settings can be reactionary and strongly anti-immigrant, often in open contradiction to state or national policies. Even when there is conscious engagement with borders and bordering practices, there is an insistence on shifting territorial or scalar units as fundamental in building theories to explain migration dynamics in place and space.

### **Future Directions: Growing Precarity and Environmental Triggers**

This chapter was written as the world experienced collective immobility due to border closures and stay-at-home orders brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic. We still do not know the long-term impact of the pandemic on the scalar and spatial dimensions of human migration. Will this be a momentary mobility decline, or will larger structural forces conspire to shift where and why people move? Given the uncertainty of this moment, two themes weigh heavily on future migration research within the geographic realm. One area is the inevitable impact of climate change in

terms of sea level rise and other extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and more severe hurricanes that will impact and even force human mobility. The second is a growing concern with the precarious conditions that migrants and refugees face with regards to their ability to migrate and the socio-legal conditions (both regular and irregular) under which they must live in their places of destination.

An influential paper by Australian geographer Graeme Hugo concluded that “our understanding of the nature and significance of the complex linkages between migration and environmental change remains limited” (Hugo 1996: 125). He added that the international dimensions of the migration–environment relationship are of growing concern. The relationship between migration and environment is neither simple nor linear. Among geographers, there is concern that the migration and the environmental change scholars are not well integrated, resulting in often overly deterministic or simplistic conclusions (Jokisch, Radel, Carte, and Schmook 2019).

A review of the environmental migration literature by Swiss scholars Etienne Piguet, Raoul Kaenzig, and Jérémie Guélet (2018) provides a useful framing. Reviewing over 50 years of scientific papers, they note various blind spots and over-studied areas—the US, Bangladesh, and Mexico being the most studied countries. More tellingly is the trend that environmental migration research is mainly done in developing countries (the Global South) whereas in the Global North research is framed as climate science. The authors assert this trend exhibits “the post-colonial imagination—which sees the archetypal victim of climate change as a poor peasant from the South” (2018: 359). The study also confirms that most of the funding for environmental migration research comes from North America, Europe, and Australia.

Theories to explain environmental migration fall into three broad areas (Piguet, Kaenzig, and Guélet 2018). The first looks at *development inequalities*, arguing that countries with more resources have the ability to adapt and respond to changing environments and thus are less likely to experience long-term displacement. In contrast, poorer countries lack these resources, making their populations more vulnerable to environmental change and forced migration (Neumayer, Plümper, and Barthel 2014). The inevitability of future environmental displacement is producing scholarship from the Global South to focus on negotiating the rights and protections for these migrants (Yelfaanibe and Zetter 2018). Secondly, due to the severe consequences of forecasted climate change for particular areas, a certain level of *environmental determinism* persists—as in the case of Bangladesh, due to its low elevation, dense population, and forecasted intense flooding, or in low-lying island nations such as Kiribati, which are threatened by rises in sea level. The third theoretical framing for environmental migration is *post-colonial securitization*, which tends to focus on potential climate refugees, especially in the regions of Africa and South Asia. By racializing environmental migration and linking it to developing countries, it is easier for the Global North to characterize this type of movement as a security threat. Thus, the securitization approach to environmental migration often leads to policies that defend borders and dismiss the complex interconnections between climate, society, and livelihood.



Like environmental migration, there is an emerging interest in critical geographies of precarity, especially as they intersect with various classes of migrants who enter into labor arrangements that are often temporary and insecure (Waite 2009; Reid-Musson 2014; Jordan 2017, Vickers et al. 2019). Kendra Strauss (2018) argues that a growing institutionalization of precarious employment emerged in the 1990s as part of a neoliberal acceptance of non-standard employment. Immigrants often face greater precarity than the native-born due to their irregular, temporary, or contingent status, be they day laborers, international students, domestic workers, or high-skill professionals.

Migrant precarity is influenced by macro-level factors such as fluctuating national regulations and policies, labor markets, changes in popular discourse on migration and migrants, as well as embodied characteristics such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, class, or language (Chacko and Price 2020). Precarity is not a fixed status, and migrants experience oscillations in their levels of precarity over time and across different spatial scales. Although precarity is not usually desirable, the politics of precarity can lead to collective agency and a resistance to categorizations as disposable and transitory laborers. In a time of great economic, social, environmental, and political precarity, perhaps it is understandable that geographies of migrant precarity will be of intense concern moving forward. And as with other major societal and environmental issues, it is through discussions across disciplines that stronger theories, methodologies, and policies may emerge toward migration and for the betterment of migrant lives.

## Discussion Questions

1. Long-standing research questions on the spatial and scalar aspects of migration research go back to Ravenstein's research in the late 19th century. What are the parallels and differences to research questions today?
2. The mobility transition thesis by Zelinsky suggests that, as places develop, populations become more mobile, to a point. How does research on immobility inform the connections between migration and development?
3. How do different scalar approaches shape migration theory? Are there migration theories that are independent of scale?
4. Geographers have long relied on the map to show migration patterns which may suggest the processes behind migration. How do other disciplines visualize migration flows over time and through space? How might such visualizations influence theory?
5. How have theories of bordering and securitization changed the ways migration policies and practices are viewed, especially with regard to refugees?

## References

- Allen, James P. and Eugene Turner. 1996. "Spatial Patterns of Immigrant Assimilation." *The Professional Geographer* 48(2): 140–55.
- Arreola, Daniel. 2004. *Hispanic Spaces, Latino Places: Community and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary America*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

- Baas, Michiel, Delphine Pagès-El Karoui, and Brenda Yeoh. 2020. "Migrants in Global Cities in Asia and the Gulf: Cosmopolitan Dialectics and Non-integration." *City* 24(5–6): 793–804.
- Bailey, Adrian J. 2001. "Turning Transnational: Notes on the Theorisation of International Migration." *International Journal of Population Geography* 7: 413–28.
- Bailey, Adrian J., Richard A. Wright, Alison Mountz, and Ines Miyares. 2002. "(Re) Producing Salvadoran Transnational Geographies." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92: 125–44.
- Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation States*. New York: Routledge.
- Bastia, Tanja. 2019. *Gender, Migration and Social Transformation: Intersectionality in Bolivian Itinerant Migrations*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bastia, Tanja and Ronald Skeldon. 2020. *Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Beaverstock, Jonathan V. and Sarah Hall. 2012. "Competing for Talent: Global Mobility, Immigration and the City of London's Labour Market." *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 5(2): 271–88.
- Bélanger, Danièle and Rachel Silvey. 2020. "An Im/mobility Turn: Power Geometries of Care and Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (16): 3423–40.
- Benton-Short, Lisa, Marie Price, and Samantha Friedman. 2005. "Globalization from Below: The Ranking of Global Immigrant Cities." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(4): 945–59.
- Blue, Sarah. 2004. "State Policy, Economic Crisis, Gender, and Family Ties: Determinants of Family Remittances to Cuba." *Economic Geography* 80: 63–82.
- Blue, Sarah A., Alisa Hartsell, Rebecca Torres, and Paul Flynn. 2020. "The Uneven Geography of Asylum and Humanitarian Relief: Place-Based Precarity for Central American Migrant Youth in the United States Judicial System." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1732588>.
- Blunt, Alison. 2007. "Cultural Geographies of Migration: Mobility, Transnationality and Diaspora." *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5): 684–94.
- Boccagni, Paolo and Marta Bivand Erdal. 2020. "On the Theoretical Potential of 'Remittance Houses': Toward a Research Agenda Across Emigration Contexts." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1804340>.
- Boyle, Paul. 2001. "Towards a (Re)Theorisation of Historical Geography of Nationalism in Diasporas: The Irish Diaspora as an Exemplar." *International Journal of Population Geography* 7: 429–46.
- Çağlar, Ayşe and Nina Glick Schiller. 2021. "Relational Multiscalar Analysis: A Comparative Approach to Migrants within City-Making Processes." *Geographical Review* 111(2): 206–32.
- Carling, Jørgen. 2002. "Migration in the Age of Involuntary Immobility: Theoretical Reflections and Cape Verdean Experiences." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28(1): 5–42.
- Carling, Jørgen and Kerilyn Schewel. 2018. "Revisiting Aspiration and Ability in International Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(6): 945–63.
- Carter, Sean. 2005. "The Geopolitics of Diaspora." *Area* 37(1): 45–63.
- Casteñeda, Ernesto, ed. 2021. *Reshaping the World, Rethinking Borders*. Basel: MDPI Books.
- Chacko, Elizabeth. 2007. "From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Reverse Migration to Bangalore and Hyderabad, India's Globalizing High Tech Cities." *GeoJournal* 68: 131–40.

- Chacko, Elizabeth and Marie Price. 2020. "(Un)settled Sojourners in Cities: The Scalar and Temporal Dimensions of Migrant Precarity." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1731060>.
- Clark, William A. V. and Sarah A. Blue. 2004. "Race, Class, and Segregation Patterns in U.S. Immigrant Gateway Cities." *Urban Affairs Review* 39(6): 667–88.
- Clark, William A. V. and Regan Maas. 2015. "Interpreting Migration Through the Prism of Reasons for Moves." *Population, Space, and Place* 21: 54–67.
- Cooke, Thomas J., Richard Wright, and Mark Ellis. 2018. "A Prospective on Zelinsky's Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition." *Geographical Review* 108(4): 503–22.
- Collins, Francis. 2020. "Geographies of Migration I: Platform Migration." *Progress in Human Geography*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132520973445>.
- Collyer, M. 2007. "In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan Transit Migrants in Morocco and the Fragmented Journey to Europe." *Antipode* 39(4): 668–90.
- Collyer, Michael and Russell King. 2015. "Producing Transnational Space: International Migration and Extra-Territorial Reach of State Power." *Progress in Human Geography* 39(2): 185–204.
- Collyer, Michael, Myriam Cherti, Thomas Lacroix, and Anja van Heelsum. 2009. "Migration and Development: The Euro–Moroccan Experience." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(10): 1555–70.
- Culcasi, Karen, Emily Skop, and Cynthia Gorman. 2019. "Contemporary Refugee-Border Dynamics and the Legacies of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference." *Geographical Review* 109(4): 469–86.
- Czaika, Mathias and Hein de Haas. 2014. "The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?" *International Migration Review* 48(2): 283–323.
- De Genova, Nicolas, ed. 2017. *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- De Haas, Hein. 2010. "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective." *International Migration Review* 44(1): 227–64.
- De Hass, Hein. 2020. "Paradoxes of Migration and Development." In *Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development*, edited by Tanja Bastia and Ronald Skeldon, 17–31. New York: Routledge.
- Délanó, Alexandra. 2014. "The Diffusion of Diaspora Engagement Policies: A Latin American Agenda." *Political Geography* 41: 90–100.
- DeWind, Josh, Eun Mee Kim, Ronald Skeldon, and In-Jin Yoon. 2012. "Korean Development and Migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(3): 371–88.
- Drbohlav, D., A. Bailey, Z. Čermák, D. Čermáková, D. Lozovanu, E. Masná, L. Pavelková, M. Seidlová, R. Stojanov, O. Valenta, and F. Vietti. 2017. "Diversification Trends in Moldovan International Migration: Evidence from Czechia and Italy." *AUC Geographica* 52(2): 237–48.
- Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2005. "Placing Identities: Transnational Practices and Local Attachments of Turkish Immigrants in Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31(2): 345–64.
- Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2017. "Geographies of Migration I: Refugees." *Progress in Human Geography* 41(6): 813–22.
- Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2019. "Geographies of Migration II: The Racial-Spatial Politics of Immigration." *Progress in Human Geography* 43(2): 363–75.
- Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2020. "Geographies of Migration III: Transit and Transnationalism." *Progress in Human Geography* 44(6): 1202–11.

- Ellis, Mark, Richard Wright, and Virginia Parks. 2006. "The Immigrant Household and Spatial Assimilation: Partnership, Nativity and Neighborhood Location." *Urban Geography* 27(1): 1–19.
- Erdal, Marta Bivand and Jørgen Carling. 2021. "New Economics of Transnational Migration." *Population, Space and Place* 27(5): 1–11.
- Evans, James and Phil Jones. 2011. "The Walking Interview: Methodology, Mobility and Place." *Applied Geography* 31(2): 849–58.
- Fan, Cindy. 2008. *China on the Move: Migration, the State and the Household*. New York: Routledge.
- Foner, Nancy. 1997. "What's New about Transnationalism?: New York Immigrants Today and at the Turn of the Century." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 6(3): 355–75.
- Fonseca, Maria Lucinda. 2008. "New Waves of Immigration to Small Towns and Rural Areas in Portugal." *Population, Space and Place* 14(6): 525–35.
- Forrest, James, Michael Poulsen, and Ron Johnston. 2006. "A 'Multicultural Model' of the Spatial Assimilation of Ethnic Minority Groups in Australia's Major Immigrant-Receiving Cities." *Urban Geography* 27(5): 441–63.
- Frazier, John W., Florence M. Margai, and Eugene Tettey-Fio. 2003. *Race and Place: Equity Issues in Urban America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Furuseth, O., H.A. Smith, and P.N. McDaniel. 2015. "Belonging in Charlotte: Multiscalar Differences in Local Immigration Politics and Policies." *Geographical Review* 105(1): 1–19.
- Gamlen, Alan. 2008. "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination." *Political Geography* 27(8): 840–56.
- Gimlartin, Mary. 2015. *Ireland and Migration in the Twenty-First Century*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Gimlartin, Mary and Allen White, eds. 2013. *Migrations, Ireland in a Global World*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Gimlartin, Mary and Anna-Kaisa Kuusisto-Arponen. 2019. "Borders and Bodies: Siting Critical Geographies of Migration." In *Handbook on Critical Geographies of Migration*, edited by Katharyne Mitchell, Reece Jones, and Jennifer L. Fluri, 18–29. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Goodwin-White, Jamie. 2018. "The Shaping of Selection: Secondary Migration, Scale, and Changing Immigrant Geographies." *Population, Space and Place*. 24(8): e2158. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2158>.
- Gordon, Steven Lawrence. 2016. "Welcoming Refugees in the Rainbow Nation: Contemporary Attitudes towards Refugees in South Africa." *African Geographical Review* 35(1): 1–17.
- Gorman, Cynthia S. 2019. "Singled Out: Scaling Violence and Social Groups as Legal Borderwork in U.S. Asylum Law." *Geographical Review* 109(4): 487–506.
- Graham, Elspeth and Paul Boyle. 2001. "Editorial Introduction: (Re)Theorizing Population Geography: Mapping the Unfamiliar." *International Journal of Population Geography* 7: 389–94.
- Grant, Richard and Daniel Thompson. 2015. "City on Edge: Immigrant Businesses and the Right to Urban Space in Inner-City Johannesburg." *Urban Geography* 36(2): 181–200.
- Halfacree, Keith. 2012. "Heterolocal Identities? Counter-Urbanisation, Second Homes, and Rural Consumption in the Era of Mobilities." *Population, Space and Place* 18: 209–24.

- Hardwick, Susan W. 2006. "Nodal Heterolocalism and Transnationalism at the United States-Canadian Border." *Geographical Review*, 96(2): 212–28.
- Hardwick, Susan W. and James E. Meacham. 2005. "Heterolocalism, Networks of Ethnicity, and Refugee Communities in the Pacific Northwest: The Portland Story." *The Professional Geographer*, 57(4): 539–57.
- Hayes, Matthew. 2015. "Introduction: The Emerging Lifestyle Migration Industry and Geographies of Transnationalism, Mobility and Displacement in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 14(1): 7–18.
- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2014. "Performing Homeland Security Within the US Immigrant Detention System." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32(4): 571–88.
- Hiemstra, Nancy. 2019. *Detain and Deport: The Chaotic US Immigration Enforcement Regime*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Hillman, Felicitas. 2010. "New Geographies of Migration." *Die Erde* 1–2: 1–13.
- Hillmann, Felicitas and Michael Samers. 2021. "Introduction to the Special Issue: Transatlantic Perspectives on Urban Transformation and the Governance of Migration." *Geographical Review* 111(2): 173–86.
- Hoang, Lan Anh and Brenda Yeoh. 2011. "Breadwinning Wives and "Left-Behind" Husbands: Men and Masculinities in the Vietnamese Transnational Family." *Gender & Society* 25 (6): 717–39.
- Huang, Xu, Bo Zhao, Ye Liu, and Desheng Xue. 2020. "Belonging to a Place: An Analysis of the Perceptions of Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China" *Geographical Review* 110(3): 406–24.
- Hugo, Graeme. 1996. "Environmental Concerns and International Migration." *International Migration Review* 30(1): 105–31.
- Hume, Susan and Susan W. Hardwick. 2005. "Migration, Culture and Place: The Impacts of Refugee Resettlement on the Portland Urban Area." *Geographical Review* 95(2): 189–209.
- Janská, Eva, Zdeněk Čermák, and Richard Wright. 2014. "New Immigrant Destinations in a New Country of Immigration: Settlement Patterns of Non-Natives in the Czech Republic." *Population, Space and Place* 20: 680–93.
- Johnston, Ron, Michael Poulsen, and James Forrest. 2007. "Ethnic and Racial Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas 1980–2000: The Dimensions of Segregation Revisited." *Urban Affairs Review* 42: 479–504.
- Jokisch, Brad. 2002. "Migration and Agricultural Change: The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Highland Ecuador." *Human Ecology* 30: 523–50.
- Jokisch, Brad and Jason Pribilsky. 2002. "The Panic to Leave: Economic Crisis and the 'New Emigration' from Ecuador." *International Migration* 40(4): 75–101.
- Jokisch, Brad D., Claudia Radel, Lindsey Carte, and Birget Schmook. 2019. "Migration Matters: How Migration is Critical to Human-Environment Geography." *Geography Compass* 13: e12460.
- Jones, Reece. 2017. *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move*. London and New York: Verso.
- Jones, Richard C. 1998. "Remittances and Inequality: A Question of Migration Stage and Geographic Scale." *Economic Geography* 74(1): 8–25.
- Jones, Richard C. 2020. "The Decline of Migrant Transnationalism with Time Abroad." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 43(15): 2685–704.
- Jones, Richard C. and Leonardo de la Torre. 2011. "Diminished Tradition of Return? Transnational Migration in Bolivia's Valle Alto." *Global Networks* 11(2): 180–202.

- Jordan, Lucy P. 2017. "Introduction: Understanding Migrants' Economic Precarity in Global Cities." *Urban Geography* 38(10): 1455–58.
- Kaplan, David H. 2018. *Navigating Ethnicity: Segregation, Placemaking and Difference*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Kaplan, David and Wei Li. 2006. *Landscapes of the Ethnic Economy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Kemeny, Thomas and Abigail Cooke. 2018. "Spillovers from Immigrant Diversity in Cities." *Journal of Economic Geography* 18: 213–45.
- Kenny, Kevin. 2003. "Diaspora and Comparison: The Global Irish as a Case Study." *Journal of American History* 90(1): 134–62.
- King, Russell. 2012. "Geography and Migration Studies: Retrospect and Prospect." *Population, Space and Place* 18(2): 134–53.
- Koca, Burcu Togrul. 2019. "Local Bordering Practices, Refugees, and Civil Society: The Case of Berlin." *Geographical Review* 109(4): 544–61.
- Lawson, Victoria. 1998. "Hierarchical Households and Gendered Migration in Latin America: Feminist Extensions to Migration Research." *Progress in Human Geography* 22(1): 39–53.
- Leitner, Helga and Christopher Strunk. 2014. "Space of Immigrant Advocacy and Liberal Democratic Citizenship." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 104 (2): 348–56.
- Lewis, Peirce. 1979. "Axioms for Reading the Landscape." In *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes*, edited by D.W. Meinig, 11–32. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ley, David. 2013. "Does Transnationalism Trump Immigrant Integration? Evidence from Canada's Links with East Asia." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(6): 921–938.
- Li, Wei. 2006. *From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Li, Wei, Gary Dymski, Yu Zhou, Maria Chee, and Carolyn Aldana. 2002. "Chinese-American Banking and Community Development in Los Angeles County." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92(4): 777–96.
- Li, Wei. 2009. *Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.
- Lobo, Michele. 2016. "Geopower in Public Spaces of Darwin, Australia: Exploring Forces that Unsettle Phenotypical Racism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39(1): 68–86.
- Lobo, Michele. 2021. "Living on the Edge: Precarity and Freedom in Darwin, Australia." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47(2): 4615–4630.
- Malecki, Edward J. and Michael C. Ewers. 2007. "Labor Migration to World Cities: With a Research Agenda for the Arab Gulf." *Progress in Human Geography* 31(4): 467–84.
- Manley, David, Ron Johnston, and Kelvyn Jones. 2018. "Decomposing Multi-Level Ethnic Segregation in Auckland, New Zealand, 2001–2013: Segregation Intensity for Multiple Groups at Multiple Scales." *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 110(3): 319–38.
- Manning, Patrick. 2010. *The African Diaspora: A History Through Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Marston, Sallie. 2000. "The Social Construction of Scale." *Progress in Human Geography* 24(2): 219–42.
- Marston, Sallie, John Paul Jones III, and Keith Woodward. 2005. "Human Geography Without Scale." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30(4): 416–32.



- Massey, Doreen. 1994. *Space, Place and Gender*. Cambridge, UK: Policy Press.
- Mayer, Margit. 2018. "Cities as Sites of Refuge and Resistance." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 25(3): 232–49.
- Mendoza, C. and R. Morén-Alegret. 2013. "Exploring Methods and Techniques for the Analysis of Senses of Place and Migration." *Progress in Human Geography* 37(6): 762–85.
- Mensah, Joseph, Christopher J. Williams, and Edna Aryee. 2013. "Gender, Power, and Religious Transnationalism among the African Diaspora in Canada." *African Geographical Review* 32(2): 157–71.
- Mitchell, Katharyne. 1997a. "Transnational Discourse: Bring Geography Back In." *Antipode* 29(2): 101–14.
- Mitchell, Katharyne. 1997b. "Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 15: 533–53.
- Miyares, Ines, Richard Wright, Alison Mountz, and Adrian Bailey. 2019. "Truncated Transnationalism, the Tenuousness of Temporary Protected Status, and Trump." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 18(1): 210–16.
- Mountz, Alison. 2010. *Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mountz, Alison. 2011. "The Enforcement Archipelago: Detention, Haunting and Asylum Islands." *Political Geography* 30: 118–128.
- Mountz, Alison. 2020. *The Death of Asylum: Hidden Geographies of the Enforcement Archipelago*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mountz, Alison and Nancy Hiemstra. 2014. "Chaos and Crisis: Dissecting the Spatiotemporal Logics of Contemporary Migrations and State Practices." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 104(2): 382–90.
- Mukherjee, A. and B.K. Pattnaik. 2021. "Assimilation, Heterolocalism and Ethnic Capital: The Case of an Immigrant Indian Community in America." *Sociological Bulletin* 70(1): 24–41.
- Nelson, Lise and Nancy Hiemstra. 2008. "Latino Immigrants and the Renegotiation of Place and Belonging in Small Town America." *Social & Cultural Geography* 9(3): 319–42.
- Nelson, Lise and Peter B Nelson. 2011. "The Global Rural: Gentrification and Linked Migration in the Rural USA." *Progress in Human Geography* 35(4): 441–59.
- Neumayer, Eric, Thomas Plümper, and Fabian Barthel. 2014. "The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Damage." *Global Environmental Change* 24: 8–19.
- Nicholls, Walter J. and Justus Uitermark. 2016. "Migrant Cities: Place, Power, and Voice in the Era of Super Diversity." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(6): 877–92.
- Nyberg-Sorensen, Ninna, Nicholas Van Hear, and Poul Engberg-Pedersen. 2002. "The Migration–Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options." *International Migration* 40(5): 49–73.
- Oner, Asli Ceylan, Bahar Durmaz-Drinkwater, and Richard J. Grant. 2021. "Precarity of Refugees: The Case of Basmane-İzmir, Turkey." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47(20): 4651–4670.
- Pareñas, Rhacel, Krittiya Kantachote, and Rachel Silvey. 2021. "Soft Violence: Migrant Domestic Worker Precarity and the Management of Unfree Labor in Singapore." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47(20): 4671–4687.
- Pavlovskaya, Marianna, Siri Gerrard, and Marit Aure. 2018. "Introduction to Special Issue: "Gender and Im(mobilities)." *Gender, Place & Culture* 25(8): 1115–20.
- Peach, Ceri. 1996. "Good Segregation, Bad Segregation." *Planning Perspectives* 11: 379–98.



- Peach, Ceri. 1997. "Pluralist and Assimilationist Models of Ethnic Settlement in London." *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 88(2): 120–34.
- Piekut, Aneta, Gwilym Pryce, and Wouter van Gent. 2019. "Segregation in the Twenty-First Century: Processes, Complexities and Future Directions." *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 110(3): 225–34.
- Piguet, Etienne. 2010. "Linking Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration: A Methodological Overview." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 1(4): 517–24.
- Piguet, Etienne, Paoul Kaenzig, and Jérémie Guélat. 2018. "The Uneven Geography of Research on 'Environmental Migration.'" *Population and Environment* 39: 357–83.
- Pratt, Geraldine and Brenda Yeoh. 2003. "Transnational (Counter)topographies." *Gender, Place and Culture* 10: 159–66.
- Pred, Alan. 1984. "Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74(2): 279–97.
- Price, Marie and Lisa Benton-Short. 2007. "Immigrants and World Cities: From the Hyper-Diverse to the Bypassed." *GeoJournal* 68(2–3): 103–17.
- Price, Marie and Lisa Benton-Short, ed. 2008. *Migrants to the Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Price, Marie and Elizabeth Chacko. 2009. "The Mixed Embeddedness of Immigrant Entrepreneurs in a New Immigrant Gateway." *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* 7(3): 328–46.
- Price, Marie and Derek Breese. 2016. "Unintended Return: U.S. Deportations and the Fractious Politics of Mobility for Latinos." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 106(2): 366–76.
- Price, Marie, Ivan Cheung, Samantha Friedman, and Audrey Singer. 2005. "The World Settles in: Washington, DC as an Immigrant Gateway." *Urban Geography* 26(1): 61–83.
- Price, Marie and Giancarla Rojas. 2021. "The Ordinary Lives and Uneven Precarity of the DACAmented: Visualizing Migrant Precarity in Metropolitan Washington." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47(20): 4758–4778.
- Price, Marie and Nicole Svajlenka. 2021. "Undocumented Youth and Their Unequal Rights: State Responses to Trump's Immigration Policies." In *Political Landscapes of Donald Trump*, edited by Barney Warf, 322–38. New York: Routledge.
- Radel, Claudia and Birgit Schmook. 2008. "Male Transnational Migration and its Linkages to Land-Use Change in a Southern Campeche Ejido." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 7(2): 59–84.
- Ralph, David and Lynn A. Staeheli. 2011. "Home and Migration: Mobilities, Belongings and Identities." *Geography Compass* 5(7): 517–530.
- Ravenstein, E.G. 1885. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 48(2): 167–235.
- Ravenstein, E.G. 1889. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 52(2): 241–305.
- Reid-Musson, E. 2014. "Historicizing Precarity: A Labour Geography of 'Transient' Migrant Workers in Ontario Tobacco." *Geoforum* 56: 161–71.
- Robinson, Vaughan; Roger Andersson, and Sako Musterd. 2003. *Spreading the 'Burden'? A Review of Policies to Disperse Asylum Seekers and Refugees*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Ryburn, Megan. 2018. *Uncertain Citizenship: Everyday Practices of Bolivian Migrants in Chile*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

- Samers, Michael. 2010. *Migration*. London: Routledge.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1991. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schein, Richard. 1997. "The Place of Landscape: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting an American Scene." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84(4): 660–80.
- Schein, Richard, ed. 2006. *Landscape and Race in the United States*. New York: Routledge.
- Shah, Sonia. 2020. *The Next Great Migration: The Beauty and Terror of Life on the Move*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Sheller, Mimi. 2018. *Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes*. London: Verso.
- Silvey, Rachel and Victoria Lawson. 1999. "Placing the Migrant." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 89: 121–32.
- Silvey, Rachel. 2006. "Geographies of Gender and Migration: Spatializing Social Difference." *International Migration Review* 40 (1): 64–81.
- Silvey, Rachel. 2009. "Development and Geography: Anxious Times, Anemic Geographies and Migration." *Progress in Human Geography* 33(4): 507–15.
- Singer, Audrey, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell. 2008. *Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Skeldon, Ronald. 1997. *Migration and Development: A Global Interpretation*. London: Longman.
- Skeldon, Ronald. 2012. "Migration Transitions Revisited: The Continued Relevance for the Development of Migration Theory." *Population, Space and Place* 18(2): 154–66.
- Skop, Emily. 2006. "The Methodological Potential of Focus Groups in Population Geography." *Population, Space and Place* 12(2): 113–24.
- Skop, Emily. 2019. "Geography and Migration." In *Sage Handbook of International Migration*, edited by Christine Inglis, Wei Li, and Binod Khadria, 108–21. London: Sage Publications.
- Smith, Darren P. 2019. "Population Geography II: The R/age of Migration." *Progress in Human Geography* 43(4): 729–38.
- Smith, Heather and Owen Furueth, ed. 2006. *Lations in the New South: Transformation of Place*. Burlington: Ashgate Press.
- Strauss, Kendra. 2018. "Labour Geography 1: Towards a Geography of Precarity?" *Progress in Human Geography* 42(4): 622–30.
- Swanson, Kate and Rebecca Maria Torres. 2016. "Child Migration and Transnationalized Violence in Central and North America." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 15(3): 23–48.
- Teixeira, Carlos and Wei Li, eds. 2015. *The Housing and Economic Experiences of Immigrants in US and Canadian Cities*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Torres, Rebecca M. and Lindsey Carte. 2014. "Community Participatory Appraisal in Migration Research: Connecting Neoliberalism, Rural Restructuring and Mobility." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 39: 140–54.
- Torres, Rebecca M. and Lindsey Carte. 2016. "Migration and Development? The Gendered Costs of Migration on Mexico's Rural 'Left Behind'." *Geographical Review* 106(3): 399–420.
- Tuan, Yi Fu. 1977. *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Tyner, James. 2010. *The Philippines: Mobilities, Identities, Globalization*. New York and London: Routledge.
- van Riemsdijk, Micheline. 2014. "International Migration and Local Emplacement: Everyday Place-Making Practices of Skilled Migrants in Oslo, Norway." *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 46(4): 963–79.
- Varsanyi, Monica. 2010. *Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in US Cities and States*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2007. "Super-Diversity and its Implications." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(6): 1024–54.
- Vickers, Tom; John Clayton, Hilary Davison, Lucinda Hudson, Maria A Cañadas, Paul Biddle, and Sara Lilley. 2019. "Dynamics of Precarity Among 'New Migrants': Exploring the Worker–Capital Relation Through Mobilities and Mobility Power." *Mobilities* 14(5): 696–714.
- Viteri, María Amelia. 2015. "Cultural Imaginaries in the Residential Migration to Cotacachi." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 14(1): 119–38.
- Vogiazides, Louisa. 2018. "Exiting Distressed Neighbourhoods: The Timing of Spatial Assimilation Among International Migrants in Sweden." *Population, Space and Place*: 24(8). <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2169>.
- Waite, Louise. 2009. "A Place and Space for a Critical Geography of Precarity?" *Geography Compass* 3(1): 412–433. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00184.x>.
- Waldinger, Roger and David Fitzgerald. 2004 "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(5): 1177–95.
- Walker, K. E. 2014. "The Role of Geographic Context in the Local Politics of U.S. Immigration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(7): 1040–59.
- Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2004. "Transnational Migration Theory in Population Geography: Gendered Practices in Networks Linking Canada and India." *Population, Space and Place* 10: 357–60.
- Walker, Kyle and Helga Leitner. 2011. "The Variegated Landscape of Local Immigration Policies in the United States." *Urban Geography* 32: 1–23.
- Walton-Roberts, Margaret, Jonathan Crush, and Abel Chikanda. 2019. "Diasporas and Development." In *Handbook on Critical Geographies of Migration*, edited by Katharyne Mitchell, Reece Jones, and Jennifer L. Fluri, 290–302. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Wang, Gungwu. 2009. *The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Warf, Barney. 2015. "Global Cities, Cosmopolitanism, and Geographies of Tolerance." *Urban Geography* 36(6): 927–46.
- Waters, Johanna L. 2005. "Transnational Family Strategies and Education in the Contemporary Chinese Diaspora." *Global Networks* 5(4): 359–77.
- Wessel, Terje, Roger Andersson, Timo Kauppinen, and Hans Skifter Andersen. 2017. "Spatial Integration of Immigrants in Nordic Cities: The Relevance of Spatial Assimilation Theory in a Welfare State Context." *Urban Affairs Review* 53(5): 812–42.
- White, Paul and Peter Jackson. 1995. "(Re)theorising Population Geography." *International Journal of Population Geography (now Population, Space and Place)* 1(2): 111–23.
- Winders, Jamie. 2007. "Bringing back the (B)order: Post-9/11 Politics of Immigration, Borders, and Belonging in the Contemporary U.S. South." *Antipode* 39(5): 920–42.
- Winders, Jamie. 2013. *Nashville in the New Millennium: Immigrant Settlement, Urban Transformation, and Social Belonging*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Winders, Jamie. 2014. "New Immigrant Destinations in Global Context." *International Migration Review* 48(S1): S149–79.
- Wright, Richard, Mark Ellis, Steven R. Holloway, and Sandy Wong. 2014. "Patterns of Racial Diversity and Segregation in the United States: 1990–2010." *The Professional Geographer* 66(2): 173–82.
- Wright, Richard, Mark Ellis, and Virginia Parks. 2005. "Re-Placing Whiteness in Spatial Assimilation Research." *City & Community* 4(2): 111–35.
- Yao, Jing, David W.S. Wong, Nick Bailey, and Jonathan Minton. 2018. "Spatial Segregation Measures: A Methodological Review." *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 110(3): 235–50.
- Yelfaanibe, Augustine and Roger Zetter. 2018. "Policies and Labels for Negotiating Rights Protection for the Environmentally Displaced in Ghana: The Dagara Farmer in Perspective." *African Geographical Review* 37(2): 83–97.
- Yeoh, Brenda. 2016. "Migration and Gender Politics in Southeast Asia." *Migration, Mobility and Displacement* 2(1): 74–88.
- Yeoh, Brenda and Theodora Lam. 2016. "Immigration and its (Dis)contents: The Challenges of Highly Skilled Migration in Globalizing Singapore." *American Behavioral Scientist* 60(5–6): 637–58.
- Yeoh, Brenda and Kamalini Ramdas. 2014. "Gender, Migration, Mobility and Transnationalism." *Gender, Place & Culture* 21(10): 1197–213.
- Yeoh, Brenda, Shirlena Huang, and Theodora Lam. 2005. "Transnationalizing the 'Asian' Family: Imaginaries, Intimacies and Strategic Intent." *Global Networks* 5(4): 307–15.
- Zelinsky, Wilbur. 1971. "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition." *Geographical Review* 61(2): 219–49.
- Zelinsky, Wilbur. 1983. "The Impasse in Migration Theory: A Sketch for Potential Escapees." In *Population Movements: Their Forms and Functions in Urbanization and Development*, edited by P. A. Morrison, 19–46. Liege: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population.
- Zelinsky, Wilbur and Barrett A. Lee. 1998. "Heterolocalism: An Alternative Model of the Sociospatial Behaviour of Immigrant Ethnic Communities." *International Journal of Population Geography* 4: 281–98.

# 7 The Politics of International Migration

*James F. Hollifield and Tom K. Wong*

The scholarly study of international migration has, in the past decade, entrenched itself in the mainstream of political science. From research that intersects migration and the study of racial and ethnic politics to work that examines how migration collides with the foundational principles of national security, sovereignty, and citizenship, migration is a cross-cutting issue that touches the heart of political science. In previous editions, we began this chapter by asking, “Why is migration relevant for political science?” Answers to this question are now increasingly clear across the discipline (Hollifield 2010; Hollifield and Wong 2013). We begin the chapter for this new edition by offering a brief historical and theoretical explanation for the previous lack of interest in migration among (American) students of politics and then discuss the relationship between migration and the nation-state, which sets the stage for theorizing about the politics of international migration.

## **Political Scientists Came Late to the Study of International Migration**

Why did political scientists come late to the study of international migration compared to other disciplines? The historical explanation lies in the long gap between the end of the third wave of immigration to the United States in the 1920s—when the famous Chicago School of Sociology was dominant (Park 1928; and for a review, see the chapter by FitzGerald in this volume)—and the beginning of the fourth wave after the passage of the landmark Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1965 that dismantled the discriminatory national origins quota system. During this period, levels of immigration to the United States were at historic lows. And from the end of WWII until the 1980s, immigration policy was largely confined to the realm of “low politics,” which is to say that it was considered to be a domestic issue that did not rise to the level of international or “high politics,” affecting relations between nation-states. The Cold War was the dominant theme in international relations and since migration did not directly affect the balance of power in the East-West standoff, it was a non-topic, with the partial exception of political and conflict-induced refugees. This is not to say that immigration to the United States was unimportant during the period from the end of the third to the beginning of the fourth wave—one need only look at major policy reforms

such as the National Origins Quota Act (1924), McCarran-Walter Act (1952), and Hart-Celler Act (1965), all major pieces of immigration legislation—but levels of immigration were at historic lows. The Cold War also created “strange bed-fellow” coalitions between political or civil rights liberals (Democrats) on the left and economic liberals (Republicans) on the right, making it easier to pass major immigration legislation than in earlier periods of American history. These rights-markets coalitions held together until the end of the Cold War (Hollifield, Hunt, and Tichenor 2008), helping to pass the Hart-Celler Act (1965), the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and the 1990 Immigration Act.

In Europe, however, France, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, to name but a few, had opened their doors to immigrants, guestworkers, and refugees as early as the 1950s, with the result that, by the 1970s, immigration was a hot political issue, which attracted the attention of scholars of comparative politics. In *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (1973), two political sociologists, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, argued that foreign labor (in the form of guestworkers) is necessary for the survival of advanced capitalist societies because foreign workers provide an “industrial reserve army” of labor. Two political scientists, Gary Freeman (1979) and Mark Miller (1981), then looked at issues of immigration, race, and ethnic politics in Western Europe.

Still, international migration remained on the margins of political science in the United States, if not in Europe, until the 1990s (see also Freeman 2011 for a review) and migration theory was dominated by push-pull and cost-benefit analyses closely associated with neoclassical economics or by sociological and anthropological explanations rooted in networks, transnationalism, and world systems theory (Wallerstein 1976; Levitt 2001). Only in roughly the past thirty years has a field of study begun to emerge, which we might call the *politics of international migration*, as political scientists scrambled to see how we can “bring the state back in” (Evans et al. 1985) to social scientific analyses of international migration.<sup>1</sup> It is here—theorizing about and empirically testing how politics affects international migration and *vice versa*—where political scientists have shined.

## International Migration and the Nation-State

To understand how politics affects international migration requires us, in the first instance, to theorize about politics and the state. This is an essential first step—to agree on the categories and concepts, as well as how to operationalize them—that will constitute our independent variables (see also the introduction to this volume). The next step is to search for a consensus on the dependent variables: what exactly is it that we are trying to explain? These first two steps not only provide a road map linking politics and the state to migration-related outcomes, but also begin to unravel and make legible the political processes and causal mechanisms that confound (or are confounded by) economic, sociological, or other factors. Indeed, one of the challenges for political scientists is to bring the power of political explanations to bear in the development of theories of international migration that not only incorporate political variables, but also lend themselves

to generalizable and testable hypotheses. This can help inform *political theories of international migration*, wherein our research objectives include theorizing about, and empirically testing the political determinants of international migration itself. At the same time, our analyses often push much further than explaining policy choices and migratory outcomes. Our attention to the role of politics in migratory processes can be seen as a deductive first step that begs other important and politically salient questions.

If politics do indeed matter, then what explains the modes of politics that form around international migration? Who are the consequential political actors involved and what makes them consequential? What interests are at play and what shapes these interests? These questions help inform our understanding of the *politics of international migration*, as well as potential endogeneity wherein our causal arrows become reversed. The final step, which is the principal subject of this chapter, is to open a dialogue with migration scholars in the other social sciences so that we can talk across the disciplines, see if the objects of our inquiry are the same, ask whether the processes and mechanisms we propose that link causes to effects are substantively equivalent, and see whether research findings are complementary or contradictory. A new generation of scholars in political science is doing the work that is needed to fill the political gaps that exist in the migration literature (for an overview, see Antje Ellermann 2021), bringing to bear theories of politics, sorting out politically salient independent and dependent variables, and addressing what we see as two major areas of inquiry in the politics of international migration: the politics of control and the politics of inclusion and exclusion, which include questions centered around citizenship, national identity, immigrant incorporation, and political participation. We devote the rest of this section to theorizing about politics, the state, and international migration.

Notwithstanding the system of collective security rooted in the United Nations, the most basic function of the modern nation-state—providing security for the territory, the population, and the government—has not changed much since the creation of the garrison state and the evolution of the Westphalian system of nation-states in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If we accept the Weberian definition of sovereignty, a nation-state can exist only if it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territorial area. It follows that the ability or inability of a nation-state to control its borders is the *sine qua non* of sovereignty (Andreas and Snyder 2000; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Hollifield 2005, 2012). With some notable exceptions—such as the international refugee regime created by the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees—the right of a nation-state to control who enters, who remains, who leaves, and under what conditions is an undisputed principle of international law (Shaw 1997; Hollifield 2005). But this principle, which is a cornerstone of the international legal system, immediately raises a puzzling question: why are some nation-states willing to accept rather high levels of immigration (or emigration) when it may not be in their political interest to do so (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998b; Boswell 2007; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Hérán 2022)?



The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of what Richard Rosecrance (1986) called the *trading state*, in which economic considerations (free trade and a stable exchange rate system) took precedence in world politics over crude power maximization. This period represented the “age of imperialism” during which the European model of the nation-state (and the trading state) would be violently exported around the globe, along with the subjugation of indigenous populations and colonization (Lucassen 2021 and Gabaccia in this volume). From a strategic, economic, and demographic standpoint, trade and migration go hand in hand. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the wealth, power, and stability of the nation-state is dependent on its willingness to *risk both trade and migration* (Hatton and Williamson 1998; Hollifield, Osang, and Orrenius 2006; Peters 2015); and *international security and stability are dependent on the capacity of states to manage migration* (Weiner 1993; Hollifield 2012). Yet it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nation-states to manage or control migration unilaterally or even bilaterally. Indeed, migration interdependence (Hollifield and Foley 2021) has increased sharply in recent decades, bringing the issue of global migration governance “beyond the state” to the fore (Geddes 2021; cf. Hollifield 2000a).

The latter half of the twentieth century gave rise to the *migration state* (see Figure 7.1), where some nation-states are constrained by “embedded liberalism” and rights-based politics (Hollifield 1992, 1999, 2004). The conceptual advance made by using the migration state framework lies in recognizing how important international migration is for *all* nation-states—across regime type, region, as well as founding myths and migratory histories—as the legitimacy of any nation-state depends greatly upon its ability to maintain territorial sovereignty, which includes controlling migration. This developmental scenario, meaning the evolution of the garrison to trading to migration state, is understood largely as a Western (European and American) story that does not apply to non-Western countries and regions; but no nation-state or region can escape the dilemmas of migration control and its consequences for human development. The migration state must reconcile the need for migration to meet economic objectives against

| <u>The state</u> | <u>Type</u>                                       | <u>Function</u>        |
|------------------|---|------------------------|
| Garrison state   | Absolutist<br>16 <sup>th</sup> - 17 <sup>th</sup> | Security<br>(subjects) |
| ↓                |   |                        |
| Trading state    | Liberal<br>18 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup>    | Economic<br>(firms)    |
| ↓                |   |                        |
| Migration state  | Welfare<br>post 1945                              | Rights<br>(citizens)   |

Figure 7.1 Changes in type and function of the nation-state. Source: Created by the authors.

demands for closure to protect the social contract, the institution of citizenship, and the legitimacy of the nation-state. These pressures, in turn, can increase anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment among the native-born population, thus making some migrant groups unwelcome because they deviate too greatly from some national ideal. Migration states must often thus balance their propensity to risk migration (openness) to meet economic ends against the preferences of their citizens—what Hollifield (1992) has termed the “liberal paradox.” Moreover, beyond this fundamental tension, the migration state framework also allows us to interrogate other important migration-related considerations, including how nation-states link national security and migration and, once admitted, the rights they extend to newcomers, or what rights they withhold. The migration state framework also allows us to include considerations of forced migration, transnationalism, and diasporas (and remittances), all topics that are especially salient for non-Western countries and regions.

In migration states, four factors drive the politics of international migration: national security, which includes what Hannah Arendt (1951) described as the “time honoured and necessary” need for nation-states to protect territorial sovereignty; economic considerations (i.e., markets); rights, which include conversations that have been dominated in recent years by growing nationalism, populism, nativism, and xenophobia; and a broader set of cultural and ideational concerns. National security, economic considerations, rights, and cultural and ideational concerns are all part of a multi-dimensional game in the politics of international migration.<sup>2</sup>

During much of the post-war period, immigration policy debates revolved around two poles: economic considerations, which manifested in questions such as how many immigrants to let in and under what conditions; and rights, which manifested in questions about the legal status of newcomers (e.g., temporary or




Figure 7.2 The dilemmas of migration governance. Source: Created by the authors.

guestworkers versus more permanent migrants) and access to citizenship and the rights it confers (e.g., family reunification and a pathway to citizenship). Questions about migration policy clustered around these two poles continue to form the basis of recent scholarship. Rather than balancing economic and rights-based considerations, scholars have increasingly suggested that migration states are forced to make trade-offs between economic considerations and rights (Ruhs and Martin 2008; Martin and Ruhs 2013). Whether such trade-offs exist, why, and to what effect, are good research questions.

However, cultural and ideational concerns—where immigrants come from, their race and ethnicity, the languages they speak, the religions they practice, to name but a few—can be as, or even more salient, than economic considerations and they often precede questions related to rights. Who belongs or who are we? National identity is a politically fraught question, but a foundational one for students of the politics of international migration. The US case provides no shortage of historical examples. Although shrouded in talk about labor market competition, US immigration policy history is marred by the exclusion of entire categories of people because of their race and their perceived (in)assimilability (e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882; Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907–1908 that effectively halted Japanese immigration into the United States; Immigration Act of 1917 that created an “Asiatic-barred zone”), as well as their national origins (e.g., National Origins Quota Act of 1924 that severely limited immigration from eastern and southern Europe, see FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014 and FitzGerald in this volume). In a previous version of this chapter, we wrote that it was only recently that the United States had moved away from identity-based legal admissions policies with the Hart-Cellar Act (1965), which repealed the national origins quota system and prohibited discrimination based on “race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence” (Tichenor 2002; Wong 2017). However, the Trump-era of immigration policymaking witnessed new efforts to prohibit immigration into the United States from Muslim-majority countries (i.e., the “travel or Muslim ban”).

Moreover, with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and again with a series of horrendous attacks in Europe in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the politics of international migration in Western democracies shifted to an explicitly national security dynamic. However, even this shift in the framing of immigration debates occurred against the backdrop of a deep cultural subtext—fear of Islam, in particular, and broader concerns that liberal migration policies could threaten national security (Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995; Lucassen 2005; Adamson 2006; Rudolph 2006; Guild 2009). Indeed, if a national security threat is perceived to be “cultural,” debates centered on economic considerations and rights quickly give way to *symbolic politics* that paint many prospective migrants as existential threats. This happened in the US presidential campaign of 2016 and again with the debates over Islam and laïcité in France in 2020. Moving debates about the politics of international migration away from economic or material interests to culture and ideational concerns accentuates the ideological dimensions of policy and intensifies the symbolic dimension of electoral politics.

The Covid-19 pandemic reinforced the national security dynamic, affording populist leaders an opportunity to pursue illiberal, xenophobic, and nativist policies. This is what happened during the Trump administration when the pandemic made it easier to conflate Covid-19—the invisible enemy, which Trump referred to repeatedly as the “Wuhan or China virus”—with US immigration policies, even though little empirical evidence exists that shows a relationship between international migration and the spread of infectious disease (Wong 2020). Indeed, in times of war and pandemic, the political salience of economic considerations and rights give way to national security and cultural dynamics, which makes finding an equilibrium (compromise) in the game of immigration politics much harder as states tend to move toward closure. Such are the current dilemmas facing leaders in every migration state, which have opened doors to new and virulent forms of nationalism. To be clear, we are not suggesting that it is either economic considerations and rights or national security and cultural and ideational concerns that explain the politics of international migration. The explanatory power of the migration state framework is that it acknowledges that the political salience of any one aspect can ebb and flow, as well as interact.

We can now identify ideal types of migration states, ranging from the most liberal, like Canada, which balance national security, economic considerations, rights, and broader cultural and ideational concerns through a well-established national immigration regime, to the more illiberal, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which run strict guest worker programs that are basically the modern equivalent of indentured servitude. In Asia, although there are large numbers of economic migrants, especially in South Asia and in Southeast Asia, the region remains characterized by relatively closed and often authoritarian regimes, wherein migrants and guestworkers see limited prospects of accessing citizenship and the rights it confers (Sadiq 2009; Chung 2010). The more liberal and democratic regimes in East Asia, like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, are the exceptions (Hollifield and Sharpe 2017; Chung 2020; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022). In Africa and the Middle East, which have high numbers of forced migrants and refugees, ongoing conflicts and civil wars have destabilized entire regions, diasporas abound, and regimes are characterized by their instability (or as failed states) with little institutional or legal capacity to manage international migration (Lischer 2005; Adamson 2006; Salehyan 2009; Betts 2013; Hollifield and Foley 2021).

The remainder of this chapter treats three major themes or questions that have emerged in the study of the politics of international migration. The first major theme revolves around the question of *control* and how nation-states establish rules of entry, exit, and expulsion/deportation. To what extent can nation-states control their own borders? What are the political factors that define the capacity and limits of control and what are the principal dilemmas of governing international migration (Hollifield 1992, 1999a, 2000b, 2012; Freeman 1995; Weiner 1995; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Ellermann 2009, 2021; Wong 2015; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022)? These questions lead directly to the second major theme of this chapter—how international migration affects

international relations and *national security*. Why do states “risk migration” and, at times, accept “unwanted immigrants” (Martin 1994; Hollifield 1999, 2004; Joppke 1998a)? Lastly, how does international migration impinge upon or expand notions of *citizenship* (Benhabib 2004; Carens 2013; Hollifield 2021)? Answering this question requires not only understanding of how nation-states negotiate access to citizenship and the rights it confers, but also requires that we interrogate how (in)elastic national identity may or may not be and the inclusion or lack thereof (i.e., political, economic, and societal incorporation) of newcomers into society. Citizenship and the rights it confers, along with national identity and inclusion, lie at the heart of the way in which every polity defines itself.

### **The Politics of Control**

Many political scientists would agree that at its most basic level politics involves control, influence, power, and authority. If we add to this definition Weber’s concerns (1947) about legitimacy and the importance of controlling territory, together with Aristotle’s more normative focus on issues of participation, citizenship, and justice, we have a picture of what Robert Dahl (1991) calls the “political aspect.” We can see immediately how international migration touches on each of these dimensions of politics: the procedural or distributional dimension, including who gets what, when, and how; the legal or statist dimension, involving issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, and national identity; and the ethical or normative dimension, which revolves around questions of justice, citizenship, participation, and inclusion. Choosing policies to control international migration leads us to ask who is making these decisions? What interests are being pursued or ignored? How and why do these interests take shape in the ways that they do and how dynamic are they? How do policymakers adjudicate between conflicting interests and what explains their decisions? Do these decisions conform to liberal democratic norms and are they just?

Increases in international migration, even modest or imagined increases, can give rise to a sense of crisis—a crisis which is as much political as economic or social. Yet, the political aspect of international migration received little attention from political scientists for much of the post-WWII period. This is perhaps because the “crisis” was so recent, or because international migration was viewed as essentially an economic and sociological phenomenon. With the rise of far-right political parties across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and, more recently, the upswell of nativism in the United States, political scientists in the “liberal democracies” began to take international migration more seriously.

Before chasing headlines, however, it might be wise to remind ourselves that international migration is *not* a new phenomenon in the annals of human history. Indeed, for much of recorded history, the movement of people was not unusual. Only with the advent of the nation-state in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe did the notion of legally tying populations to territorial units and to specific forms of government become commonplace (Moch 1992; Lucassen 2021, see also the discussion above of the migration state and the chapter by

Gabaccia in this volume). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, passport and visa systems were created and borders were increasingly closed to non-nationals (Torpey 2000; Andreas and Snyder 2000; Schain 2019). Almost every dimension of human existence—social-psychological, demographic, economic, and political—was reshaped to conform to the dictates of the nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990; Hollifield 2005). In looking at recent migration “crises,” it is important to keep in mind *la longue durée*, to put these “crises” into historical perspective.

In *The Global Migration Crisis* (1995), Myron Weiner argues that increasing international migration poses a threat to international stability and security. This is especially true for the most fragile nation-states. Weiner extends this argument to Western democracies as well, pointing out that the rise in xenophobic and nationalist politics in Western Europe indicates that even the most liberal democracies risk being destabilized politically by “massive” inflows of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Weiner postulates that there are limits on how many newcomers a society can absorb. Another political scientist, Samuel Huntington (1996, 2004) has argued that in the post-Cold War era, failure to control American borders is the single biggest threat to the national security and identity of the United States. Weiner and Huntington echo the sentiments of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who sees international migration and the rise of multiculturalism as an existential threat to society, leading potentially to the *Disuniting of America* (1992). In this line of reasoning, nation-states are being threatened by globalization from above and multiculturalism from below.

Are these sensationalized claims to be dismissed or are they empirical questions to be pursued? The answer is both. Whether international migration poses as dramatic a threat to the sovereignty of nation-states and to liberal democracies in particular, as these scholars suggest, seems doubtful but remains an open question. Clearly international migration has led to political crises in many countries in both the developed and developing world (Hollifield and Foley 2021). As a result, a new literature on migration and citizenship has emerged in political science. Not surprisingly, at the heart of this new field are concerns about the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, and Zolberg 2011). These issues immediately spill over into more specific questions centered around control, and a large and growing body of literature in the social sciences seeks to understand why and how societies exclude foreigners. Here, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists begin to step on each other’s toes, with historians and demographers more or less on the sidelines. To understand the difficulties of controlling (or regulating) international migration, it is essential to understand why individuals move in the first place. Economists and sociologists have developed elaborate models to explain international migration, favoring such factors as demand-pull, supply-push, and relative deprivation on the economic dimension (Lee 1966; Todaro 1976; Stark 1991; Martin in this volume) and transnationalism, networks, and social capital on the sociological dimension (Massey et al. 1993; Portes 1996; Levitt 2001; and chapters by Brettell and FitzGerald in this volume). Still, how we understand the motives that drive migratory decisions is much the same today as it was over a century ago when

E.G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889) studied what he called the “Laws of Migration.” In using census data to examine patterns of migration to England during the nineteenth century, Ravenstein concluded that international migration can be explained most fundamentally by “the desire inherent in most men [sic] to better themselves in material respects.”

In the 1980s, political scientists began to formulate hypotheses about the political dimension of international migration, more specifically, the role of the state. For Aristide Zolberg (1981, 1999), who was among the first to insert political variables into the equation, by any measure, politics do matter, and states have the capacity, if not always the will, to regulate international migration. That said, even if we accept this argument *prima facie*—that politics and the state matter—it does not explain *how*, *when*, and to *what extent* they matter. Measuring and observing the independent effect of state policies designed to control immigration and to inhibit (or promote) integration of immigrants remains an empirical challenge (see Bevelander and Hollifield 2021; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022). Recent research has attempted to plug these gaps by operationalizing the state using different conceptualizations and measures of regime type and by linking migration-related outcomes with the political and institutional constraints that attend different regimes. Nevertheless, a unified theory of the politics of international migration remains elusive.

As in other social sciences, but especially economics, the key concept here is one of interest. But, unlike economics, where the emphasis is on scarcity and efficiency (Martin in this volume), in the study of politics the primary emphasis is on power, influence, and authority, but with strong ethical and normative overtones, concerning justice, citizenship, and inclusion (Walzer 1983; Gibney 2004; Benhabib 2004; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Carens 2013). In a free market, the allocation of scarce goods and resources takes place according to the logic of the marketplace, that is, the interaction of supply and demand. The exercise of power, however, takes place in the ideational, legal, and institutional confines of political systems. These range from the most autocratic regimes (e.g., North Korea, which scores –10 on the Polity2 score), where decisions are made by a single individual, surrounded by a small clique of military or party officials, to the most democratic regimes (e.g., Switzerland, which scores +10 on the Polity2 score), where decisions are made by “the people” according to elaborate constitutional arrangements and with safeguards often built into the system to protect against the “tyranny of the majority.” Of course, in migration is less of an issue in North Korea than in Switzerland. Almost by definition, the more liberal and democratic a society is, the greater the likelihood that immigration control will be a political issue; and that there is likely to be some level of “unwanted migration” (Hollifield 1992, 2004, 2012; Martin 1994; Joppke 1998b; Boswell 2006).

Not surprisingly, therefore, almost all the literature on the politics of immigration control is focused on the receiving countries, many but not all of which are liberal democracies (Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022). Much less has been written about the politics of control (entry or exit) from the standpoint of



the sending or transit countries (see however FitzGerald 2008; Sadiq 2009; Klotz 2013; Natter 2018; Tsourapas 2019; Hollifield and Foley 2021). As the world has become more open and democratic, since the end of WWII and especially since the end of the Cold War (Hollifield and Jillson 1999)—from a political standpoint, entry rather than exit is more problematic.<sup>3</sup> With the steady increase in immigration in the advanced industrial democracies in the post-war period, many states began to search for ways to stop or slow the entry of newcomers, while immigration injected itself into the electoral politics of these countries. In traditional countries of immigration, especially the United States, this was not the first time that immigration had become a national political issue; but for many of the states of Western Europe, immigration was a relatively new phenomenon, which took politicians and the public by surprise. How would these different political systems cope with immigration? Would there be a convergence of policy responses, or would each state pursue different control policies (Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022)? As political scientists began to survey the politics of immigration control, a central puzzle emerged. Since the 1970s, almost all of the receiving states were trying to reassert control over migration flows, often using similar policies and in response to public opinion, which was hostile to high levels of immigration (Fetzer 2000; Freeman et al. 2012; cf Norris and Inglehart 2019). Yet, immigration persisted and there was a growing gap between the goals of immigration policies—defined as outputs—and the results or outcomes of these policies (Hollifield 1986, 1990, 1992).

With this puzzle in mind and armed with a panoply of theories, political scientists set off in search of answers. Some, like Aristide Zolberg, Anthony Messina, and to a lesser extent Gary Freeman, questioned the empirical premise of the argument. Zolberg argues that liberal states never lost control of immigration and that the migration crisis itself is exaggerated (Brubaker 1994; Zolberg 1999). Messina and Freeman pointed to Great Britain as a major outlier—a liberal democracy which was efficient at controlling its borders, prior to EU enlargement (Freeman 1994; Messina 1989, 1996, 2007). Yet Freeman concedes that “the goal of a theory of immigration politics must be to account for the similarities and differences in the politics of immigration in receiving states and to explain the persistent gaps between the goals and effects of policies as well as the related but not identical gap between public sentiment and the content of public policy” (Freeman 1998: 2). A major challenge, therefore, for political scientists is to develop some generalizable or unifying hypotheses to account for variation in (1) the demand for and the supply of immigration policy, whether greater restriction or more liberal policies; (2) the outcomes or results of those policies; and (3) the impact of immigration and diversity on political behavior (voting in particular) and the political economy (on the former, see Wong 2017, and on the latter, see Peters 2015 and Bevelander and Hollifield 2020).

If politics is defined primarily in terms of process and the struggle for “influence, power, and authority,” then it is a relatively straightforward exercise to develop a theoretical framework for explaining the demand for and supply of immigration policy, as well as the gap between policy outputs and outcomes. This

is the approach taken by Gary Freeman, who, following the work of James Q. Wilson on *The Politics of Regulation* (1980), argues that the demand for immigration policy—like any public policy in a democracy—is heavily dependent on the play of organized interests. To understand the politics of immigration control, we must be able to define the distribution of costs and benefits, which will then enable us to separate winners from losers in the policymaking process. Depending on the scarcity or abundance of productive factors (land, labor, and capital), as well as the substitutability of immigrant for native labor, the costs and benefits of immigration will be either concentrated or diffuse. From this simple factor-cost logic, we can deduce what position powerful interest groups, like organized labor and agricultural or business lobbies, are likely to take in debates over immigration policy. Following Wilson, Freeman associates different cost-benefit distributions with specific “modes of politics,” either interest group, clientelist, entrepreneurial, or majoritarian (Wilson 1980; Freeman 1995).

Using this essentially microeconomic framework, Freeman predicts that, when benefits are concentrated and costs are diffuse, a clientelist politics will emerge. In this scenario, the state will be captured by powerful organized interests, which stand to benefit handsomely from expansive immigration policies—like fruit and vegetable growers in the southern and southwestern United States; the software and computer industry in Silicon Valley and the Northwest; or perhaps the construction industry in Ireland, Spain, or Japan. The client politics model has, however, been critiqued on several important levels. First, in focusing on the influence of interest groups, it neglects the role that legal and other institutional factors may play in shaping policies (Boswell 2007). Empirically, while immigration policy-making may reflect client politics when immigration is not a salient issue (i.e., when the public is not paying close attention), policy does not mirror powerful interests in the presence of “populist pressure against immigration” (Givens and Luedtke 2004:149; Schain 2012; Helbling 2013). Nevertheless, if we combine Freeman’s “modes of politics” approach with the work of Jeannette Money (1999) and Margaret Peters (2015)—who argue in a similar vein that the demand for immigration policy is heavily dependent on the relative rates of return to factors and the substitutability or complementarity of immigrant and native labor—then we have a fairly complete theory of the politics of immigration control, albeit one that is heavily indebted to microeconomics and may be (like the old push-pull arguments) economically over-determined.

The reason for this is not hard to see. If we start with a definition of politics that reduces the political process to an economic calculus, then we have in effect defined away some of the more interesting and difficult questions associated with immigration politics. In this formulation, the role of the state is particularly problematic, since the state is merely a reflection of societal interests, like a transmission belt, to use the language of systems analysis (Easton 1965). By focusing so exclusively on process, we lose sight of the importance of institutional and ideological variation within and among states. Freeman (1995) concedes that the supply of immigration policy does not always match demand. Policy outputs are heavily contingent on ideational, cultural, and institutional

factors—witness the return of nativism under Donald Trump in the United States—which often distort the market interests of different groups, to such an extent that some groups (like organized labor, for example) may end up pursuing policies that would seem to be at odds with their economic interests (Haus 1995, 1999; Watts 2002; Ness 2005). As Freeman puts it, the drawback of these economic models of politics “is their extreme parsimony. They leave us with generalizations about labor, landowners and capitalists; useful abstractions, surely, but probably too crude for the satisfactory analysis of immigration politics in particular countries, especially highly developed ones” (Freeman 1998:17).

An alternative to Freeman’s interest-based approach to the politics of immigration control can be found in Hollifield’s work, which one reviewer aptly described as the “liberal state” thesis (Schmitter-Heisler 1993; cf. also Joppke 1998b, Boswell 2006; Ellermann 2021). Rather than focusing on politics defined as process, which leads us into a factor-cost logic, where productive factors in the guise of interest groups are the units of analysis, Hollifield takes the state as the level of analysis (Hollifield 1992, 1997a, 2004, 2012). The dependent variable also differs from that of Freeman and many other political scientists (see, for example, Money 1999, the various works of Zolberg 2006, and Peters 2015), who are more interested in explaining policy outputs (e.g., the demand for and the supply of immigration policy) than in explaining policy outcomes (e.g., flows and stocks of immigrants across time and space). From a political and theoretical standpoint, it is admittedly more difficult to explain outcomes than it is to explain outputs, because we are compelled to look at a broader range of independent variables. If we want to know why individuals move across national boundaries and if we want to explain variation in those movements over time, it will not be enough just to look at policy outputs and the political process. As we pointed out in the first section of this chapter, in the social sciences theories of international migration have been propounded primarily by economists and sociologists. Economists have sought to explain population movements in terms of a push-pull and cost-benefit logic, whereas sociologists have stressed the importance of transnationalism and social networks (see chapters by FitzGerald and Martin in this volume).

By their own admission, sociologists have struggled to incorporate political variables into their analysis of international migration. Both Douglas Massey (1987, 1998) and Alejandro Portes (1995) lament the absence of a political theory of international migration. Massey writes, “Until recently, theories of international migration have paid short shrift to the nation-state as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration” (Massey 1999b:303). Portes argues along the same lines that “detailed accounts of the process leading to major legislation...have not been transformed into a systematic theoretical analysis of both the external pressures impinging on the state and the internal dynamics of the legislative and administrative bodies dealing with immigration” (Portes 1997:817).

In response to this challenge, Hollifield’s liberal state thesis draws our attention to a third independent variable—rights—which are heavily contingent upon

legal, institutional, and ideational developments. Rights must be considered in any theory of international migration. Thus, in the formulation of Hollifield's work, international migration can be seen as a function of (1) economic forces (demand-pull and supply-push); (2) networks; and (3) rights (Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022, especially Chapter 1; Hollifield and Wilson 2011; cf. Ruhs 2013). Much of the variation in international migration over time can be explained in economic terms. In the post-war period, south–north labor migration started largely in response to demand-pull forces.<sup>4</sup> Major industrial democracies suffered labor shortages, from the 1940s through the 1960s; and foreign workers were brought in to meet the increasing demand for labor (Hollifield 1992). In the United States, these shortages, especially in agriculture, were met in part through the *bracero* program; whereas in Western Europe, *Gastarbeiter* programs were put in place to recruit foreign workers, thus placing the imprimatur of the state on certain types of (presumably temporary) international migration (see various works of Philip Martin 2002; 2003). But when demand for foreign labor began to decline in the 1970s, in the wake of the first oil shock in 1973, powerful supply-push forces came into play. The populations of the sending countries (for example, Algeria, Turkey, and Mexico) were increasing rapidly at the same time that the economies of these developing states were reeling from the oil shocks and the first truly global recession of the post-war period. Networks helped to sustain international migration, even in countries that attempted to stop all forms of immigration, including family and refugee migration. These economic and sociological factors were the *necessary* conditions for continued migration; but the *sufficient* conditions were political, legal, and ideational. In the face of major recessions, beginning with the supply shocks of the 1970s through the financial crisis of 2008–10, a principal factor that has sustained international migration (both south–north and, to a lesser extent, east–west) is the accretion of rights for foreigners in the liberal democracies, or what Hollifield calls the rise of “rights-based politics” (Hollifield 2021; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022; cf. Ruhs 2013).

Politics affects migration, like many other social and economic phenomena, at the margins. But this does *not* mean that politics (like culture) is simply a residual variable. In any social process, it is often what happens at the margins that is of greatest importance and the most difficult to incorporate into our analysis. To use a familiar Weberian metaphor, the speeding train of international migration is fueled by economic and sociological forces, but it is the state that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of the train, derail it altogether, or send it plunging off a cliff. In the oft-quoted words of the Swiss novelist Max Frisch, speaking of the guestworker program in Switzerland: “We asked for workers, but instead human beings came” (see also Rogers 1985).

Where do rights come from, and how are they institutionalized? A major challenge for migration scholars is to find ways to incorporate rights, as an institutional, legal, and ideational variable, into our analysis of international migration. Hollifield has done this in two ways: first, by measuring the impact of specific policy changes (either expanding or contracting rights for immigrants and foreigners) on immigration flows, while controlling for changes in the business cycle

(Hollifield 1990, 1992; Hollifield and Wilson 2011); and secondly, by looking specifically at how rights act, primarily through independent judiciaries, to limit the capacity of liberal states to control immigration (Legomsky 1987; Schuck 1998; Hollifield 1992, 1999, 2010; also Joppke 2001, 2010; Morris 2002; Law 2010). Again, the level of analysis is the state and unit of analysis is the migrant; and the method is statistical, comparative, and historical. The best way to think about how rights act to limit the capacity of states to control immigration is to envision a time-series curve of immigration flows. The United States is currently well into the fourth great wave of immigration in its history, which crested in 2018–2019 due to the effects of the restrictionist policies of the Trump administration and restrictions on mobility associated with the global pandemic. But what was driving this immigration wave, which lasted for decades? To what extent was it driven by economic or political factors? To answer these questions, Hollifield and Wilson (2011) used time-series analysis to look at the effect of business cycles on immigration flows from 1890 to 2010. They were able statistically to demonstrate the impact of major policy shifts on flows during this time period, net of the effects of the economic conjuncture. The most striking result of this analysis is the gradual weakening of the effect of business cycles on flows after 1945, but especially from the 1960s to the late 1990s. The impact of legislation passed after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was so expansive that it negates the effect of business cycles, in stark contrast to the period before 1945, when flows were much more responsive to economic cycles. Thus, to explain the politics of control in Western democracies, it is crucial to take account of changes in the legal, institutional, and ideational environment. It is not sufficient simply to look at winners and losers, or to focus on politics defined narrowly in terms of the political process and interests (cf. Peters 2015).

From the works of Zolberg, Freeman, Hollifield, Wong, Peters, and others, we are starting to get a better picture of how politics matters in driving and channeling international migration. Nothing in these arguments implies that rights, once extended to foreigners, can never be revoked. Laws and institutions can and do change, as we have seen in dramatic fashion during the Trump administration in the United States (Hollifield 2021). Like any social, economic, or political variable, rights vary, cross-nationally and over time; we have seen evidence in the past 20 years that many liberal states have indeed tried to roll back immigrant rights (Hollifield 2010; Wong 2015; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Hérán 2022). But rights in liberal democracies have a long half-life. Once extended, it is difficult to roll them back, which may explain why many liberal states, especially in Western Europe, including the EU, are so reluctant to make even small or incremental changes in immigration and refugee law that expand rights. Governments fear that any move to expand the rights of foreigners could open up the floodgates and that such change would increase the propensity to emigrate. Such fears are particularly pronounced when it comes to the issue of legalizing unauthorized migrants or welcoming large numbers of asylum seekers. Thus far, however, the empirical evidence suggests that concerns about the “moral hazard” of legalization are overblown (Wong and Kosnac 2017).

To this point, our review has barely touched on the core issues of sovereignty, citizenship, political participation/behavior, and national identity. We now turn our attention from the politics of control to the politics of sovereignty, citizenship, participation, and national identity.

### **The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion**

Immigration politics and policies, especially in the big three liberal republics—the United States, France, and Germany—are heavily influenced by national or founding myths, which are codified in citizenship and nationality laws. These myths about national identity are fungible, subject to manipulation, and involve strong elements of symbolic politics (Anderson 1983 [2006]; Hollifield 1997a; Chavez 2001; King 2005; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014). They are reflected in constitutional law and can be analyzed from a historical, sociological, legal, and political standpoint (Burbaker 1992; Hollifield 1997b; Weil 1991, 2002; Smith 1997; Shanks 2000; Tichenor 2002; Motomura 2006; Zolberg 2006; Kanstroom 2007; Bosniak 2008; Abraham in this volume). They are the objects of intense political struggle and heated partisan debates, and the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship, like the broader economy and society, are subject to exogenous shocks. There is arguably no single phenomenon that simultaneously shocks these institutions like immigration. As generations of migration scholars have now pointed out, immigration can change the demographic composition of societies, which reshapes their racial and ethnic milieu (Héran in this volume). Immigration can also alter political coalitions, disrupt party systems, and ignite new debates and controversies regarding representation, voice, and agency, which all combine to transform what it means to be a member of a polity. Multiculturalism is the functional equivalent of multinationalism. If the rise of multinational corporations—as Keohane et al. (1996) and others have argued—contributed to the creation of new free-trade coalitions, then the rise of immigration and multiculturalism has contributed to political realignments in the liberal democracies. As newcomers gain a legal foothold in liberal societies, rights accrue to them and they become political actors capable of shaping both policy and polity (Schmitter 1979; Miller 1981; Hollifield 1992; Goldin 1994; Ireland 1994, 2004; Zolberg 2006; Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Conversely, immigration can increase diversity and radically alter the composition of societies, provoking a radical, populist backlash. For this reason, the politics of incorporation is closely linked to issues of race (Rex and Moore 1967; Barth 1969; Skerry 2000; Bleich 2003; Givens 2007; Dancygier 2010; King and Smith 2011; Hochschild et al. 2013), religion (Klausen 2005; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Foner and Alba 2008; Gest 2010), and social class (Marshall 1964; Piore 1979; Lamont 1998, 2000; Massey and Sanchez 2010).

Understanding the politics of inclusion and exclusion raises many questions of sovereignty, citizenship, participation, and national identity—all of which delimit the “us” from the “them.” For this reason, we must begin by interrogating the ways in which host societies respond to newcomers. To be clear, the politics of



inclusion and exclusion are not reducible to the issues of sovereignty or the politics of citizenship and national identity. These areas of inquiry are linked together in that they all depend deeply on how host society members inter-subjectively define newcomers: are they members or are they perpetual outsiders? On this question, a cottage industry of research in economics, sociology, and political science has examined individual attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, and, given the general nature of these attitudes, this has largely become the study of anti-immigrant sentiment in the form of racism, nativism, and xenophobia. Economists have used hypotheses derived from differences in the skill composition of native-born relative to foreign-born workers to explain the varying preferences over immigration that individuals have (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006). Sociologists have used contact theory (Allport 1979; Pettigrew 1998) and other hypotheses related to intergroup relations and group threat to analyze the individual determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes (Quillian 1995; Lamont 2000; McLaren 2003; Massey 2020). Political scientists have pursued political explanations, ranging from partisanship and ideology (Citrin et al. 1997; Wong 2015, 2017), feelings of political alienation and isolationist preferences (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), patriotism (De Figueiredo, Jr. and Elkins 2003), preferences over other areas of social policy (Pantoja 2006), informational asymmetries and the problem of innumeracy when it comes to evaluating the size of the immigrant population (Sides and Citrin 2007), news media coverage of immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009), and heightened post-9/11 anxiety (Branton et al. 2011).

A new generation of research in political science has also used experimental methods (mostly in surveys) in order better to parse out the underlying causes of anti-immigrant sentiment. In the first of these studies, Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior (2004) use a series of experiments embedded in a national survey in the Netherlands to test hypotheses related to realistic group threat, which emphasizes material concerns, and hypotheses related to social identity, which stress identity-based factors. Not only do they find that identity-based factors have greater explanatory power than do economic factors, but that latent anti-immigrant sentiment can be triggered “to mobilize support for exclusionary policies above and beyond the core constituency already predisposed to support them” (Sniderman et al. 2004:35). Ted Brader, Nicholas Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay (2008) similarly use an experimental design to show that elite discourse, in the form of news media, shapes the opinions that individuals have regarding immigrants and what government should do about immigration. Their study also shows that these preferences vary depending on the race or ethnicity of the immigrant group under consideration. Lastly, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2010) use a survey experiment to show that expectations about preferences over highly skilled and low-skilled immigration do not conform neatly to economic theories of labor market competition.

These new strands of research are taking place alongside recent efforts to craft a new (transatlantic) comparative study of immigrant political incorporation (Givens 2007; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Hochschild et al. 2013). In addition to asking whether the knowledge accumulated over decades of research



on immigrant political incorporation in the United States is applicable in other contexts, this effort is revisiting many of the most basic (and most important) questions about the experience of newcomers in society. Are immigrants a distinct political group? If so, what makes them distinctive? What does incorporation mean and is it different from assimilation? Do all paths to incorporation also lead to citizenship (Hollifield 2021)? If not, what does this mean for national identity and civil society?

It is this area of immigration politics, which involves issues of sovereignty, citizenship, participation, and national identity, where the most work remains to be done. Many questions have barely been posed but are begging for answers. (1) What is the relationship between the politics of immigration and the politics of sovereignty, citizenship, and national identity? (2) How does the interplay between the politics of immigration and the politics of sovereignty, citizenship, and national identity affect the societal, economic, and political incorporation and participation of immigrants? (3) Are our causal arrows reversed? How does the societal, economic, and political incorporation of immigrants affect the institutions of sovereignty, citizenship, and national identity? All of these questions strike at the heart of the state–society relationship and presuppose that immigration has the effect of upsetting or transforming this relationship and altering the social contract.

Theories concerning *the socio-political impact of immigration* fall into roughly four categories (liberal, neo-mercantilist and Malthusian, Marxist, and Durkheimian). Each of these theoretical perspectives tends to inform the way in which social scientists think about the political impact of immigration, and its effects on the theory and practice of citizenship. First is the liberal view, which holds that market-oriented societies are dynamic and capable of absorbing large numbers of immigrants, who, because they tend to self-select, will contribute to the human capital stock and to the overall wealth of society. The works of economists, like Julian Simon (1989), Barry Chiswick (2008), and Michael Clemens (2011), reflect this perspective. Scholars working in this tradition generally accept the proposition that immigrants will assimilate, within one or two generations (Chiswick 1978; Alba and Nee 1997; Foner and Alba 2008). Ethnic identity and ethnic politics should fade quickly as individuals are absorbed into the mainstream of the political and social life of the host country. If problems arise with the assimilation of immigrants, then naturalization or “Americanization” would be the long-term remedy (Skerry 1993; Pickus 2005). This optimistic view of assimilation is in contrast to the findings of Robert Putnam that diversity undermines trust and is detrimental to civil society. Putnam (2007; cf. Janoski 1998) argues, however, that this is a short-term problem and that in the long term “successful immigrant societies have overcome such fragmentation by creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities.”

A second theoretical perspective—at the opposite extreme of liberalism—is the neo-mercantilist and Malthusian (zero sum) view that every society has limited resources and a limited number of jobs (often called the lump of labor theory). From this perspective, immigration is harmful to native-born workers. This perspective

is shared by some demographers (e.g., Coleman 1992), economists (Borjas 1990), and political scientists (Weiner 1995; Freeman 1995). A third perspective is informed by the Marxist notion that, to survive, capitalist economies need an industrial reserve army, composed primarily—but not exclusively—of easily exploitable (and disposable) foreign workers, in order to overcome periodic crises of accumulation. In this critical view, immigration heightens class conflict and contributes to politicization and ethnicization of the working class (Castles and Kosack 1973; Miles 1982; cf. Rath 1988 and Faist 1995). Finally, a fourth perspective is what Hollifield (2021) calls the Durkheimian view, that immigration, like the process of modernization itself, contributes to a sense of alienation, leading to the fragmentation of society and a cultural backlash (Putnam 2007; Norris and Inglehart 2019; cf. Janoski 1998). In this perspective, with unfettered markets and weak social protection for native workers, liberalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, leading to widespread anomie and alienation in the native population and a populist revolt against immigration (Goodman and Pepinsky 2020; cf. Joppke 2021). Moreover, large concentrations of foreigners in specific locales exacerbate class, ethnic, and racial tensions (Clark 1997; Money 1999; cf. Price in this volume).

From a liberal perspective, the institution of citizenship should be dynamic enough to respond to the challenges posed by immigration. The strongest polities are those with resilient civil societies and well-developed traditions of citizenship and nationhood and founding myths around which to organize debates about immigration (Brubaker 1989, 1992; Hollifield 1997a). In this perspective, the strength of American civic culture has helped the United States to overcome racial, ethnic, and class divisions, leading to a kind of “voluntary pluralism” (Fuchs 1990; FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014; Hollifield 2019). This is an argument for American exceptionalism (Fuchs 1990; Schuck and Wilson 2008), where the strengths of liberal-republican ideals and institutions have created a pluralist and centrist politics, gradually excluding extremist politics that one finds in other political systems, particularly in Europe (contrast the works of Smith 1997 and King 2000, 2005; also Smith and King 2020). In this liberal perspective, the American conception of citizenship, with its emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities and its aversion to “Old World” notions of social class, is most compatible with a liberal society and economy and therefore more open to immigration (Pickus 2005).

Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States, access to citizenship is automatic for anyone born on American territory and naturalization is relatively easy for newcomers who arrive legally in the United States (Schuck 1998; cf. Schuck and Smith 2018). Immigration, as Rogers Brubaker (1989) and others (Howard 2009) have pointed out, is part of the American tradition of nationhood, whereas in Europe the formation of nation-states did not coincide with waves of immigration. With the partial exception of France (Hollifield 1997a, Hollifield and Héran 2022), European societies from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries were exporting rather than importing people (Moch 1992; Bade 2000). Many of these European emigrants went to the Americas, with the idea of a new beginning, leaving the “Old World” behind forever.

The American political theorist Rogers Smith, while remaining firmly ensconced in the liberal-republican tradition, has criticized this narrow (Tocquevillian or Hartzian) reading of American history. Smith finds that there are multiple traditions in American liberalism, some more egalitarian and tolerant than others. For much of the history of the American Republic, ascriptive, hierarchic, and racist views prevailed over egalitarian or Tocquevillian views of citizenship (Smith 1997; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014). Clearly, racism—through slavery and the Jim Crow system, American apartheid—was built into the American political system from the beginning (Foley 2021). In the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, racism played a prominent role in the making of immigration and naturalization policy and in the construction of American national identity, from the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) through to the national origins quota system (1924) (King 2000; Zolberg 2006).

For much of the post-war period, the United States and the immigrant-receiving societies of Western Europe moved away from this ascriptive, exclusionary, or particularistic approach to immigration and citizenship in favor of more liberal and egalitarian policies (Tichenor 2002; Joppke 2005, 2010; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius, and Héran 2022). In 1999, the German government changed German nationality law, making it possible for anyone born in Germany who has at least one parent who has been in the country for eight years to gain automatic German citizenship. This reform was the culmination of decades of political struggle and debate and was fiercely contested right up to the moment of its passage (Green 2004; Martin and Thränhardt 2022). Among the liberal democracies, Britain was the exception to this rule of liberal convergence in citizenship policy and practice (Freeman 1994). Race remained a prominent feature of immigration policy-making in Britain throughout the post-war era (Freeman 1979; Messina 1989; Layton-Henry 1992; cf. Hansen 2000, 2022) and Britain reformed citizenship and nationality laws largely along racial lines, to exclude “colored” immigrants from new Commonwealth countries (Bleich 2003).

Remaining within the liberal-republican tradition, the jurist Peter Schuck (1998) has written extensively on the evolution of American citizenship, carefully documenting changes in law and policy and their effects on immigration and incorporation. Schuck and his coauthor, Rogers Smith, criticized American naturalization policy for contributing to the “devaluation” of American citizenship (Schuck and Smith 1985; cf. Pickus 2005). Their main concern was that newcomers had little incentive to naturalize, and that American society and citizenship are weakened as a consequence. This concern for social cohesion is echoed in the works of other political theorists, like Michael Walzer (1983) and Joseph Carens (2013), who argue that openness to immigration must be tempered by a willingness to quickly integrate and care for newcomers. To show how expansive and adaptive liberal thinking about citizenship can be, the Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka (1995) argued that liberal states can function in a multiethnic or multicultural setting. A uniform (legal) citizenship is not inconsistent with the recognition of minority and group rights. The biggest theoretical stretch in the liberal tradition is the argument advanced by the sociologists Yasemin Soysal

(1994) and David Jacobson (1996), who see the emergence of a *post-national membership*, where rights flow from EU and international law.

Each of these liberal theorists places great emphasis on ideas and institutions for understanding the impact of immigration on the state–society relationship. Each points to the contradictions and tensions within liberal theory; but none of them, with the exceptions of Peter Schuck (1998) and Daniel Tichenor (2002), seek to include in their theoretical framework more economic or interest-based explanations for the supply of and demand for immigration and citizenship policy (Schuck 1998; Tichenor 2002; Hollifield and Wilson 2011). For many liberal theorists, citizenship is a dependent rather than an independent variable; hence, there is no reason to link the development of rights-based politics with changes in immigration policy (outputs) or actual levels of immigration (outcomes). Rogers Smith (1997), for example, is writing more broadly about American political development, rather than about immigration *per se*.

Sociologists, like Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut (2006), focus on immigration (that is, the process of immigrating), settlement, and incorporation. They see citizenship not so much as an institution but as a process whereby newcomers are able to adapt to their new social and political environment, with some groups adapting more quickly than others, depending on their levels of social and human capital. They take issue with scholars, like Glazer and Moynihan (1970) or Fuchs (1990), who see assimilation as a linear process where ethnic identities and attachments fade quickly over time. Instead, they note an increasing tendency toward segmented assimilation, whereby immigrant groups (and especially the second generation) suffer from new forms of discrimination that may delay or impede acculturation and assimilation. The unevenness of the process is linked to the advent of postindustrial society, which rewards education and human capital.

Earlier waves of unskilled immigrants were able to find employment in traditional manufacturing industries. Their children either followed in the parents' footsteps or (more likely) got a better education and moved into high-skill jobs (Chiswick 1978, 2008). This is the traditional pattern of assimilation as outlined by Alba and Nee (1997). In the fourth wave of immigration, however, according to Portes and Rumbaut (2006), many immigrant groups in postindustrial economies have found themselves trapped in an endless cycle of poverty and discrimination. Yet, despite the difficulties of finding adequate employment, immigrants continue to arrive in the United States in great numbers (legally or illegally) because of poorer opportunities in the countries of origin and because social networks help to sustain high levels of immigration. Many members of the first and second generations find themselves excluded from the mainstream of social and economic life, ostracized or stigmatized by dominant groups in the host society. They are thus denied the full benefits of citizenship (Lamont 2000). As a result, they retreat into ethnic enclaves (or ghettos) in search of community, which can lead to deviant behavior, such as joining gangs. This pattern of segmented assimilation reinforces ethnic identity and makes it more difficult for newcomers to incorporate politically leading to what Fitzgerald (2015) has labeled an "ethnic Olympics" (cf. Favell 1998 and the chapter by Favell in this volume).

In this analysis, we can see how the optimistic, liberal view of immigration and citizenship begins to give way to a darker, Durkheimian view of the impact of immigration on state and society. As newcomers “fail” to assimilate, a political backlash will build and natives—especially those more marginal members of the majority ethnic group—will come to see immigrants as a threat. By the 1990s and 2000s, newcomers in the United States were naturalizing in great numbers and beginning to organize and participate in a wider range of political activities. While political participation of first-generation immigrants in the United States is low, it is substantially higher for the second generation, although still lower than that of natives (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa 1998; Ramakrishnan 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Hollifield 2010; Wong 2017). Likewise, comparative studies of immigrant political behavior show the resilience of the institutions of the liberal state and demonstrate how immigrants are able to take advantage of opportunity structures open to them in the political process. Immigrants become players in redefining the institution of citizenship itself (Miller 1981; Ireland 1994; Zolberg 2006; Helbling 2013; cf. Chung 2010, 2020).

The rather straightforward Durkheimian thesis is that social change itself is driving immigration politics (Durkheim 1964). As societies “modernize” and (internal and international) migration increases, individuals and families are uprooted. This occurred in Europe during the industrial revolution, when migration from the farms to the cities, completely disrupted family and community life, leading to anomie and forcing individuals to seek new communities and new identities. In some societies, social change led to radicalization and the polarization of politics—in Germany, for example—whereas in others (like Britain) the institutions of the liberal state were able to control and channel radical impulses. Many political and social scientists see the same thing happening with the advent of postindustrial society, which has created feelings of failure, alienation, and resentment, especially among native workers, many of whom see immigrants as the cause of their problems (Kitschelt 1995; Lamont 2000; Givens 2005; Norris 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2019). With such anomie, all it takes is some entrepreneurial and reactionary politician, like Donald Trump, to trigger feelings of xenophobia and racism in these segments of the population (Thränhardt 1993; Betz 1994; Joppke 2021; Art 2011; Smith and King 2020). It is not surprising that immigration becomes the focal point of reactionary populist politics (Minkenberg 1992; Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Arzheimer 2009; Helbling 2013), and the entire party system may be destabilized (Givens 2005; Schain 2012; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

A variant of the Durkheimian argument draws heavily on social geography and has a distinctive Malthusian ring to it. This is the idea that the spatial concentration of immigrants triggers a xenophobic reaction in the native population, which fears being overwhelmed by “the other.” According to Jeannette Money (1999; cf. Favell 1998 and the chapter by Price in this volume), limits on resources and space, especially at the local level, will trigger xenophobic and nativist politics. The intensity of local reactions against immigration, as happened in the town of Dreux, France, in the early 1980s marking the rise of the National Front, or in California in the early 1990s, culminating in Proposition 187, forced immigration

onto the national political agenda (Hollifield and Héran 2022). Martin Schain (2012) has analyzed how the French National Front began to make inroads in local politics, at the expense of the communists, playing on the xenophobic feelings of the native working class vis-à-vis North African immigrants, who were having difficulties in acculturating and assimilating. Tolbert and Hero (1996) look at the subtle interplay of class, race, and ethnicity in local voting patterns for and against Proposition 187 in California. In the mid-1990s, it appeared that the California ballot initiative would succeed in putting nativist politics back on the top of the agenda in American politics. Nonetheless, as quickly as the issue inserted itself onto the California agenda, it disappeared as the business cycle improved. The “Golden State” once again found its Midas touch, which indicates that economic interests play a crucial role in the politics of immigration and citizenship.

As pointed out above, however, it would be a mistake to reduce immigration politics to the simple play of economic interests (or to the business cycle, see Hollifield and Wilson 2011). Coalitions that form for or against immigration are held together not simply by narrow calculations of the costs and benefits that accrue to a specific class or group. Rather policy and politics in this area are driven in no small measure by attitudes and beliefs shaped by national cultures and histories. This is why identity politics in the liberal democracies can quickly overwhelm clientelist politics (cf. Freeman 1995), driving immigration policy either in a more expansive direction or toward greater restriction. Concerns over citizenship, identity, sovereignty, and incorporation can override the market interests of specific groups or classes, creating “strange bedfellow” coalitions, most often of right-wing (free-market or economic) liberals and left-wing (civil rights or political) liberals—what I have called elsewhere “rights-markets coalitions” (Hollifield, Hunt, and Tichenor 2008). What is it that holds these coalitions together?

In the American case, it was the strange conjuncture of the Cold War—with its emphasis on national security and the need to resurrect the old notion of the United States as a land of asylum or refuge—and the civil rights movement. Taken together, they dramatically expanded the civil and social rights of minorities, including immigrants (Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006; Crepaz 2008). In the German case, the Cold War also played a role; but more important was the politics of collective memory, which helped to shape a new German model of citizenship (Hollifield 1997; Markovits and Reich 1997; Art 2011). This model was based in the first instance on the famous social market economy (*Sozialmarktpolitik*), meaning a strong commitment to the welfare state and to the maintenance of social solidarity in the face of rapid social and economic change (Hollifield 2000b). In the second instance, the model derives from the overwhelming burden of German history and the experiences of the Holocaust and the Second World War. In both cases “ideas, institutions, and civil society” worked to limit immigration control (Hollifield 1999; 2004; cf. Janoski 1998). In neither case were markets for immigrant or foreign labor functioning in a political, cultural, or ideational vacuum. In the German or American cases, any attempt to understand immigration policy purely in terms of interest or clientelist politics will not get us very far. The



politics of immigration and citizenship shifted dramatically with the end of the Cold War (in the 1990s) and the populist backlash in the 2000s and especially the 2010s (Mudde 2007; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Joppke 2021).

The backlash is nationalist, nativist, and exclusionary in character. Its principal targets are immigrants and liberal politicians who support the expansion or preservation of civil and political rights for immigrants and ethnic minorities (Brubaker 2017). Reactionary populism is widespread in Europe, America, and Australia. Canada—where liberal immigration policies retain public support—is an outlier (Bloemraad 2006; Joppke, 2021; Reitz 2022). The passage of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 have been attributed directly to the failure of Britain and the United States to control immigration (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). The growth of extreme right anti-immigrant parties places politicians of the center-right and left under tremendous electoral pressures, shattering the post-war liberal consensus.

The previous section linked three themes (control, security, and citizenship) together, focusing on political explanations for international migration and the role that nation-states play in encouraging or discouraging immigration, and how immigration policy affects inclusion and exclusion. Demarcating the politics of international migration is a first and essential step to talking across the disciplines.

## **Conclusion: Avenues for Future Research**

Simply asserting that politics and the state matter in the analysis of international migration does not help us in constructing a theory of the politics of international migration. The challenge for political scientists is to demonstrate how the state and politics matter and to develop theories of international migration that incorporate political variables. Few serious social scientists, irrespective of their home discipline, would disagree with the proposition that politics matters. The trick, as one colleague put it, is to bring politics into the analysis in a “non-stylized way.”<sup>5</sup> Before we can get to the richness or power of political explanations for migration, we must be clear about the models we are using, as well as the levels and units of analysis. Only then will we be able to develop generalizable and testable propositions.

In the current literature, what is an independent variable for some—the supply of and the demand for immigration policy—is a dependent variable for others. We can therefore identify an immediate schism between those who see their objective as explaining policy, *tout court*, or what Hollifield (1986) calls policy outputs, and those who have a somewhat broader objective of explaining policy outcomes, in this case international migration itself. Most works, however, focus on explaining policy rather than migration, for reasons outlined in the first section of this chapter. The powerful receiving countries are still calling the shots with respect to international migration. Therefore, not surprisingly, greater attention is given to the politics of immigration (rules of entry) than to the politics of emigration (rules of exit). This points to an immediate gap in the literature, since most scholars have focused their attention on political, economic, and social conditions in the liberal,



receiving states. One, perhaps false, assumption is that immigration is permanent. But with the rise of transnational communities and dual nationality, this may be even less true today than it was in earlier periods (Levitt 2001). Clearly more research needs to be done on the politics of emigration and the increasingly transnational nature of migration, one indicator of which is dual nationality.

By contrast, in the study of the politics of immigration, we have only scratched the surface. Much of the literature takes the supply of and the demand for immigration policy as the dependent variable, focusing heavily on the play of organized interests to explain why some states are willing at certain points in time to “risk migration,” whereas others remain closed.

As with most interest-based arguments in political science, we do not have to look very far to find alternative hypotheses that place more stress on institutions and ideas, if not culture. Migration is simply one of several transnational forces that buffet states and societies. Few, if any, political scientists would accept the transnational argument in its purest form, because it is too apolitical. Most political scientists and sociologists would agree that states remain at the center of international migration politics (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; cf. Levitt 2001). Much work, however, remains to be done in the area of migration and international relations. Scholars have only just begun to specify the conditions under which states may cooperate to manage migration. Not surprisingly, a great deal of attention is being lavished by political scientists on the experience of the European Union, as it attempts to grapple with a surge in migration. A burgeoning literature exists that examines the links between immigration and the politics of incorporation, citizenship, and identity. Immigration remains one of the singular and most powerful processes that can change the demographic composition of a society. As the racial and ethnic milieu of a society changes, this can alter political coalitions, disrupt party systems, and ignite new debates and controversies regarding political representation, voice, agency, and exclusion—all of which combine to transform what it means to be a member of a polity. Given the rise in immigration throughout the OECD world since 1945 and the development of more expansive notions of citizenship and belonging, the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and identity is likely to preoccupy students of international migration for decades to come.

In this respect, political scientists have their work cut out for them. Historians, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and demographers have a head start in the study of international migration. These disciplines have a large body of literature and a bigger empirical base from which to work. But given the sheer number of political scientists who are turning their attention to the study of international migration, we are closing the gap fairly quickly.

## **Discussion Questions**

1. Why is migration relevant in the study of politics?
2. Who are the consequential actors in the making of migration policy and what interests are at play?

3. Why are states willing to risk migration, sometimes accepting large numbers of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, when it might not be in their immediate interests to do so?
4. What are the principal dilemmas of migration governance?
5. How does immigration affect political behavior, public opinion, and voting?

## Notes

- 1 Reference here is to the seminal essay by Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In” (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985).
- 2 Our multi-dimensional game is difficult enough at the national level, but also plays out at sub-national (i.e., state and local) levels. Because of its effects on international relations, political leaders are engaged in two- or even three-level games (Putnam 1988) as they seek to build domestic coalitions to maximize support for migration policies that they know will have foreign policy consequences or national security implications (Weiner 1993). International migration politics often involves “suasion games,” whereby receiving and/or sending states seek to use leverage to compel cooperation in managing or controlling migration, including refugee movements (Greenhill 2010; Hollifield 2012; Tsourapas 2019).
- 3 Aristide Zolberg pointed out the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, which, throughout the period of the Cold War, worked to create a right to exit, but without a concomitant right to entry (Zolberg 1981).
- 4 The argument here is that international migration in the post-1945 period was stimulated by economic imbalances between the North and the South. We cannot, however, ignore the role of decolonization and refugee movements in this process. The politics of postcolonial and refugee migrations are admittedly different from the politics of labor migration (see Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; Joppke 1998a).
- 5 The quote is taken from an e-mail exchange by Hollifield with Robert Keohane.

## References

- Adamson, Fiona. 2006. “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security.” *International Security* 31(1): 165–99.
- Adamson, Fiona B., Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and Aristide R. Zolberg. 2011. “The Limits of the Liberal State: Migration, Identity and Belonging in Europe.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(6): 843–59.
- Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.” *International Migration Review* 31(1): 826–74.
- Allport, Gordon W. 1979. *The Nature of Prejudice*. New York: Basic Books.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1983 [2006]. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Andreas, Peter, and Timothy Snyder, eds. 2000. *The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Art, David. 2011. *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002.” *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 259–75.

- Bade, Klaus J. 2000. *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck.
- Barth, Fredrik. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Betts, Alexander. 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Betz, Hans Georg. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bleich, Erik. 2003. *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Rens Vliegthart. 2009. "How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Germany, 1993–2005." *European Journal of Political Research* 48(4): 516–42.
- Borjas, George J. 1990. *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bosniak, Linda. 2008. *The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Boswell, Christina. 2006. "The Liberal Dilemma in the Ethics of Refugee Policy." In *The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies*, edited by Anthony M. Messina and Gallya Lahav. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- . 2007. "Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?" *International Migration Review* 41(1): 75–100.
- Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 959–78.
- Branton, Regina, Erin C. Cassese, Bradford S. Jones and Chad Westerland . 2011. "All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation, Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and Immigration." *Journal of Politics* 73(3): 664–679.
- Brochmann, Grete, and Tomas Hammar, eds. 1999. *Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*. Oxford: Berg.
- Brubaker, Rogers, ed. 1989. *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- . 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1994. "Are Immigration Control Efforts Really Failing?" In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2017. "Why Populism?" *Theory and Society* 46: 357–85.
- Carens, Joseph H. 2013. *The Ethics of Immigration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castles, Stephen, and Godula Kosack. 1973. *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Chavez, Leo R. 2001. *Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Chiswick, Barry R. 1978. "The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men." *Journal of Political Economy* 86: 897–921.
- . 2008. "Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?" In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, 2nd ed., edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. New York: Routledge.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *Journal of Politics* 59(3): 858–81.
- Chung, Erin A. 2010. *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2020. *Immigrant Incorporation in East Asian Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, W.A.V. 1997. "Scale Effects in International Migration to the United States." *Regional Studies* 30(1): 589–600.
- Clemens, Michael. 2011. "Economics and Emigration: Trillion Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3): 83–106.
- Coleman, David A. 1992. "Does Europe Need Immigrants? Population and Work Force Projections." *International Migration Review* 26(2): 413–61.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1991. *Modern Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Figueiredo, Rui J.P., and Zachary Elkins. 2003. "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 171–88.
- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1964. *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew Goodwin. 2018. *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*. London: Pelican/Penguin Books.
- Ellermann, Antje. 2009. *States Against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2021. *The Comparative Politics of Immigration Policy Choices in Germany, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Espenshade, Thomas J., and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. "Contemporary American Attitudes toward US Immigration." *International Migration Review* 30(2): 535–70.
- Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Faist, Thomas. 1995. *Social Citizenship for Whom? Young Turks in Germany and Mexican Americans in the United States*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- . 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fetzer, Joel S., and J. Christopher Soper. 2005. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FitzGerald, David S. 2008. *A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- FitzGerald, David S., and David Cook-Martín. 2014. *Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Foley, Neil. 2021. "Who Belongs? Immigration, Nativism, and the Decline of Liberal Democracy." In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Foner, Nancy, and Richard Alba. 2008. "Immigrant Religion in the US and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?" *International Migration Review* 42(2): 360–92.
- Freeman, Gary P. 1979. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experiences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1986. "Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485(1): 51–63.
- . 1994. "Britain, the Deviant Case." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." *International Migration Review* 29(4): 881–902.
- . 1998. *Toward a Theory of the Domestic Politics of International Migration in Western Nations*. South Bend, IN: Nanovic Institute, University of Notre Dame.
- . 2004. "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies." *International Migration Review* 38(3): 945–69.
- . 2011. "Comparative Analysis of Immigration Politics A Retrospective." *American Behavioral Scientist* 55(12): 1541–60.
- Freeman, Gary P., Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal, eds. 2012. *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*. New York: Routledge.
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1990. *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and the Civic Culture*. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University and University Press of New England.
- Geddes, Andrew. 2021. *Governing Migration Beyond the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gest, Justin. 2010. *Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Gibney, Matthew J. 2004. *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Givens, Terri E. 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. "Immigrant Integration in Europe: Empirical Research." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 67–83.
- Givens, Terri E., and Adam Luedtke. 2004. "The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization." *Policy Studies Journal* 32(1): 145–65.
- Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1970. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Goldin, Claudia. 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921." In *The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy*, edited by Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodman, Sara Wallace and Pepinsky, Thomas B. (July 7, 2020). "The Exclusionary Foundations of Embedded Liberalism." *International Organization*, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3645239>.
- Green, Simon. 2004. *The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Greenhill, Kelly. 2010. *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Guild, Elspeth. 2009. *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Guiraudon, Virginie, and Gallya Lahav. 2000. "A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(2): 163–95.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104: 61–84.
- Hansen, Randall. 2000. *Immigration and Citizenship in Postwar Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2022. "UK Immigration and Nationality Policy: Radical and Radically Uninformed Change." In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective*, 4th ed., edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998. *The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haus, Leah. 1995. "Openings in the Wall: Transnational Migrants, Labor Unions and U.S. Immigration Policy." *International Organization* 49(2): 285–313.
- . 1999. "Labor Unions and Immigration Policy in France." *International Migration Review* 33(3): 683–716.
- Helbling, Marc. 2013. "Framing Immigration in Western Europe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(1): 21–41.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L., and John H. Mollenkopf, eds. 2009. *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L., Jacqueline Chattopadhyay, Claudine Gay, and Michael Jones-Correa. 2013. *Outsiders No More? Models of Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F. 1986. "Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs vs. Outcomes." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485(1): 113–28.
- . 1990. "Immigration and the French State." *Comparative Political Studies* 23(1): 56–79.
- . 1992. *Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1997a. *L'Immigration et L'Etat-Nation à La Recherche d'un Modèle National*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- . 1997b. "Immigration and Integration in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis." In *Immigration into Western Societies: Problems and Policies*, edited by Emek M. Uçarer and Donald J. Puchala. London: Pinter.
- . 1999. "Ideas, Institutions and Civil Society: On the Limits of Immigration Control in Liberal Democracies." *IMIS-Beiträge* 10(January): 57–90.
- . 2000a. "Migration and the 'New' International Order: The Missing Regime." In *Managing Migration: The Need for a New International Regime*, edited by Bimal Ghosh. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2000b. "Immigration and the Politics of Rights." In *Migration and the Welfare State in Contemporary Europe*, edited by Michael Bommers and Andrew Geddes. London: Routledge.



- . 2004. “The Emerging Migration State.” *International Migration Review* 38(1): 885–912.
- . 2005. “Sovereignty and Migration.” In *Immigration and Asylum from 1900 to the Present, Volume Two*, edited by Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- . 2010. “American Immigration Policy and Politics: An Enduring Controversy.” In *Developments in American Politics 6*, edited by Gillian Peele, et al. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2012. “Migration and International Relations.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F., and Calvin Jillson, eds. 1999. *Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. New York: Routledge.
- Hollifield, James F., Pia M. Orrenius, and Thomas Osang. 2006. *Migration, Trade and Development*. Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Hollifield, James F., Valerie F. Hunt, and Daniel J. Tichenor. 2008. “Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United States as an ‘Emerging Migration State.’” *Washington University Journal of Law & Policy* 27: 7–44.
- Hollifield, James F., and Carole J. Wilson. 2011. “Rights-Based Politics, Immigration, and the Business Cycle: 1890–2008.” In *High-Skilled Immigration in a Global Labor Market*, edited by Barry R. Chiswick. Washington, DC: The AEI Press.
- Hollifield, James F., and Tom K. Wong. 2013. “International Migration: Cause or Consequence of Policy Change.” *APSA Migration and Citizenship Newsletter* 1(1): 3–10.
- Hollifield, James F., and Michael Orlando Sharpe. 2017. “Japan as an ‘Emerging Migration State.’” *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 17(3): 371–400.
- Hollifield, James F., and Neil Foley, eds. 2021. *Understanding Global Migration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F., and François Héran. 2022. “Immigration and the Republican Tradition in France.” In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective*, edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hollifield, James F., Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran, eds. 2022. *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Howard, Marc Morjé. 2009. *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. “The West: Unique, Not Universal.” *Foreign Affairs* 75(6): 28–46.
- . 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Ireland, Patrick. 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2004. *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration and the Welfare State*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Jacobson, David. 1996. *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Janoski, Thomas. 1998. *Citizenship and Civil Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.



- Joppke, Christian, ed. 1998a. *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1998b. “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Migration.” *World Politics* 50(2): 266–293.
- . 2001. “The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: The United States, Germany and the European Union.” *Comparative Political Studies* 34(4): 339–366.
- . 2005. *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2010. *Citizenship and Immigration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2021. *Neoliberal Nationalism: Immigration and the Rise of the Populist Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kantrou, Daniel. 2007. *Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. Helen V. Milner, Robert H. Bates, Peter Lange. 1996. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- King, Desmond S. 2000. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Diverse Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2005. *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, Desmond S., and Rogers M. Smith. 2011. *Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama’s America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Klausen, Jytte. 2005. *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Klotz, Audie. 2013. *Migration and National Identity in South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lamont, Michèle. 1998. *The World in Moral Order: Working Men Define the Boundaries of Race, Class and Citizenship*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2000. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Law, Anna O. 2010. *The Immigration Battle in American Courts*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Layton-Henry, Zig. 1992. *The Politics of Race: Immigration, “Race” and “Race” Relations in Postwar Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lee, Everett S. 1966. “A Theory of Migration.” *Demography* 3(1): 47–57.
- Legomsky, Stephen H. 1987. *Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Levitt, Peggy. 2001. *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lischer, Sarah K. 2005. *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lucassen, Leo. 2005. *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850*. Urbana and Chicago, IL: The University of Illinois Press.
- . 2021. “Beyond the Migration State: Western Europe since World War II.” In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Markovits, Andrei S., and Simon Reich. 1997. *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Marshall, T.H. 1964. *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Martin, Philip L. 1994. "Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2002. "Mexican Workers and US Agriculture: The Revolving Door." *International Migration Review* 36(4): 1124–42.
- . 2003. *Managing Labor Migration: Temporary Worker Programs for the 21st Century*. Geneva: International Labor Organization (ILO).
- Massey, Douglas S. 1987. *Return to Aztlan: The Social Processes of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 1998. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , ed. 1999a. *Becoming American, American Becoming*. New York: Russell Sage.
- . 1999b. "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State." *Population and Development Review* 25(2): 303–22.
- , Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration." *Population and Development Review* 19(3): 431–466.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Magaly Sanchez R. 2010. *Brokered Boundaries: Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510–30.
- Mayer, Nonna, and Pascal Perrineau, eds. 1996. *Le Front National à Découvert*. Paris: Presses de la FNSP.
- McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81(3): 909–36.
- Messina, Anthony M. 1989. *Race and Party Competition in Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1996. "The Not so Silent Revolution: Postwar Migration to Western Europe." *World Politics* 49(1): 130–54.
- . 2007. *The Logic and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miles, Robert. 1982. *Racism and Migrant Labour: A Critical Text*. London: Routledge.
- Miller, Mark J. 1981. *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force*. New York: Praeger.
- . 1997. "International Migration and Security: Towards Transatlantic Convergence." In *Immigration into Western Societies: Problems and Policies*, edited by Emek M. Uçarer and Donald J. Puchala. London: Pinter.
- Minkenberg, Michael. 1992. "The New Right in Germany: The Transformation of Conservatism and the Extreme Right." *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 55–81.
- Moch, Leslie Page. 1992. *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

- Money, Jeannette. 1999. *Fences and Neighbors: The Geography of Immigration Control*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Morris, Lydia. 2002. *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights*. London: Routledge.
- Motomura, Hiroshi. 2006. *Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Natter, K. (2018). "Rethinking Immigration Policy Theory Beyond 'Western Liberal Democracies'." *Comparative Migration Studies* 6(4): 1–21.
- Ness, Immanuel. 2005. *Immigrants, Unions, and the New U.S. Labor Market*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Park, Robert E. 1928. "Human Migration and the Marginal Man." *American Journal of Sociology* 33: 881–93.
- Pantoja, Adrian. 2006. "Against the Tide? Core American Values and Attitudes toward US Immigration Policy in the Mid-1990s." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32(3): 515–31.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67(1): 114–154.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49(1): 65–85.
- Pickus, Noah M.J. 2005. *True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Piore, Michael J. 1979. *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1995. *The Economic Sociology of Immigration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- . 1996. "Transnational Communities: Their Emergence and Significance in the Contemporary World-System." In *Latin America in the World Economy*, edited by R.P. Korzeniewicz and W.C. Smith. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- . 1997. "Immigration Theory for a New Century." *International Migration Review* 31(4): 799–825.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 2006. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*. 42: 427–460.
- . 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2): 137–74.
- Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60(4): 586–611.
- Ramakrishnan, Karthick S. 2004. "Second-Generation Immigrants? The '2.5 Generation' in the United States." *Social Science Quarterly* 85(2): 380–99.

- Rath, Jan. 1988. "Political Action of Immigrants in the Netherlands: Class or Ethnicity?" *European Journal of Political Research* 16(1): 623–44.
- Ravenstein, E.G. 1885. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 48(2): 167.
- . 1889. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 52(2): 241.
- Reitz, Jeffrey. 2022. "Canada." In *Controlling Immigration: A Comparative Perspective* (4th ed.), edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin, Pia M. Orrenius, and François Héran. 123–167. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rex, John, and R. Moore. 1967. *Race, Community and Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rogers, Rosemarie, ed. 1985. *Guests Come to Stay: The Effects of European Labor Migration on Sending and Receiving Countries*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rudolph, Christopher W. 2006. *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ruhs, Martin. 2013. *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ruhs, Martin, and Philip L. Martin. 2008. "Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs." *International Migration Review* 42: 249–265.
- Sadiq, Kamal. 2009. *Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2009. *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2006. *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schain, Martin A. 2012. *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain and the United States*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- . 2019. *The Border: Policy and Politics in Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–45.
- Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. 1992. *The Disuniting of America*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Schmitter, Barbara E. 1979. "Immigration and Citizenship in West Germany and Switzerland." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Schmitter-Heisler, Barbara. 1993. "Review of Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States*." *Work and Occupations* 20(4): 479–80.
- Schuck, Peter H. 1998. *Citizens, Strangers and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Schuck, Peter H., and Rogers Smith. 1985. *Citizenship without Consent*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Schuck, Peter H., and James Q. Wilson. 2008. *Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional Nation*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Shanks, Cheryl. 2000. *Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty, 1890–1990*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Shaw, Malcolm N. 1997. *International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sides, John, and Jack Citrin. 2007. "European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information." *British Journal of Political Science* 37(3): 477–504.
- Simon, Julian. 1989. *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Skerry, Peter. 1993. *Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority*. New York: Free Press.
- . 2000. *Counting on the Census: Race, Group Identity, and the Evasion of Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Smith, Rogers M., and Desmond King. 2020. "White Protectionism in America." *Perspectives on Politics* May: 1–19.
- Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. 2004. "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 35–49.
- Soysal, Yasemin N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Stark, Oded. 1991. *The Migration of Labor*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
- Teitelbaum, Michael S., and Myron Weiner. 1995. *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thränhardt, Dietrich. 1993. "Die Ursprünge von Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der Konkurrenzdemokratie." *Leviathan* 21(3): 336–57.
- Tichenor, Daniel J. 2002. *The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Todaro, Michael P. 1976. *Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities*. Geneva: International Labor Office.
- Tolbert, Caroline J., and Rodney E. Hero. 1996. "Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California's Illegal Immigration Initiative." *Journal of Politics* 58(3): 806–18.
- Torpey, John. 2000. *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsourapas, G. 2019. *The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt - Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Urbinati, Nadia, and Mark E. Warren. 2008. "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1): 387–412.
- Voss, Kim, and Irene Bloemraad. 2011. *Rallying for Immigrant Rights: The Fight for Inclusion in 21st Century America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Waldinger, Roger, and David FitzGerald. 2004. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(5): 1177–95.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. *The Modern World System*. New York: Academic Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1983. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Watts, Julie R. 2002. *Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization: Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Weber, Max. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weil, Patrick. 1991. *La France et ses étrangers: L'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration 1938–1991*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

- . 2002. *Qu'est-ce qu'un français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution*. Paris: Bernard Grasset.
- Weiner, Myron, ed. 1993. *International Migration and Security*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- . 1995. *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Weiner, Myron, and Michael S. Teitelbaum. 2001. *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Wilson, James Q., ed. 1980. *The Politics of Regulation*. New York: Harper.
- Wong, Tom K. 2015. *Rights, Deportation, and Detention in the Age of Immigration Control*. Stanford University Press.
- . 2017. *The Politics of Immigration: Partisanship, Demographic Change, and American National Identity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2020. *COVID-19 and the Remaking of U.S. Immigration Policy? Empirically Evaluating the Myth of Immigration and Disease*. La Jolla, CA: US Immigration Policy Center (USIPC) at UC San Diego.
- , and Hillary Kosnac. 2017. "Does the legalization of undocumented immigrants in the US encourage unauthorized immigration from Mexico? An empirical analysis of the moral hazard of legalization." *International Migration* 55/2: 159–173.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. 1981. "International Migration in Political Perspective." In *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research in International Population Movements*, edited by Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi. New York: Center for Migration Studies.
- . 1999. "Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy." In *Becoming American, American Becoming*, edited by Douglas Massey. New York: Russell Sage.
- . 2006. *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and Russell Sage.
- Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. 1989. *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

# 8 Law and Migration

## Constants, Challenges, and Changes

*David Abraham*

### **Immigration and Sovereignty**

Law is not a research discipline or tool of social analysis. Law is, in the first instance, a tool of regulation; as such, it constructs legality and illegality, the permissible and the impermissible. Law is also an expression of norms of justice as construed by a particular sovereign legislating community, one whose own composition is dynamic and changed by the very things, including migration, it seeks to regulate. Law, like the state in general, may be construed as a society's résumé, indicating where the society has been and where it stands at any particular time, what is there and then being contested and what is not, who is in charge and who is not. Since it may evolve, law is also a terrain of struggle over where and how to steer society, one of many fields in which class and interest politics, constructed in myriad ways, play out in simple and complicated venues. Finally, since law, notwithstanding the existence of bi- and multilateral agreements, is overwhelmingly produced on a national basis, methodological nationalism is reflected in most thinking about law and what it does. Despite both instability and contestation, Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty still prevail, and perhaps more in the arena of migration and citizenship than in most others.

Recent efforts through the UN to create a Global Compact on Migration and to extend “refugee internationalism” through a Global Compact on Refugees (Global Compact 2018) are exceptions to this Westphalianism, and they have to date, at least, not fared particularly well. The “mixed movements” we witness today do not seem as amenable to international cooperation as was the case with the post-WWII refugee regime to be discussed below. The human rights movement of recent decades, whatever its successes, has not made much headway in the realm of migration. Indeed, “closer linkage of refugee and migration issues risks shrinking the protection space” (Kainz 2020: 14).

Migration—both emigration and immigration—is in any event only infrequently motivated by law. (Lawlessness, either in the form of chaos and state failure or in the form of persecution, does, however, often play a role in generating those commonly referred to or recognized in international agreements as refugees or asylum seekers.<sup>1</sup>) Of the four percent of the world's population that is reported to be “migrant,” many may actually know or be guided and steered by



legal options—they deal with the law, generally adversely or as its victims—but law is not the source of choices made by very many.<sup>2</sup> Nigeriens desperate to reach Algeria, west Africans crossing both the Sahara and the Mediterranean, Central Asians and Middle Easterners heading for Australia or Europe, central Americans and Haitians heading to North America, and countless more of the chief flows being documented in recent years have been flows animated by the most elemental of material needs (food, work, security) and consisting of people who confront laws, laws in whose making they have played no active part, mostly as sluices to get around or armed border patrols to evade.

On the other hand, those making the laws are generally animated by mercantilist conceptions, seeking to draw in value, human capital of particular sorts (and later to control and improve it), while keeping out unneeded or undesirable elements. Like the princes of early modern times, sovereign states today are concerned with whom they might have to feed in hard times, whom they can successfully tax, and who will make them stronger, richer, or more talented than their competitors. Among the countervailing rights that individuals have gained against their sovereigns is the “right to leave,” to exit or emigrate—and that only recently. The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, states that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” However, there is to date no right to immigrate against the will of the sovereign or even to enter a country not one’s own.<sup>3</sup>

The acquisition of human capital remains one of the chief functions of immigration law, and possession of it is generally the measure by which future legal immigrants are selected and evaluated. Immigration law, as we shall see, hardly ends at the border or with the entry of immigrants into a state’s jurisdiction, but selecting immigrants is one of the first, front-end functions of migration regulation. Different societies—or, better said, different policies emerging out of a nation’s legislative processes—create different preference systems. Thus, Canada admits about 250,000 immigrant permanent residents annually (155,000 skilled workers and professionals, 65,000 close relatives, and 30,000 business investors), while the US admits about one million annually (two-thirds on the basis of close family ties, 10,000 business investors, 50,000 through a lottery, and only the rest on the basis of professional and work skills). Canadian applicants are in effect scored on points given for education, knowledge of English and/or French, work experience, youth, employment offers, proof of funds and friends, and adaptability. One could interpret the US’s “generosity” toward family unification as a greater preference, at least compared to Canada and Germany, for cheap rather than, or along with, skilled labor. Why the Canadian system is often considered more liberal or fair is a bit of a mystery.<sup>4</sup> Canada and the US both, in addition, admit on a temporary basis over 200,000 skilled or specialist workers annually, while Germany has introduced a so-called Blue Card program with the goal (not yet reached) of bringing in, on a temporary basis that may be converted after two or three years to permanent residence, about 10,000 highly skilled and well-paid workers annually.

Needless to say, who is needed and who may be desirable for any particular society or polity is no simple question, but it is not entirely indeterminate either.

Today, there is hardly a rich county in the world that is not looking for high-tech or STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) graduate immigrants. At the same time that the law treats migration as something exogenous to itself and to be regulated, migration as a process is thoroughly a part, a normal part, of economy, polity, and culture. Though human capital, family unification, and investment capital seem to be the dominant “goods” that immigration laws seek to steer into the country, ethnic fellowship has frequently been a sought-after good as well. Israel’s “Law of Return,” inviting Jews to be gathered in from their presumptive exile, and Germany’s past strong preferences for ethnic Germans from throughout Europe and Asia are but two of the better-known surviving cases, while White Australia and the US Quota System of 1924–1968 fell into complete disrepute decades ago.<sup>5</sup> Without doubt, some of the “populist” anti-immigrant sentiment of recent years is due to the *de facto* abandonment of “ethnic fellowship” as a privileged ground of inclusion/exclusion. The balance of “origin, interest, and convention,” as Schumpeter put it (1950: 244), has been rejiggered (Joppke 2005).

From the standpoint of the law, what is illegal should not happen at all, and when it does anyway, it should be stopped, deterred, and punished. Officially and manifestly, the law does not administer illegality, though it certainly acts as a switchman to encourage or divert migration flows, thereby often creating more illegality in different places. Thus, for example, US business’s demand for cheap and pliable labor is only partly recognized by and effectuated through legal visas, contributing to the presence of 11 million people in the country illegally. Problems this may create with neighbors or former colonies—Mexico, for example, or around the Mediterranean—may have to be administered, but the primacy of sovereignty in law-making renders this a secondary concern, another people’s problem. The overwhelming inclination of immigration law scholars of the last generation almost everywhere, on the other hand, has been to ease restrictive and exclusionary laws and improve the lives of migrants, both legal and illegal, both those hoping or intending to become citizens and those who merely sojourn. Immigration law scholarship in this respect is remarkably and dramatically partisan and seldom connected to legislators or judges, who tend to share the broader populace’s more restrictionist inclinations.<sup>6</sup>

Although immigration law, by definition, addresses cross-border movement between sovereignties, and notwithstanding a number of international agreements on asylum, refugees, and migration control, for example, immigration law, and even more so citizenship law, remains an exercise in the power of individual nation-states. Collective efforts like the EU’s Frontex patrol force reflect an agreement to exclude illegal “third county” nationals from the entire EU but do not undermine individual member states’ sovereign authority over legal migration and citizenship.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, control of borders and border crossing remains a defining element of viable statehood, an extension of foreign affairs in some ways. For that reason, too, nearly all states, and with them legal scholars (unlike historians, sociologists, political scientists, and others), treat migration as an exogenous phenomenon in need of policing. Indeed, as we shall see below, the emphasis on

policing and criminal control, both at the frontier and internally, has grown in recent years, spawning the term “crimmigration” and the rendering “criminal” of what used to be a “civil” matter.

In the case of the US, immigration law, like citizenship law, emerged out of the post-Civil War re-founding, a re-founding that created both a serious national government and a serious national identity. Within a generation of defining citizenship in *jus soli* birthright terms in the 14th Amendment, the US began its ruthless policy of excluding Chinese from either entering the country or joining the ranks of its citizens.<sup>8</sup> Membership and exclusion have ever since gone hand in hand in the law. This correspondence was true not just for the US; it seems to have been the case for most emergent, strong nation-states of the nineteenth century, whether they thought of themselves as lands of immigration or not. Nation-states as bounded communities use law, as Linda Bosniak reminds us, both to regulate relations on the inside—where we have in the past century or more mostly seen an expansion of rights and inclusionary sentiments—and to separate themselves from those elsewhere, on the outside (2006).<sup>9</sup> As Hannah Arendt put it—not uncontestedly—in her defense of Jewish and other statehoods, only those on the “inside,” citizens or potential citizens of a state, could claim the “right to have rights,” and those on the inside certainly and absolutely do—as civil rights and anti-discrimination movements have repeatedly demonstrated (1951: 177),<sup>10</sup> in the case of the US from Reconstruction to Black Lives Matter.

Notwithstanding the growth of a certain amount of universalism and humanitarianism in international law, including in the areas of refuge and asylum,<sup>11</sup> immigration laws remain intensely sovereigntist. They express the plenary power of a state to regulate its foreign affairs in a disorderly, if not Hobbesian, world without the constraints of domestic constitutional norms, especially norms of non-discrimination and due process. In the American case, this was made clear very early on. Already in 1889, the US Supreme Court held that the Burlingame Treaty between the US and China was of no greater moment than an act of Congress and could in effect be nullified by a domestic statute;<sup>12</sup> that as a key incident of national sovereignty, federal states and local governments had no role to play in immigration law; and that as a matter of peace and security, the plenary powers of government—that is the executive and the legislature—were empowered, without being subject to the Constitution or review by the courts, to decide whom to exclude from the country. All of these “incidents of sovereignty” were complete. Hence, not only was there, and to this day is there, no right to enter a country of which one is not a citizen, but the grounds of permission and denial are subject to the complete and virtually unreviewable discretion of the plenary branches of government—so far even as to allow a “Muslim ban.”<sup>13</sup>

The American courts, particularly in times of worry over sovereignty and security such as occasioned by the Cold War, “the war on terrorism,” and the like, have repeatedly stressed that, “[a]dmission of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign” and that exclusion “is a fundamental act of sovereignty,” “inherent in the executive power to control foreign affairs,” a power that is “final and conclusive.” How such a privilege is to be administered is up

to Congress, not the courts and, “[w]hatever the procedure that is authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Such plenary powers are held not only over first-time entrants but even over long-term permanent residents who depart and seek to re-enter, and they include powers of detention as well as the use of secret evidence and procedures as broad or narrow as Congress might see fit to legislate.<sup>14</sup>

Once allowed into the country, an alien lives with constitutional protection on *non-immigration matters*: his life, liberty, and property may not be taken without due process of law, and he enjoys the civil rights and liberties of all persons as well as “equal protection of the law” against the states, including discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, national origin, and similar protected bases. Thus, the same Chinese who could be excluded altogether or deported for violating whatever requirements Congress might choose to impose could not be discriminated against on account of race in the granting of government licenses,<sup>15</sup> or punished without full-fledged criminal proceedings.<sup>16</sup> In regard to *immigration matters*, however, in the US and elsewhere, all aliens, that is, all foreigners resident in the country, long-term and permanent as well as transient, to this day remain subject to sovereign plenary power. They may be deported or removed for violating any of the requirements that the legislature or executive may impose, including retroactively, in regard to behavior that took place after or even before their arrival in the country.<sup>17</sup> The Supreme Court has more than once queried this *ex post facto* legality but has found that there is no “clean slate” available and that these policies are “entrusted exclusively to Congress [and are] as firmly embedded in the ... tissues of our body politic as any aspect of government.”<sup>18</sup>

Here, too, security fears have produced the most unvarnished judicial statements of the core reality. Unlike citizens, no alien, regardless of how long resident, enjoys any vested right to remain in the country. An alien’s presence is a “matter of permission and tolerance” while the “[g]overnment’s power to terminate its hospitality” is unquestionable. And here too, since deportation is not a criminal punishment, there is no issue of *ex post facto* illegality. One can be deported (in 1952) for having been a Communist at a time (1925–1940, for example) when being a Communist violated no law, if Congress should later decide that being or having been a member of the Communist Party makes an alien deportable.<sup>19</sup> As Justice Jackson (of Nuremberg fame) frankly admitted in *Harisiades*, “world convulsions have driven us to a closed society, the expulsion power has been exercised with increased severity, manifest in multiplication of grounds for deportation” and more. Of course, today’s Islamic charity associations can be or become yesterday’s Communist Party—even if “freedom of speech and of press are [explicitly] accorded aliens residing in the country.”<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, procedurally, since deportation is a *civil* penalty and not a *criminal* punishment, the right to appeal deportation is extremely limited and the procedures under which such an appeal might be heard rather informal and well below regnant due-process standards. In the US, at least, the advances registered on behalf of defendants in criminal trials during the civil rights revolution are not available to those facing deportation hearings: for example, there is no

state obligation to supply an attorney; there is no bar on hearsay evidence, and only weak exclusionary rules as to dubiously gathered evidence; there is no bar on negative inferences from silence; and extremely overburdened immigration judges—who are themselves part of the same executive branch as the government attorneys and not members of the independent federal judiciary—enjoy broad discretion and oversee only loose standards of “fundamental fairness.” Indeed, most deportation hearings produce little more than requests for voluntary departure, or discretionary and merciful “relief from removal,” available to those long-term residents who can demonstrate ancillary hardship of an “exceptional and extremely unusual” sort that would accrue to members of the alien’s immediate family—parents, unmarried minor children, or spouses—provided that those relatives are themselves citizens or permanent residents.<sup>21</sup> In brief, few things within the world of immigration law are as cruel as the deportation power (Kanstrom 2007, 2012).<sup>22</sup>

### **Westphalian and Post-Westphalian Problems and Reforms**

Numerous scholars have argued that the continuities of space, identity, and nationality have eroded considerably and irreversibly (Bauböck 1995; Castles and Davidson 2000; Sassen 2007; Spiro 2011). Indeed, this erosion “means that there is always an open question as to the composition of the polity, and the nature of the bonds uniting its members—and this openness increases the risk of democratic failure” (Huq 2020: 29). To avoid having openness lead as a consequence to democratic failure, social and political discriminations in regard to immigration especially are unavoidable. Roger Waldinger has summarized the matter frankly. After noting that there is no pride in winning the birthright lottery, he writes:

there is no political community without boundaries, no people that can take responsibility for one another without some prior agreement as to the terms of belonging. Boundaries imply discrimination, in favour of the citizens and against the aliens. ... there are neither good choices to be had nor admissions criteria that are more unambiguously just than others. Consequently, conflict over the number, characteristics, and rights of immigrants is an inherent part of the phenomenon.

(Waldinger 2018: 1425)

These discontinuities of space and nationality have both reflected and reinforced the multicultural and identity politics that followed and disrupted the civil rights and citizenship struggles of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>23</sup> For a number of years, the facile tendency among scholars to welcome so-called “globalization” as somehow emancipatory and rights-facilitating was hard to resist—though there were early skeptics. Thus, as the always-prescient Charles Tilly observed years ago, “To the extent that it undermines the capacity of states to deliver on their commitments to citizens, globalization of the world economy and polity will weaken both citizenship and democracy” (1994: 12). In any event and notwithstanding

the fact that the early twentieth century was marked by migration as intense and almost as diverse as that of the early twenty-first century, a new era of greater and more diverse migration flows seemed to have begun, and the field of “migration studies” came into its own.<sup>24</sup> Much like “cultural studies,” it has exercised broad influence across the social sciences and humanities. Still, the ascendance of “globalization” and of “human rights” discourses and practices has changed little of the harshness or structure of immigration law or its administration. As we shall see below, however, the categories on which immigration law is based have come under great stress, leading to incoherence in doctrine and radicalization among scholars.

To be sure, notable reforms have taken place—Germany’s dramatic shift from *jus sanguinis* and difficult naturalization requirements to partial *jus soli* and relaxed naturalization in the late 1990s being a signal example (Hoffman 2004: 203; Abraham 2006: 88–100).<sup>25</sup> There, but not only there, legal reform focused on the new labor migration from the east: efforts to encourage immigration of highly skilled foreigners, especially entrepreneurs and high-tech workers from Asia, and the ongoing problem of citizenship and nationality for the German-born children and grandchildren of an earlier generation of mostly Turkish and Balkan guestworkers. As to the first, Germany accepted free movement of EU labor after winning a seven-year break-in period and appears to have managed with a considerable labor influx from the new EU lands, especially Poland and the Balkans. As to the second, the Immigration Law of 2004 grudgingly opened some new doors to hi-tech workers and graduating foreign university students especially, although also blocking other avenues.<sup>26</sup> The third set of issues, citizenship for and the integration of the descendants of Turkish and other guestworkers, remains the most knotty.

In 1999, Germany saw the passage of its first immigration and naturalization law since 1913, and the first-ever embodying considerable *jus soli* principles. The central goal of the reformers was to ease access into German society for all those born in Germany. Legally, that meant introducing birthright citizenship to the children of long-term resident aliens and easing the naturalization process for those residents not born in Germany. By thus distancing, if not divorcing, citizenship and membership from ethnicity, the reformers sought to facilitate integration into an evolving and more capacious German identity and society. Legal reforms, it was hoped, would steer immigrants, especially the descendants of guestworkers and especially Turkish and Muslim minorities, into the mainstream, helping thereby also to lessen socioeconomic disparities and cultural gaps.

Immigrants would more easily and more willingly become German while “German” itself would come to mean something broader. Now, if a child has at least one parent who has lived in Germany for at least eight years and has unlimited status, the child automatically enjoys citizenship from birth; if that child has inherited another citizenship through his or her parents, the child may retain both citizenships until age 23, by which time a choice must be made. Furthermore, aliens living in Germany for at least eight years who possess an unlimited status settlement or residence permit are fully entitled to obtain German citizenship



if they can show that they can guarantee their livelihoods without recourse to social welfare benefits, possess adequate knowledge of German, have not been convicted of a serious crime, and pledge adherence to the free and democratic values of the Constitution.<sup>27</sup> Finally, applicants for citizenship must commit themselves to having or acquiring an adequate knowledge of German, for example by undertaking a public-school language course in “everyday life” German. Similar language and civics requirements and testing have been spreading throughout Europe and, in some cases, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have become quite onerous and barely camouflaged deterrents.

These reforms, in Germany and elsewhere, with the possible exception of the broader acceptance of dual citizenship (discussed below), have sprung from domestic anti-discrimination and liberalization impulses and not from transnational or globalist initiatives (Abraham 2000; Joppke 2007). Whether or not connected to expanded migration, the pre-9/11 era of civic nationalism or “constitutional patriotism” (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) (Müller 2007)<sup>28</sup> did much to improve the legal condition of aliens residing in the liberal democracies but, beyond downplaying the explicit role of race, religion, and ethnicity, that civic nationalism did little to liberalize the immigration regimes themselves. Although scholars have tried, it is difficult to assess, on balance, whether one can say overall that immigration regimes have grown more liberal or more restrictionist in recent years.<sup>29</sup> As noted, legal advocates for immigration, being mostly liberal progressives, are professionally loath to acknowledge success—in part because they are stymied by and unreconciled to the fact that there is no moral justification in liberal theories of merit or just deserts for the accident of birth in a rich country rather than a miserably poor one.<sup>30</sup> As we shall see below, the trajectory regarding irregular or undocumented migration is far less happy.

On the one hand, reforms in the major immigrant-receiving countries comport nicely with a longer-running and broadly accepted legal commitment to non-discrimination. Hence much law reform pressure, backed by scholarship, has been exerted to remove immigration exclusions based on coverture, sexual orientation, political opinion, and the like. Recently in the US, it came to pass that same-sex spouses may sponsor the immigration of their partners, and, on gender equality grounds, the fathers of illegitimate children now enjoy the same immigration sponsorship rights as the more reliably identifiable mothers who previously alone enjoyed the privilege. Procedural fairness on behalf of the disadvantaged has also been part of recent reform efforts, pushed by law school clinics, civil rights organizations, and immigration scholars. Thus, two of the most trumpeted legal victories of recent years in the US concern obtaining additional chances for those, mostly poor, facing deportation for criminal guilty pleas occasioned by inadequate lawyering or representation, and the limitation of the time someone found deportable may be detained pending finding a county willing to take him. Unsurprisingly, one of the biggest defeats was on the labor front, where it was held that “an undocumented alien who has never been authorized to work” could not be awarded back-pay penalties when his employer violated the law—because he was not supposed to be working here to begin with.<sup>31</sup>



In this presumptively more migratory and arguably post-Westphalian environment, increased emphasis has been placed on “presence” and community “membership” at the expense of formal citizenship. Much of this rights expansion for non-citizens derives from more generous readings of domestic liberal constitutions. In the US and elsewhere, the legal protection of “personhood” has expanded greatly over the past half-century. This has been accomplished not by reference to “human rights” or transnational citizenship, but rather by elaboration of constitutional “equal protection” and “due process” principles to include alien residents and to limit both public and private discrimination against them on non-immigration matters. Thus, the 14th Amendment’s command that no state shall deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”<sup>32</sup> has been at the heart of nearly all liberalization, while constitutional principles like “human dignity” and “proportionality” have served analogous functions in Europe.<sup>33</sup>

One thing would seem to be certain: citizens, permanent residents, denizens, sojourners, temporary and seasonal migrants, circular and return migrants, family migrants, economic migrants, legal and undocumented migrants, foreign students, tourists, and an assortment of others—all of them are persons, humans. All of them are present and would appear to be entitled to “due process” and “equal protection” benefits. And on most non-immigration matters, such as civil rights and liberties, they generally are. But when it comes to social and political rights, “membership” is more difficult to assess and less generously afforded. One might think of “membership” as a series of concentric circles of “affiliation” with citizens in the center, permanent resident aliens (immigrants) in the next circle, legal temporary residents in the next, etc., with undocumented aliens in the outermost circle. Laws on who is entitled to what, and the salience of citizenship itself, are a real hodgepodge and difficult to compare internationally.<sup>34</sup> EU foreigners are thus entitled to a great deal, socially, economically, and even electorally and politically when living elsewhere in the EU. Recent anxieties about “welfare tourism,” in which residents of the poorer EU countries such as Romania and Bulgaria allegedly swamp the richer countries of the North have sounded sour notes.<sup>35</sup> “Third country” foreigners, on the other hand, are entitled to much less, even if they have been resident for an extended period and are integrated, at least into their local communities. Some writers have suggested, not without hyperbole, that the dramatic rise in income of continental European workers during the heyday of the welfare state was achieved on the backs of rights-deprived guest workers (Goodman and Pepinsky 2021). What social rights and benefits different classes of inhabitants are entitled to in the US is an extraordinarily complex, murky, and incoherent matter (Hammond 2018).

Most significant immigrant-receiving countries today are such reformed capitalist democracies, countries that pay at least some respect to personhood or human rights, and in them life without citizenship is not in fact life without rights or solidarities. Social rights in the US are weaker than they are in Canada or Germany or most of Europe, northern and southern—but they are weaker for citizens and aliens alike. The discounts and the premiums of alienage and citizenship do not

seem to justify a race to naturalize, and the harshness of vulnerability to deportation does not seem an overwhelming concern to those migrants and immigrants whose presence is legal—though it certainly is to those who are undocumented—and who lead law-abiding lives. In the case of northern Europe, long-term foreign residents have enjoyed the same labor market preferences enjoyed by natives, and the same social benefits as well. Given much higher union density than in the US and a more centralized bargaining regime, as well as tougher government enforcement of labor standards, the disparities between domestic and foreign workers are smaller than in the US, though real. Indirect wages are high by American standards, just as they are for native workers: child benefits, health insurance, school and job education allotments, longish vacations, pensions, etc. Shopkeepers and other *petit bourgeois* and businesspeople are eligible for and protected by the same universalist programs. As to civil and political rights, the picture resembles that of North America and Oceania: on non-immigration issues, foreigners enjoy the same civil liberties as natives, while, with rare exceptions, non-EU foreigners may not vote or occupy upper-reach civil service or political offices.

Whereas the “devaluation” of citizenship had been a complaint among those worried about the decline in naturalizations and cultural integration, this devaluation has flipped for others into a virtue, signaling a post-national world in which citizenship is less important and rights, human rights, are derived from multiple sources.<sup>36</sup> The flipside of this devaluation is evidenced by the growing acceptance of dual citizenship. Whereas citizenship was once like marriage and dual citizenship like bigamy, citizenships (like passports) now resemble credit cards: useful credentials, different versions of which may be superior in particular transactions or circumstances, and the accumulation of which indicates no particular (dis)loyalty. As recently as the 1960s, European states worked to reduce the incidence of dual citizenship, which was thought to be an unfortunate consequence of asymmetric *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* regimes brought to their union and to their children by marriage partners from different countries. By the 1990s, the Council of Europe, like the US State Department, had completely reversed its position: the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality (634 UNTS 221 1963) was completely reversed in a 1993 Protocol which endorses retention of all nationalities.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, the accumulation of citizenships as personal assets and nodes in transnational community relations has become a form of capital and sparks respect rather than anger (Harpaz 2019).

Finally, the free market and free movement of capital and of goods associated with globalized capitalism and high levels of labor migration have permitted an unprecedented flow of remittances from both individuals and organized groups of migrants to their home countries. There is no doubt that the sums are enormous: about US\$ 550 billion in 2013 and growing, prior to the Covid crisis, at eight percent annually.<sup>38</sup> Such transfers are possible only because of the legal deregulation of capital movements that has caused considerable harm in other areas. There is, on the other hand, lively debate as to the absolute, distributional, and developmental contributions of remittances back to developing countries. Some scholars, particularly economists associated with the World Bank and IMF, argue

that remittances reduce the level and depth of poverty and promote development almost everywhere<sup>39</sup> Others sharply disagree, maintaining that “migrant associations” simply “have limited capacity and power to overcome structural economic problems and to compensate for the failure or absence of national development policies.” In turn, the home governments’ role in migrant initiatives is “ambiguous, contested, and not necessarily desirable,” with inequalities exacerbated, development distorted, and, at the end of the day, elites more rather than less entrenched.<sup>40</sup> In either event, what is striking in this post-Westphalian regime is that migrants, even those from nationalistic countries like Mexico, Turkey, China, and Israel, are now viewed less as deserters and more as assets deployed abroad, network nodes, and sources of social as well as money capital. For poorer countries, however, this is less true, and “brain drain” remains a serious loss.<sup>41</sup>

In academic circles, “citizenship” itself has fallen into some disrepute. Rather than being seen as the essential engine for the realization of human rights, as in the French revolutionary “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” it is viewed with suspicion as a proprietary and exclusionary device. Unearned and unmerited by those born with strong ones, those unfortunates born with weak citizenships suffer limited mobility, restricted work options, and a paucity of human recognition. Citizenship, in the extreme view, is but a tool of confinement and oppression (Kochenov 2019) at a time when marginalization and inequality enjoy pride of place as evils in academic discourse. By this logic, the provision of rights and opportunities *via* a free market in movement combined with transnational and denizenship rights (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997; Sassen 2007) would be far superior. As one of the minority of critics complains, however, “a literature that celebrates denizenship, permanent residence with economic and social but not political rights, that trivializes national citizenship, is a tribute to mass disenfranchisement.” (Hansen 2009: 21).

Parallel to or part of the turn against citizenship has been a growing gap between the academy and the polity. In the US, but not only there, academic scholarship has radicalized in the sense that globally oriented and global justice-focused scholars, following the path of progressive neoliberalism (Fraser 2017), have turned against fundamental principles of closure, membership, selectivity, or any kind of national preference (Abraham 2010). Whereas the full-fledged “open borders” position (Carens 1987) remains an outlier, ethical superiority has been ceded to it while the center of academic gravity has certainly moved its way (Bosniak 2012). Driven, in part, by a dramatic increase in concern with race and racism, facile adoption of settler colonial theory, a concomitant deference toward the indigenous, a front-lash advocacy on behalf of Muslim communities treated unfairly after 9/11, and by the intolerant universalism of secular *laïcité*, joined with extraordinary sympathy for the refugees created by the wars of a declining American Empire that ravages the planet, advocacy has displaced scholarship to a remarkable degree. Lodged securely in the discourses of anti-racism and neo- or post-colonialism, immigration becomes a form of anti-racist and reparatist activism (Achiume 2019). What would not long ago have been considered balanced scholarship, theorizing in the law/political science realm that is cognizant

of competing perspectives and interests, is now the exception (Song 2019; Martin 2020; Motomura 2020).<sup>42</sup>

The radicalization of academic and advocacy discourse stands, as noted, in sharp contrast to the more immigration-dubious sentiments of voters, especially working-class voters in both Europe and America (Sanders 2015; Streeck 2017). Whereas a generation ago, an organ of the educated middle-class public could devote many pages to taking seriously “The Price of Immigration,” while generally endorsing it (Atlantic Monthly 1996), comparable balance there today would be considered pusillanimous, if not reactionary. At the same time, for example, that enlightened circles have abandoned the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” or “undocumented” migrants in most discussion,<sup>43</sup> the broader, less enlightened public has become more concerned with that very distinction, a reality reflected in a popular hostility toward *immigration* that is not matched by commensurate hostility toward *immigrants*. Ignoring such sentiment has been costly to liberal-left parties on both continents.<sup>44</sup>

### Post-Westphalian and Neo-Westphalian Backlash

For all these advances and new understandings, there has been a legal as well as a political backlash, in part accelerated by the polarization noted above. Well before the Great Migration Crisis of 2015 (to be discussed below), and even before the economic crisis that began in 2008, and only partly in response to the upsurge in undocumented migration, numerous immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and elsewhere began demanding more integration from new and recent arrivals. Although not confined to Europe, some of this backlash has been specific to the issue of Islam in Europe, described by partisans as Islamophobia or as the resistance of Islam and Muslim communities to secular, liberal, enlightened society (as the natives construe it). Whatever its origins and propellants, some of its manifestations are shared across otherwise disparate countries.

The central elements of the backlash have been the following. First, what began as talk on both sides of the Atlantic of limiting *jus soli* benefits to children born to mothers or fathers legally in the country for longer periods of time (variously, three, five, eight years, or even a whole generation) has become law everywhere in Europe—Ireland, in 2004, ratified by a popular referendum, was the last to abolish absolute *jus soli*.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the US, Canada, and Brazil are the only large or significant countries with an “all persons born” rule, and almost all the others are small Caribbean/Latin American lands.<sup>46</sup> Second, there has been an effort, in Germany but also elsewhere, to make access to migration and citizenship more difficult through marriage. Despite that Constitution’s strong commitment to family rights, the importation of “country girl” wives from the old country (Turkey and Morocco, in particular) is widely seen as setting back integration, and especially language acquisition, throughout northern Europe. Third is what Joppke describes as “the attempt by states to tie citizenship more firmly to shared identities [and] civic competence,” thereby combating the “centrifugal tendencies” of increasingly diverse societies through means such as citizenship tests,

pre- and post-arrival language courses, pre-entry cultural preparation sessions, integration courses, integration contracts, and the like (2008: 6).<sup>47</sup>

Prospective new citizens (unlike born citizens) are increasingly called upon to consent explicitly to, and sometimes literally sign on to, a contractual conception of membership: they are joining an already existing association, one with specific rules, a specific history, and maybe specific political and cultural norms and values—all of which may be tested, literally as well as metaphorically. Some of the new tests of the past decade or so are easy, anodyne mixtures of national history, language, geography, daily survival skills, and civics-lite, a kind of driver's manual test. Some are very constitutional and rights-oriented, hardly designed to discipline or repress the potential citizen. Others, however, are of a culturally denser and more subjective sort, going well beyond the civic, and drawing on or referencing a "lead culture" (*Leitkultur*), albeit generally a prettied-up liberal one, and even verging in some cases on one's moral-ethical and inner inclinations—reflecting the "illiberal liberalism" of intrusively freeing others from *their* ignorance (Orgad 2011: 2010).<sup>48</sup> The sudden eagerness of mainstream and conservative politicians and churchmen in both Europe and North America to champion women's rights and homosexuality has been particularly striking.<sup>49</sup> Still, it would seem that, despite a variegated picture, on balance these tests and procedures have been constrained by the fundamentally liberal-universalist nature of the constitutional regimes of the countries in question.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, the role of criminal law and criminal enforcement in the immigration process has grown. It has done so within this atmosphere of backlash and in combination with both post-9/11 security obsessions and a rapid rise, especially in the US, in the number of undocumented migrants—in the US about 11 million or well over one-quarter of the foreign-born population (Passel et al. 2013), even after Trump. In turn, particularly in federal states, the expansion of interior enforcement alongside more stringent patrol of the border has enlarged the presence of both (often ill-trained) local law enforcement officials and the (often ill-equipped) ordinary criminal courts.<sup>51</sup> It has also blurred the civil/criminal line procedurally. With the threat of deportation hanging over the undocumented, life in the shadows, in addition to all of its economic and social impairments, creates extra dangers when ordinary law enforcement comes into play. Consequences have become all the worse and more widespread as more and more of the undocumented live in so-called "mixed families," some of whose members, spouses, and/or children, may be legal immigrants or born or naturalized citizens. Criminal arrests and the free sharing of data between local law enforcement officials and immigration authorities can lead not only to the identification and subsequent removal of the undocumented party but also to the breakup of families and the *de facto* deportation of citizen children.<sup>52</sup>

"Crimmigration," with its overtones of criminalizing migration and migrants as such, reaches well beyond policing the undocumented, deporting the criminal, or detaining those facing removal, none of which practices is itself at all novel.<sup>53</sup> The restructuring of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service in the aftermath of 9/11 under the Department of Homeland Security is symbolic of

a transformation that associates migration with questions of security and the loss of sovereign control, “human trafficking” being a most recent exemplar. Broader parts of migration management have been put under criminal law, in the UK and in Europe as well as in North America and Australia. The (re-)location of detention facilities to the perimeter, such as the remote counties of Sicily, Louisiana, and the Negev, or to camps established abroad in New Guinea, Nauru, and the like further criminalizes migrants. As Joanna Parkin has put it, “the constant reinforcement of border patrols, tightening of conditions of entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation and the proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of the press, public and political establishment regarding migrant criminality” have produced something approaching a “criminalisation of migration” (2013: 1).<sup>54</sup>

Not only do these discourses and practices of dangerousness, fear, and social control criminalize undocumented migrants, they also degrade legal migrants and even citizens and their rights. Intensified efforts at employment verification, for example, with criminal liability for both unauthorized workers and their employers, have disadvantaged immigrants and unintentionally generated discrimination against certain minorities. Crimmigration also bleeds into other areas, helping to displace general social governance through rights and well-being with governance through security and crime control (Simon 2007; Yin and Abraham 2011: 77–99). Like the “war on drugs” or the “war on crime,” or Guantanamo and data-gathering jurisprudence, such criminal law approaches have generally contained racial elements, tempting when 98 percent of the apprehended illegal entrants are Mexican and Central American. In the US, these are especially viable politically at the local level, and various states and towns have for a while now attempted measures intended to criminalize the normal activities of the undocumented.<sup>55</sup>

Yet here too it must be appreciated that there are countertendencies emerging from the constitutional commitments to equality and the social acceptance of membership through presence. Scores of US cities have declared themselves “sanctuaries” that will not use local resources to enforce federal law or make inquiries as to documentation, while a growing number of states have made available in-state resident higher-education tuition discounts to high-school graduates whose very presence in the county is, absent temporary deferred action, in fact, illegal.<sup>56</sup> The Trump administration’s efforts to punish sanctuary cities enjoyed limited success, although the effort to strip protected status from “Dreamers” came to naught.

### **The European Migration Crisis of 2015: Legal Categories Collapse**

No area of law can function without clearly established and broadly accepted, often dichotomous, categories: voluntary *versus* involuntary, dependent *versus* independent, adult *versus* juvenile, etc. Laws governing migration are no exception. The massive influx of migrants into Germany—over one million in 2015



alone—presented a potentially fatal challenge to the EU’s migration regime while also exploding the categories on which post-WWII refugee, asylee, and immigration policy had been based. It was a crisis that threatened the Shengen intra-EU free mobility agreements and highlighted the woeful inadequacy of a rudderless Frontex external border control system (on which internal free mobility turned out to be predicated). The failure of the UNHCR to organize and maintain centers for identifying and housing the war refugees among the migrants and the general inability to find, let alone allocate them to, willing resettlement nations underscored the inadequacy of the regime established after WWII with its clear categorical distinctions. The unwillingness of the “new” EU states of Eastern Europe to share in the burden—or even the ideology—of relief only made matters worse.

Real life always transgresses the logical boundaries of law, even as the life of the law is itself supposed to be experience rather than logic. Hence, as embodied in law over the years, an *asylum seeker* is someone seeking shelter in a storm, someone whose preferred intention would be to return “home” but who has a well-founded fear of persecution there that requires the grant of temporary protection, specifically the guarantee of not being sent “back there” (or somewhere else) to be persecuted—*non refoulement*. An asylee could remain in limbo for a long time and dependent on halfway measures of support, education, work opportunities, and the like, though numerous countries afford asylees the chance, after a certain period of time (one year in the US, three years in Germany), to eschew return home and to become legal permanent residents instead.

*Refugees* are defined in international and most domestic law as persons outside their place of nationality or habitual residence who are unable or unwilling to return to that place and are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that sovereign on account of a well-founded fear of persecution, according to UN Treaties “on account of ... race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Refugees, unlike asylees, are not yet at the border of or inside “your” country. They are, by definition, “hosted” in third countries, generally in camps, and under the auspices of the UNHCR, aided often by NGOs of various sorts, with the goal of permanent resettlement in willing countries. That process is notoriously slow and, in the current crisis, has left masses of people on the margins of those societies where the camps are located, mostly in countries adjacent to the zones of conflict such as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Iran, Colombia, etc.

As to potential *asylees* who have reached the border or are inside a signatory country, by treaty no numerical ceiling is allowed—a point on which Chancellor Merkel rightly insisted at the time. On the other hand, however, applicants are supposed to be vetted on an individual basis and not defined as *per se* eligible simply on the basis of the country whence they have come—a point on which her domestic opponents insisted. To consider everyone who comes from a particular country, say Syria or Iraq, automatically to be a meritorious asylee is not unprecedented. The US has been doing this for over half a century with the Cuban



Adjustment Act, a malicious piece of Cold War aggression designed to act like an electromagnet drawing out Cuba's human capital (80 Stat. 1161 1966).

As to *refugees* in camps outside a country, no state is obligated to accept any at all, though many negotiate a quota with the UNHCR, which is charged, together with potential receiving countries, among other things, with background investigations and processing. After "resettlement" in an accepting country (usually in groups in a predetermined location), the refugee's future is now definitively in that new home—as difficult as any transition may be. At any given moment, some portion of those awaiting resettlement abroad may well imagine returning "home," but historical experience suggests that such is not often the case. In countries that, unlike Germany, have real immigration policies, refugees are, after a short period, assimilated into the category of immigrants, like them presumptively on the road to naturalized citizenship.

A *migrant* is someone on the move who has "chosen"—though we know there is no such thing as unconstrained free choice, hence the neologism of "forced migration"—to move from one place to another in response to push factors in his own former abode and/or pull factors in some new place which there is some chance of accessing. As noted earlier, the asymmetry of international law is that while states may not prevent their nationals or residents from leaving, neither is any other country obligated to allow them in. A state considering accepting this or that migrant may unabashedly consider that migrant's "worth" to the country—economic, political, ethnic, etc.—and do so in a way that pays no heed to the circumstances the migrant might be seeking to escape. States offer migrants admission and membership in exchange for what they have to offer, not out of moral obligation.

Based on what was in the post-WWII years a hegemonic, liberal and individualist political conception of persecution (which the Soviet Union never succeeded in extending to include economic matters), the "mere" fact of someone being subjected to poverty, anarchy, dangerous insecurity, or generalized misery did not make him a candidate for refugee or asylee status. Disentangling political, social, economic, and other factors from one another is both difficult and likely to yield injustice. At the same time, since controlling borders, admissions, and exclusions is a hallmark of sovereignty, something that precedes any constitutional limitations on plenary state power, decisions in this area have often been a matter of foreign policy preferences (in the case of the US, for example, "merely-immiserated" Haitians versus "victims of Communism" Cubans) and have little to do with equal protection, due process, or other constitutional mandates.

Restrictive refinements adopted in the 1990s, such as the Dublin "country of first entry" requirement (asylum requests must be filed in the first EU country accessed) and safe third country provisions (the labeling of certain countries of origin or through-passage as *per se* safe from persecution, thereby disqualifying all its nationals from asylum), quickly became embarrassing dead letters. At the same time, for both humanitarian and administrative reasons, the established Article 33 definition of refugee or asylum seeker (8 U.S.C.A. §101(a)(42)) has been stretched beyond all recognition, while belief in the UN's capacity to

bring order and offer relief has waned worldwide, to the further detriment of that organization.

Without doubt, the migration crisis was precipitated by many things: ruinous interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya; civil war in Syria; spreading desertification in Africa; free trade immiseration of small peasantries, of the Global South especially; the ubiquity of cheap communications and professional smugglers; the presence of many new *Landsmann* networks in Europe; and, above all, perhaps, the continued disparity in life chances between Europe and the world to its south and east. This concatenation of factors bears some resemblance to those that characterized the great migrations of the generations before WWI but missing now is the voracious appetite for workers that the industrial economies of that time possessed. Instead, there are welfare states that now seem vulnerable on multiple fronts. Peace in the Middle East and Muslim Africa are much to be wished for, but it is not clear that population-absorbing-and-limiting development, such as we have seen in East Asia, would soon follow. One thinks of how long it took, once it began and networks were established, for emigration from places like Italy, Ireland, Poland, and Mexico to taper off.

Under such circumstances, one can see how the distinctions among asylum seekers, refugees, and “ordinary” migrants confused not only officialdom but the citizens of receiving countries as well. This confusion, this inability to exercise sovereignty, has had real, deleterious consequences. “We” have foresworn any ability to select, to pick which of “them” might really be welcome to become one of “us.” But “immigration by asylum” will not work, either as a legal or a social matter. Using asylum law this way only discredits both immigration and asylum, mystifying the former and vitiating the latter. Immigration needs to be a transparent and normal process; refuge and asylum an extraordinary one.

The point here is not to glorify these precarious statuses nor to begrudge the poor souls who benefit from them. The expansion of such categories, were it to be recognized, could be an advance and an opportunity, especially for the miserable of Asia and Africa. If nothing else, they illuminate the successes and limits of transnational/post-national human rights thinking, providing a weak reed to support the sometimes wretched. The crisis showed Europeans, and others as well, the inadequacy of the post-WWII legal regimes for refugee and asylum policies and the need to develop explicit immigration laws and procedures that have largely been absent. The migration crisis exacerbated an already-widespread moral panic and fear in European (and North American) electoral democracies, where neoliberal economic policies and the fear that “things are out of control” had already badly eroded middle- and working-class security and boosted populist and xenophobic sentiments both outside and inside the halls of parliaments. East Asia, South Asia, the Near East, and Eastern Europe have of late all suffered the impairment of liberal democracy, and waves of migrants have become representative of disappearing jobs, alien values, incompetent state administrations, media estrangement, crime, disease, and whatever else ails almost everywhere they are found, including the US.

## Post-multiculturalism, Diversity, and the Neoliberal Welfare State

In the past several years, the once-contentious term “multiculturalism” itself has receded from media attention. Much of the space multiculturalism formerly occupied in the legal and political imagination has been replaced by race and “diversity.” Diversity is an even more capacious or expansive concept than multiculturalism, encompassing as it does categories such as race, gender, sexuality, religion, disability, and the like that may in most respects be considered elements or subsets within the same culture. Conversely, each culture within a multicultural society may presumably be viewed as diverse. One of the standard concerns about multiculturalism has, indeed, been that diversity within communities suffers when a minority culture, immigrant or otherwise, represents itself to other cultures or to the state. Whereas multiculturalism generated the fear among its critics of Balkanization, of treating other domestic (sub-)cultures in the manner of foreign relations, diversity recognizes the *pluribus*—and the mistreatment some of the many have been subjected to—while accepting that there is an *unum*.

Meanwhile, multiculturalism as a policy position has been rejected by most European (less so American) politicians, even where practices themselves have arguably not changed much. There have surely been virtues as well as detriments to focusing on identity and the recognition and protection of cultural difference, as regards both domestic minorities and immigrants. There is no space here to debate whether multicultural policies—however defined—have contributed to or impeded immigrant integration or improved or restricted migrants’ lives.<sup>57</sup> The jury will remain out forever on this question. What is clear is that policies and debates about them have taken place in a double setting: one where civic constitutional liberalism, despite the weakening of some of its fundamentals, like secularism and universalism, has reigned, reducing the premium or surplus value of citizenship, and where at the same time a formerly robust social welfare state has either surrendered to or, at the very least, come under significant neoliberal assault.

With security of residence, moderate family reunification rights, social rights, civil liberties, and a high standard of living, why would a legal migrant take the extra step of becoming German or Dutch or American? Why risk losing benefits and rights in one’s county of origin—as was often the case for years, for example, with land ownership in Turkey or Mexico—in order to become part of a people who seem ambivalent about having you or your being “yourself”? In the abstract, the lack of social integration arguably represented by both multicultural policies, transnational and diasporic linkages, and low naturalization rates threatens the solidarity underlying the social wage, but such threats are often not visible in segmented labor markets, or are derided as racist or even xenophobic (Freeman 1986: 51).<sup>58</sup> But not integrating immigrants into a “closed shop” where labor costs can be removed from competition risks serious deterioration of the social wage that had been so central to equality within the welfare state (Ferrera 2005).

As an incipient form of social citizenship, the democratic welfare state enabled “justice and the rule of law, the democratic demand for voice and equal rights, and the communitarian concern for solidarity and collective identity” to come together (Cohen 1999: 252). Social policies in the welfare state operationalized citizenship and provided a domain where it was constituted—albeit not equally for everyone—through a class-based economy sanctioned and supported by law, especially in Europe. The Fordist world of industrial mass production featured a high-wage unionized core sector that was for years especially attractive to immigrants throughout the Global North.<sup>59</sup> Over the last generation, however, the social rights that were part of being a resident or becoming a citizen, of enjoying a citizenship that took class warfare off the agenda, have begun to vanish (Jessop 2016). The lifeboat of citizen security turns out to be chained to the ship of capitalist insecurity. The globalization of capital and the migration of people and money that it has wrought have generated much insecurity, and unleashed widespread and considerable populist backlash, almost worldwide, sometimes ugly and explicitly directed at migrants.

Indeed, in most of the prosperous counties of the world, we have seen populist movements fight globalization on the terrain of immigration in an effort to protect national sovereignty, and the welfare state. To the extent that migration, especially undocumented migration, represents the globalized, free-market future, it became unpopular nearly everywhere well before Brexit, Trump, Orban and Co. (Slobodian 2019). The ability of the state to get its hands around the market economy and force capitalism to show a more humane and redistributive face was the hallmark of post-WWII social democracy (Esping-Andersen 1988). The subsequent end of “closure” and the increased mobility of people and capital have contributed to a race to the bottom and a perceived decline in the security and standard of living of the working and middle classes of the rich countries. Free trade and greater mobility have shifted some wealth from the rich countries of the North to the BRIC countries and others (Lakner and Milanovic 2013: 31)—but arguably, with the exception of China, to their upper classes, not their masses, while it has been the working classes and not the elites of the North who have booked the losses (Harvey 2005a, 2005b; Bacon 2013; Streeck 2013). The resulting anxieties, well founded and hardly phantasmagoric, have mixed with existing and cultivated racism to create a large reservoir of exploitable anxiety and resentment in all migrant-receiving counties on every continent, while also generating tension within the political and scholarly left and often confounding its legal representatives (Abraham 2010, 2019).

Once the century-old dreams of communism, true social democracy, and the universal welfare state were abandoned, for many only the power of democratic citizenship remained as the tool, the lever, for combating the inequality generated by free markets. Politics, in the form of citizenship, was long juxtaposed to markets and viewed as providing a potential route to greater human equality. Politics and popular sovereignty could only exist within the nation-state which, perforce, needed to be bordered and set off from others in order to function. There is no chance for popular sovereignty outside the citizenship-based nation state

system because there is no world government, and oligarchy is the natural result of the market system that otherwise rules—particularly as the counterweights to oligarchy, such as the trade unions of industrial capitalism, have given way to financialization. “Equality” may be a borderless, universalist aspiration, but its realization can only be bounded.

At the same time that working-class, social democratic progressivism has been in decline, in its former strongholds and beyond, often taking labor market protectionism with it, social liberal progressivism, based especially in the educated middle classes rather than the historical working classes, has flourished. Often expressed in the language of “choice,” “human,” and “cultural” rights rather than “social” or “citizenship” rights, a distinct set of beliefs and practices has gained broad acceptance. These include, as noted earlier, feminism and gender equality, gay rights, concern for the indigenous, environmentalism, and an array of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration loosely described as “multiculturalist,” with significant emphasis on recognizing and welcoming the alien, honoring and protecting her or his identity, and generally empowering “the Other” (Honig 2001). Given their respective class bases, it is unsurprising that Green/Liberal parties in Europe and their analogues elsewhere have been more “progressive” on migration and integration matters than have social democratic parties (Fraser 2017; Streeck 2017). Some migration theorists and political proponents view these policies as a more effective route to integration and membership<sup>60</sup> while others advocate multicultural policies as an alternative to integration, which is itself considered coercive and suspect, preferring side-by-side (*nebeneinander*) coexistence, while still others acknowledge that the relationship is indeterminate. In the last camp, Keith Banting, though an advocate, sums up:

In the absence of appropriate nation-building policies, a particular MCP [multicultural policy] may reduce solidarity and trust, by focusing exclusively on the minority’s difference. But in the presence of such nation-building policies, the same MCP may in fact enhance solidarity and trust, by reassuring members of the minority group that the larger identity promoted by nation-building policies is an inclusive one that will fairly accommodate them.

(Banting and Kymlicka 2004: 251–252)

From the perspective of 2022, the great intellectual tumult over multiculturalism seems to have been unwarranted. In places like Germany, and most of the rest of Europe for that matter, the multiculturalist turn was simply a call for a more liberal, civic, pluralist immigration and integration law and policy, and a corresponding turn away from ethnic and exclusionary conceptions of “the nation” and “the people.” Rhetoric often outran reality among both proponents and adversaries,<sup>61</sup> and “multiculturalism” became a touchstone of immigration and integration debate within the ranks of legal scholars, social scientists of all sorts, and political theorists, as well as a lightning rod for popular anxieties. Its most recent and widely debated fate, particularly in relation to aggressive neoliberal policies, cannot be addressed here in further detail.<sup>62</sup> Suffice it to say that its core

advocates have downsized their definitions and moderated their tone while claiming successes of diverse sorts. The dramatic rise of anti-immigration sentiment in Europe, North America, and elsewhere might possibly have been lessened by stronger integration practices, but it would certainly be mistaken to blame multiculturalist impulses for generating that sentiment.

No name has been more closely associated with the multicultural agenda than Will Kymlicka's. In what might be understood as a winding down of the entire debate, Kymlicka has asserted that, as the "legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity," multiculturalism has helped in "replacing older forms of ethnic and racial hierarchy with new relations of democratic citizenship" (2012: 1). There is no suggestion any longer that multiculturalism might have implied group rights or privileges, reified and celebrated "authenticity" at the expense of adaptation, reinforced power relations within immigrant communities, or trivialized problematic practices. Instead, it is "human rights ideals" that animate multiculturalism rather than any "celebration of diversity" or lack of concern with "societal problems such as unemployment and social isolation."

Kymlicka now sees the conditions for successful multiculturalism more narrowly than before: borders must be secure; immigrants themselves must be diverse (rather than stemming from the same country or two); immigrants must be perceived as hard workers; and immigrants must share a commitment to human rights. This may well describe Canada, but not so much contemporary Europe: "Multiculturalism tends to lose support in ... situations where immigrants are seen as predominantly illegal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or movements, or as net burdens on the welfare state." On balance, however, multiculturalist policies have been a real "success story," "fully consistent with ... civic integration policies" (Kymlicka 2012: 2, 10, 21). Such success notwithstanding, Kymlicka is fair enough in suggesting why legal and political practice might now want to develop a post-multiculturalism approach, one that emphasizes:

Political participation and economic opportunities over the symbolic politics of cultural recognition, 2) human rights and individual freedom over respect for cultural traditions, 3) the building of inclusive national identities over the recognition of ancestral cultural identities, and 4) cultural change and cultural mixing over the reification of static cultural differences.

(Kymlicka 2012: 5)

If indeed "diversity" and "intersectionality" have become the watchwords of progressive policy in and beyond the immigration arena, then, seen in retrospect, "multiculturalism" may wind up with no more critical a bite than the now-tame "pluralism" before it.

Last among recent developments and in a related vein, some social liberalism has gone beyond equality and non-discrimination issues and even multiculturalism to question borders themselves. Some scholarship has embraced a cultural rights-infused immigration diversity in the strong sense, while, as noted

previously, decentering the nation state and its citizenship prerogatives. Beginning perhaps with a seminal 1987 article by the political philosopher Joseph Carens (1987, 1989), the previous liberal consensus, very widely held and effectively summarized by Michael Walzer and David Miller and their vision of progressive national communities (Walzer 1983; Miller 1989: 51–72), was challenged by a morally demanding appreciation of individualism and cosmopolitanism requiring “open borders,” particularly on the part of rich countries. John Rawls, whose work represented the *non plus ultra* of political liberal democratic theory, did not extend that to issues of migration and immigration. He, Walzer, and others accepted consequentialist as well as principled arguments that would allow for, but also limit, immigration in the name of internal equality, the prerogatives of historical communities and social solidarity (Rawls 1999: 39, 112).<sup>63</sup> The legal regime for immigration adopted in the US in 1965 in the context of the struggle for “color blind” civil rights largely mirrored that view, which has receded along with the latter.

The Walzerian position has eroded over the past 35 years. Few have gone as far as Carens in disavowing the privileges of birth by opening up the borders and letting nature (effectively, “the free market”) decide migration patterns. Nonetheless, the injustices of birthplace privilege have become more broadly thematized, culminating, for example, in calls to impose a levy on the undeserving but lucky people born in rich countries or inheriting a rich nationality (Bosniak 2006: 39–52; Shachar 2009: 70–108). Almost all of the provocation in this arena has come from political theorists uncomfortable with communitarian justification, not from legal scholars, let alone lawmakers, but many legal scholars were quick to take on board the language of post-nationalism, along with that of multiculturalism and global justice.<sup>64</sup> To be sure, institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and perhaps 30 others, mostly of recent vintage, along with aspirational documents like the Global Compact on Migration, noted here at the outset, testify to the increased interest in transnational and international adjudication drawing on more than national positive law. While questions of borders, refugees, ethnic cleansing, and the violation of basic rights appear on the dockets of these courts, there is little reason to believe either that they will take up any immigration issues or allow individual litigants to bypass their own national courts.

Today’s migrant and today’s immigrant surely experience a legal regime and corresponding political milieu vastly different from those of a century ago. Yet, in most countries, the differences are less fundamental, in both substance and procedure, than they would be in practically any other area of public law. Principles of sovereignty and nationhood were not easily or quickly established, and—though later supplemented by principles of due process and some equal protection—they will not be displaced or overcome anytime soon. Quite the contrary: current political contestation over migration on every continent suggests a sovereigntist backlash that will be with us for some time to come.



## Discussion Questions

1. What are the best arguments for a state's minimizing immigration flows and retaining state sovereign control over borders? What are the best arguments against such unilateral and strict control?
2. Should our conceptions of "justice" and "obligation" be defined nationally or globally?
3. In the US and most other countries, "constitutional protections" apply only inside the country. This often makes immigration law seem arbitrary and inhumane. What, if anything, should be done about this?
4. Are the inherited distinctions among asylees/refugees/migrants still viable? Why, and if not, what should be put in their place?
5. Have multicultural immigrant-integration policies been successful? What would you consider to be evidence of success or failure?

## Notes

- 1 Thus, many countries have adopted into their domestic legal regimes the UN Refugee Convention of 1951's Article 1 definition. The US version refers to "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" (INA §101(a)(42)).
- 2 In the big picture, the orderly immigration of about a million people per year to the US as permanent immigrants and several million more in various temporary capacities (such as education or business exchange) is normative but exceptional. Likewise, organized guestworker programs, like that for which Germany was the prototype and in which the US also indulges, especially in agriculture, are exceptional: long-term, international/intercontinental, unidirectional migration remains preponderant even if "circular" migration, legal and illegal, is also part of the contemporary mix, both in the historical settler societies and elsewhere.
- 3 See Kleven (2002) and Huemer (2010). The most incisive analysis of the relationship between sovereign, subject/citizen, and movement is John Torpey (2000); on the problematic nature of the right to emigrate, see Green and Weil (2007).
- 4 For example, Bloemraad (2012). No doubt, prosperous, educated, skilled immigrants have an easier time integrating.
- 5 See Joppke (2005: 157–218). Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and others have all preferred the descendants of former emigrants while the former British colonies were long infamous for their white, northern, western, and Protestant preferences, a story oft-told by historians; see, for example, Gerstle (2005).
- 6 It is true that some of the authors of the leading US immigration law textbooks have served in government, but they are amongst the most cautious of immigration law scholars. One could scour the North American (and, I suspect, the Australasian) scholarly law journals for days without finding any "pro-restrictionist" work. In Germany, scholars are routinely called upon by various commissions and councils for their expertise, in this area as in others, and the current generation of scholars is also largely "progressive." In France, Patrick Weil, for one, has been an active participant in government commissions on migration and on citizenship, even those called by conservative governments. The American listserv IMMPROF, in principle home

- to immigration law scholars, is indistinguishable from a pro-immigration lobbying forum.
- 7 See Papastavidis (2010); Mungianu (2013).
  - 8 See Neuman, (1996: 157–159). Only in the middle of WWII, with China as an ally in the war with Japan, were Chinese made eligible for citizenship by naturalization. Only with the Hart-Celler reforms—undertaken amidst the civil rights struggles of the 1960s—did race and ethnicity cease to be an explicit category of immigrant admission and exclusion.
  - 9 Germany famously settled on its first national, *jus sanguinis*-based citizenship and immigration law in 1913, at the conclusion of its imperial nation state construction and directly prior to the war that ended that empire. In turn, its first serious counter-ethnic reforms did not take place until the end of the 1990s, a delayed extension of its own post-1968 civil rights reforms.
  - 10 US Chief Justice Warren used this phrase in arguing against expatriations, which he asserted “disgraced and degraded” individuals, leaving them with “no lawful claim to protection,” only the “sufferance” of their host countries, *Perez v. Brownell*, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). Some European legal systems, the German especially, have found a “right to have rights” in the concept of “human dignity,” a post-war construct intended to push back against socialism; a balanced view in Enders (2010).
  - 11 The post-World War Refugee and Asylum treaties remain the benchmark for this humanitarianism, but it would be a grave error to assume that any significant portion of migrants are assimilated into these small, privileged, and very political categories. The 2018 UN “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration” (UN Doc A/Res/73/195 [Dec. 19, 2018]) remains hortatory and aspirational.
  - 12 *Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.*, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
  - 13 “Every sovereign nation has the power as inherent in sovereignty and essential to preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe” (*Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S.*, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)), and “[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend on the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and is therefore not constrained by it (*U.S. v. Curtiss Wright Export Company*, 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). Practically speaking, an alien denied admission into the US has no appeal rights; all he can do is apply over again for permission. President Trump’s “Muslim Ban” was thus “rightly” found not to be precluded on the constitutional grounds of equal protection, race discrimination, or religious liberty.
  - 14 The lead US case remains *U.S. ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The doctrine was extended to cover re-entering or returning non-citizens, even one who had lived in the country for 25 years, albeit without naturalizing, a fact that was held against him; *Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
  - 15 *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
  - 16 *Wong Wing v. U.S.*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
  - 17 In a case that was extremely close and contentious at the time but which has unambiguously remained the law and without which the entire system would collapse under its own weight, the Supreme Court held that states had an absolute power to expel foreigners, that expulsion (deportation) was not so different from exclusion and was not a criminal punishment, that *ex post facto* and retroactivity issues were consequently not pertinent, and that a foreigner’s presence was by “pure permission and tolerance,” with no implied “obligation,” a “political question” not for the courts to interfere in. Although a resident alien might claim some procedural rights unavailable to those standing outside or at the border, substantively he may be deported (and detained along the way) for whatever reasons the political branches deem appropriate (*Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.*, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). The list of deportation grounds appears in §237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
  - 18 *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

- 19 *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 585 (1952).
- 20 *Bridges v. Wixson*, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945). Obviously, seven years later, as the Cold War worsened, Harisiades' free speech rights were treated as less than those of citizens, though they ought not to have been. That situation may be better today: see the ambiguous *American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).
- 21 §§240, 240A, 240B.
- 22 The US currently deports about 350,000 aliens annually, roughly half after criminal convictions, mostly to the impoverished counties whence they came. For some transnational and international comparisons on these and other matters, see Aldana et al. (2013). Ironically, US deportation numbers reached their maximum under President Obama and declined under President Trump, who focused on initial exclusion.
- 23 For its advocates, multiculturalist politics of various sorts were the natural and rightful continuation of civil rights and citizenship struggles; see Kymlicka (1995) and the tradition it has generated. A focus on gender and sexuality complicated the picture further (Yuval-Davis 2007: 561–574).
- 24 See, for example, King (2010; 2011: 134–153). Much data is compiled in Castles et al. (2014); for Europe, see Bade et al. (2010).
- 25 Insightful histories of German citizenship law are to be found in Nathans (2004) and Gosewinkel (2001).
- 26 At the same time that this was the first German immigration law seeking to encourage selective in-migration of both temporary and permanent high human-capital workers, the law also introduced new and stiffened penalties for undocumented migration. Its very title, “The Law on the Regulation and Limitation of Immigration,” speaks clearly.
- 27 Importantly, this entitlement is a matter of right and not subject to the capricious discretion common under earlier law. Spouses and children may be naturalized with the main applicant, even if they do not themselves meet the eight-year requirement. Foreign spouses of German citizens must be married for two years and have lived in Germany for three years prior to naturalizing. To the disappointment of many, liberalization did not lead to a consistent rise in naturalization numbers (Pape 2013: 4).
- 28 Even as conditions for immigrants and resident aliens largely improved, in the US, at least, immigration laws themselves were made more stringent in 1986 and again in 1998.
- 29 Sara Goodman and Marc Howard see “a combination of both liberalizing and restrictive measures that provide a more variegated picture than either a ‘liberalizing convergence’ or a ‘restrictive backlash’ perspective could offer” (2013: 18). See also Howard (2009).
- 30 See Abraham (2011), an appreciative critical review of Bosniak (2006) and of Shachar (2009).
- 31 *Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) and *Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board*, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), respectively.
- 32 US Const. amend. XIV.
- 33 Bosniak (2006: 37–76) offers an extended discussion of alienage discrimination; see also, Joppke (2002, 2007) and Abraham (2000).
- 34 Alex Aleinikoff (1995) postulated a deteriorating situation as one moved outward from the center. This assessment may have been too dire. See also Motomura (2008), calling for an expansive, functional conception of membership “affiliation”—in which even many of those illegally present are very centrally members of the nation, cities, and communities in which they reside, work, have children in school, etc.; and Song (2014).
- 35 Nielsen (2013); Castle (2014: A6).
- 36 For the former, see Schuck (1989); for the latter, Spiro (2007, 2013).
- 37 See Donner (1994: 201–214); Martin (1999); Hansen and Weil (2002).

- 38 World Bank, Migration and Development Brief #21 (2013: 1). India leads with US\$ 71 billion—much of it from the Middle East and not discussed here—Mexico reports US\$ 25 billion or US\$ 2,300 per migrant annually, making remittances Mexico’s number two source of income, behind oil and ahead of tourism.
- 39 For example, Adams, Jr. and Page (2005); Acosta et al. (2008); Gupta and Pattillo (2009).
- 40 De Haas and Vezzoli (2010: 6, 9): “Philanthropic projects do not appear to trigger development,” “migrants are not willing or able to become entrepreneurs or ‘development workers,’” “migrant projects do not necessarily support initiatives that would help most local communities.” Often, in fact, they lead to greater inequality in housing and consumer goods, especially.
- 41 See Green and Weil (2007: 195–304). On how migration generally hurts the homeland and prior immigrants, see Collier (2013).
- 42 Examples of this *Zeitgeist* or flattening of analysis and debate across the disciplines abound and merit a full analysis of their own. In recent American immigration histories, there is no conflict, no disagreement, no support for open immigration policies, and no explanation for them. Certainly, there is no reason any decent person would endorse restrictions (Lee 2019). Cutting-edge legal scholarship is concerned with settler colonialism and its reverberation or emanation through sovereignty claims, plenary power, and the like (Rosenbaum 2020). Sometimes, the work is serious (Chacón 2018); sometimes what is dubbed “theory” generates self-satire, as in “an impassioned plea for a queer, decolonial, anti-racist coalitional stance against the systematized devaluing and anti-intersectionalities of citizenship” (Brandzel 2016).
- 43 On the decline in the use of “illegal” in discussing immigrant status, see for example the evolution of *New York Times* policy from 2013 to 2020: <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/business/media/the-times-shifts-on-illegal-immigrant-but-doesnt-ban-the-use.html>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/us/another-word-for-illegal-alien-at-the-library-of-congress-contentious.html?smid=em-share>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/insider/illegal-undocumented-unauthorized-the-terms-of-immigration-reporting.html?smid=em-share>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/colorado-illegal-immigrants.html?smid=em-share>
- 44 Certainly Trumpism, Brexit, and populism generally are incomprehensible without appreciating the immigration anxieties of the natives. See, for example, “World Grows Less Accepting of Migration,” Gallup Poll, September 23, 2020. Interestingly, the greatest decline in the “migrant acceptance index” took place in Latin America and Middle East, where migrant flows have grown. For details and a thorough bibliography, see Dempster et al. (2020).
- 45 When Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith some 35 years ago very tentatively proposed the possibility that birthright *jus soli* citizenship might be withheld from the children of those illegally present in the US, they were criticized harshly (1985: 116–118). Yet, almost overnight in the summer of 2010, the issue of birthright citizenship exploded onto the US scene, a key theme in right-wing populist discourse ever since. Aggravating matters is the fact that the 3.8 percent of the population that is in the US illegally has seven percent of the nation’s children, 79 percent of them birthright citizens (Pew Hispanic Center 2010). This greatly expands the “mixed family” category, in which some families’ members are deportable while others are fully-fledged natives.
- 46 For an explanation of the various European *jus soli/jus sanguinis* rules, see Bauböck et al. (2013). The UK in 1983 was the first to end absolute birthright citizenship, and the trend has spread to many immigrant societies: Australia in 1986, India in 1987, New Zealand in 2006, and even the Dominican Republic (explicitly at the expense of its Haitian neighbors) in 2010.
- 47 Some of the more extreme measures include having to study and learn Dutch overseas at one’s own expense prior to receiving permission to join a spouse already in Holland. Even famously liberal multiculturalist Canada has introduced more rigorous

- language capacity requirements, at least for unskilled immigrants. Since July 2012 applicants in the Provincial Nominee Programs have had to pass English or French tests before immigrating (*Migration und Bevölkerung* 2012: 8), and in the name of “openness and social cohesion” covered faces are now prohibited at naturalization ceremonies.
- 48 The hubris of illiberal liberalism is developed by John Gray (2000). Patrick Weil (2009) has written of “lifting the veil of ignorance.” For a sampling of the recent debates on the new wave of citizenship tests in Europe, see “How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?” (EUDO Observatory on Citizenship 2013) sponsored by the European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre.
  - 49 Yurdakul and Kortweg (2013: 204–213). The *reductio ad absurdum* of this tendency appeared when the government of Baden Württemberg proposed to ask Muslims at their naturalization interviews how they would feel if a son returned home and announced that he was gay and in a relationship. That question, though not all like it, disappeared after being widely criticized.
  - 50 Similar conclusions have been reached by Joppke, who earlier (2010: 123–142) had displayed greater concern and by Michalowski (2011).
  - 51 In the US, this trend was accelerated by state government complaints that the federal government was devoting inadequate resources to policing and enforcement, thereby off-loading costs onto border states and those with large immigrant populations. Congress responded by quintupling the size of the federal border patrol and by passing §287(g), which mandates the training and deputization of local law enforcement officials to do law enforcement and apprehension (Chin 2011; Pauw 2000; Elias 2008).
  - 52 Ironically, the Obama administration’s decision to focus deportation on criminal aliens, though intended to display mercy toward ordinary folks, enlarged the place of criminal law in the system (Chacon 2009), something on which the Trump administration later built; for Europe, see Spijkerboer (2007).
  - 53 See Menjvar and Kanstroom (2013); Moran (2011); Aliverti (2012).
  - 54 Bridget Anderson (2013) claims that in the UK criminal law has glued together an otherwise incoherent system. October 2012 witnessed the first international Crimmigration Control Conference at the Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; see João Guia and van der Woude (2013). Legomsky explains it similarly, “[I]mmigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime” (2007).
  - 55 Thus, the state of Arizona and various townships in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere have attempted, with limited success, to criminalize and use local police to arrest those without documents or attempting apartment rental, commercial space leasing, “harboring,” offering or accepting unauthorized employment, banking, auto rental, and a range of other life activities (Olivas 2007; Provine 2013: 115–26). The number of apprehended illegal entrants peaked at 1.8 million in 2000 and fell to 420,000 by 2013. A full third of the total were apprehended south of Tucson, Arizona. The Trump Wall and associated brutalities lowered the need for interior apprehensions.
  - 56 The last pre-DACA count showed there were twenty such states, double the number of 2009 (Olivas 2009, 2012). DACA, of course, greatly expanded the number of beneficiaries. On “sanctuary cities,” and “local citizenship,” Villazor (2009); Blank (2007).
  - 57 For current measures or indexes of “integration” for a range of counties, see Migration Policy Group (2014) at <http://mipex.eu>. Identifying and scoring specific “multicultural policies” is not simple, but two substantial efforts, using a large number of indicators, have been undertaken, one by proponents at Queens University (n.d.) in Canada, <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp> and one by skeptics at the Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin, <http://www.wzb.eu/en/persons/ruud-koopmans?s=12394>.
  - 58 What was true 35 years ago is even truer today: migration has undoubtedly “helped shift the ideological center of European politics to the right” (Freeman 1986: 62).

- 59 On the dynamics of the high-tide welfare state, see Offe (1984) and Esping-Andersen (1999).
- 60 Although limited to the foreign-born themselves and not considering their children, a strong defense of the multiculturalist view of integration from the perspective of the new immigrants is offered by Wright and Bloemraad (2012: 77, 89). Multiculturalism as a specific *nebeneinander* alternative to integration is less popular now than it once was; see Von Dirke (1994: 513, 528), Cohn-Bendit and Schmid (1993); Cohn-Bendit went on to become Frankfurt's "Senator for Multiculturalism"; Leggewie (1993).
- 61 See, for example, Ohliger et al. (2003); Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010).
- 62 For an extended discussion of this problematic, see Abraham (2014). As Bryan Turner puts it, market liberalism and cultural diversity both undermine solidarity and "[t]he tension between the universalistic principles of secular solidarity associated with national citizenship and the cultural diversity that flows from contemporary patterns of globalization" is a dangerous one that only citizenship equality can mitigate (2012: 1059, 1061). See also Koopmans (2010: 1–26).
- 63 Rawls's work with its anti-cosmopolitanism and defense of "peoples" had little to offer immigrant advocates, a point recognized by his own disappointed students and followers. Beitz (2000: 669–696) was one of the younger Rawlsians who parted company with Rawls over this; even more so Benhabib (2004), who accused Rawls of the sin of "liberal nationalism" and worse; not so, Macedo (2004), who offered a staunch and persuasive defense. Through her discussion of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe, Somers (2008: 66–68, 102–110), makes clear that even the most powerless of citizens would not let themselves be treated as "refugees" or migrants, let alone as just human persons.
- 64 Yasemin Soysal's *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe* (1994) became the first "must-read" among transnationalist immigration law scholars very soon after its appearance. It now appears tame.

## References

- 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality, 634 U.N.T.S. 221 (1963), 8 U.S.C.A. §§101(a)(42), 1227, 1229 (a), (b), (c) (2013).
- Abraham, David. 2000. "The Good of Banality? The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Proportionality in the Treatment of Aliens in the U.S. and Germany," *Citizenship Studies* 5: 237–53.
- . 2006. "After Ethnicity and 'Constitutional Patriotism': Searching for a Capacious German Membership." In *Towards the Completion of Europe: Analysis and Perspectives of the New European Union Enlargement*, edited by Joaquin Roy and Roberto Dominguez, 88–100. Miami: Miami-Florida European Union Center.
- . 2010. "Doing Justice on Two Fronts: The Liberal Dilemma in Immigration," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33: 968–85.
- . 2011. "The Geometry of Inside and Outside," *Issues in Legal Scholarship* 9(1): Article 10.
- . 2014. "Immigrant Integration and Social Solidarity in a Time of Crisis: Europe and the U.S. in a Post-Welfare State," *Critical Historical Studies* 1: 215–53.
- . 2019. *Wer gehört zu uns? Who Belongs to Us?* Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
- Achiume, E. Tendayi. 2019. "Migration as Decolonization," *Stanford Law Review* 71: 1509–74.
- Acosta, Pablo, Cesar Calderon, Pablo Fajnzylber, and J. Humberto Lopez. 2008. "What Is the Impact of International Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Latin America?" *World Development* 36: 89–114.



- Adams, J. Richard and John Page. 2005. "Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?" *World Development* 33: 1645–69.
- Aldana, Raquel, Won Kidane, and Beth Lyon. 2013. *Global Issues in Immigration Law*. St. Paul: West Publishers.
- Aleinikoff, Alex. 1995. "The Tightening Circle of Membership," *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly* 22(4): 915–24.
- Aliverti, Ana. 2012. "Making People Criminal: The Role of Criminal Law in Immigration Enforcement," *Theoretical Criminology* 16: 417–34.
- American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).
- Anderson, Bridget. 2013. *Us & Them: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1968 [1951]. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harvest Books.
- Atlantic Monthly. 1996. "The Price of Immigration," November 1996, 51–80.
- Baade, Klaus, Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer. 2010. *Enzyklopädie: Migration in Europa vom 17 Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Bacon, David. 2013. *The Right to Stay Home: How U.S. Policy Drives Mexican Migration*. New York: Beacon Press.
- Banting, Keith and Will Kymlicka. 2004. "Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?" In *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*, edited by Phillipe van Parijs, 227–84. Brussels: Deboeck.
- Bauböck, Rainer. 1995. *Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration*. London: Edward Elgar.
- Bauböck, Rainer, Iseult Honohan, Thomas Huddleston, Derek Hutcheson, Jo Shaw, and Maarten Peter Vink. 2013. *Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration: European Summary and Standards*. European University Institute. [http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit\\_report\\_eu%20level%20summary.pdf](http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit_report_eu%20level%20summary.pdf)
- Beitz, Charles. 2000. "Rawls's Law of Peoples," *Ethics* 110(4): 669–96.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. "The Law of Peoples: Distributive Justice and Migration," *Fordham Law Review* 72(5): 1761–87.
- Blank, Yishai. 2007. "Spheres of Citizenship," *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 8(2): 411–52.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2012. *Understanding Canadian Exceptionalism in Immigration and Pluralism Policy*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Bosniak, Linda. 2006. *The Citizen and the Alien*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2012. "Arguing for Amnesty," *Law, Culture, and the Humanities*. DOI: 10.1177/1743872111423181
- Brandzel, Amy. 2016. *Against Citizenship: The Violence of the Normative*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Bridges v. Wixson*, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
- Carens, Joseph. 1987. "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," *Review of Politics* 49: 251–73.
- . 1989. "Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States." In *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, edited by W.R. Brubaker, 31–49. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Castles, Stephen. 2014. "Volatile European Mix: Welfare and Migration," *New York Times*, January 19, A6.
- Castles, Stephen and Alastair Davidson. 2000. *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. New York: Routledge.



- Chacon, Jennifer. 2009. "Managing Migration through Crime," *Columbia Law Review Sidebar* 109: 135–45.
- . 2018. "Citizenship Matters: Conceptualizing Belonging in an Era of Fragile Inclusions," *UC Davis Law Review* 52: 1–80.
- Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.*, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
- Chin, Ryan. 2011. "Moving toward Subfederal Involvement in Immigration Law," *UCLA Law Review* 58: 1859–912.
- Cohen, Jean. 1999. "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos," *International Sociology* 14(3): 245–68.
- Cohn-Bendit, Daniel and Thomas Schmid. 1993. *Heimat Babylon: Das Wagnis der Multikulturellen Gesellschaft*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.
- Collier, Paul. 2013. *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century*. London: Penguin.
- De Haas, Hein and Simona Vezzoli. 2010. *Time to Temper the Faith: Comparing the Migration and Development Experiences of Mexico and Morocco*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Dempster, Helen et al. 2020. *Public Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants*. London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 588.
- Donner, Ruth. 1994. *The Regulation of Nationality in International Law*, 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Elias, Stella B. 2008. "'Good Reason to Believe' Widespread Constitutional Violations," *Wisconsin Law Review* 1109: 1140–54.
- Enders, Christoph. 2010. "A Right to Have Rights: The German Constitutional Concept of Human Dignity," *National University of Juridical Sciences Law Review* 3: 253–64.
- Esping-Andersen, Gösta. 1988. *Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1999. *The Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- EUDO Observatory on Citizenship. 2013. "How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?" EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. <https://globalcit.eu/how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests/>
- Ferrera, Maurizio. 2005. *The Boundaries of Welfare*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.*, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
- Fraser, Nancy. 2017. "Progressive Neoliberalism versus Reactionary Populism." In *The Great Regression*, edited by Heinrich Geiselberger, 40–49. Malden: Polity Press.
- Freeman, Gary. 1986. "Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 485: 51–63.
- Gallup 2020. "World Grows Less Accepting of Migrants," <https://news.gallup.com/poll/320678> (accessed September 23, 2020).
- Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
- Gerstle, Gary. 2005. *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the 20th Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Global Compact for Refugees, UN DocA 73/12 (July 30, 2018)
- Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, UN DocA/Res/71/280 and 72/244, A/Conf231/3 (July 18, 2018).
- Goodman, Sara and Marc Morjé Howard. 2013. "Evaluating and Explaining the Restrictive Backlash in Citizenship Policy in Europe," *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society*, 60: 111–39.

- Goodman, Sara and Thomas Pepinsky. 2021. "The Exclusionary Foundations of Embedded Liberalism," *International Organisation*, 75 Special Issue 2: 411–439 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000478>
- Gosewinkel, Dieter. 2001. *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
- Gray, John. 2000. *The Two Faces of Liberalism*. New York: New Press.
- Green, Nancy and François Weil, eds. 2007. *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Gupta, Sanjeev and Catherine Pattillo. 2009. "Effect of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa," *World Development* 37: 104–15.
- Hammond, Andrew. 2018. "The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era," *Lewis & Clark Law Review* 22: 501–39.
- Hansen, Randall. 2009. "The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration, and the New Europe," *Theory and Society* 38: 1–24.
- Hansen, Randall and Patrick Weil. 2002. "Introduction: Dual Citizenship in a Changed World." In *Dual Nationality, Social Rights, and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe*, edited by Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil, 3–23. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
- Harpaz, Yossi. 2019. *Citizenship 2.0 Dual Nationality as a Global Asset*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2005a. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2005b. *Spaces of Global Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Hoffman, Holger. 2004. "The Reform of the Law on Citizenship in Germany," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 6(3): 195–203.
- Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board*, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
- Honig, Bonnie. 2001. *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Howard, Marc. 2009. *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huemer, Michael. 2010. "Is There a Right to Immigrate?" *Social Theory and Practice* 36: 429–61.
- Huq, Aziz. 2020. "Democracy as Failure." In *Democratic Failure*, edited by Melissa Schwartzberg and Daniel Viehhoff, 11–49. New York: New York University Press.
- INA §§ 237, 240, 240A, 240B, 287(g) (2013).
- Jacobson, David. 1997. *Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jessop, Bob. 2016. "Toward a Schumpeterian Workfare State?" *Studies in Political Economy* 40: 7–39.
- João Guia, Maria and Maartje van der Woude, eds. 2013. *Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear*. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.
- Joppke, Christian. 2002. "The Rights of Aliens in Germany and the United States." In *Two Cultures of Rights: The Quest for Inclusion and Participation*, edited by Manfred Berg and Martin Geyer, 95–120. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2005. *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2007. "The Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity," *Citizenship Studies* 11: 37–48.

- . 2008. "Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn?" *Law & Ethics of Human Rights* 2: 1–41.
- . 2010. *Citizenship and Immigration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kainz, Lena, Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, and Kathleen Newland. 2020. *The Divergent Trajectories of the Global Migration and Refugee Compacts*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Kanström, Daniel. 2007. *Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2012. *Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- King, Russell. 2010. *People on the Move: An Atlas of Migration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2011. "Geography and Migration Studies: Retrospect and Prospect," *Population, Space and Place* 18(2): 134–53.
- Kleven, Thomas. 2002. "Why International Law Favors Emigration over Immigration," *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 33: 69–100.
- Kochenov, Dimitry. 2019. *Citizenship*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2010. "Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36: 1–26.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2012. *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*. Washington, DC: MPI Europe.
- Lakner, Christoph and Bruno Milanovic. 2013. "Global Income Distribution from the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6719.
- Lee, Erika. 2019. *America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in the U.S.* New York: Basic Books.
- Leggewie, Claus. 1993. *Multi Kulti. Spielregeln für die Vielvölkerrepublik*. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag.
- Legomsky, Stephen H. 2007. "The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Norms," *Washington & Lee Law Review* 64: 469–528.
- Macedo, Stephen. 2004. "What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another," *Fordham Law Review* 72: 1721–38.
- Martin, David. 1999. "New Rules on Dual Citizenship for a Democratizing Globe," *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 14: 1–34.
- . 2020. "Taming Immigration," *Georgia State University Law Review* 36(3): 1–33.
- Menjvar, Cecelia and Daniel Kanström, eds. 2013. *Constructing Immigrant Illegality*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Michalowski, Ines. 2011. "Required to Assimilate? The Content of Citizenship Tests in Five Countries," *Citizenship Studies* 15: 749–68.
- Migration Policy Group. 2014. *Migrant Integration Policy Index*. London: Migration Policy Group. <http://mipex.eu>
- Miller, David. 1989. "In What Sense Must Socialism be Communitarian?" *Social Philosophy & Policy* 6: 51–72.
- Moran, Rachel F., ed. 2011. "Symposium: Criminal Law and Immigration Law, Defining the Outsider," *UCLA Law Review* 58: 1389–912.

- Motomura, Hiroshi. 2008. "Immigration Outside the Law," *Columbia Law Review* 108: 2037–97.
- . 2020. "The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and Citizens in an Anxious Age," *Cornell Law Review* 105: 457–547.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2007. *Constitutional Patriotism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mungianu, Roberta. 2013. "Frontex: Toward a Common Policy on External Border Control," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 15: 359–85.
- Nathans, Eli. 2004. *The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and Nationalism*. New York: Berg.
- Neuman, Gerald. 1996. *Strangers to the Constitution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nielsen, Nikolaj. 2013. "UK and Germany Dislike EU 'Welfare Tourism' Plan," *EU Observer*, December 6, 2013. <http://euobserver.com/justice/122370>
- Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S.*, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
- Offe, Claus. 1984. *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ohliger, Rainer, Karen Schönwälder, and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, eds. 2003. *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Olivas, Michael. 2007. "Immigration Related State and Local Ordinances," *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 17: 27–55.
- . 2009. "Undocumented College Students, Taxation, and Financial Aid," *Review of Higher Education* 32: 407–16.
- . 2012. "Dreams, Deferred: Deferred Action and Prosecutorial Discretion," *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 21: 463–547.
- Orgad, Liav. 2010. "Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 58: 52–105.
- . 2011. "Creating New Americans: The Essence of Americanism under the Citizenship Test," *Houston Law Review* 47: 1227–97.
- Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
- Papastavridis, Estavos. 2010. "Fortress Europe and Frontex: Within or Without International Law?" *Nordic Journal of International Law* 79: 75–111.
- Pape, Ulrike. 2013. "Zahl der Einbürgerungen gestiegen," *Migration und Bevölkerung* 7(13). <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/newsletter/169171/mehr-einbuengerungen>
- Parkin, Joanna. 2013. "The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe." Centre for European Policy Studies Paper in Liberty and Security #61. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Passel, Jeffrey S., D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013. "Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed," Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed>
- Pauw, Robert, 2000. "A New Look at Deportation as Punishment," *Administrative Law Review* 52: 305–45.
- Perez v. Brownell*, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
- Pew Hispanic Center. 2010. "Unauthorized Immigrants and their US Born Children." Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/08/11/unauthorized-immigrants-and-their-us-born-children>
- Provine, Doris. 2013. "Disappearing Rights: How States Are Eroding Membership in American Society." In *Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear*,

- edited by Maria João Guia and Maartje van der Woude, 115–26. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.
- Queens University. n.d. Multiculturalism Policy Index. <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp>
- Rawls, John. 1999. *The Law of Peoples*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rosenbaum, Carrie. 2020. “Anti-Democratic Immigration Law,” *Denver Law Review* 97: 797–850.
- Sanders, Bernie. 2015. “Open Borders? That’s a Koch Brothers Proposal,” *Vox News Interview*. Available at <http://youtube.com/watch?v=rf=k68Ofxz0>
- Sassen, Saskia. 2007. *Territory, Authority, Rights*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schuck, Peter. 1989. “Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship,” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 3: 1–18.
- Schuck, Peter and Rogers Smith. 1985. *Citizenship without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*. New York: Harper Bros.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2009. *The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
- Simon, Jonathan. 2007. *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Slobodian, Quinn. 2019. “Perfect Capitalism, Imperfect Humans: Race, Migration and the Limits of Ludwig von Mises’s Globalism,” *Contemporary European History* 28: 143–55.
- Somers, Margaret. 2008. *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Song, Sarah. 2014. “The Significance of Territorial Presence and the Rights of Immigrants.” In *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*, edited by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, 225–248. New York: Oxford University Press. Doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0011
- . 2019. *Immigration and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spijkerboer, Thomas. 2007. “The Human Costs of Border Control,” *European Journal of Migration and Law* 9: 127–39.
- Spiro, Peter. 2007. *Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2011. “A New International Law of Citizenship,” *American Journal of International Law* 105: 693–747.
- . 2013. “The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship,” *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 21: 899–923.
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 2013. *Gekaufte Zeit: Die Vertagte Krise des Demokratischen Kapitalismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- . 2017. “Between Charity and Justice: Remarks on the Social Construction of Immigration Policy in Rich Democracies,” Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, Working Paper 2017-5.
- Tilly, Charles. 1994. “Citizenship, Identity, and Social History,” Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper #205. New York: Center for Studies of Social Change.
- Torpey, John. 2000. *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Turner, Bryan. 2012. "Managing Religion, Citizenship, and the Liberal Paradox," *Citizenship Studies* 16: 1059–72.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217 U) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(U (Dec. 10, 1948).
- U.S. Const. Amend XIV.
- U.S. ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
- U.S. v Curtiss Wright Export Company*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
- Vertovec, Steven and Susanne Wessendorf, eds. 2010. *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Villazor, Rose. 2009. "Sanctuary Cities and Local Citizenship," *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 37: 574–97.
- Von Dirke, Sabine. 1994. "Multikulti: The German Debate on Multiculturalism," *German Studies Review* 17(3): 513–36.
- Waldinger, Roger. 2018. "Immigration and the Election of Donald Trump," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41: 1411–26.
- Walzer, Michael. 1983. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Weil, Patrick. 2009. "Why the French *laïcité* Is Liberal," *Cardozo Law Review*, 30: 2699–714.
- Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin. Data Hub. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum zu Berlin. <http://www.wzb.eu/en/persons/ruudkoopmans?s=12394>
- Wong Wing v. U.S.*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
- World Bank. 2013. *Migration and Development Brief #21*. Geneva: World Bank.
- Wright, Matthew and Irene Bloemraad. 2012. "Is There a Trade-Off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration?" *Perspectives on Politics* 10: 77–95.
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
- Yin, Tung and David Abraham. 2011. "The Alien-Citizen Distinction and the Global War on Terrorism." In *Democratic Citizenship and War*, edited by Yoav Peled and Noah Lewin-Epstein, 77–99. London: Routledge.
- Yurdakul, Gökçe and Anna Kortweg. 2013. "Gender Equality and Immigrant Integration: Honor Killing and Forced Marriage Debates in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain," *Women's Studies International Forum* 41: 204–14.
- . 2014. *The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 2007. "Intersectionality, Citizenship, and Contemporary Politics of Belonging," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 10: 561–74.

# 9 The State of Migration Theory

## Challenges, Interdisciplinarity, and Critique

*Adrian Favell*

As a handbook, *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines* has had the difficult task of moving with the times. The first edition (2000)—which was notably criticized by geographer Russell King as being too US-centric and not interdisciplinary enough—nevertheless reflected the heady free-flowing globalization of the 1990s. A second edition (2007), adjusted to take in more critical human geography and a better sense of thinking outside North America, sat within a decade of booming economies but growing political anxiety after 9/11. By the third edition (2014), migration scholars were coming to terms with an ongoing global economic crisis, the fracturing of neoliberalism, and a collapse of confidence in development models. We now hold a fourth edition (2022), which arrives after more than five years of unremitting crisis on all scales: from refugee disasters and populist wall building to environmental apocalypse and the global lockdown of Covid-19.

The emergent scholars and scholarship of the present day could not be more different from the boom years of the transatlantic field of migration studies, that took off and thrived from the late 1980s through the 1990s and early 2000s, out of which this handbook initially emerged. There was a wave of interest in migration and mobilities that carried many of its most cited names to international prominence, in the establishment of the field of interdisciplinary work covered by this volume. It was, on the whole, an age of constructive thinking about progress in immigration politics, of growing diversity, and a certain confidence in the institutions of liberal democracy in dealing with these challenges, even if there was always a “liberal paradox” about their ultimate ability to resolve the conflicts of rights and sovereignty at its heart (Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1998). How times have changed. New generations of academic work on international migration now reflect the desperate global context of the past few years, as well as the political anger of movements against borders, environmental extinction, racial violence, and the ongoing colonial privileges of the Western world. It also reflects a much tougher professional environment, with precarious work conditions the norm long after the PhD. In the meantime, migration studies has gone from the periphery (“Why are you studying that?—it won’t get you a job”), to center stage across many disciplines (“You won’t get a job—there are too many people studying migration already”).



In this closing chapter, after briefly taking stock of how the established mainstream of migration studies looks today, I move to introduce the new critical migration studies, that reflects these changing conditions and sensibilities. Much of critical migration studies focuses on the way that familiar liberal institutions, legal mechanisms, and political terms in fact reproduce and reinforce exclusionary and exploitative bordering and categorization of migration and mobilities, the sovereign power of states, and the dominance of the capitalist West (or Global North). Established migration studies also faces the charge of “denying race” and being too “white,” as well as being insufficiently “decolonized.” Critical world systems thinking has seen a comeback, amidst the more pronounced (post-)Marxist, feminist, and anti-racist frustration with the normative core of progressive liberal democratic and internationalist thinking that has informed much of the mainstream. More broadly, there is still clearly a problem with the Euro-American-centered nature of the field, that has faced substantial challenge in integrating views from the Global South, and particularly the emergence of a vast range of studies centered on the Global East, i.e., Asia. Provincializing and decolonizing migration studies—as the slogans go—need to take on board these critiques, but, as I argue, may also re-connect with the editors’ vision of a unified field and the emergence of a “migration state” taming transnationalism. Migration and mobilities studies, I will argue, can be reconceived as the study of “political demography”: an approach which, in fact, will need to continue to focus on critiquing the pervasive methodological nationalism of conventional North Atlantic-centered views of immigration, integration, and citizenship, a mindset in which much of their influence and power as “colonial” perspectives in a global context resides.

### **Reviewing the Mainstream**

As also mentioned in this volume by David FitzGerald, a recent review of the field of migration studies (Levy et al. 2020) attempted a “holistic” quantitative mapping of the field, in terms of its institutionalization, internationalization, and spatial relations of emergent “epistemic communities” of interconnected scholars. Their spatial visualizations of the field were a particularly interesting representation, drawing some humorous as well as irate social media backchat from senior figures in the field—if they felt left out or misrepresented. In a general sense, as well as confirming the growth and establishment of a coherent, inter-related field, the mapping exercise also indicated how the field had shifted over time. Where once the field was unquestionably dominated by North American sociologists, social psychologists, and demographers in some combination, there had been a clear shift over time to more European work, more qualitative studies, and more critical views, suggested by the presence of names in critical theory/philosophy, geography, and anthropology. Mobilities, critical race theory, and transnationalism have also appeared more clearly as alternatives to the mainstream. Political science—which has been very central in Europe—is still difficult to locate, underlining the longstanding message of James Hollifield (2007), reiterated in this volume, that the field needed to “bring the state back in.”

Without doubt, though, this quantitative exercise underlined how self-referential and limited in scope recognizably “mainstream” research in fact is. It is clearly overly weighted toward the obvious Euro-American venues for migration research—the major journals (*International Migration Review*, *International Migration*, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, notably)—as well as reflecting the solid reproduction of a canon of North American authors, who established the US and Canadian examples as the prototypical social science models and concepts of immigration studies (names such as Alejandro Portes, Doug Massey, Richard Alba, Mary Waters, John Berry, Will Kymlicka, Nina Glick Schiller, and Peggy Levitt). A wider range of global migration phenomena has yet to make itself felt in terms of the weight of citations, compared to these names above. And the strong suspicion is that the field analysis is simply not picking up a lot of work that has emerged in recent years, often from academic pathways in the critical humanities that does not even engage with or cite the mainstream references listed above. I will introduce some of what might be considered the new critical migration studies presently.

Without doubt, though, a “normal science”—in the Kuhnian sense of a paradigm—has established itself in the journals cited above and networks reflected in this article, building on the North American model, but centered rather on “comparative” European issues of immigration, integration, and citizenship. Although they were slow to engage, quantitative social stratification and inequalities scholars have moved assertively into the study of immigration and ethnic minorities, as the topic has risen in salience. The subject is beset with difficulties of standardizing data about migrants and minorities across different national contexts, but also rarely engages with the issue of social formations beyond the nation-state. In this, it has followed tamely North American “container box” views of society, as one of one-way linear migration to immigration to settlement, integration, and citizenship. The upscaling of research into larger, quantitative scope has opened up ambitions for new scholars moving into the field. The other, major source of quantification has been the proliferation of policy “indexes,” such as those produced on integration laws and institutions by the Migration Policy Group in Brussels (i.e., MIPEX; Solano and Huddleston 2020), or on citizenship rights by the European University Institute in Florence (i.e., EUDO; Vink and Bauböck 2013). These systematizing resources enable large-scale, world-spanning projects, without questioning the standard paradigm on which they work (see also Koopmans 2013). It is in fact getting harder to make the case for an epistemologically transformative vision of immigration, integration, and citizenship in a world fast re-nationalizing and securing its borders because of Covid (this is reflected in the familiar skepticism toward transnationalism in FitzGerald’s piece, as well as Abraham and Hollifield and Wong’s solidly state-centered views). We still seem to find it so difficult to develop an autonomous, social science that isn’t almost entirely shaped in its language and perception of the world by popular media and everyday politics. Moreover, the “normal science” of the field has been decisively shaped by growing governmental incentives—and in Europe, EU cross-national consortia funding—for applied, impact-oriented research, focusing on

comparative variation between countries and/or migrant/minority groups. Much migration studies has been largely co-opted by nation-state prerogatives of governance and population management (this is a theme I develop in much of my work; for further argumentation, see Favell 2003, 2015, 2022; see also Boswell 2009; Scholten et al. 2015; Schinkel 2017).

For sure, transnationalism, as a movement in the 1990s, opened up all kinds of alternatives to this: to post-national, cosmopolitan, diasporic, and potentially transformative visions of migration and mobilities as an indicator of an emergent global society and international governance, de-centering the dominant receiving host society view of one-way immigration and state-centered management of migration (see, for example, Soysal 1994; Faist 2000; Pries 2001; but also, Gilroy 1993; Brah 1996). The concern with transformative development dynamics, linked to migration, had their most hopeful expressions in debates about “brain gain,” the positive effects of remittances, and diasporic homeland politics. Yet, as captured in Hein de Haas’s widely discussed metaphor of the migration studies pendulum swing (de Haas 2012), thinking on migration and development has swung back to a much more critical consensus on relations of domination, exploitation, and loss of human capital associated with South to North migrations. The immense human tragedy involved in refugee migration toward the West, and the presence of displaced populations in limbo in all kinds of conflict-prone areas of the world, has also emphasized the sense of an age of migration in crisis (Koser 2016). The work of the solidly Marxist scholar, Stephen Castles, arguably the most influential scholar to have emerged from European migration studies (see, especially, Castles 2017), has been a good bellwether of the field, not least as the lead author of the most used international textbook on the subject, now in its sixth edition (de Haas et al. 2019). Notably, after the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, Castles’ work started emphasizing again a critical world systems approach, underlining the negative, often exploitative, and stratifying effects of international migration—with the only sure path to secure status for migrants, a relatively conventional endpoint of inclusion into national rights and citizenship.

The new “realism” thus seems to have two contrasting sides, which in fact mirror each other. One is a withering and often negative view of international migration as a symptom of a neoliberal and neocolonial world order, in which most international attempts to govern it rationally or even humanely are in fact symptomatic of the domination and exploitation on which global capitalism and nation-state power thrives. This is the focus of the Marxist and post-Marxist (above all, Foucauldian) scholars who have developed the line of work that can be thought of as critical migration studies. The second is a retreat by centrist and pragmatic liberal and conservative scholars in mainstream social sciences to justifying the national level focus on the limits of migration and diversity (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Collier 2013; Miller 2016). Here, the best that can be hoped for—it is argued—is a highly selective and limited immigration, strict integration to the norms and expectations of life in a Western society, and implacable remote and efficient border control against all those other world populations it can no

longer face or receive—usually because of the political intolerance of receiving societies. Despite its relative theoretical autonomy, these sort of receiving nation-centered evaluations are also very typical among economists; for example, Martin’s chapter in this volume. Even if mass migration would be the fastest way of effecting the mass redistribution of resources that would be needed to shift the hierarchy of global inequalities and the only plausible “just” solution (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009; Carens 2015), the default positions seem to be either how the effective control, surveillance, and exploitation of these migrations underpins and reproduces the implacable order, or conversely, how the Western nation-state must maintain those borders for its own values of equality, rights, and citizenship to survive.

### **Rise of Critical Migration Studies**

The core of the older transatlantic literature on international migration could be said to have resided in a combination of political economy and political sociology, drawing on legal and institutional policy studies, and history, about immigration and state sovereignty, while referring to models of assimilation, integration, or acculturation as contemporary expressions of citizenship (a field well summarized, for example, by Joppke 1998; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Shachar et al. 2017). It had a distinctly social science-based epistemology, focusing on comparative national analysis. Without doubt, the center of gravity for younger generations writing critically about migration, borders, surveillance, and ongoing racial or colonial formations, has shifted to a more critical and transnational, humanities-based rejection of empiricism, and a more prominent place for critical theory and academic work as activism (see, for example, the reviews by Fassin 2011; Gonzales and Sigona 2017; Mayblin and Turner 2021). This has, of course, been reflected to some extent in the methodologies presented here in this volume in the chapters on history, geography, and anthropology (by Gabaccia, Price, and Brettell, respectively), although there has been a generational shift to the humanities and more discursive, theory-driven work more broadly.

Newer generations of authors in this line of work operate in a space of critical theory, usually in a kind of Marxist-Foucauldian hybrid that taps into contemporary feminist and queer theory, or critical race theory. There has been a strong Italian flavor to much of the work, due to the influence of radical autonomist philosophers, Antonio Negri (i.e., Hardt and Negri 2000) and Giorgio Agamben. The latter’s reflection on the “bare life” of refugees, and the “state of exceptionality” as the governing logic of control and surveillance (Agamben 1998, 2005) have seen much of the new migration studies—in fact located in critical international studies, border studies, and a “new” citizenship studies (associated particularly with the theorist Engin Isin 2002, 2008), rather than migration journals as such—emphasizing “governmental” approaches to population that have little to do with older rights-based studies of citizenship (this is captured very well by McNevin 2019). The material of these scholars is violence at borders, deportation, the disasters of the refugee crisis, of walls of all kinds being thrown

up, with universal, rational bureaucratic procedures, and rights-based institutions being essentially differentiating, stratifying devices, designed to use (usually neoliberal) citizenship as a bio-political means for differentiating wanted and unwanted populations (see, for example, two edited collections by De Genova and Peutz 2010; De Genova 2017). Accordingly, there has been a shift from studying labor markets, multiculturalism, and transnational communities, to an all-consuming focus on refugees, state violence, and immigration control and deportation (Gonzales et al. 2019), with post-immigration now dominated by notions of integration (or its critique) that emphasize the sovereign prerogative of the nation-state (Schinkel 2017). The work, though, also emphasizes activist mobilization against this “new fascism”: of local and regional solidarity with migrants, and the “autonomous” collective expressions of migrants, in the face of unremitting power (Tazzioli 2019). Gently progressive discussions about post-national human rights and other modes of inclusion, remittance-led growth, freedom of movement, or cosmopolitanism, which animated the critical agenda of the past, have often been rejected as utopian idealist constructions, squeezed out as a choice between nation-centered pragmatics and *realpolitik*, and a growing contestatory politics that has lost patience with such (typically liberal) internationalist incrementalism (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013).

Here, the critical interdisciplinary impulse—that is only weakly present in this volume—is driven very much as a reflection of the rise in militant postcolonialism (i.e., the “decolonial” movement), and the imperative to address the race issues raised by Black Lives Matter, that has become such a global standard-bearer for racialized migration-related inequalities more generally (McNevin 2019). Younger generations of readers would expect a migration studies handbook to reflect and address these issues, as well as be looking for an agenda that must be seen to shift away from North America and Europe, and these continents’ dominant preoccupation with the fruits of post-colonial Empire, and conciliatory multicultural/multiracial modernization according to a Western paradigm (as stressed by DeGenova et al. 2018; Mayblin and Turner 2021).

Prominent manifestos in critical migration studies (e.g., Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Tazzioli and De Genova 2016) underline the alleged redundancy of much of the language of the older literature on migration and immigration politics, that grew up around comparative politics and policy, law, economic sociology, and the demographic geography of migration. They assert the need for new “keywords” that address the mechanics of neoliberalism and neocolonialism that is apparent in the international governance models of “managed” migration, and the progressive liberal democratic idiom of citizenship (see also Anderson 2013). Even more strident has been the charge of “sanctioned ignorance” displayed by the older field as it was, because of its lack of engagement with alternative literature and voices coming out of the Global South—a key point of the decolonial agenda (Mayblin 2017; Mayblin and Turner 2021: 2). The lack of attention to post-colonial history, and the effects of Empire and the racial hierarchies they were built on, in accounts of immigration politics, is indeed a missing aspect of progressive thinking about immigration, across the North Atlantic advanced

liberal democracies, which has always tried to focus on the forward-looking “challenge to the nation-state” and the reconstructive potential of migrant-born change and diversity (see Favell 2022). This in turn has led to the charge that the field has been insufficiently attuned to the question of race—roughly speaking the “scar” of race, associated with the colonial slave trade, racial science, and its ongoing repercussions. International migration studies and migration theory are said to be too “white” in their orientation—despite the professed attention to global migration flows, diversity, and ethnicity (Lentin 2020).

Migration studies or the field of international migration have had awkward relations over the years with ethnic and racial studies and critical race theory, both in European and North American contexts. In Europe—and the UK in particular—migration and refugee studies (in geography, anthropology, and development studies) had to move from out of the shadow of critical race studies dominated by sociologists, which tended to be focused quite specifically on racism and anti-racist mobilizations associated with post-colonial populations, and the activist concerns driving that kind of work. This literature was not particularly well attuned to discussing new migrations, new types of diversity, or the specificities of asylum and refugee studies, and it was weak on understanding comparisons across national contexts. But this critical race studies literature has certainly been stung into interesting new responses on these issues in the intervening years, as it has encompassed a much richer, historical, pan-national and global perspective. Without doubt, the long-term insights and influence of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy—and the prescience of their work despite its at-first-glance rather UK-centered concerns—has been paramount (see, for example, Hall 2017 [1994]; Gilroy 2005). The activist or “militant epistemology” of critical race studies also gives it a new edge, as it addresses migration and population mobilities more generally, rejecting the policy- and politics-focused impact of so much conventional migration research (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013).

In the US, Canada, and other settler societies, immigration has always been central, with a somewhat difficult intersection with the traditional study of racial inequality and the “color line” in American society, or the question of indigenous rights in Canada or Australia (Kymlicka 1995; see other recent works on the complications of indigenous *versus* colonial settler rights; i.e., Sharma and Wright 2008–2009; Ellerman and O’Heran 2021). It is simply odd that a lot of immigration scholars in the US are now turning, instead of “assimilation,” to the notionally more “correct” concept of “integration” (for example, Alba and Foner 2015; Eaton 2016; Donato and Ferris 2020), which was hitherto more associated with race inequality issues, and very much embedded in a structural-functionalist—and, as it turned out, cultural racist—paradigm of diagnosing the deficiencies of “negro” culture in American society (i.e., Glazer and Moynihan 1964; Moynihan 1965). This echoes the fact that a lot of mainstream assimilation research, for example, appears to want to turn race into “ethnicity,” and then to model the disappearance of ethnicity (or not) into monochromatic mainstreams (Alba and Nee 2003)—hence the debate about “post-racial” tendencies in the research. Again, re-invigorating the discussion over race and migration in the US has been



connected to more radical politics and pro-migrant mobilizations, rejecting dominant mainstream immigration studies paradigms (Gonzales and Chavez 2012). These dynamics in the field are also reflected in the contributions to this volume by FitzGerald and Brettell.

Yet, in the meantime, migration studies has become so ascendant as a field that the charge has been that in its focus on very diverse types of migrants, on broad processes of assimilation and integration into which difference disappears, and on quasi-universalist (Western) conceptions such as citizenship, transnationalism, or cosmopolitanism, it has deliberately “denied race” and removed it from discussion. This is the charge put forward in combative manifesto-like statements by new-generation scholars such as Alana Lentin and Lucy Mayblin, buoyed by wider currents in decolonizing the social sciences and a return of emphasis on anti-racism and racial inequality (see Lentin 2014; Mayblin 2017; Mayblin and Turner 2021). Their position is largely a sweeping and dismissive critique of the field as a whole, lacking much specific engagement with authors aligned with the discredited “old-style” migration studies, or with the ways in which a focus on race and anti-racism and its intersection with migration were often also a feature of their work (examples being the work of Doug Massey or Roger Waldinger in the US, or scholars such as Marco Martiniello, Patrick Simon, Jan Rath, Bridget Anderson, or myself, in Europe).

Nevertheless, the defensive response of organizations such as IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe), Europe’s most powerful migration studies network, has been to put race and anti-racism firmly back onto the agenda with new working groups and discussions in response to claims that race or anti-racism were not being discussed at migration studies conferences. There is a sense of a wheel turning full circle here. For example, there was a struggle for more than a decade to create a separate section on migration and citizenship within the American Political Science Association, because there was already a section on racial and ethnic politics, which those scholars insisted fully covered migration and immigration. A more constructive engagement of critical race theory and critical migration studies may be expected in future, as migration studies scholars engage better in the longer-term historical, colonial antecedents of the stylized post-war “immigration” and “integration” that has been the focus of so much of the mainstream work. The return of world systems theory—which was so central to early migration studies in the 1970s, under the influence of Wallerstein—also necessarily foregrounds colonialism and migrations as constitutive of it (Boatcă 2015). Such scholarship also underlines the false presentism of most immigration thinking, given that the great migrations of the past were colonial settlement movements of Europeans to the rest of the world (Kunz 2020). There was no zero point to immigration in colonial Europe (because they were Empires). There was no *tabula rasa* for settler countries (they were also Empires). These are contemporary fictions that do political work and sustain the standard model; it is remarkable it has taken a revived decolonial theory to make this point obvious, and unavoidable (see Gurminder Bhambra’s foreword in Mayblin and Turner 2021).



## **De-centering Migration Theory**

Even in these critiques of “Eurocentric” modes of thinking about migration and diversity and their historical grounding in colonialism, there is still a sense that the focus is rather too much on exposing (and discussing) views from the center of the world system, rather than its alternates or peripheries. This is certainly also a point made by those who want to argue for an alternate “southern theory,” or views on the interdependence of migration globally that reflect the realities and experiences of other parts of the world outside the developed West (see Hollifield and Foley 2021). One thing this may also signal is a realization that the Anglo-American conceptions of race and ethnicity should perhaps not always be so hegemonic—or indeed that this intellectual hegemony is also part of the “colonial” problem—in that both the American immigration model and its formative race question (along with the Jewish question, from the European side), has arguably overdetermined global thinking generally on “race” and “diversity,” in ways that may also need to be “decolonized” (see Lamont et al. 2016, for a comparative study that tackles this question). While the US is still far from being, in its messy and unjust reality, a model for the world, its idealized image of an immigrant nation based on multiracial identities, open to the diversity of the world (e.g., Eaton 2016), is still very much the open model of a sovereign “integration nation” of immigration and diversity that European nations—struggling with ethno-cultural heritage and colonial specificities—still aspire to (Favell 2022).

This may be the other way in which the decolonial movement is decisively shifting international migration and mobilities: that is, as a de-centering of North Atlantic (i.e., Euro-American) experiences of immigration, integration, and citizenship, but also its ways of thinking about race and diversity, as such (see also Goldberg 2009). How might views of and from the Global South—or East—change a handbook such as this?<sup>1</sup>

A shift such as this would be parallel to the quite substantial shift that has taken place in this direction in urban studies, as it stops taking the Western city as the paradigm for urbanism. Why do we impose overly rationalized models of “governance” on social systems still characterized by remarkably complex systems of “informality” and human “infrastructure” (Robinson 2002; Simone 2004). Could it have something to do with our inherently state-centered modes of thinking about politics and policy? (Scott 1998). For example, it is obvious there has been a signal shift in the study of African migration away from Western destinations, to look at other global flows, cross-border displacements, and new destinations of migration outside the developed world (Betts 2013; Düvell 2020). The linear assumption that all migrants are headed to the West has been suspended, along with the realization that there are far more migrants in other regions of the world compared to Europe or North America. Ethnographic work on African migrant and migration systems in fact emphasizes informality, porousness, and creativity in the face of bordering (Stock 2019; Schapendonk 2020), rather than the implacable logics of the border and state power emphasized by critical and

conventional migration theory alike (e.g., Kotef 2015, Yuval-Davis et al. 2019; but also Hollifield 2004, FitzGerald 2020).

The huge expansion in refugee studies responding to the massive crisis of 2015 has also taken the subject away from “immigration” as such, into the study of migration paths and multiple- sited studies in an array of other locations (Crawley et al. 2018). Although much of the debate on asylum reflects a Western assumption that the only possible solution is a reception and settlement of such migrants in the West (Gibney 2004; Crawley and Skleparis 2017), the crisis raised issues anew about return, reconstruction, and the necessity of temporary protection and global intervention near to source, as a wider imperative (see Shachar 2020). New technologies (i.e., following social media), new visual and long distance or virtual methodologies have played their part in facilitating the full understanding of asylum seeking that now extends well beyond classic definitions of refugee law (Crawley et al. 2018).

Other parts of the world have also come to offer distinctive views of migration or mobilities that are not obviously strictly patterned on the linear US (or European) immigration-to-citizenship model. Latin America, for instance, can be conceived as a transnational space of migration and mobilities, to some extent in parallel to the free movement space of Europe (Acosta and Geddes 2014; Gomes 2021). More dramatically, the field has clearly been knocked sideways by the emergence of Asian migrations, as a now quite vast field of scholarship has amassed in a way that suggests that a paradigm of migration (immigration-integration-citizenship) based on Europe and North America is no longer unavoidable as a unique reference point in global comparative discussion (Liu-Farrer and Yeoh 2018; Chung 2021). The basic point here is that development levels of Asian societies are now comparable to or outstripping North America—such that the full range of migration and mobilities questions are playing out against a very different legal, political, economic, and cultural backdrop, that need not be thought of on some “less-developed” or “emergent” development scale relative to the North American/European paradigm. Asian migrations in turn may suggest comparative points that help us rethink some of the normative bases that are taken as given in Euro-American work, from distinctions between internal and international migration to alternate modes of migration governance outside of Western liberal democratic norms. For example: the massive internal migrations in China (see Sun 2019); shifting notions of race/nation/ethnicity/indigeneity (Yeoh 2018, Liu Farrer 2020); migration without rights under conditions of contract or indenture, and new kinds of guestworker programs (Ruhs 2013; Surak 2018); citizenship as a mode of stratification and exclusion, categorized by nationality (Anderson 2010); new public-private migration infrastructures (Xiang and Lindquist 2014); new regional forms of transnationalism (Soysal 2015); and the emergence of quite different kinds of race hierarchies and rights-based modes of inclusion (Tsutsui 2018).

### **Political Demography: A Sketch**

In my contribution to the second edition of this handbook (Favell 2007), I offered a synthesis of post-disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and globalizing tendencies in

migration studies, that might offer a “reboot” of migration theory outside of, or beyond, the conventional parameters of linear, nation-state-centered conceptions of immigration, integration, and citizenship that still form the solid basis of mainstream research in this field. Taking a cue from the then- widespread study of mobilities and of transnationalism, I argued that an alternate analytical edge might be generated in migration studies, by thinking seriously about how population movements under conditions of “free movement” also reveal elements of how and why the nation-state borders and categorizes some movers as “immigrants” and “aliens” while letting others float free as “global citizens” or the invisibly mobile. Migration and immigration studies, but also much of the critical migration studies literature, still remains focused on the figure of the abject, suffering, excluded, or pressurized “migrant,” while having little or no interest in the 99% of other international mobilities and population movements that make up a world of flows *and* control, openings *and* closures. Intra-EU freedom of movement or the movement of GATS service personnel provided the insight for me; for others, tourism or student migration has provided the analytical key (Cresswell 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006). Much of the dramatization of carceral surveillance and impenetrable walls, while understandable in its indignation, is incomplete in its exclusive focus on those who do suffer at the base of asylum migration and labor systems. Humanitarian migration, for instance, only makes up a small proportion of the overall permanent migration flows to OECD countries (Safi 2020: 15–16). Meanwhile, without this broader focus, the elements of the “neoliberal racial capitalism” diagnosed by critical migration and race theory scholars (see, for example, Bhattacharya 2018; Yuval-Davis et al. 2019), may offer only a partial insight into how these systems work to define, differentiate, and control populations, as well as emancipate or render invisible many others (see Favell 2022 for a development of this argument).

I refer to this kind of work as “political demography” (for alternate/previous uses of this term, see Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001; Goldstone et al. 2011). Anne McNevin (2019), for example, builds explicitly on the reboot idea to further diagnose the persistence of the classical notion of bordered space and linear migration time, that leaves so many mobile populations invisibly in limbo between migration and immobility, in a world based on assumptions of sovereign territoriality and simple notions of “natives” and “migrants.” The world has changed, yet our political conceptions of populations, peoples, and (particularly) the democratic communities these are meant to reflect, has not shifted much out of classic Westphalian frame; in fact, as emphasized by Nandita Scharma, they are being evermore deeply anchored, particularly by American post-war nation-building hegemony (Sharma 2020).

This suggests, in fact, that it might be right to draw the critique *back* to the source of those resilient modes of thinking in the West, and to their *highest* expression of nation-state modernity: what can be seen in the heroic idea of sovereign nations of immigration, built on the integration of diversity—multicultural and multiracial—as the distinctively Western, progressive-minded response to the population challenges of globalization. This is, in effect, the North American model,

to which supposedly progressive national “immigrant integration” in Europe (or what used to be called “multiculturalism”) also aspires (see Favell 2016, critiquing Alba and Foner 2015). Rather than only de-centering the Euro-American model, then, to understand its hegemonic power in the world, we may need to re-examine it, although in critical terms. It aligns with much of critical migration studies, coming out of the humanities or the more activist wings of sociology and international studies. Here, the conceptually powerful turn to Foucauldian governmentality-based approaches in critical border and citizenship studies is of great use: in diagnosing how state and institutional power is built through bordering and categorizing multicultural or multiracial populations through both pastoral and bio-political means, as a means of perpetuating nationalist colonial power in an increasingly porous world. But it can also still build on the realist political economy and political sociology of the “migration state” (Hollifield 2004), in a tradition that can be traced back to the powerful (Weberian) influence of Aristide Zolberg (e.g., 1989, 1999), as well as Hollifield’s early work on political economy (Hollifield 1992). Effectively, the new critical migration studies can be read as a different spin, epistemologically (and politically), on the older political economy and political sociology of immigration echoed strongly by FitzGerald in this volume, but also related to the approaches to sovereignty and citizenship outlined by Abraham, and the conventional liberal political economy mode of Hollifield and Wong, both in this volume. Their contributions, unlike Brettell and Gabaccia, seem intent on wanting to make a historical judgment call about the *legitimate* existence of nation-state-centered sources of power (are they still fighting the battles of globalization theory of the 1990s, I wonder?), rather than analyzing the *contingent* sources of power (corruption and lies), that still anchor the nation-state as all-powerful (*via* law, bureaucracy, legislative institutions, and the media, principally). This is at a time when there is plenty of evidence on the table that vast amounts of what constitutes our “society” (or “social relations” or whatever forms we are living in)—i.e., our economies, cultures, networks, spaces of flows, discourses, scapes, imaginaries, environments, anthropocenes, or whatever—are clearly *not* bounded at a national scale. Although with border shutdowns everywhere, it may seem different, the interconnectedness of the global world has not been changed by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic; in some ways, it has even been emphasized by it. Viruses do not recognize national borders, just as they do not recognize the integrity of human bodies. So, the issue is a normative one about governance, yes; but also very much about explaining the patently massive gap between empirical reality—sociologically, geographically, anthropologically, historically, culturally, biologically, and geologically, ultimately, and our modern-day nation-state-centered governance structures and modes of thinking about politics: still stuck somewhere between the Westphalian State and the *trente glorieuses*, with Hobbes and Machiavelli apparently still vying for the Prince’s ear, and with a fair amount of retrotopic nineteenth-century imperial colonialism thrown in, in some European cases at least.

Institutionally-focused political scientists and sociologists—a mode of analysis which always requires some sense of the continuity of the nation-state—thus

often seem ill-equipped to study the very political formation of populations as governable units (modern nation-state-societies), and how these institutions come to have the normative “magical” powers of legitimacy, in what we call “liberal democracy.” They may take for granted what it is that needs explaining. This would be, in other words, an exemplar of methodological nationalism. Of course, too, their reproduction of the statist *doxa*—visibly apparent in conventional notions of “immigration,” “integration” and “citizenship”—also short-circuits any possibility of understanding sources of change that might challenge (or even revolutionize) these very sources of power, or cause these fictions to suddenly crumble before our eyes—as they can and have done historically, and will do again.

Perhaps it is worth repeating this message at the end of a volume on the state of migration theory and how migration makes a difference to the world we are living in. The issue is *not* whether or not nation-state-societies have power in a highly globalized world as sovereign migration states to govern and dominate populations as “nations.” They clearly do. This is, to echo Ludwig Wittgenstein, *bloody obvious*. The point is: how will we ever change this?

## Note

- 1 This is one of the central missions of the “Global De-Centre” network of scholars, founded by Peggy Levitt and Maurice Crul, which brings together established scholars and younger researchers across North and South, West and East, working in the fields of (post-/decolonial) migration, mobilities, and diversity. The network is dedicated to developing alternate epistemologies, but focuses on reconstructive rather than purely deconstructive work. <https://globaldecentre.org/>.

## References

- Acosta, Diego and Andrew Geddes. 2014. “Transnational Diffusion or Different Models? Regional Approaches to Migration Governance in the European Union and Mercosur.” *European Journal of Migration and Law* 16(1): 19–44.
- Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. *State of Exception*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Alba, Richard and Nancy Foner. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds. 2001. *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Anderson, Bridget. 2010. “Mobilizing Migrants, Making Citizens: Migrant Domestic Workers as Political Agents.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(1): 60–74.
- Anderson, Bridget. 2013. *Us and Them: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Betts, Alexander. 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bhattacharyya, Gargi. 2018. *Rethinking Racial Capitalism: Questions of Reproduction and Survival*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bloemraad, Irene, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yudakul. 2008. "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation and Challenges to the Nation-State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 153–79.
- Boatcă, Manuela. 2015. *Global Inequalities Beyond Occidentalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Boswell, Christina. 2009. *The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brah, Avtar. 1996. *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.
- Carens, Joseph H. 2015. *The Ethics of Immigration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castles, Stephen. 2017. *Migration, Citizenship and Identity: Selected Essays*. London: Edward Elgar.
- Chung, Erin Aeran. 2021. "The Developmental Migration State in East Asia." In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James Hollifield and Neil Foley, 127–151. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Collier, Paul. 2013. *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century*. London: Penguin.
- Crawley, Heaven, Franck Düvell, Katharine Jones, Simon McMahon, and Nando Sigona. 2018. *Unravelling Europe's "Migration Crisis": Journeys Over Land and Sea*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Crawley, Heaven and Dimitris Skleparis. 2017. "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe's 'Migration Crisis'." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(1): 48–64.
- Cresswell, Tim. 2006. *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World*. London: Routledge.
- De Genova, Nicholas, ed. 2017. *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Migration*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- De Genova, Nicholas, Glenda Garelli, and Martina Tazzioli. 2018. "Autonomy of Asylum? The Autonomy of Migration Undoing the Refugee Crisis Script." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 117(2): 239–65.
- De Genova, Nicholas and Nathalie Peutz, eds. 2010. *The Deportation Regime*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- de Haas, Hein. 2012. "The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy." *International Migration* 50(3): 8–25.
- de Haas, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. 2019. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. 6th ed. London: Macmillan.
- Donato, Katharine and Elizabeth Ferris. 2020. "Refugee Integration in Canada, Europe and the United States: Perspectives from Research." *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 690: 7–35.
- Düvell, Franck. 2020. "Shifts in the Global Migration Order and Migration Transitions in Europe: The Case of Turkey and Russia." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(45).
- Eaton, Susan E. 2016. *Integration Nation: Immigrants, Refugees and America at its Best*. New York: The New Press.
- Ellerman, Antje and Ben O'Heran. 2021. "Unsettling Migration Studies: Indigeneity and Immigration in Settler Colonial States." In *Research Handbook on Law and Politics of Migration*, edited by Catherine Dauvergne, 21–34. Cheltenham: Elgar.



- Faist, Thomas. 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fassin, Didier. 2011. "Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 213–26.
- Favell, Adrian. 2003. "Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe." *Comparative Social Research*, Yearbook 22 (November): 13–42.
- Favell, Adrian. 2007. "Rebooting Migration Theory: Interdisciplinarity, Globality and Postdisciplinarity in Migration Studies." In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, edited by Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield, 259–78. New York: Routledge.
- Favell, Adrian. 2015. "Integration Policy and Integration Research in Western Europe: A Review and Critique." In *Immigration, Integration and Mobility: New Agendas in Migration Studies 1998–2014*, edited by Adrian Favell, 69–122. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Favell, Adrian. 2016. "Just Like the USA? Critical Notes on Richard Alba and Nancy Foner's Cross-Atlantic Research Agenda." Review of Alba and Foner (2015) *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39(6): 2352–60.
- Favell, Adrian. 2022. *The Integration Nation: Immigration and Colonial Power in Liberal Democracies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- FitzGerald, David S. 2020. "Remote Control of Migration: Theorising Territoriality, Shared Coercion and Deterrence." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46(1): 4–22.
- Garelli, Glenda and Tazzioli, Martina. 2013. "Challenging the Discipline of Migration: Militant Research in Migration Studies, an Introduction." *Postcolonial Studies* 16(3): 245–49.
- Gibney, Matthew. 2004. *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilroy, Paul. 1993. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. London: Verso.
- Gilroy, Paul. 2005. *Postcolonial Melancholia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel. 1964. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Goldberg, David Theo. 2009. *The Racial Threat: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Goldstone, Jack, Eric Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds. 2011. *Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Gomes, Charles P. 2021. "The Migration State in South America." In *Understanding Global Migration*, edited by James Hollifield and Neil Foley, 342–364. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gonzales, Roberto and Leo Chavez. 2012. "'Awakening to a Nightmare': Abjectivity and Illegality in the Lives of Undocumented 1.5 Generation Latino Immigrants in the United States." *Current Anthropology* 53(3): 255–81.
- Gonzales, Roberto and Nando Sigona, eds. 2017. *Within and Beyond Citizenship: Borders, Membership and Belonging*. London: Routledge.
- Gonzales, Roberto, Nando Sigona, Martha Franco, and Anna Papoutsis. 2019. *Undocumented Migration*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hall, Stuart. 2017[1994] *The Fateful Triangle: Race, Ethnicity, Nation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



- Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hollifield, James. 1992. *Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hollifield, James. 2004. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* 38(3): 885–912.
- Hollifield, James. 2007. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We 'Bring the State Back In'?" In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, 2nd ed., edited by Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield, 183–283. New York: Routledge.
- Hollifield, James and Neil Foley. 2021. *Understanding Global Migration*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Isin, Engin. 2002. *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Isin, Engin and Greg Nielsen, eds. 2008. *Acts of Citizenship*. London: Zed.
- Joppke, Christian. 1998. "Immigration Challenges the Nation State." In *Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*, edited by Christian Joppke, 5–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, Christian and Ewa Morawska. 2003. *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2013. "Indices of Immigrant Rights: What Have We Learned, Where Should We Go?" *Comparative European Politics* 11(5): 696–703.
- Korzeniewicz, Roberto P. and Timothy P. Mora. 2009. *Unveiling Inequality: A World-Historical Perspective*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Koser, Khalid. 2016. *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kotef, Hagar. 2015. *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kunz, Sarah. 2020. "Expatriate, Migrant? The Social Life of Migration Categories and the Polyvalent Mobility of Race." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46(11): 2145–62.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Multicultural Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lamont, Michèle, Graziella Moraes Silva, Jessica Welburn, Joshua Guetzkow, Nissim Mizrachi, Hanna Herzog, and Elisa Reis, Elisa. 2016. *Getting Respect: Responding to Stigma and Discrimination in the United States, Brazil and Israel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lentin, Alana. 2014. "Postracial Silences: The Othering of Race in Europe." In *Racism and Sociology*, edited by Wolf Hund and Alana Lentin, 69–104. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Lentin, Alana. 2020. *Why Race Still Matters*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Levy, Nathan, Nisa Pisarevskaya, and Peter Scholten. 2000. "Between Fragmentation and Institutionalisation: The Rise of Migration Studies as a Research Field." *Comparative Migration Studies* 8(24): 1–24.
- Liu-Farrer, Gracia. 2020. *Immigrant Japan: Mobility and Belonging in an Ethno-Nationalist Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Liu-Farrer, Gracia and Brenda Yeoh. 2018. "Introduction. Asian Migrations and Mobilities: Continuities, Conceptualisations and Controversies." In *Routledge Handbook of Asian Migrations*, edited by Gracia Liu-Farrer, Gracia and Brenda Yeoh, 1–18. New York: Routledge.
- Mayblin, Lucy. 2017. *Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Mayblin, Lucy and Jo Turner. 2021. *Migration Studies and Colonialism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- McNevin, Anne. 2019. "Mobility and its Discontents: Seeing Beyond International Space and Progressive Time." *Environment and Planning C*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419871966>.
- Mezzadra, Sandro and Brett Neilson. 2013. *Border as Method; or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Miller, David. 2016. *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moynihan, Daniel P. 1965. *The Negro Family: The Case for Action* (The Moynihan Report). Washington, DC: Office of Policy Planning and Research.
- Pries, Ludger, ed. 2001. *New Transnational Social Spaces: International Migration and Transnational Companies in the Early Twenty-First Century*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, Jennifer. 2002. *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*. London: Routledge.
- Ruhs, Martin. 2013. *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labour Migration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Safi, Mirna. 2020. *Migration and Inequality*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Schapendonk, Joris. 2020. *Finding Ways Through Eurospace: West African Movers Re-Viewing Europe from the Inside*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Schinkel, Willem. 2017. *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scholten, Peter, Han Entzinger, R. Penninx, and Stijn Verbeek, eds. 2015. *Integrating Immigrants in Europe: Research Policy Dialogues*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE-Springer.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2020. *The Shifting Border*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Shachar, Ayelet, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink, eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sharma, Nandita. 2020. *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Sharma, Nandita and Cynthia Wright. 2008–2009. "Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial States." *Social Justice* 35: 120–38.
- Sheller, Mimi and John Urry. 2006. "The New Mobilities Paradigm." *Environment and Planning A* 38: 207–26.
- Simone, Abdelmalek. 2004. "People as Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg." *Public Culture* 16(3): 407–29.
- Solano, Giacomo and Thomas Huddleston. 2020. *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020: Measuring Policies to Integrate Immigrants*. Barcelona/Brussels: CIDOB and MPG.
- Soysal, Yasemin N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Soysal, Yasemin N., ed. 2015. *Transnational Trajectories in East Asia: Nation, Citizenship and Region*. London: Routledge.
- Stock, Inka. 2019. *Time, Migration and Forced Immobility: Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco*. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
- Sun, Li. 2019. *Rural-Urban Migration and Policy Intervention in China: Migrant Workers' Coping Strategies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Surak, Kristin. 2018. "Migration Industries and the State: Guestworker Programs in East Asia." *International Migration Review* 52(2): 487–523.

- Tazzioli, Martina. 2019. *The Making of Migration: The Biopolitics of Mobility at Europe's Borders*. London: Sage.
- Tazzioli, Martina and Nicholas De Genova, eds. 2016. *Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of "the Crisis" in and of "Europe."* Online Resource. Zone Books. <http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe/>.
- Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. 2018. *Rights Make Right: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vink, Maarten and Rainer Bauböck. 2013 "Citizenship Configurations: Analysing the Multiple Purposes of Citizenship Regimes in Europe." *Comparative European Politics* 11: 621–48.
- Weiner, Myron and Michael Teitelbaum. 2001. *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Xiang, Biao and Johan Lindquist. 2014. "Migration Infrastructure." *International Migration Review* 48(S1): 122–48.
- Yeoh, Brenda. 2018. "Transnational Migrations and Plural Diversities: Encounters in Global Cities." In *Routledge Handbook of Asian Migrations*, edited by Gracia Liu-Farrer and Brenda Yeoh, Brenda, 238–49. New York: Routledge.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira, Georgie Wemyss, and Kathryn Cassidy. 2019. *Bordering*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Zolberg, Aristide. 1989. "The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World." *International Migration Review* 23(3): 403–30.
- Zolberg, Aristide. 1999. "Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy." In *Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh De Wind. New York: Russell Sage.

# Index

*Note:* Page numbers in **bold** indicate tables in the text, and references following “n” refer notes.

- A8 migrants from Central European countries 155n19
- Abdi, C. 175
- Abel, G. 115
- Abraham, D. 17–18, 343, 352
- absence, politics of 178
- acculturation 172
- Adamic, L. 52
- Advanced Society* 236
- African Americans 49, 173, 206
- African Centre for Migration and Society 62
- Agamben, G. 345
- The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (De Haas, Castles and Miller) 64–6
- Alamanyali 197
- Alarcón, R. 176, 179
- Alba, R. 6, 24, 118, 122, 169, 171, 172, 343
- Aleinikoff, A. 330n34
- “all persons born” rule 317
- American Academy of Political and Social Science 160
- American Community Survey (ACS) 95, 102
- Americanization 179, 286
- American Journal of Sociology* 160
- American Political Science Association 348
- American Sociological Association 160
- Analytical Theory* (Lotka) 86
- Anderson, B. 332n54
- Anglo-American common law tradition 17
- Annals of the American Association of Geographers: one on Migration* (Wright) 233
- Annan, K. 122
- anthropology 130, 194; articulation 199–203; belonging/inclusion and exclusion 208–10; citizenship 208–10; cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; cultural 195, 215n2; dependent variables **26**; ethnicity 205–8; identity 205–10; in immigration 12–13; independent variables **26**; interpretivist approach to study of migration 4; methods 195–6; in migration studies 10, 12–13, 194–5; patterns of mobility 196–9; race 205–8; research questions 10, **11**, 12, 15–16; roots of 23; social organization of migration 203–5; state, city, and multiculturalism 210–13; in-text references of migration on 53; theoretical perspectives **11**; transnationalism in 176; units of analysis **11**, 18–21; volumes and rates of scholarly production 54, 208
- anti-immigrant sentiment 27, 273, 285
- Appadurai, A. 58
- Arendt, H. 273
- Aristotle 276
- Arreola, D. 239
- Arthur, W. B. 86, 87
- Asiatic-barred zone 274
- assimilation 168, 180, 347, 348; assumption of 169–70; clouding studies of 174; comparative study of 170–1; contemporary empirical studies of 168; discredited in US academy 169; downward 172–4; intergenerational drivers of 162; in migration theory 4–5; modes of 168–9; in political science 286; research program 181;

- second-generation decline 171–3; in United States 57–9, 170; upward 172–4
- assimilation theory 7, 57; American 58–9; spatial 243
- asylum: application for 211; processing sites 255; seekers 2, 24, 29, 93, 211–12, 254, 277, 283
- ATLAS.ti software 195
- Aure, M. 233
- Australia: experience of immigration in 7–8; population growth 2
- Baily, S. 24
- Bakalian, A. 171
- Banting, K. 325
- Barthram, P. 47
- Basch, L. 248
- Bean, F. D. 171–2
- Beauchemin, C. 99, 173
- Becker, G. 97
- Beitz, C. 333n63
- Belgium, immigration as political issue in 270
- belonging 195, 208–10, 239
- Benhabib, S. 333n63
- Benmayor, R. 22, 30n8
- Berry, J. 343
- bias(es) 107; destination 81, 123; salmon 94; selection 94
- Biden, J. 135
- Bjeren, G. 10, 23
- black box of net migration 106–11
- Black immigrants 244
- Black Lives Matter movement 309, 346
- Blackwell Companion to Globalization* (Ritzer) 64
- Blanc, C. S. 248
- Blanchet, D. 121
- Bloemraad, I. 27, 171, 328n3, 333n60
- Blue Card program 307
- Blunt, A. 252
- Boas, F. 51, 215n1
- Bodnar, J. E. 57
- borders 252–6
- Borjas, G. 6, 138, 142–4, 146, 155n25, 165
- Borkert, M. 28
- Bosniak, L. 309
- Bourdieu, P. 15, 97–8, 160
- Bourne, R. 52
- Bozorgmehr, M. 171
- bracero* program 198, 282
- Brader, T. 285
- Braudel, F. 59
- Braudelian approach 18
- Brettell, C. 12, 19, 30n8, 67n1, 242, 352
- Brexit 28, 292, 331n44
- Brin, S. 155n21
- Britain 288
- Brubaker, R. 167, 170, 174, 287
- Bureau of Labor Statistics 95–6
- Burgess, E. W. 161, 168
- Bush, G. W. 133
- Caldwell, J. C. 30n7
- California 136, 139, 146–7, 174, 290–1
- Camus, R. 122
- Canada: geographic isolation and ability 168; immigration in 7–8, 347; law system in 307; multiculturalism in 171 “capture-recapture” method 101
- Card, D. 142, 144
- Carens, J. 288, 327
- Carling, J. 180, 240
- Carnegie, A. 144–5
- Castles, S. 64, 270, 344
- census 5, 14, 80, 101–2, 143, 180, 247; 1999 French census 91; absence of 114
- Census Acting Director 102
- Census Bureau 95, 102, 118
- centrifugal tendencies 317–18
- A Century of Transnationalism* (Waldinger and Green) 60
- chain migration 98, 132, 203
- Chamie, J. 105, 119, 121–2
- Chavez, L. 209
- Chicago School of Sociology 4, 49, 146, 160, 181, 269
- Chikanda, A. 252
- China: citizenship by naturalization 329n8; emigration rates in 1; external migration in 115; inhabitants in 111; internal migration in 115, 350
- Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 17, 274, 288
- Chinese immigrants 245
- Chiswick, B. 6, 286
- citizenship 152–3, 195, 291, 353; access to 287; American 288; belonging 208–10, 239; devaluation of 288, 315; dual 177, 313, 315; flexible 208; illusion of 210; for immigrants 276; institution of 287; insurance policy 178; law and 308, 311–17; optimistic, liberal view of 290; participatory forms 209; Tocquevillian views of 288; uniform (legal) 288–9
- city-scale approach 213
- Civil Rights Act (1964) 283

- civil rights movement 17, 49  
 Clandestino project 101  
 Clark, R. 146  
 Clemens, M. 286  
 Clinton, H. 134  
 closed population model 86–7  
 Coale, A. 78, 87  
*Code noir* (“Black Code”) 124n2  
 Cohen, R. 60  
 Colbert, J-P. 50  
 Cold War 269, 270, 279, 291, 330n20  
 Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana 96  
 Coleman, D. 120  
 colonialism 164  
*Comparative Studies in Society and History* 67n9  
 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) 133–4  
*confianza* (trust) 204  
 conflict migration 197  
 consonant acculturation 172  
 constitutional patriotism 313  
 constructive realism 28  
 contact theory 285  
 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 315  
 convergence, principle of 86  
 Conzen, K. N. 57  
 Cook-Martin, D. 166–7  
 Cornelius, W. 176  
 cost-benefit analysis 6–7  
 cost-benefit distributions 280  
 Covello, L. 52  
 Covid-19 pandemic 1, 94, 111, 182, 352; impact in US immigration 135; and national security 275  
 criminalization of immigration in United States 18, 319  
 crimmigration 309, 318–19  
 critical migration studies 255, 342–3, 345–8  
 critical race theory 58, 169, 206, 239, 342, 345, 347–8  
 cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; about methodology and theory 58; of social science disciplines 53–7  
 cross-disciplinary fertilization 27  
 cross-national interdisciplinary research projects 26–7  
 Crul, M. 173, 353  
 Crush, J. 252  
 Cuba: Cuban Adjustment Act 320; Cuban exiles in Miami 207; Cuban immigrants 141–2  
 Culcasi, K. 233  
 cultural/culture 212; analysis 46, 212; anthropology 215n2; citizenship 208–9; defenses 25, 212–13; geography 239, 252; and ideational concerns of immigrants 273, 274; of migration 9, 199, 201; studies 52, 58, 62; theorizers of cultural pluralism 52  
*Cultures in Contact* (Hoerder) 60, 62–3  
 cumulative causation theory 97  
 Current Population Survey (CPS) 95–6  
 cutting-edge legal scholarship 331n42  
 Dahl, R. 276  
 data analysis, revolution in 95  
 Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 114  
 “Day Without Immigrants” 133  
*The Death of Asylum: Hidden Geographies of the Enforcement Archipelago* (Mountz) 254  
 “decolonial” movement 346  
 decolonization 167, 294n4  
 Dedoose software 195  
 Deegan, M. J. 52  
 de Haas, H. 64, 238, 344  
 demographic data 94; challenge of micro-data 94–5; intercontinental surveys on migration 98–100; measuring unauthorized migration 100–4; panoply of censuses and surveys 95–8; World Gallup Survey on intentions to migrate 104–6  
 demographic/demography 4, 8–9, 14, 78, 118; analysis 84; art of 83; balance 87; data and methodology 21–2; dependent variables **26**; disciplines in 78; false symmetry of demographic equation 79–81; formalization of 85; fundamental equation of 79, 80; hypothesis **11**; independent variables **26**; interpretivist approach to study of migration 4; mathematical 84; political 350–3; projections 118; research questions **11**, 14–16; role in migration studies 5, 9; sub-discipline within 84; theoretical perspectives **11**; transition model 236; units of analysis 5–6, **11**, 19  
 demographic giants: China 111–12; India 111–12; proportion of national population 112; United States 106  
 demographism 118–19  
 Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) 253–4

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 95, 134, 318–19  
 deportation 210, 310–11, 329n17  
 destination bias 81, 96, 123  
 detention centers 255  
 detribalization 205  
 devaluation of citizenship 288, 315  
 de Vattel, E. 50  
*Diaspora* journal 234  
 diasporic/diasporas 251–2; citizenship 208; nationalism 207; studies 60, 234, 251–2  
 Diner, H. 44  
 DIOC “extended” database (DIOC-E database) 114–15  
 dissimilarity, index of 247  
 dissimilation: literature 182; sociology of 178–9; *see also* assimilation  
 dissonant acculturation 172  
*Disuniting of America* 277  
 diversity 323, 326, 349; immigrant visas by US 132; *see also* multiculturalism  
*The Divine Order* (Süssmilch) 87  
 Donato, K. M. 51, 58  
 downward assimilation 172–4  
 Dreby, J. 171  
 dual citizenship 177, 313, 315  
 “dual positionality” of asylum seekers 212  
 “due process” principle 314  
 Durand, J. 99, 176  
 Durkheim, E. 160  
 Durkheimian view 287, 290  
 Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 79
- Early Transitional Society* 236  
 earned legalization 133  
 eclecticism 45  
 econometric studies 141–4  
 economic(s) 6, 9, 130, 278; considerations for immigrants 273, 274; cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; data and methodology 21–2; dependent variables 26; econometric studies 141–4; economic mobility studies 144–5; hypothesis 11; immigrant entrepreneurship 148–9; immigrant innovation 149–50; immigration and taxes 146–8; immigration patterns and responses in US 131–2; impacts of migration 130–1; independent variables 26; labor market effects 139; macroeconomic effects 135–8, 136; in migration studies 6–7, 9, 131; positivist approach to study of migration 4; research questions 11, 15, 16; theoretical perspectives 11, 131; units of analysis 11, 19, 20; volumes and rates of scholarly production 54  
*The Economist* 156n36  
 education: of foreign-and US-born workers 138; inequality 173; migration 196–7; net present value of immigrants by 147  
 Ellison, L. 155n23  
 embodied migration 10, 195, 199, 202, 210, 213, 249, 255, 258  
 emigration/emigrants 47, 49, 51, 53, 107; law and 306–7; Mexican 165; policy 16  
 Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID) 96  
 Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE) 96  
 Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF-N) 96  
 enforced migration 197  
 enforcement archipelago concept 254  
 entrepreneurship: definition of 156n32; immigrant 148–9  
 environmental determinism 257  
 environmental migration research 257  
 environmental triggers 256–8  
 epistemic communities 342  
 equality 325  
 “equal protection” principle 314  
 ethnic/ethnicity 195, 205–8, 347; boundaries 206; communities 245; histories of American immigration 57; histories of individual ethnic and national groups 45; identity 206, 286; politics 286; Turnerians 51  
 Ethnic Minority Health Observatory (MEHO) 93  
*Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America* (Li) 244  
 ethnoburbs 12, 239, 244–5  
 ethnography 196, 247  
 ethno-survey (*etnoencuesta*) 97  
 etymologies 47  
 Euler, L. 85–6  
 Europe: challenges in demographic data 98–100; “demographic desert” 113; demographic statistics in 88; interdisciplinary reciprocity in 61  
 European Commission 94  
 European Convention on Human Rights 103  
 European Court of Human Rights 327



- European Court of Justice 327  
 European Migration Crisis (2015) 319–22  
 European Social Science History Association 61  
 European Union: Frontex patrol force 308; shifting immigration policy 166  
 Eurostat 94, 98  
 E-Verify 133  
 exclusion 208–10, 284–91  
 exhausted migrant effect 93  
 expatriates 107  
 expatriations 106, 107  
 expulsion 329n17  
 external migration 115
- factor–price equalization theorem 150, 156n35  
 Faist, T. 19, 30n6  
 Favell, A. 4, 9, 27–8  
 Feldman, D. 61  
 Feliciano, C. 165  
 feminist anthropology 204–5  
 feminization of migration 58  
 Fernández-Kelly, P. 177  
 fertility: migration relationship with 90–2; rate of migrants 85, 91  
 FitzGerald, D. 6, 12, 13, 19, 94, 163, 166–7, 177, 178, 342–3, 352  
 Flores agreement 154n8  
 “flow-through” legalization 101  
 Foged, M. 143  
 Foner, N. 24, 65, 172, 173  
 forced displacement 234  
 forced emigration 160  
 forced migration 89; neologism of 321; studies 164  
 formal demography 14, 15, 78; migration and 84–7  
 Foucault, M. 4, 81  
 foundational theories 232, 234  
 Fourteenth Amendment in United States 287, 309  
 Fox, C. 171  
 France: AME in 103–4; HIV-AIDS among sub-Saharan migrants in 93–4; immigration as political issue in 270; legal scholars in 328n6; myths about national identity in politics 284; natural increase in population in 107, 109–10; net migration of population in 80, 107, 109–10; political culture of 178; “sans-papiers” in 100; second-generation decline in 173
- Freeman, G. 270, 279, 283; interest-based approach 280–1; “modes of politics” approach 280  
 French National Front 291  
 Freyre, G. 51, 52  
 Frontex patrol force 308  
 frontier thesis 51  
*Front National* 121  
 Fussell, E. 4  
*Future Advanced Society* 236
- Gabaccia, D. 3, 10, 18, 24, 28, 51, 57, 58, 352  
 Gallup Institute 105  
 Gamio, M. 51, 175–6  
 Gans, H. 171  
 GAO 139, 155n18  
*Gastarbeiter* programs 109, 198, 282  
 Gates, B. 138, 155n23  
*Gender, Place, and Culture* journal 233  
 gendered mobility 235  
 gender in migration studies 52, 57, 203–5  
 “generous betrayal” of immigrants 212  
 Geneva Convention on Status of Refugees 271  
 genome analysis of human remains 89  
 Gentleman’s Agreement (1907–1908) 274  
*Geographical Review* 233, 256  
 geographic scholarship 232  
 geography 4, 7, 9, 12, 232; borders and geopolitics 252–6; cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; data and methodology 22; definition of scale in 19; dependent variables **26**; development and diasporas 251–2; ethnoburbs 244–5; foundations of migration theory 234–9; heterolocalism 245–6; hypothesis **11**; independent variables **26**; interpretivist approach to study of migration 4; methodological tools 247–8; in migration studies 7–8, 233; precarity and environmental triggers 256–8; research questions **11**, **12**; socio-spatial theories and scale 239–43; spatial assimilation 243–4; sub-disciplines 233; theoretical perspectives **11**; transnationalism in 176, 248–51; units of analysis **11**, **19**; volumes and rates of scholarly production 54  
 geopolitics 252–6  
 Germani, G. 170  
 German immigration law 330n26  
 German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) 92

- Germany: Blue Card program 307; commissions and councils 328n6; free movement of EU labor 312; immigration and naturalization law in 312–13; immigration as political issue in 270; international migrants in 132; *jus sanguinis*-based citizenship 328n9; labor market and social welfare state integration in 168; myths about national identity in politics 284; natural increase in population 108–9, 113; net migration of population 108–9, 113; origins of immigrants in 92
- Gerrard, S. 233
- Gjerde, J. 24, 51
- Glazer, N. 289
- Glick-Schiller, N. 343
- Global Compact on Migration 306, 327
- Global Compact on Refugees 306
- “Global De-Centre” network 353n1
- Global East 342
- global history 53, 60, 63
- globalization 311–12; theory 63–4
- The Global Migration Crisis* (Weiner) 277
- Global Migration Matrix 113–15
- Global Networks* 234
- Global North 28, 29; availability of migration industry 166; Fordist world of industrial mass production 324
- Global South 28, 29, 30n2, 59, 342, 346; general dynamic in 111; growth of proportion of elderly people 119–20; migrations within 161; with natural growth 111–13; refugees living in developing countries 175
- Gmelch, G. 30n8
- Goldberg, B. 60
- Golden Rule 107, 123
- Gonzales, R. 171
- Goodwin-White, J. 244
- Google 140; Google Earth 240; Google NGram 56, 59, 64
- Gordon, M. 168–9
- governance 81; international 344, 346; migration 233, 272, 273, 350; multiterritorialized 256; rationalized models of 349; of refugees 211; social 319
- governmentality 4, 195, 210
- grand remplacement* *see* great replacement
- Grant, E. 160
- Gray, J. 332n48
- Great Migration Crisis of 2015 317
- great replacement 117–18, 122; Alba’s reaction to 118–19; destination bias 123; UN Report on Replacement Migration 119–22
- Green, N. 24, 60, 61, 65, 328n3
- Grinblat, J-A. 119–22
- Grove, A. 155n22
- growing immobilities 234
- gulfan* (immature, unmarried male) 197
- Gulf Cooperation Council 162, 170, 177
- Hagan, J. M. 180
- Hagendoorn, L. 285
- Hainmueller, J. 285
- Haller, W. 172
- Halley, E. 85
- Hammar, T. 30n4
- Handlin, O. 50
- Hardwick, S. 242, 246
- Harisiades* 310
- Hart, D. W. 30n8
- Hart-Celler Act (1965) 2, 270, 274, 329n8
- Harzig, C. 50–2
- Hayes, M. 233, 249
- H-1B program 141, 145, 156n31
- health: migrant effect 93; migration and 92–4; transition 94
- Heisler, B. 24
- Heisler, S. 163
- Hellman, F. 233
- Henry, L. 87, 90, 115
- Héran, F. 5, 13–14, 19
- Hero, E. 291
- heterolocal dynamics of Bengali immigrants 246
- heterolocalism 12, 239, 245–6
- Hiemstra, N. 255
- Hill, A. G. 19, 30n7
- Hiscox, M. 285
- Hispanic Spaces, Latino Places: Community and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary America* (Arreola) 239
- historiography 45
- history 9; American assimilation theory 57–9; cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; data and methodology 22–5; dependent variables 26; discipline of 44–5; and eclecticism 45; hypothesis 11; immigration studies 56–9; independent variables 26; interdisciplinarity 45–6; interpretivist approach to study of migration 4; in migration studies 8, 59–65; national time 56–9; periodization

- as theory 46–7; periodization of interdisciplinary research 49–52; productivity 53; research questions 10, 11, 15; temporality 10; terminologies of mobility 47–9; theoretical perspectives 11; units of analysis 11; volumes and rates of scholarly production 54
- A History of Humanity* (Manning) 63
- Hobbes, T. 352
- Hoerder, D. 30n6, 50–2, 59, 60, 62–3
- Holdaway, J. 172
- Hollifield, J. 9, 16–8, 28, 67n1, 124n1, 152, 273, 281, 283, 287, 292, 342, 343, 352
- “homeland” governments 252
- Horowitz, D. L. 168, 174
- household 241
- Hugo, G. 257
- hukou* 115
- human capital 307–8
- human development index (HDI) 116, 117
- human dignity 329n10
- human geographic research 239
- humanity time 46–9, 53, 63
- human mobility 1, 236
- human rights 312, 314; ideals 326; movement 306
- human trafficking 205, 319
- Huntington, S. 277
- hyperdocumentation 210
- “The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition” (Zelinsky) 236
- illegality 198, 210, 331n43
- illiberal liberalism 318, 332n48
- immigrant inclusion and exclusion 208–10, 284; citizenship in 284–6, 288, 291; contact theory 285; ethnic identity in 289; institution of citizenship 287–8; liberal theory 288–9; multiculturalism 284; national identity in 284–6, 288, 291; participation of immigrants 284; research on social identity 285–6; socio-political impact of immigration 286; sovereignty in 284–6, 291; theoretical perspectives 286–7
- immigrant incorporation 58, 168–9, 208–9, 291; Durkheimian view 287, 290; Malthusian view 286–7; Marxism 287; neo-mercantilist view 286–7; political 284–6
- immigrant integration 168, 347, 348, 352; contemporary empirical studies of 168; political 170; state policies and domestic politics 171
- immigrant settlement 10, 115, 179, 244; of Britain by French-speaking Normans 48; in Europe and the United States 24; Flores 154n8; frontier 51, 236; in society of immigration 204; urban social 52
- Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (S. Castles and G. Kosack) 270
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 135
- Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 269
- immigration control *see* migration control
- immigration/immigrants 47, 49–50, 53, 81, 243, 253; anthropology in 12–13; case studies of impacts of immigrant workers 139–41; cost-benefit analysis 6–7; Cuban 141–2; cultural and ideational concerns 274; definitions of 81–2; earnings of 6, 144–6; econometric studies 141–4; economic beneficiaries of 137–8, 152; employment priorities 156n26; entrepreneurship 148–9; as equilibrium and rejuvenation factor 87–8; experience in settler/colonial societies 7–8; immigration in European context 206; impact on state–society relationship 289; innovation 149–50; Mexican 92, 139; Moroccan 81; optimistic, liberal view of 290; patterns and responses in US 131–3; placemaking 239; policy debates 133–4, 273; politics of incorporation in 284; remittances 176; role of social capital, networks, and social relationships of 5; share of science prizes 149, 152; socio-political impact of 286; structural demand for 164; studies of periodization 56–9; taxes for 146–8
- Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 135–6, 270
- immobility research 255
- IMMPROF 328–9n6
- imperfect demographic adjustment methods 84
- inclusion 208–10
- India: emigration rates in 1; inhabitants in 111
- indirect demographic estimation techniques 84

- individualism, methodological 20  
 “individual scale” concept 19, 240–1  
 industrial reserve army 270  
*In Honor of Fadime* (Wikan) 212  
 innovation, immigrant 149–50  
 Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) 60  
 integration of immigrants 59, 278, 353  
 The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) 172  
 Intel 140  
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights 327  
 interdisciplinarity 25, 27, 30n4, 45, 53, 61, 341  
 internal migration 30n3, 115, 162  
 International Court of Justice 327  
 international division of labor 200  
 International Institute for Applied Systems (IIASA) 115  
 internationalization 28, 200  
*International Journal of Population Geography* 233  
 International Labor Organization (ILO) 51, 88  
 International Migrant Stock database 81–2, 114  
 international migration 1, 28, 30n3, 150, 160, 232; drivers of 163–8; law and 17; long-distance 162; political science of 270–6; politics of 16; research agenda for scholars of 27; theories of 162–3, 181  
 International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe (IMISCOE) 61, 348  
*International Migration Review* 46, 234  
 International Monetary Fund 114  
 International Organization for Migration 180  
 International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) 97  
 Ireland, self-reported race or ethnicity in 98–9  
 Iron Rule 107  
 Iwata, M. 167
- Jacobson, D. 299  
 Japan, immigration policy in 2, 167, 274, 280  
 Jim Crow system 288  
 Jiménez, T. 174  
 Jobs, S. 138, 155n23
- Joppke, C. 18, 166  
*Journal of American Ethnic History* 67n9  
*Journal of Economic Geography* 234  
*Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 234  
*Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* 234  
*Journal of Latin American Geography* 233, 249  
*Journal of Migration History* 67n9  
*Journal of Tropical Geography* 234  
 JSTOR digital collection 53  
*jus sanguinis* 170, 312, 331n46  
*jus soli* 170, 309, 317; citizenship 331n45; principle 312, 331n46  
 “just-add-women-and stir” approach 205
- kallan* (a self-interested maximizer) 197  
 Kallen, H. 52  
 Kaltwasser, C. R. 167  
 Kantachote, K. 241  
 Kaplan, D. 240  
 Kennedy, E. 132  
 Kennedy, J. F. 124n4  
 Keohane, R. 284  
 Keyfitz, N. 86, 121  
 Kibria, N. 30n8  
 Kim, J. 167  
 King, R. 51, 235, 341  
 kinship and migration 203–5  
 Kiribati 257  
 Kosack, G. 270  
 Kwan, M. P. 233  
 Kymlicka, Will 288, 326, 343
- labor force surveys 96  
 labor immigration 109  
 labor market 346; case studies 139–41; econometric studies 141–4; economic mobility studies 144–5; effects 139; macroeconomic effects 135–8, 136; productivity growth 148; segmentation theory 97  
 labor migration 150, 164  
 Labor Migration Project at Bremen University 59  
 labor mobility 51  
 labor theory 286–7  
*The Lancet* 92  
*Landsmann* networks 322  
 Lara-García, F. 175  
*Late Transitional Society* 236  
 Latin American Association of Population (ALAP) 123

- The Latino Threat* (Chavez) 209  
*lato sensu* 82  
 law 9, 306; birthplace privilege 308, 312;  
 citizenship 311–17; criminalisation  
 of migration 319; criminal law and  
 criminal enforcement role 318; and  
 crimmigration 309, 318–19; cross-  
 disciplinary exchange 53–6; data and  
 methodology 22; dependent variables  
 26; deportation 310–11; discontinuities  
 of space and nationality 311–12; and  
 diversity 323, 326; European Migration  
 Crisis (2015) 319–22; and human  
 rights 307; hypothesis 11; and illegality  
 308, 331n43; and immigration 310;  
 independent variables 26; and labor  
 migration 315–16; legal and political  
 backlash 317–19; and migration  
 306–9; migration crisis 322; and  
 multiculturalism 323, 325–7, 333n60;  
 and neoliberal welfare state 323–4;  
 research questions 11, 17–18; restrictive  
 refinements 321–2; right to leave 307;  
 social rights 314; and sovereignty 306–  
 11; theoretical perspectives 11; units of  
 analysis 11, 19, 20; volumes and rates of  
 scholarly production 54  
*Law Harsh as Tigers* (Salyer) 16  
 “Law of Return” in Israel 308  
*Laws of Migration* (Ravenstein) 234–5,  
 251, 278  
 Lawson, V. 241  
 “lead culture” (*Leitkultur*) 318  
 Le Bras, H. 87  
 Lee, B. 245  
 Lentin, A. 348  
 Le Pen, J.-M. 121, 122  
 Le Pen, M. 120–1  
 Leridon, H. 120  
 Lesthaeghe, R. 121  
 Levitt, P. 343, 353  
 Levy, N. 56, 61  
 Li, W. 244  
 liberal democracy 166–7  
 liberalism, embedded 272  
 liberal nationalism 333n63  
 liberal paradox 273, 341  
 “liberal state” thesis 279, 281–2, 288  
 life-course analysis 95  
 life cycle 15, 19, 85, 88–9; interaction  
 92–4  
*Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and  
 Post-National Membership in Europe*  
 (Soysal) 333n64  
 local ripple effects 98  
 long-tunnel thesis 254  
 Los Angeles 139, 172, 244–5  
 Lotka, A. J. 86  
 Louis XIV 88, 124n2  
 Lucassen, J. 10, 60  
 Lucassen, L. 60, 61  
 Luethi, B. 61  
 Luthra, R. 175  
 Macedo, S. 333n63  
 Machiavelli, N. 352  
 macroeconomic effects 135–8, 136  
 macroeconomic perspective of migrants 6  
 Malthus, T. 50–1  
 Malthusian view 286–7  
 Manning, P. 63  
 maps 232, 234, 247; digital 240  
 Marielito controversy 142  
 marriage 235; migration relationship with  
 90–2  
 Marshallian trilogy 18  
 Marx, K. 160  
 Marxist-Foucauldian hybrid 345  
 Massey, D. 3, 4, 13, 14, 19, 21, 30n7,  
 31n9, 96–9, 155n25, 156n40, 176, 203,  
 343, 348  
 Mayblin, L. 348  
 McCarran-Walter Act (1952) 270  
 McKeown, A. 63  
 McNevin, A. 351  
 Mead, M. 194  
*Measuring Segregation: Challenges,  
 Innovations and Future Directions*  
 (Piekut, Pryce and van Gent) 233  
 Messina, A. 279  
 methodological individualism 20  
 methodological nationalism 13, 59, 96,  
 99–100, 167–8  
 MetLife 86  
 Mexican Census of Housing and  
 Population 96  
 Mexican emigrants/immigrants 139, 165  
 Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) 96  
 Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 5,  
 96–7, 99  
 Mexican paradox 92  
 Mexico-US border 133; ACS 95; CPS  
 95–6; EMIF-N 96; migration theories  
 97–8, 150–2, 161; MMP 96–7; wall  
 issue on 134–5  
 micro-data method 94–5, 102–3  
 Migrant Mortality Advantage (MMA)  
 92–3

- Migrant Protection Protocol 154n9
- Migration between Africa and Europe project (MAFE project) 99–100
- migration control 276; cost-benefit distributions 280; demand for immigration policy 279–80; and integration of immigrants 278; interest-based approach 280–1; in liberal democratic countries 278–9; “liberal state” thesis 279, 281–2; “modes of politics” approach 280; in North Korea 278; threat to international stability and security 277–8
- Migration in World History* (Manning) 63
- migration/migrants 1, 2, 15, 28, 47–8, 50, 53, 67n6, 199, 202–5, 213, 256, 321; anthropology in 12–13; assimilation effect in fertility 91; associations 316; balance 79; chain 132; complexity of 88–9; contemporary 64; demography 82–3; and development in US 150–1; differences in 130; distribution in world 117; economic aspects of 130; Euler’s views on 85–6; European regulation on statistics 81–2; external 115; forced 89; geographical foundations 234–9; in global countries 161; global logic of 116–17; within Global South 161; and health 92–4; history 56; identification of residents of territory 83; intercontinental surveys on 98–100; interdependence 272; interdisciplinary research on 25; internal 115; international 150; international student migrants 83–4; laws of 12, 51, 116; lower fertility of 91; in macroeconomic perspective 6; management 153; as marginal factor in formal demography 14; as marginal phenomenon in 84–7; methods of standardization 89–90; in microeconomic perspective 6; networks 203; politics of 28–9, 269; precarity 258; relationship with marriage and fertility 90–2; remittances 150; researchers and policymakers 153; risk 293; role in population dynamics 78; role of religion in 81; sick migrant paradigm 93; simple census declarations 80; social organization of 203–5; in social science studies 4–9; in sociology 14–15; subjectivities 195; terminology 59; theories of 97, 205–8; top-down “macro” approach on 3; US economic impacts of 136; vital statistics 80; workers from lower-wage countries 155n19; *see also* immigration/immigrants; unauthorized migration
- Migration Policy Group in Brussels 343
- migration state 152–3, 272, 342, 352; driving factors of politics 273–5; to risk migration 273
- migration studies 1, 3, 312, 341; anthropology in 10, 12; challenge in 28; challenge of periodization 59–65; contrasting sides of new “realism” 344–5; critical 342–3, 345–8; critical world systems approach 344; de-centering migration theory 349–50; demography role in 5; establishment of 342; features of 7–9; “mainstream” research 343; methods for 23; normal science of 343–4; within population studies 123; proliferation of policy “indexes” 343; spatial visualizations of 342; theory in 44; transnationalism 344; in United States 4; units of analysis in 18–21
- migration theory 3; assimilation model in 4–5; across disciplines 11; origin of 51; paradigms in 4; state of 4
- Milanovic, B. 152–3, 156n38
- Milewski, N. 92
- militant epistemology 348
- Miller, D. 327
- Miller, M. 270
- Miller, M. J. 64
- “missing men” analysis 201
- “mixed family” category 331n45
- mixed movements 306
- mobilities 233, 342
- Mobilities* journal 233–4
- mobility 342; justice 255–6; labor 51; migration studies and 50; studies 49, 53, 64; terminologies of 47–9; transition theory 12, 234, 236–8, 237, 251; types of 181; *see also* migration/migrants
- modernization theory 199–200, 205
- “modes of politics” approach 280
- Money, J. 280, 290
- Montello, D. R. 19
- Mountz, A. 253
- Moynihan, D. P. 289
- Mudde, C. 167
- multiculturalism 169, 174, 210–13, 323, 325–7, 333n60, 346, 352; comparative study of 170–1; in politics 284
- Mun, T. 50

- nation-states 156n37, 270–3, 275–6;  
 changes in type and function of 272;  
 continuity of 352–3; dilemmas of  
 migration governance 273; European  
 model of 272; modernity 351; role in  
 immigration 292; sovereign prerogative  
 of 346; threat to international stability  
 and security 277–8
- national identity in immigration 284–6,  
 288, 291
- National Institute for Demographic Studies  
 (INED) 95
- National Institute of Statistics and  
 Economic Studies (INSEE) 95
- nationalism: liberal 333n63;  
 methodological 13, 59, 99–100, 167–8;  
*see also* transnational(ism)
- National Museum of the History of  
 Immigration 124n2
- National Origins Quota Act (1924) 270
- National Origins Quota Law (1924) 17
- National Research Council study (NRC  
 study) 136, 137, 146–7, 155n16
- National School of Statistics (ENSAE) 121
- national time 46, 47; of periodization  
 56–9; shared periodization of 53, 56
- A Nation of Immigrant* (Kennedy) 124n4
- Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
 (UNHCR) 2
- Nations Unbound* (1994) 248
- native-born population 243
- natural decrease of population 79
- natural increase of population 79; in  
 European countries and United States  
 107–8, 108; in France 109–10; in  
 Germany 108–9; global vision of  
 111–13; per thousand inhabitants 112;  
 in Spain 109; in United States 110–11
- naturalization 82, 170, 177–8, 286, 312
- Navigating Ethnicity* (Kaplan) 240
- Nee, V. 169, 171
- Negri, A. 345
- Nemoto, K. 167
- neoclassical theory 97
- neoliberal(ism) 346; racial capitalism 351;  
 welfare state 323–4
- neo-mercantilist view 286–7
- Netherlands: immigrants population in  
 79, 80; immigration as political issue in  
 270; multiculturalism in 171; Turkish  
 and Moroccan migrants in 91–2
- Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic  
 Institute (NIDI) 99
- net migration of population 79, 87, 106;  
 black box of 106–7; in France 80, 107;  
 in Germany 108–9; global vision of  
 111–13; in Spain 109; in United States  
 80, 107–8, 108, 110–11, 112
- networks 165, 203–5; helping to sustain  
 international migration 282; hiring  
 139–40; information about exploitation  
 within 165–6; *Landsmann* 322;  
 migration 203; network-mediated  
 migration 203; social 165, 166
- New Zealand 7–8
- The Next Great Migration* (Shah) 253
- North American Free Trade Agreement  
 (NAFTA) 150, 151
- North American model 351–2
- NVivo software 195
- Obama, B. 133–4
- Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
 150
- Oishi, N. 163
- Olwig, K. F. 30n8
- Orbán, V. 167
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation  
 and Development (OECD) 14, 21, 82,  
 83, 94, 114
- Ortiz, F. 51, 52, 172
- “the Other” 325
- Oxford English Translator (OET) 47
- Page, H. 121
- Parcours survey 104
- Park, R. 4, 161, 168
- Parkin, J. 319
- Parreñas, R. 241
- Passel, J. 5, 146
- pavam* (innocent, good guy, generous to  
 point of self-destruction) 197
- Pavlovskaya, M. 233
- Pedraza-Bailey, S. 175
- Peri, G. 143, 144, 156n27
- periodization 44, 46; challenge of 59–65;  
 of interdisciplinary research 49–52;  
 of national time 53; terminologies of  
 mobility 47–9; as theory 46–7, 65
- Peters, M. 280, 283
- Pew Research Center 95
- Piekut, A. 233
- “pink card” (*roz karta*) 211
- Pisarevskaya, A. 61
- place 238–9
- pluribus* 323



*The Polish Peasant in Europe and*

*America* (Thomas and Znaniecki) 175  
 political demography 342, 350–3  
 political economy of migrant illegality 210  
 political science 7, 9, 13, 269; cross-disciplinary exchange 53–6; data and methodology 22, 25; dependent variables **26**; Durkheimian view 287, 290; ethical or normative dimension 276; future research 292–3; hypothesis **11**; identity politics 291; of immigration control 276–84; and immigration policy 269, 291–2; of inclusion and exclusion 271, 284–92; of incorporation 284; independent variables **26**; of international migration 270–6; and international relations 269–70; level/unit of analysis 283; Malthusian view 286–7; Marxism 287; migration crisis 276–7; multiculturalism in 284, 330n23; multi-dimensional game in 273, 294n2; and nation-states 270–3, 275–6; neo-mercantilist view 286–7; and popular sovereignty 324; positivist approach to study of migration 4; procedural or distributional dimension 276; research questions **11**, 13, 16–17; rights-based politics 282–4; role of state in 278; segmented assimilation 289; theoretical perspectives **11**, 286–7; threat to international stability and security 277–8; traditions in American liberalism 288; units of analysis **11**, 12, 20–1; volumes and rates of scholarly production 54  
 political sociology 166  
 population 78, 81; mobility 194; movements 88, 163, 200; nature of population change 14; projections into future 84–5; stability 86; stationary 86; studies 78  
*Population, Space, and Place see International Journal of Population Geography*  
 Population Association of America (PAA) 123  
 population dynamics: contribution of demography in 78; counting in 85; endogenous demographic analysis in 90; immigration as equilibrium and rejuvenation factor in 87–8; Lotka's mathematical approach to 86–7; migration role in 78  
 population growth 106; black box of net migration 106–11; expatriates or

emigrants 107; global logic of migration 116–17; Global Migration Matrix 113–15; internal and external migration 115  
 populism 331n44; reactive/reactionary 28, 292  
 Portes, A. 5–6, 13, 20, 24, 30n5, 97, 149, 171–2, 177, 281, 289, 343  
 post-colonial: imagination 257; securitization 257; theory 58  
 post-World War Refugee and Asylum treaties 329n11  
 Potsdam, Edict of 88  
 Potts, L. 59  
 precarity 256–8  
*Premodern Traditional Society* 236  
 Price, M. 19  
 primordialist approach 206  
 Prior, M. 285  
 proclivity of Slavic race 160  
*Progress in Human Geography* 233  
 Providence 87  
 Pryce, G. 233  
 public finances 6, 15, 131, 146–7  
*Push-Pull* survey 99–100  
 Putnam, R. 286  
 Pythia of Delphi 118  
  
 race/racism 195, 205–8, 245, 288, 290, 348, 349; and liberal democracy 166; suicide 160  
 racialization 206  
 “rainbow underclass” 171  
 Ramakrishnan, S. K. 27  
*Rassemblement National* 120  
 Ravenstein, E. G. 4, 50–2, 116, 234, 278  
 Rawls, J. 327, 333n63  
 reactive/reactionary populism 28, 298  
 recognition: of cultural difference 323; of minority and group rights 288  
 redistribution of resources 345  
*reductio ad absurdum* 332n49  
 refugee(s) 47, 49, 198–9, 320–1, 345; camps 255; crisis 113, 114; definitions 255; internationalism 306; in situations of ongoing violence 165; studies 164, 350; studies 58; warriors 177; *see also* immigration/immigrants  
 “Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit” 62  
 Refugee Convention 29  
 reinforcement of borders 234, 319  
 Reitz, J. G. 168

- religion: institutions and activities 207;  
     role in migration 81  
 Remain in Mexico program 154n9  
 remote border control 163  
 replacement: fertility 87; through greater  
     longevity 87; migration report 87–8,  
     119–22  
 Research Center 102  
 resident workers 155n14; fate of 139–40  
 return migration 197; sociology of 179–80  
 rights-based politics 17, 18, 282  
 rights of immigrants 273–4, 276, 282  
 right to have rights 329n10  
 right to historical continuity 118  
 risk migration 276, 293  
 risk-minimization 19  
 Ritzer, G. 64  
 roots migration 197  
 Rosecrance, R. 272  
 Ross, E. 160  
 Roumans, G. 121  
 Rumbaut, R. G. 5, 171–2, 289  
 Russell Sage Foundation 52  
 Rygiel, P. 61
- Salyer, L. 16  
 Samers, M. 233  
 sanctioned ignorance 346  
 sanctuary cities 135  
 Sandel, M. 153, 156n39  
 Sarkozy, N. 118  
 Sassen, S. 97  
 Saudi Arabia: international migrants in  
     132; restriction to guest workers 147  
 Sayad, A. 178  
 scale 239–40; cities/suburbs/sub-state  
     scales 241–2; in geography 19;  
     importance of 239–43; individual  
     240–1; matters 240; national scales  
     242–3; scalar sensitivity 242  
 Schain, M. 291  
 Scharma, N. 351  
 Schiller, N. G. 167, 196, 248  
 Schlesinger, A. 50  
 Scholten, P. 4, 61  
 Schoorl, J. 99  
 Schrover, M. 61  
 Schuck, P. 21, 288, 289, 331n45  
 scientific racism 28–9  
 Second Demographic Transition in  
     Germany 108–9  
 second-generation decline 7, 81, 171–3  
 securitization 255–6
- sedentarist bias 194  
*Seeking Asylum* (Mountz) 254  
 segmented assimilation 171–2; ethnic  
     identity 289; theory 7, 13; in United  
     States 173  
 segregation 240; index of 247  
 self-selection 91, 93  
 semi-peripheries 59–60  
 Serra, A. 50  
 Shah, S. 253  
 sick migrant paradigm 93  
 Sikh immigrants in Britain 206  
 silo effect 28  
 Silvey, R. 241, 247–8  
 Simmel, G. 160  
 Simon, J. 286  
*sine qua non* of sovereignty 271  
 Singer, A. 242  
 skepticism 235  
 Skop, E. 22, 233  
 Skotnes, A. 22, 31n8  
 Skrentny, J. D. 167  
 Smith, A. 50  
 Smith, R. 21, 24, 288, 289, 331n45  
 Snel, E. 177  
 Sniderman, P. 285  
 social capital 5, 13, 15, 165, 204;  
     mobilization of 98; theory 97–8  
 social cohesion 288  
 social histories: of American immigration  
     57; of individual ethnic and national  
     groups 45  
 social liberalism 326–7  
 social market economy  
     (*Sozialmarktpolitik*) 291  
 social networks 165, 166, 203–4, 215n5  
 social organization of migration 203–5  
 social rights 314  
*Social Science History* 67n9  
 social sciences 78; bridge building among  
     disciplines 25–9; cross-disciplinary  
     exchange among disciplines 53–6; data  
     and methodology research in 21–5;  
     disciplines 1; formal demography in 84;  
     framing question on disciplines 9–10;  
     levels and units of analysis in 18–21;  
     migration in 4–9; scholars 2; treatment  
     of periodization 46; volumes and rates  
     of scholarly production 54  
 social theory 233  
 “social wage” in Europe 18  
 society–environmental dynamics 234  
 sociological theory 12

- sociology 4, 6–9, 12, 130, 162, 181;  
 American assimilation theory 57–9;  
 of assimilation 168–75; comparative-  
 historical 181; cross-disciplinary  
 exchange 53–6; data and methodology  
 21–2, 24, 25; dependent variables  
**26**; dissimilation 178–9; drivers  
 of international migration 163–8;  
 hypothesis **11**; immigrant integration  
 168–75; immigration in US 160–1,  
 174–5; immobility of migrants 162–3;  
 independent variables **26**; interpretivist  
 approach to study of migration 4;  
 methodological tool 180–1; in migration  
 studies 7, 9; mobilities paradigm in  
 British 162; political 166; research  
 questions **11**, 12–3; return migration  
 179–80; theoretical perspectives 5, **11**;  
 of transnationalism 175–8; units of  
 analysis **11**, 18–21; volumes and rates of  
 scholarly production 54  
 socio-spatial theories 239–43  
 South Africa, experience of immigration  
 in 7–8  
 South–South migrations 61, 93  
 sovereignty: in immigration 284–6, 291;  
 law and 306–11; popular 324; territorial  
 272; Weberian definition of 271  
 Soysal, Y. 170, 288–9, 333n64  
*Space and Place: The Perspective of  
 Experience* (Tuan) 239  
 Spain: natural increase in population 109;  
 net migration of population 109  
 spatial assimilation 239, 243–4  
 spatial statistics 247  
 Spickard, P. 57  
 Spivak's theories of subalternity 58  
 Stack, C. 30n8  
 standardization methods 89; classic 92;  
 traditional 90  
 standardized mortality rates (SMR) 93  
 State-Led Diaspora Strategies in Asia 234  
 State medical aid (AME) 103  
 stationary population 86  
 STEM (science, technology, engineering,  
 and mathematics) 308  
*stricto sensu* 81–2  
 Suárez-Orozco, M. M. 30n4  
 subjectification 209  
 sub-state scales 241–2  
 Suhay, E. 285  
 surveys: ACS 95, 102; CPS 95–6; Labor  
 Force Surveys 96; MxFLS 96; Parcours  
 survey 104; *Push-Pull* survey 99–100;  
 TeO survey 95; trans-regional surveys  
 100; World Gallup Survey 104–6  
 Süßmilch, J-P. 87  
 “swing states” 102  
 Switzerland 270  
 systematic deportation 160  
 Tamas, K. 30n4  
 Tannenbaum, R. 51  
 Taylor, P. 175–6  
 Telles, E. 172  
 temporal framing 234  
 temporality 44, 46  
 terminologies of mobility 47–9  
 theoretical perspectives 286–7; American  
 assimilation theory 57–9; client politics  
 model 280; contact theory 285; critical  
 race theory 58, 169, 206, 239, 342,  
 345, 347–8; cumulative causation  
 theory 97; Durkheimian view 287,  
 290; economic theories of migration  
 30n3; factor–price equalization theorem  
 150, 156n35; foundational theories  
 232, 234; game theory 9; globalization  
 theory 63–4; international migration  
 theories 162–3, 181; labor theory 286–7;  
 liberal perspective 287; Malthusian  
 view 286–7; market theory approach  
 203; Marxism 287; of migration 3, 44;  
 mobility transition theory 234, 236–8,  
 237, 251; neoclassical theory 97; neo-  
 mercantilist view 286–7; periodization  
 as 46–7, 65; postcolonial theory  
 58; refugee studies 58; segmented  
 assimilation theory 7, 13; social capital  
 theory 97–8; social sciences disciplines  
**11**; social theory 233; sociological  
 theory 12; socio-spatial theories 239–43;  
 southern theory 349; theory building  
 18; transcultural societal studies 52;  
 transnational migration theories 248;  
 world systems theory 8, 13, 18–19, 97  
*Théorie analytique des associations  
 biologiques* 86  
 third demographic transition 122  
 Thomas, W. I. 160–1, 175  
 Tichenor, D. 289  
*Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale  
 Geografie* 233  
 Tilly, C. 311  
 Todaro, M. 97  
 Tolbert, C. J. 291

- top-down “macro” approach 3  
 Torpey, J. 328n3  
 Toulemon, L. 91, 92  
*Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* (Goldberg) 60  
*Trajectoires et Origines* (TeO) survey 95  
 Tran, V. C. 175  
 transitional social gravity model 250–1  
 transnational(ism) 7, 60, 182, 201–3, 248, 342, 344; in anthropology 176; arrangements 208; citizenship 314; community 176, 346; dimensions 177; in geography 176; literature 176, 177; migration theories 248; networks 249; perspective 201; in refugee experiences 177; religious system 207; social fields 202; sociology of 175–7; spaces and lives 249; turn 248–51  
 tri-level model 30n6  
 Trump, D. 98, 134, 154n12, 167, 281, 290  
 Trumpism 331n44  
 Trump Wall 332n55  
 Tuan, Y-F. 239  
 Turkish identities in Berlin 206  
 Turner, B. 333n62  
 Turner, F. J. 51  
*Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America* (Singer, Hardwick and Brettell) 242  
 twice migrants 206  
 United Kingdom 80; multiculturalism in 171; natural increase of population in 113; net migration of population in 113; self-reported race or ethnicity in 98–9  
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 175, 320, 321  
 United Nations Population Division 81  
 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 175  
 United States (US): 9/11 attack in 274; 14th Amendment 287, 309; assimilation theory in 57–9; asylum seeker 320, 322; Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 17, 288; citizenship 288; Citizenship and Immigration Services agency 135; Civil Rights Act (1964) 49, 283; classical assimilation studies in 168, 169; Covid-19 impact 135; criminalization of immigration in 18; Cuban immigrants 141–2; deportation 330n22; econometric studies 141–4; economic mobility studies 144–5; emigration rates in 1–2; experiences of migratory women in 24; generosity 307; goals of migration policies 131; H-1B program 141, 145; Hart-Celler Act (1965) 2; immigrant entrepreneurship 148–9; immigrant heritage 131; immigrant innovation 149–50; Immigration and Naturalization Service 318; immigration in 7–8, 146–8, 283, 347; immigration law and policy 18, 133–4, 309; immigration patterns and responses in 131–3; immigration reform 56; Indian emigrants to 165; international students migrants in 83–4; IRCA 135–6, 270; labor market 139, 143–4; majority-minority reversal issue in 118; Marielito controversy 142; Mexican paradox in 92; migration and development in 150–1; migration studies in 4; myths about national identity in politics 284; National Origins Quota Law (1924) 17; natural increase in population 110–11; net migration of population 80, 110–11; residence permit policy in 98; sociological perspective of immigration in 160–1; sociology of migration in 163–4; taxes in 146–8; Trump administration in 134–5, 167, 281, 283, 319; unauthorized migration measurement in 101–2  
 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) 151  
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17, 307  
 UN Population Division 14, 94, 105, 114, 119  
 UN Refugee Convention of 1951 328n1  
 upward assimilation 172–4  
 USCIS public charge regulation 155n13  
 US-Mexican corridor *see* Mexico-US border  
 Valentino, N. 285  
 Van der Linden, M. 60  
 van Gent, W. 233  
 Vaupel, J. W. 87  
 Védrine, H. 122  
*Verfassungspatriotismus* *see* constitutional patriotism  
 Vermeulen, H. 173  
 vital statistics 80; pre-war American 87; Sweden attempting migration in 88  
 voluntary pluralism 287

- wage: of Black workers 155n20;  
depression 155n16; economic mobility  
studies 144–5; indirect 315; for low-  
skilled workers 151
- Waldinger, R. 6, 60, 177, 311, 348
- Wallerstein, I. 59–60, 97
- Walton-Roberts, M. 252
- Walzer, M. 288, 327
- Ware, C. 51
- Wassink, J. T. 180
- Waters, M. C. 172, 343
- Wattelar, C. 121
- Weber, M. 160–2, 276
- Weil, F. 61, 328n3
- Weil, P. 328n6, 332n48
- Weiner, M. 277
- Western bias in migration studies 8–9
- Westphalian frame 4
- Westphalianism 306
- What is Migration History?* (Harzig and  
Hoerder) 50
- White Australia Policy 2
- Wiedemann, F. 51
- Wikan, U. 212
- William, F. 88
- Wilson, J. Q. 280
- Wilson, P. 136
- Wimmer, A. 167
- withering of migration 344
- Wittgenstein, L. 353
- Wong, T. K. 5, 9, 16, 28, 29, 283,  
342, 353
- World Bank 14, 21, 114
- World Gallup Survey on intentions to  
migrate 104–6
- world systems theory 8, 13, 18–19, 97
- Wright, M. 333n60
- Wright, R. 233
- xenophobia 57, 273, 285, 290–1
- Yans-McLaughlin, V. 31n8
- Yeoh, B. 249
- Zelinsky, W. 236, 245
- Znaniacki, F. 52, 160–1, 175
- Zolberg, A. R. 17, 20, 163, 278, 279, 283
- Zuckerberg, M. 155n23